Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Darshana International
Vol. 39 1999 No. 4

G K V Lib
Hardwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
079378

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Stock Verification-2021

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ISSN - 0011 - 6734

079378

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARDWAR

An

INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

153

MORADABAD (India)

Vol. XXXIX JANUARY 1999 NUMBER 1

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DEDICATION

This issue of the Darshana International is most respectfully dedicated to Professor Hajime Nakamura who was the professor of Indian and Buddhist Philosophy at the University of TOKYO for thirty years. He was the Founder Director of Eastern Institute. He was awarded the Order of merit by the Emperor. The honorary degree Vidya Vacaspati was awarded to him. He was the author of several books on philosophy, such as History of Early Vedanta philosophy; Early Buddhism (in Japanese); A Comarative History of ideas and History of the development of Japanese thought and many others. He was the member of the editorial Board of Journal Darshana International. He died on 10th October, 1999 at Tokyo.

May his Teachings and Guidance be useful for the humanity for ever.

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Editor

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARDWAR

Regd. No. 9568/61

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An International Quarterly
OF
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical
Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

Vol. XXXIX January 1999 Number 1

CONTENTS

	Editorial Pauronik View about Women	R.N. Vyas	III
1.	Sankara and Radhakrishnan Representing Classical and Modern Vedanta	Girish Baruah	1
2.	Atheism : with special Reference to Feuerbach, Marx Neitzsche and Comte	D. R. Bhandari	9
3.	The Religious Philosophy of Ambedkar Sreeramamurty S.		14
4.	A Critique of the Theory of Evolution Andrew Friday Uduigwomen		19
5.	A Philosophical Critique of the Principal Teaching of Islam in Suratul Ikhlas	Kamaldeen Balogun A.	31
6.	Sub-terranean Regions of George Eliot's Psyche Rupakshi Sharma		40
7.	Cultural Relativism	Hugo A. Meynell	51
8.	Possibilities For Unending life	Frank B. Dilley	62
9.	Parapsychology and Repeatability	S. Braude	80
10	Solitude in Literature and Philosophy Hywel D. Lewis		94

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

BOARD OF EDITORS

GENERAL EDITOR

J. P. ATREYA (India)

MEMBERS

G. Verbeke	[Belgium]	Dejan Pavalov	[Beograd]
Miguel Reale	[Brazil]	Tarab Tulku N. Losang	[Denmark]
Feng Yu	[China]	Mourad Wahba	[Egypt]
E. T. Rasmussen	[Denmark]	E. Moutsopoulos	[Greece]
Pierce-Maxime Schuhl	[France]	Hans Thomae	[Germany]
Triant Triantafyllou	[Greece]	I.C. Sharma	[India]
Prakash Atreya	[India]	A.J. Syrikin	[Israel]
R.N. Vyas	[India]	Hiroshi Motoyama	[Japan]
I.T. Imamichi	[Japan]	R.S. Hartman	[Mexico]
Hajime Nakamura	[Japan]	Nils Bjor Kvastad	[Norway]
J. Berting	[Netherland]	Jerze Pele	[Poland]
Ija Pawlowska	[Poland]	Ionaa Kucuradi	[Turkey]
Evandro Agazzi	[Swiss]	Panos D. Bardis	[U.S.A.]
R.B. Harris	[U.S.A.]	Christopher B. Hills	[U.S.A.]
Winfield E. Nagley	[U.S.A.]	John O. Nelson	[U.S.A.]
Paul A. Schilpp	[U.S.A.]	Robert C. Whittemore	[U.S.A.]
Marietta Stepaniant	[U.S.S.R.]	E.N. Anikeva	[U.S.S.R.]

Managing Editor

ANURAG ATREYA

Assistant Managing Editor

VIVEK ATREYA

ASSITANT EDITORS

Vandana Arati Neeti Vasudha

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LIBRARY 16/2/26
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARDWAR

ISSN. 0011-6734

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An International Quarterly
OF
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical
Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

Vol. XXXIX April 1999 Number 2

CONTENTS

Editorial : Jain Epistemology and Parapsychology. *J.P. Atreya.*

1. Protagoras — *Anna C. Avey-Albert E. Avey* — 1
2. Culture and Psychoanalysis — *Albert Shalom* — 7
3. On Strawson's Non-Rational Foundation of Moral Reality — *Archana Barua* — 18
4. An Existentialist Account of Interpersonal Relations — *Santosh Kumar Pal* — 24
5. Matter Like Christ Crucified — *M.P. Gaurola* — 28
6. Freedom from 'Freedom' it self (J.Krishnamurti's views on Freedom) — Subrata Roy — 30
7. Man and his Concepts of Nature — *Ranjan Ghosh* — 37
8. The Nature and Function of Speculative Thinking — *Girish Chand Baruah* — 43
9. Religion as a Cohensive Force — *Gauri Prasad Chattopadhyay* — 48
10. Descriptive Metaphysics and Revisionary Metaphysics- An Inter-Relationship — *Jashobanta Roy* — 51
11. C.G.Jung's Concept of Religion — *Madhuri Verma* — 54
12. A Comperative Study of the Element of Intutive Spiritual Experience in 'The Idea of the Holy' and 'The Geeta' — *D.R. Bhandari* — 58
13. Technology and Culture — Torben Peter Kemp — 63

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Our Contributors to this Number

1. **Atreya, J.P.**
   Retd. Head, Department of Philosophy,
   Editor Darshana International, Moradabad.

2. **Avey, Assa C.**
   Professor of Philosophy, U.S.A.
   Avey, Albert E.
   Professor of Philosophy, U.S.A.

3. **Barua Archana**
   Head of the Department of Philosophy, St. Anthony's College,
   Shillong - 793001

4. **Baruah, Girish Chand**
   Head of the Department of Philosophy, D.K.D. College,
   P.O. Dergaon - 785614, Assam.

5. **Bhandari, D.R.**
   Chairman, Department of Philosophy J.N.V. University,
   Jodhpur (Rajasthan) - India.

6. **Chattopadhyay, Gauri Prasad.**
   Reader and Head, Department of Philosophy, Jiaganj Sripat Sing College, Jiaganj, Murshidabad, West Bengal.

7. **Gaurola, M.P.**
   Advocate, Tehri Garhwal, Garhwal.

8. **Ghosh, Ranjan**
   Assistant Lecturer, Visva Bharati University, Shantiniketan.

9. **Kemp Torban Peter**
   University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.

10. **Pal, Santosh Kumar.**
    Department of Philosophy, Vidya Sagar University, Midnapur, West Bengal

11. **Roy Jashobanta**
    Senior Lecturer, Radhamadhab College, Silchar - 788006, Cachar, Assam.

12. **Roy Subrata**
    Meghnath Shah Sarani, P.O. Pradhan Nagar (Siliguri)
    Dt. Darjeeling - 734403

13. **Shalon Albert**
    Mc Master University, Hemilton, Ont. Canada.

14. **Verma, Madhuri.**
    Reader, Department of Philosophy, Patna Women's College, Patna, Bihar.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regd. No. 9568/61

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An International Quarterly
OF
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical
Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

Vol. XXXIX July 1999 Number 3

CONTENTS

Editorial: Philosophy and social Welfare *J.P. Atreya.* i

I. Ganesha:Harmonizer of the Mundane and the Spritual *R.N.Vyas* 1

2. A Critique of Rorty on Epistemology *Yunusa Kehinde Salami* 4

3. An Inquiry into second Copernican Revolution in Husserl's Phenomenology *Sanjay Kumar Shukla* 14

4. Faith and science: Possibility for a New Dialogue *Jan Van Der Veken* 28

5. The Concept of Swadeshi- A Gandhian Perspective *S. Radha* 41

6. Gorgias *Mrs. Albert E. Avey* 46

7. Launching the Seminars for the Endowment: Images from the Nigerian Press, 1985-1997 *Afolabi, Anthony Bamidele* 57

8. The Concept of the Poet in the Psalms *Ranjan Ghosh*

Ranjan Ghosh 68

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

BOARD OF EDITORS

GENERAL EDITOR

J. P. ATREYA (India)

MEMBERS

G. Verbeke	[Belgium]	Dejan Pavalov	[Beograd]
Miguel Reale	[Brazil]	Tarab Tulku N. Losang	[Denmark]
Feng Yu	[China]	Mourad Wahba	[Egypt]
E. T. Rasmussen	[Denmark]	E. Moutsopoulos	[Greece]
Pierce-Maxime Schuhl	[France]	Hans Thomae	[Germany]
Triant Triantafyllou	[Greece]	I.C. Sharma	[India]
Prakash Atreya	[India]	A.J. Syrikin	[Israel]
R.N. Vyas	[India]	Hiroshi Motoyama	[Japan]
I.T. Imamichi	[Japan]	R.S. Hartman	[Mexico]
Hajime Nakamura	[Japan]	Nils Bjor Kvastad	[Norway]
J. Berting	[Netherland]	Jerze Pele	[Poland]
Ija Pawlowska	[Poland]	Ionaa Kucuradi	[Turkey]
Evandro Agazzi	[Swiss]	Panos D. Bardis	[U.S.A.]
R.B. Harris	[U.S.A.]	Christopher B. Hills	[U.S.A.]
Winfield E. Nagley	[U.S.A.]	John O. Nelson	[U.S.A.]
Paul A. Schilpp	[U.S.A.]	Robert C. Whittemore	[U.S.A.]
Marietta Stepaniant	[U.S.S.R.]	E.N. Anikeva	[U.S.S.R.]

Managing Editor

ANURAG ATREYA

Assistant Managing Editor

VIVEK ATREYA

ASSITANT EDITORS

Vandana Arati Neeti Vasudha

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ISSN. 0011-6734

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An International Quarterly
OF
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical
Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

Vol. XXXIX October 1999 Number 4

CONTENTS

Editorial: Value and Changing Society
Girish Baruah IV

1. George Herbert and the Nature of a True Religious Document
Ranjan Ghosh 1

2. Moksha and its Limitation
Paul Richardson 7

3. Can Genius be Psychoanalyzed
Mark Halpern 14

4. Shankara, Kant and Schopenhaur
Gopal Stavig 17

5. Concepts in Scientific Knowledge
V. Sujatha 36

6. Business and Professional Ethics
Sumitra Purkayastha 39

7. India's Contribution to Peace
Chayya Rai 46

8. Mental Health: A Conceptual Framework
Ashok Kumar Nanda 56

9. Some Problems Concerning Samanyalaksana Pratyaksha
Bhupendra Chandra Das 62

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Our Contributors to this Number

1. **Baruah, Girish Chand**
   Head of the Department of Philosophy, D.K.D. College, P.O. Dergaon- 785614, Assam.

2. **Das, Bhupendra Chandra**
   Lecturer in Philosophy, Bongaon Dinabundhu Mahavidyalaya P.O. -Bongaon, Dist. North 24 Parganas, Pin- 743235, W.B.

3. **Ghosh, Ranjan**
   Assistant Lecturer, Visva Bharti University, Shantiniketan.

4. **Halpern, Mark**

5. **Nanda, Ashok Kumar**
   Deptt. of Education, P.N. College, Khurda.

6. **Purkayastha, Sumitra**
   Lecturer, J.B. College, Jorhat, Assam.

7. **Rai, Chayya**
   Ex. Dean, Faculty of Arts. Head, Dept. of P.G. Studies & Research in Philosophy, Rani Durgavati Vishwavidhalya, Jabalpur(M.P.) INDIA.

8. **Richardson, Paul**
   c/o IMI. Kulu, Himachal Pradesh

9. **Stavig, Gopal**
   2000 N. Ivar Ave. Apt. 6, Hollywood, CA 90068, USA

10. **Sujata, V.**
    Sr. Gr. Lecturer in Philosophy, University College, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

EDITORIAL

Pauranik View about Women

R.N. Vyas

Although the Puranas are considered to be very important in Hindu religion, the latter being understood in the light of the Shruti Smriti and the Puranas (shruti-smriti-puranokta), they are not properly understood. The reasons for this mis-understanding about puranas are firstly, the reciters or preachers of the Puranas themselves look proper understanding of these spiritual works; secondly, they are composed in the form of stories, because a religious work can be understood by common man only through the form of stories; that is why almost all religions have their own stories, the stories themselves being merely symbolic in nature, and thirdly even the listeners are sometimes not able to rise to the spiritual height which is needed to understand them properly, and project their gross mentality and fourthly, the persons belonging to other religions at times deliberately put wrong interpretations with a view to insult the very nature of Hinduism.

Thus Krishna's Rasa-lila is given a sexual interpretation and Chira-harana is similarly given a gross interpretation.

It should be clear before every person who intends to understand Puranas properly that Hinduism accepts four supreme ends of human life viz Dharma, Artha, Kama and Moksha. Artha and Kama represent temporal life and they are sandwiched between Dharma and Moksha which represent spiritual life. It implies that in Hinduism spiritual element is dominant, although temporal life too is given due importance.

Actuality in society, we should be prepared for deterioration in every walk of social life. This deterioration shall ultimately lead to the utter destruction of health of society. This fact should be realised very explicitly.

One further fact should be noted. Works of Indian, religion and philosophy are integrative in nature i.e. one shall find in them psychology, philosophy, religion, ethics, literature etc. intermixed. In the West even philosophy and religion are kept separate. Ethics is different from Religion. Psychology has its own domain. All objects are treated separately and distinctly.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The Puranas too contain religion, philosophy, ethics etc. side by side. An intelligent reader is he who can understand the statements in the proper perspective.

For example, the Skanda Purana contains the statement that the lips of a women contain abrosis, but her heart is filled with poison

पीयूषामन्धरेवायं हृद्धि हलाहलं विषम्।

Why such a statement has come from the pen of a spiritual minded person.

I am of the opinion that such statements are meant for weaning a person from the snare of sexual attraction. The charm of a lady is too strong even for a sanyasi, a recluse. This is just a study of human psychology. It is clear from the statement that all persons are suspectible to sexual charm.

दुस्तरो मदनस्मस्मात् सर्वेषां प्राणिनामपि।

This statement is seconded by the famous psychologist of our time, Freud.

That is why the Bhavishya Purana declares that even a learned man cannot resist this natural tendency.

बलवानिन्द्रियग्रामो विद्वांसमपि कर्मनि।

Woman is like a pot of ghee and a man is like a burning piece of coal. Why should they not be kept separate, if we intend to spare their energy for the attainment of spiritual objective ?

घृतकुंभ समा नारी नप्ताङ्गर समः पुमान्।

Such statements are neither against a woman, nor against a man. They merely reveal the psychological study of the seakers of spiritual realisation.

Just as the state is needed to regulate society, in the same way Dharma is needed to regulate conduct of both individual and society . The very meaning of the term Dharma is the sustaining principle of life and society. The state merely enacts laws, but to rule the very conduct of a person in every circumstance is not possible even for the mightiest state. This can be done only through Dharma. Only Dharma can regulate the tendencies of a person and impel him to resist the destructive impulses and instincts to an extent. Character is very important for individual and social progress that is why the Puranas declare that character leads to heaven.

शीलेन सर्व पर : स्वर्गः।

Charater is made in the initial period by a family. Hence, the Puranas gave the advice that it is the Character of a girl which should be given preference over beauty or wealth.

Puranas attach supreme importance to woman and advise people to obey them.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

वरयेन् कुरूस्व प्राज्ञो विरूयामपि कन्यकाम्।

They say that the gods grace that home where the woman is given respect and affection.

यत्र नार्य प्रमुदिता भूषणाच्छदिनाशनैः।

रमन्ते तत्र देवता स्तत्र स्युः सफला क्रियाः।

The greatest tribute is paid to a woman by the Puranas when they declare that purity of a woman can never be violated.

स्त्रिय पवित्राः सततं नैना दुष्यान्न केनार्यम्।

Puranas have presented the examples of ladies like Rukmini, Kunti, Radha. Draupadi and many others just to prove that they command respect and due recognition in society.

We should not forget that the Indian thought basically accepts that there is only one Truth, Brahman or Atman. There is no distinction of high or low in the domain of Spirituality. This implies that everybody should be given equal importance.

Hence, it is not justified to think that the Puranas give inferior status to women. The fact is far from it i.e. the women are given very respectful position in society.

According to the puranas a woman is endowed with twelve qualities Viz. beauty (rupa), character (shila), truthfulness (satya), purity (arjava) dutifulness (dharma), lusciousness (madhurya), purity of heart (shuddha bhava), affection for parents (pitra-anuraga), readiness for service (seva-bhava), tolerance (Sahana Shilata), sexual urge (Yauvan rati) and devotion for her husband (Pati-prema).

I think that even now these qualities of a women are considered desirable and commend respect from everybody, specially the males. Sometimes a question is asked why have the Puranas asked a wife to be devoted to her husband ? Why has pativrata dharma been given supreme value ?

The answer to this question is that just as the women has been advised to be faithful to her husband, man has also been asked to be faithful to his wife. The Markandeya Purana expressly states that it is the foremost duty of a husband to be faithful to his wife.

No husband has a right to abandon his wife, just as no wife has a right to abandon her husband. Family is the foremost institution that imparts education to children. And children need both the parents for a development of heart and mind, affection and manners.

In fact women has been given the foremost position in society when it is declared that the mother and the mother-land are superior to heaven even.

जननी जन्म भूमिश्च स्वर्गादपि गरीयसी।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

An unmarried woman (kanya) is considered an aspect of the Goddess. Even in the manusimriti woman has been accorded so much respect that a rebel thinker like Nietzsche has exclaimed :

"I know of no book in which so many delicate and kindly things are said of the woman as in the law book of Manu; these old grey heads and saints have a manner of being gallant to woman which perhaps cannot be surpassed. I conclude this article with the following hymn of Goddess which speaks volumes about the respectable and significant status of woman according to the Puranas and Hinduism.

"I bow down to Her, I bow down to Her, I bow down to Her.

The supreme Goddess, who is present in the form of woman in human society.

या देवी सर्वभूतेषु जातिरूपेण संस्थिता :
नमस्तस्यै नमस्तस्यै, नमस्तस्यै, नमो नमः।

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I

SANKARA AND RADHAKRISHNAN REPRESENTING CLASSICAL AND MODERN VEDANTA

Girish Baruah

By classical Vedanta we mean that which adheres truly to the Upanisadic tradition. The Upanisads are known as Vedanta for they comprise the end of the Vedas. The Upanisads are rich in metaphysical speculation. They have left aside the empirical and secular side of the Vedas and developed certain tarns-empirical concepts beyond the reach of sensuous experience. Some Puranas also have developed the Vedantic thought and with a mythical tinge popularised it among common people. The two great epics-the Mahabharata and the Ramayana-are also rich in Vedantic speculations and base their theories mostly on them. Then comes the Brahmasutra by Badarayana who summarises the Upanisadic speculations and defends the Vedanta against materialistic and atheistic tendencies.[1] The Bhagavadgita is another Vedantic treatise which emphasises the theological aspect of the Vedanta.

The true development of the Vedanta takes place from the time of the commentaries of the Upanisads, the Brahmasutra and the Bhagavadgita, the three sources of the Vedanta technically known as Prasthanatraya.

The first interpreter of the Upanisadic Vedanta is Gaudapada who comments upon the Mandukya Upanisad. Gaudapada is said to be much influenced by the Buddhist thought and he even is sometimes regarded as a Buddhist. After Gaudapada comes the principal commentator like Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Nimbarka. Sankara has commented upon all the principal Upanisads, the Bramasutra and the Bhagavadgita. He has also written other independent works. Ramanuja has written voluminous commentaries on the Brahmasutra and the Bhagavadgita. Madhva has commented upon the Upanisads and the other two prasthanas. Nimbarka has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

written a brief commentary on the Brahmasutra and an independent work, viz. Dasasloki. Vallabha has not commented on anything but has written independent works.[2]

Sankara follows, after Gaudapada, the Advaitic line of the Vedanta; Ramanuja, the Visistadvaita line; Madhva, the Dvaita line; Nimbarka, the Dvaitadvaita line and vallabha, the line of Suddhadvaita. Sankara says that Brahman is the only reality and the world is unreal. Ramanuja following the theistic line regards Brahman as God and the world as the Visesana or part of Brahman. Madhva advocates unqualified dualism and distinguishes between God and the soul, God and matter (Prakrti), jiva (soul) and prakrti, one jiva and another, one part of prakrti and another part. According to Nimbarka the soul, the world and God are neither absolutely identical nor absolutely distinct. Although God is different from the former, He is omnipresent in them. Vallabha, although of the opinion that Brahman is the only reality, admits the subtle reality of the world, For him the world is subtly real.

All the above-mentioned philosophers have many disciples and they have sincerely carried forward the philosophies of their masters and thereby have amply contributed to the development of the classical Vedantic schools. Apart from these classical representatives of the Vadanta there arose some regional thinkers on the Vedantic line who have also carried forward the Vedantic massage and popularised it among common people. To mention some of them are Chaitanya of Bengal, Sankardeva and Madhavdeva of Assam, Nanak in Punjab etc..

In the recent years some outstanding religious men like Swami Vivekananda[3] and Aurobindo Ghose[4]..... interpreted the Vedanta in the context of the present day world although truly adhering to the classical spirit. They have been successful in popularising the Vedanta in the Western world. Western scholars like Deussen, Max Muller etc. Also have studied the Vedanta and have written many books on it. S. Radhakrishnan, K.C. Bhatacharyya, T.M.P. Mahadevan etc. are some of the academic philosophers who have contributed a lot to the development of the Vedantic thought specially in modern terms.

To limit our scope of study here we are going to deal with too philosophers only representing the two trends - classical and modern. These two philosophers are Sankara and Radhakrishnan. We have selected Sankara[5] as the representative of classical and modern. These two philosophers are Sankara and Radhakrishna. We have selected Sankara[6] as the representative of classical Vedanta and Radhakrishnan[7] as that of the modern one.

Sankara has developed the classical Vedanta by interpreting the three Prasthanas. In going to do so he has been much influenced by the philosophy of Gauapada . For the first time Gaudapada introduces into the Vedanta philosophy the principal of maya in a systematic way.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Though he is true to the Upanisadic spirit, he is much influenced by the Buddhistic concepts as we have already mentioned earlier and imports many such concepts to his interpretations. He is particularly influenced by the Sunyavada of the Madyamiks school of Buddhism as advocated by Nagarjuna and draws his theory of ultimate unreality of the world from it.

Each of the Vedanta philosophers either classical or modern claims that he is faithful to the Upanisadic tradition. But how far they are faithful to it is a matter of dispute. In the same way Sankara and Radhakrishnan also claim that they are faithful to the Upanisads. But as the Upanisadic thought can be interpreted in any way one likes, we are not sure which interpretation is nearer to the true Upanisadic tradition. We find many philosophical schools coming out of the same source. Even the heretical philosophers claim that the elements of their philosophies are there in the Upanisads.[8] Thus, even though we find it difficult to judge who is more faithful to the Upanisads, yet it is true that both Sankara and Radhakrishnan try sincerely to carry the message of the Upanisads as truly as possible.

Like Sankara Radhakrishnan also develops the Vedantic thought by interpreting the three prasthanas. Besides, he has written many independent books in which his Vedantic thought has been revealed. With a Vedantic outlook he explains the modern social, political and religious problems and tries to hint a solution of them. He seems to be more realistic than Sankara in discussing these problems.[10] The environmental situations of both these philosophers are similar, although both of them lived at different times. At the time of Sankara, the Buddhist thought dominated India from which he ventured to rescue her. In the same way Radhakrishnan also faces a world full of materialistic and heretical thoughts like that of Marxism etc. and tries to rescue it with the Vedantic message. He feels that humanity can be rescued from its present intolerable crises only by the message of the Vedanta with its universal appeal and intergrating outlook.

Radhakrishnan does not consider the Vedanta as a particular philosophy, but the most comprehensive one. Although in India there are different sects of philosophy they are all bound by the cord of the Vedanta. The nonsectarian outlook of the Vedanta has made it possible to unite all sorts of thought prevalent at different times and places into a homogeneous integrality. Thus the Vedanta contributes to the Hindu religion a universal character and, therefore, up till now the Hinduism survives although it has come across many crises throughout its life.

Radhakrishnan has a great reverence to the Indian tradition. C.E.M. Joad, therefore, depicts him to be an "heir to a great tradition".[11] He is often described as a modern seer. He infuses the dynamism of life to the unfortunate stagnancy of the Indian tradition due to her dependence

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on foreign rule for hundreds or years. He tries to rescue India from the polluted atmosphere of foreign customs with the message of the Vedanta.

But it is to be remembered that Radhakrishnan is not blind to the Indian or Vedantic tradition. Besides tradition he sticks to truth also. The tradition which does not tally with truth is not accepted by him and he is ready to reject it out right[12]. He says that it is wrong to think that what is said in the Hindu Sastras are all true beyond question. There are some bad and unwanted things also. He says that in accepting the tenets or the Hindu Sastras we should be impartial and catholic. We should accept the truth from whatever philosophy it may come.

Radhakrishnan's thought is influenced by some of the outstanding thinkers of ancient and medieval India. Yajnavalkya is one of them. Yajnavalkya is recognised as the most outstanding philosopher of the Upanisad. He admits of the ontological reality of the world, while Sankars recommends for it only empirical reality. Radhakrishnan also admit that the world is ontologically real; it is the concertisation of the infinite possibilities of Brahman. Like Yajnavalkya Radhakrihnan also says that if the world is not real, the realisation of the self will not be possible, for this is possible only in and through the world.[13] The world, as held by Sankara, is an apparent modification (vivarta) which is denied by both Yajnavalkya and Radhakrishnan. By vivarta they do not mean unreal modification, but one-sided dependence. Though the world is real it has to depend upon Brahman for its existence, while Brahman is not to depend on the world. The world is a part of Brahman and he is revealed in it. The world is there, for Brahman imposes a limitation upon himself. He does so through his self-limiting adjunct maya. Maya, according to Radhakrishnan, is not the projector of unreality, but a creative power due to which the world is there. When Sankara says of the sublation of the world at the dissolution of maya, Radhakrishnan speaks of its redemption where the world is not rejected, but simply raised and reinterpreted.

Both sankara and Radhakrishna read their own mind into the Vadanta philosophy. They enrich it with their own ingenuity. Both of them infuse new blood into it and broaden its outlook. Radhakrishnan who is well versed in the Western philosophical concepts, interprets it in modern terminology familiar to both the Eastern and Western worlds.[14] Further, he contributes an evolutionary dynamism to the Vedanta.

Radhakrishnan imported many ideas of Absolute Idealism to the Vadanta.[15] In his Vedanta, he combines Absolute Idealism with intuitionism and mysticism. The Absolute Idea which is the ultimate reality is not foreign to us; it is in and through us and is realisable within ourselves through mystic experience possible with the help of sravana, manana and nididyasana.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In general principle though Radhakrishnan is a Sankarite, he deviates from the latter in some specific problems.[16] Radhakrishnan ... lays more importance to the problems of human beings than Sankara and he is quite cautious and conscious of the present social, ethical and other problems. He humanises the Absolute of Sankara and posits it before us as real God, who is not simply a passive on looker of human affairs, but is the active participator in it. He infuses humanism into the Vadanta and thereby makes it appealing to man.

Radhakrishnan not only reorients the Vedanta philosophy but also recontracts it. Apart from his own thinking he is also influenced by the thoughts of Gandhi and Tagore[17] who have also Vedantic leanings, and by blending these thoughts with his own he reconstructs the Vedanta philosophy to suit the modern scientific mind.[18] He says that the Vedanta is not obsolete to the modern mind, rather its meaning increases in the world perspective. There is nothing in the modern world which cannot be explained by the Vedantic theories. It depends upon how we understand them. He, therefore, emphasises the understanding of the Vedanta in its modern import.[19]

Radhakrishnan believes in the spiritual evolution of man. He says that at first matter comes out of God and then this matter begins to evolve in the order of the biological, the mental and the spiritual. Of course the spiritual phenomenon is behind all other elements of the world reality. Man is a later evolute in its blending of material, biological, psychical and spiritual elements. Man is to perfect himself spiritually and when all man would be perfected the world would be redeemed. This interpretation is, however, absent in the classical Vedanta represented by Sankara and Radhakrishnan in this context throws new light on it.

Radhakrishnan lays high importance to religion. He says that religion is an integrating force and through it the spiritual development of man is possible. He opines that science and religion can go together. These two are not antagonistic to each other. Rather religion has the power to guide and restrain science and can direct it to the right path of ushering human welfare. He says that science would be conducive to man if it is rationalised on the guidelines formulated by religion.[20] According to him the vexed political and social problems can very well be solved through religion. But by religion he means a universal one with a Vedantic approach. To him any religion of the world has the potentiality of this approach and any religion can be a universal one. Moreover if the Vedantic spirit is adopted there would be no antagonism among different religions and then all of them would come together to effectuate the common ideal of spiritual perfection and world redemption.[21]

At present India is revived with a national spirit and the Vedantic upsurge is mostly responsible for it. For this Vedantic upsurge

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

responsible is the above mentioned doyens, who after untiring efforts have been able to popularise the Vedanta and have given it a new look to suit the modern circumstances.[22] In going to do so no doubt, the modern Vedantists have, to some extent, been compelled to deviate from the classical lines. But they are very much cautious not to go beyond the basis of the Vedanta and nurture it at any cost. They do not allow the ancient civilisation to be disintegrated and crumbled down even in the face of modernism. Moreover they are inclined not to show the differences between different schools of the Vedanta, but to reconcile them so as to accommodate new ideas coming up every day.

NOTES AND REFERENCES :

1. *From Badarayana Vedanta as a system begins. As we know, the sutra philosophy ushers in an age of system building.*
2. *The history of the Vedanta has been classified by kuppuswami Sastri into the following periods : (i) early Vedic period (ii) later Vedic period, mainly the age of the Upanisads, (iii) the pre-Sankara stage in the post-Vedic age including the spic and Puranic ages, (iv) the age of Sankara, (v) the early post-Sankara period down to the end of the eleventh century A.D., (vi) the later post-Sankara period, from Sri Harsa (twelfth century A.D.) down to Brahmananda Saraswati (sighteenth century A.D.) and (vii) the modern age.*
3. *Rabindra Nath Thakur sees in Aurobindo an ancient Indian seer speaking. (Srinivasa, K.R., Sri Aurobindo)*
4. *Vivekananda's enterprise and eloquence inspired Radhakrishnan to a great extent. He says so in his 'My Search for Truth' in the Radhakrishnan Reader Munshi, K.M. ed., P.4*
5. *But as a Vedabtin Radhakrishnan is more popular than K.C. Bhattacharya. For though Bhattacharya is an astute thinker, Yet his writings are so abstract that the common readers find them difficult to understand. Moreover he has a tendency to retire "to a life of lonely contemplation", while Radhakrishnan, according to D.M. Datta, "would rather be in the think of life, and philosophize these to change the course of events for the better....." (Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy, P.116*
6. *We have selected here Sankara as the representative of the classical Vedanta because he is, according Max Muller, "the famous teacher of the Vedanta" who excels all others in matters of exposition and original thinking (Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy, P.30) Sankara, he says in definite terms, "is indeed the principal representative of the Vedanta philosophy in the literary history of India". (Ibid.,P.62) According to Thibaut also "neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by samkara nor any of the non-Vedantic systems can be compared with so-called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation." (Vedanta sutras, Part I, P.xiv) He again says, "The Sankara-bhasya...is the authority most generally referred to in India as to the rich understanding of the Vedanta-sutras and ever since Sankara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school." (Ibid,P.xv)/Radhakrishnan also says that Sankara.s commentary of the Brahma Sutra is accepted generally. (The Brahma Sutra, P. 11)*
7. *A true philosopher is not satisfied with the ready made doctrines of the past. He wants to reinterpret it with a view to perfecting and completing what is lacking in the same. Radhakrishnan says, "There cannot be an authentic philosophical situation unless there is uneasiness about prevalent opinions." (Fragments of Confession. Radhakrishnan Reader, ed., Munshi, K.M., p.19)*
8. *"The malleability of experiences and the poetic beauty of texts like the Upanisads and the Gita have enabled competent men to build up heterogeneous systems, all claiming to be based on those texts." (Murty, K.S., The Indian Spirit, P.131)*
9. *According to Radhakrishnan the three prasthans (source-books) represent the three stages of human mind viz., faith, knowledge and discipline respectively. (The Hindu View of Life, p.18.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

10. *While interpreting the Vedanta Radhakrishnan takes into consideration the concepts of individual liberty, human rights, reason and moral conduct. He hints on a spiritualistic regarded as more realistic because he discusses the problems with a realistic bias discussions on Vedanta are man oriented. His philosophy is similar to that of objective idealism of Hegel. T.M.P. Mahadevan, therefore, remarks in his essay 'Contemporary Relevance to the Insights of Advaita' in the Contemporary Indian Philosophy. (Series 2) that modern Vedantists like Radhakrishnan "lean heavily on realism not more epistemological realism, but onto logical realism, not more epistemological realism, but onto logical realism. According to them, he further observes, "the world is a real emanation, and not an illusory manifestation." (ed. Chatterjee, M.,p.113)*

11. *Joad, C.E.M., Counter Attack from the East, p.37. Radhakrishnan like ancient Indian philosophers is not going away from the traditional line. Indian philosophers, in general, do not want to start anything de novo. They insist on discussing what is old. K.S. Murty says, "Even when new ideas are formulated Hindu philosophers read them into the ancient texts." (The Indian Spirit, p.127) The Indians, according to Murty, build their present on the past.*

12. *He says, "We must preserve the spirit of truth which will guide us into all truth. God does not say "I am tradition", but he says, 'I am Truth'. Truth is greater than its greatest teachers." Munshi, K.M. etc. seds., Radhakrishnan Reader : An Anthology, p.7.*

13. *"If the world of experience were illusory and unrelated to Brahman, love, wisdom, and asceticism could not prepare us for the higher life." (Radhakrishnan.s., Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.583)*

14. *"Attempts are being made today, both in India and abroad, to present Advaita in contemporary idioms." (Mahadevan, T.M.P., 'Contemporary Relevance to the Insights of Advaita' Contemporary Indian Philosophy, Series 2, Chatterjee, M., ed., p.117)*

15. *K.S. Murty also opines that the modern Vedanta is the result of importing ideas of Kant and Hegel; and this begins with the English education in India. (Current Trends in Indian Philosophy, Murty, K.S. and Ramakrishna Rao, U.eds)*

16. *He himself says, "while the general spirit of Samkara's philosophy is commended in my writings, on many essential points I have developed on independent lines." (Radhakhrishnan, S., 'Reply to critic', The philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Schilpp, P.A., P.820)*

17. *This fact he himself admits when, in his autobiographical essay in the Ibid he says. "My relations with my great Indian contemporaries, Tagore and Gandhi, were most friendly for nearly thirty years, and I realise the tremendous significance they had for me." (p.10)*

18. *The modern Vedantins cannot shut their eyes to the technological and scientific developments going round the world. So it is imperative on them to shape and adjust their theories by taking into consideration these developments. They now feel that at present man needs a philosophy of life which includes science, morality and religion within the same setup without having any antagonism between them. Moreover, the Western philosophical systems are posing some new problems before them and therefore, the interpretation is warranted on their part in the light of these changed situations.*

19. *Ram Mohan Roy also observes that if rightly interpreted the Upanisadic teachings "contain truth relevant to all ages". (Murty, K.S., 'Introduction' Current Trends in Indian Philosophy, Murty, K.S. & Ramakrishna Rao, U., eds, P. xxix)*

20. *It is generally thought that religious ideas are detrimental to science. But the Vedantists hold, if religion is understood in the Vedantic line then such apprehensions would not be there. Then religion would be quite favourable to scientific development. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that the scientific discoveries have been confirming the Vedantic tenets. "Paradoxically enough" opines S.L. Pandey in the Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.IV, No.1, Oct. 1976, "Samkara's doctrine of No Science per excellence."*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

21. *K.S. Murty also says that "Vedanta is the only religion and philosophy, which is in harmony with reason and science, and can be universal. It is not against any religion or philosophy, but all truth is included in it." (Murty, K.S. & Introduction', current trends in Indian Philosophy, Murty, K.S.Ramakrishna Rao, U. eds. P. XXXII*
22. *K.S. Murty, observes that in the early twentieth century "the new Hindu world-view" emerged and it "accepted Vedanta as the highest type of philosophy." (Loc cit.)*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. *Munshi, K.M. etc., eds., Radhakrishnan Reader : An Anthology, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1969*
2. *Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Allen & Unwin, London, 1962*
3. *Chatterjee, M. ed., Contemporary Indian Philosophy, series 2, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1974*
4. *Murty, K.S. & Rao, R.K., eds, Currents Trends in Indian Philosophy Asia Publishing House, 1972*
5. *Schilpp, P.A. ed., The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Tudor Publishing Co., New York, 1952*
6. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly, vol., IV, No.1.,Oct. 1976*
7. *Srinivasa, K.R., Sri Aurobindo*
8. *Datta, D.M., Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy, Univ. of Calcutta, 1961*
9. *Muller Max., Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy, Varanasi, 1967*
10. *The Brahma sutra*
11. *Murty, K.S., The Indian Spirit, Andhra Univ., 1965*
12. *Radhakrishnan, S., The Hindu View of Life, Bombay, 1979*
13. *Joad, C.E.M., Counter Attack from the East, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1933.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

ATHEISM : WITH SPECIAL, REFERENCE TO FEUERBACH, MARX, NEITZSCHE AND COMTE

D.R. Bhandari

Atheism is seen as perhaps the most serious spiritual affliction of modern man. It is so rooted in the universe that it is difficult to introduce the free creature to a direct encounter of knowledge and love with his creator. The creature is inevitably drawn, towards the visible beautiful universe of matter and man. It is not a more problem but rather a mystery as called by Gabriel Marcel. Problem can be solved but mystery has no perfect answer.

Atheism arises from a mentality and attitude which involves "a flight from the invisible toward the visible, from the transcendent toward the immanent, from the spiritual toward the material."[1] Atheism begins when intellectual doubts arise about the existence of God. The first shoots of atheism arise from the infidelity of man towards God which makes him abandon God. He always blames saying how can an all-good God can send death, sin, evil, pain, slavery ? So he calls him as cruel and despotic and thus such God is an illusion. He denies God in a rational manner and makes atheism a practical way of life.

Thus atheism is the mystery of great refusal. An atheist deliberately attempts to break his vital, intimate bonds of communion with God. He demands that God should be proved like the correct answer to a problem. This paper aims at providing a brief account of atheism in the thoughts of Feuerbach, Marx, Neitzsche and Comte. These are the great intellectual atheists of our times who deliberately denied God, because they had created for themselves a new, attractive God of their own.

Feuerbach : Humanity Becomes God

Feuerbach was a student of protestant theology and an enthusiastic disciple of Hegel. He was especially impressed with Hegel's doctrine of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the religious alienation of man in the master-slave relationship in the Christian God. He said man need not be rescued from the christian God, rather he needed to be rescued from his own illusion about God. He testified that "because of its indecisive half-heartedness and lack of character ..... Christianity still haunts the minds of men at least as a ghost."[2] So he made it a sacred mission to erase this stain from the minds of people. He wanted to restore man to the greatness of his own essence and thereby to inspire men to have faith in their own humanity.

For Feuerbach, man is projecting and objectifying his own goodness and greatness in the fantastic being which he calls God. So God is the product of pure human imagination. He said, "Religion is the dream of human mind."[3] The turning point of history will be, "the moment when man becomes aware that the only God of man is man himself."[4] In this case he identified God with humanity. He reduces the Christian religion to the religion to the religion of humanity. Thereafter he says, "Man is the beginning, the middle and the end of religion."[5] Feuerbach does not deny the divine attributes of love, wisdom and justice, but only the illusory God of Christianity.

Further he gives an anti-theological interpretation of religion that "religion believes in and worships not God but human nature conceived as in itself the divine or supreme perfection."[6] According to him, "religion is disuniting of man from himself; ..... God is not what man is - man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being - both are extreemes...."[7]

Thus God is an essentially different being. His nature is different from man. So man cannot find consolation and peace in God. Man is the God of man. Feuerbach concludes saying that "the aim of his teaching is to change friends of God into friends of man, believers into thinkers, worshippers into workers...."[8] In this way, for him humanism is God. God is discovered solely on earth and in man.

MARX: CLASSLESS SOCIETY BECOMES GOD

Marx has been sometimes called as a natural born atheist. His family lived as very liberal Protestants, without any profound religious beliefs. So he grew up in a climate of freedom from religion. Later during his studies he was influenced by Hegel and Feuerbach. Marx accepted Feuerbach's proposition that "God to be the 'ficticious' creation of man's sick conscience."[9] Man becomes the creator of his world, his history and himself. He is the only reality, the only meaning of the universe, of evolution and of history. He is his own saviour. Thus liberated from the divine shackle, he is free to create himself fully in solidarity with his fellow men. Thereafter "supreme reality is man and not God."[10] This is practical humanism of Marx which is pure atheism.

He was against religion, particularly against Christianity. Religion enslaves man. It makes him dependent. Religion is merely the illusory

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sun about which man revolves so long as he does not revolve about himself."[11] A man who lives by the favour of another, considers himself a dependent being. So according to Marx, "man makes religion, religion does not make man."[12] In other words, religion is the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man who either has not yet found himself or has lost himself again. Religion is the opium of the people. So abolition of religion is necessary for the real happiness of people. This will also give meaning to the human history, because it restores him to his greatness and to himself. "Man is his own goal and God."[13] This glorification of man is the goal of Marx's atheistic humanism.

Thus Marx brought about a religious revolution in the society, to restore the divinity of man. He rejected religion, because, according to him, it is the cause of classes in the society. He believes that by treating everyone equally, the classes in the society will disappear. This is the religion of the classless society.

NEITZSCHE : GOD BECOMES SUPERMAN

Neitzsche was a deeply religious man at his early age. But gradually doubts crept in his mind regarding truth. This made him abandon the Christian God. He made a violent attack upon the Christian God. He cried "God is dead" that belief in the Christian god has become unworthy of belief. Christian god with his commands and prohibitions, is hostile to life. His main objections are against the Christian system of morals and values. Personally he rejected all religions. He considered super naturalism as opposed to reason, seeks the other world by rejecting this world. So rejection of God and complete renunciation of religion is a necessary first step in man's self conquest. Thus he is completely free and can achieve lot of things. Otherwise man will be cowardice, and a miserable beggar, unable to rise or advance.

Neitzsche brings in, his new concept of superman, the new God who dwells on earth, creating a heaven over here. For him, God is really man. His glad tidings to his new men, "Remain faithful to the earth, my brothers, with the power of your virtue. Let your gift-giving love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth ..... that it may give the earth a meaning, a human meaning."[14] But unlike Feuerbach, Neitzsche despised humanity and chose only the highest caste - the Fewest - for his process of glorification.

Further, for Nietzsche, there is no absolute truth. The very idea of truth is merely a God's shade. Since God is really dead, then reason, truth, morality have become more idols. Therefore, he said, "...I teach men : no longer to bury one's head in the sand of heavenly things, but to bear it freely, an earthly head, which creates a meaning for the earth."[15]

Thus for Neitzsche, Superman is the meaning of the earth. He says, "Let us make Superman to own [illegible] like Hades."[16]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

He will replace God, the Christian creator and guiding spirit of history, and will plan and manage history as a whole himself.

COMTE : SOCIAL HUMANITY AS GOD

Comte was brought up in an ardent catholic family in Paris. But at the age of fourteen he gave up his belief in God. He was disturbed and depressed at the disorder created by the French revolution. So he thought of bringing about an order, and reconstructing the society. He saw that existing church institutions were morally and economically ineffective and they disoriented the thoughts and beliefs of men. He felt that Christianity was hostile to human race and human conditions. So he thought that a new faith had to replace the decadent belief of tired Christianity.

He realised that God, Metaphysics, transcendent destinies, traditional beliefs and feelings had failed man. So henceforth man's destiny will be in his own hands, not in God's. Then only man will be happy. Comte was much influenced by St. Simon, while studying under him in Paris. Simon's ideas were of replacing theological morality with positive industrial morality. So Comte derived his atheistic positivism from him. M. Henri Gouhier defines Comte's task as "to discover a man with no trace of God in him."[17]

In this way, Comte declared social humanity as God. He wanted all men to love the human race. Thus transforming the philosophy of positivism into religion of Humanity. This change of thought was mainly due to his meeting with Madame Clotilde do Vaux, who was very beautiful. He formed a passionate attachment to her and wanted to marry her. But her sudden death brought about a change in his thought. From her he gained the insight into the source of human happiness. He said, "One cannot always think but one can always love."[18]

Comte tried to eliminate God as "an illusion of man's arrested Youth."[19] His system provides complete and adequate emancipation from God. Man's belief now clings to Humanity, and no longer to God, who is an illusion. Man can thus satisfy completely his religious appetite by directing his thoughts, feelings and actions towards his own humanity. He said "man are to remain united in the only true religion, the religion of humanity."[20]

Thus Comte made man as absolute like God himself. Though he was determined to eliminate the God of Catholicism, yet planned to incorporate into his religion everything that was true and useful in Catholicism except its dogmas. In his religion, God of Catholicism is slowly being assimilated into god of Humanity. For man lives through humanity. Therefore, "the focus of all his speculations, affections and worship should be Human race."[21] It is the new supreme being.

Thus we analysed the different views of these four atheists. Early in their lives they were the followers of Christianity. But they felt that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Christianity was too timidly self-reserved and thus not very relevant to the people. They felt that it was a hindrance to the development of man. So they sought to liberate man by rejecting or denying the existence of God. Thus humanism becomes their religion. In this way, they claim to have brought man to the limit of his powers and capabilities. This rejection or denial of God's existence may be ambiguous. For these atheists denied God on the basis of then existing external forms of religion, thus failing to understand the true God. At the same time, we cannot completely neglect atheism. Because this problem of atheism has brought about many changes in the Church today. But in the long run atheism has violently divorced God from man, and man from the religious morals and values.

REFERENCE

1. *Vincent P. Miceli, the Gods of Atheism, New York : Arlington House 1971, P. 2.*
2. *Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Trans. George Eliot, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957, P. 15.*
3. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume III ed., Paul Edwards, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., & The Free Press, 1967, P.191.*
4. *Henry De Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, Trans. Edith M. Riley, Dondon : Sheed and ward Ltd., 1949, P.10*
5. *Miceli, The Gods of Atheism. P. 36.*
6. *Masterson, Atheism and Alienation, Dublin :Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1971, P.63*
7. *Ibid., P. 66*
8. *Miceli, The Gods of Atheism, P.32.*
9. *Ibid., P.96.*
10. *Masterson, Athsism and Alienation, P.79.*
11. *Ibid., P.83.*
12. *Miceli, The Gods of Atheism, P.102*
13. *Ibid., P.106*
14. *Ibid., P.60.*
15. *Ibid., P.72.*
16. *Ibid., P.73.*
17. *De Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, P.78.*
18. *Miceli, The Gods of Atheism, P.159.*
19. *Ibid., P. 155.*
20. *Ibid., P.169.*
21. *Ibid., P. 167.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF AMBEDKAR

Sreeramamurty, S.

This paper is an attempt to visualise the integrated and inseparable ideas of Babasaheb Bhimarao Ramji Ambedkar on religion and its social plan of action. He is considered as a religious philosopher who promoted and propagated the perfect programme of religion to regulate and reform human behaviour. His perspectives of religion is described as a social factor to formalise the human functions in favour of humanity. His appreciation towards the spirit of Buddhism is portrayed as a functional way to promote the functions of human beings for the cocherence of understanding and welfare of society with peace and tranquillity.

Direction and destination are necessary events to decide the destiny of human life and society as a whole. Really, human being is a social as well as reflective animal to formalise the plan of life. Every creature has its own way of thinking and approach. But they synonim at one point on the basis of their interest and willing. Religion is a plan of social life which is to be reflected by its members. Actually, religion is a way of proper behaviour flows in the blood and flesh of human beings. Almost all Philosophers, Sociologists and Reformers accepted the validity of religion. Among them, Bhimarao Ramji Ambedkar is one who profounded a lot of presuppositions in favour of religion. He conspicuously construeds religion as a concrete confinement in congregating citizens with conformed concepts for constant constancy, character and conduct to consecrate conscience. To him it is a plan of inspiration to think about high way of life.

Ambedkar admitted the need of religion in society to establish social relations in proper way, like Kant, John Dewey and Vivekananda. They opined religion as the necessary concept and as a reservoir of all the highest qualities like uniformity of thought, morality and co-operation. He feels that "Religion is an influencing force suffused through the life of each individual moulding his character, determining his actions and reactions, his likes and dislikes. It is a mandate of people in all the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

way. Some times it is to be considered as an autonomous discipline and played a considerable role in shapping individual and society on the lines of social way.

Ambedkar took a step forward to profess the relevance of religion. He certified that "Man cannot live by bread alone. He had mind which needs food for thought."[2] He identified the relevance of religion for the highest level of human behaviour. Ambedkar irradiated the intrinsic initiation and indeliable interaction of religion in order to inspire people. Nagrajarao felt the same as, "Religion enables man to get over the bondage and passion to exercise his true nature."[3] Religion reflects the nature and retreats people in all sort of life. Religion acts as social mandate to coinside the human activities and enable them to lead a uniformed way of life. In the same line of thought, Goh Cheng Leong and Gillian C. Morgan also certified that "Religion originally grow up as a response to the way of life of a group of people."[4] It infuses the incesive thought of group action. The collective coordination is the content of it. In the same way Sambamurty feels that Religion provides the venture of virtue to develop the social candidature as well as human nature. To him, the cultivation of human mind in proper way is the highest state of human being. It should be an alternative to humanism.

Ambedkar profounded religion in a systematic way on the basis of human need and his awareness. He stressed the need of religion for the implementation of moral principles with a view to preserve the humanistic outlook and philanthropic attitude in human nature. Toynbee also accepted the importance of religion who said that :Religion is one of the necessities of human life which mankind can never do without."[5] Ambadkar stressed the need of religion as a way of behaviour having the moral principles and service motivation. He believed in action but not mere words and having belief in God. "Religion" to him, "is the driving force of human activity."[6] He considered it as food for thought to give psychological strength and stamina. In the same way Swami Vivekananda professed the practical views in the name of religion and opposed these great personalities, the aversion and destruction in the name of religion.

Religion, according to Ambedkar, is the code of social conduct and social principles. His religious principles are based on morality and reality which are more important to improve the human hood and mannerism. According to him, "Religion must be judged by social standards based on social ethics."[7] To him, religion is an independent body when it is happened to be rational. He concluded that "The religious sanction is the highest sanction which an institution or a belief can have to support and sustain it is beyond question."[8] His view of religion is having the complex in nature for practical but opposed the perplexity in the name of religion. It gives a healthy social atmosphere and favourable social ecology.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ambedkar considered religion and its principles as essential to the life of people to perform the activities on moral basis. He wanted to have a religion which has the universal principles applicable to all times and all places as leading principles to determine one's own duty with moral outlook. He highlighted it as "Religion approaches the individual not as a degraded worthless out castes but as a fellow human being."[9] In addition to his opinion, he quoted the words of Ellwood, who explained the importance of religion as "without the support of religion, Law and Government are bound to remain a very inadequate means of social control."[10] Religion is a plan and programme for perfect personality of people.

Religion is a beacon to moral understanding to set right the social structure. His opinion has the basis of morality and a base of commitment which comes out of realisation. He clarified that "The necessity of religion is not only to bind people but to give them a moral code to guide their life."[11] It promotes social code of conduct to eliminate social tensions. Religions is an ultimate concern of human life to improve the quality of citizens to look into the progress of humanity in the light of humanism and understanding.[12] It is considered as an intellectual activity to safe guard the favourable fragrance of social interaction and enhance the favour of fraternity.

Religion, in the view of Ambedkar, improves the conditions to exhibit one's own nature in a favourable way and purposeful manner. He compared religion with the other sources like social status and prosperity. He condemned the dominance in the name of religion which exhibits his democratic approach. He quoted the words of Allwood, are worth to mention here, who said that,"Religion is primarily a valuing attitude, universalizing the will and emotions, rather than the ideas of men. It thus harmonizes men, on the emotions, rather than the ideas of man. It thus harmonizes men, on the basis of will and emotion, with his world."[13] Ambedkar opposed every aspect which is an obstacle to the progress of individual. It is to be noted that "Religion is a means of thought which given rise to the idea of social life in protecting the mutual requirement for social action."[14] It considers the relations as the social net work for proper and planned life.

Religion, according to Ambedkar, is the theoretical spirit of human action in society which have to protect the human nature in a fount unity of thought. It is purely responsible for social atmosphere and social co-existence. "Religion", as he exhorted that "must mainly be a matter of principles only."[15] The principles uphold the human nature and help them to promote human hood. They act as spirit of motivation. He further says that "A Religion of principles can lay claim to be a true religion."[16] It trains people for right understanding and motivates them for social unification.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Sen clarified the same as "Religions have helped greatly in the development of humanity."[17] Religion itself is a humanist force of action. It injects the spirit of committedness and social out look.

With broad level of human understanding, Ambedkar appreciated the social philosophy of Buddhism which is founded and propagated by Buddha who is said to be 'Marga-data' (one who showed the way).[18] Ambedkar accepted Buddha as the light of the world and His thought as a mission of practical ethics and high rate of social culture. Thomas and Thomas felt the same and said that "Buddha was not interested in the theology of his religion. He was interested only in its ethics."[19] He considered Buddhism as a true religion which makes an attempt to protect the high way of social life. With the spirit of Buddhism, he wanted to establish real social plan of action. He considered it as 'Viswadharma'[20] : world Dharma. He highlighted the role of Bhikkhus; the intellectual sect of Teachers of Buddhism, in Society. He felt that Bhikkhus played a creditable role in society than that of Hinduism. Buddha established Sanghas : the society of Bhikkhus, to educate and enlighten society in a systematic stature. Ambedkar differentiated the activity and attitude of 'Bhikkhus' and 'Sanyasins'.[21] He confined them (Bhikkhus) as the committed workers of society. The Bhukkhus are the safe guards of Dhamma; moral temperament for happy life.

The social philosophy of Buddhism according to Ambedkar, is the manifestation of peace and order in society. Masih feels that "It (Buddhism) Preaches the importance of self-culture and the motto of service."[22]

Buddhism Considers culture as necessary requirement to prevail nature of human being. Ambedkar considered Buddhism as a guide to human life. He further clarified that "Buddhism emphasises the need and importance of knowledge to up hold the human understanding."[23] He certified it as a source of solace and responsible reality for world peace and order. It gives individual importance to make use of one's own conscience.[24] It cultivates the habit of independent thinking. It provides the freedom of life and teaches the freedom among men and women.[25] Buddhism is the universal social Dhamma which enable people to feel and enjoy.

Buddhism tried for the peaceful co-existence and made an attempt to uphold the friendship and fraternity and love and liberty. Buddha considered men and women on equal basis both in character and intellect.[26] He is the saviour of social equality. Horner confined the fact and clarified that "During the Buddhist epoch there was a change. Women came to enjoy more equality, and greater respect and authority than ever hither to accorded to them."[27] Buddhism observes the high rat of social culture in human beings. Ambedkar interpreted Buddhism as Universal and treated it as indispensable for world peace.[28] He

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

considered it as a centre for practical ethics and planned ideology. It tries to universalize the social values.

According to Ambedkar, Buddhism teaches and preaches the highest principles like 'Prejna', "Karuna' and 'Samata'.[29] He considered them as the 'Three Ratnas' : Three Jewels to establish the noble society. He strongly remarked the misconceptions and objectives in Hindu religion. He also pointed out the activities of Hindu religious teachers. He portrayed the disparities in the name of religion. The realistic ideas and rationalistic orientation of Ambedkar was misinterpreted. For that, he has been identified as a challenge to Hinduism.[30] Ambedkar emphasised the need of reformation in Hinduism to get affection from all sections of people. Due to the static ideology, he considered it as hindrance to the progress of human being.[31] He highlighted Buddhism is a great humanist force of action to elivate the human understanding and social dignity. Morality and Ahinsa: non-violence, are its sole properties to turn the view of the world.[32] It promotes the universal outlook and the sense of vicinity in the mind of people.

The Religious Philosophy of Ambedkar is the united spirit of initiation to motivate individual for all real social fabric in order to prepare them sociable and associable. He considered it as a mandate for social behaviour. His religious philosophy projects the moral code of conduct, collective behaviour in a planned and possible perspective. It infuses real sense and a mode of confident for proper fulfilment of human action. Religion, according to him, is a social stabilizer to establish proper code of conduct and to maintain right relations in society. It plans the activity and attitude of human mind to promote the social ecology for better human life. His religious philosophy is a right, straight and correct plan of action to fulfil the 'Summum Bonum' of human life.

REFERENCES :

1. *Ambedkar, B.R., Mr. Gandhi and Emancipation of Untouchables, Tacker & Co., Bombay, 1943, P.55.*
2. *Danunjay keer, Dr. Ambedkar: life and mission, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1962. P.462*
3. *Nagarajarao, P., Contemporary Indian Philosophy, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1970,P.7.*
4. *Goh cheng Leong & Gillian C. Morgan, Human Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1995, P.27.*
5. *Kochhar, S.K., Pivotal Issues in Indian Education, Sterling Pub. Pvt. ltd., New Delhi, 1981, P. 323.*
6. *W.N. Kuber, Builders of modern india, B.R. Ambedkar, Government of India, New Delhi, 1987, P.80.*
7. *W.N. Kuber, Builders of modern India, B.R. Ambedkar, P.80.*
8. *Vasant Moon (Ed) Dr. Babasahed Ambedkar Writings and Speeches Vol.5, Government of Maharstra, Bombay, 1989, P.179.*
9. *Vasant Moon (Ed) Dr. Babasahed Ambedkar Writing and speaches, Vol.5, P. 418*
10. *References incomplete from 10 to 32*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION

Andrew Friday Uduigwomen

INTRODUCTION :

By far the most vicious controversy that has arisen between science and religion is with regard to the origin of man and of living things. The main bone of contention has been the theory of evolution as articulated by Charles Darwin in 1859. This claims a naturalistic account of man and living things and denies the necessity for divine origin and also seems to contradict the Biblical picture that man and the various kind of living things were created separately.

That profound differences exist between the theory of evolution and the Biblical account of creation is indubitable. Those who propose evolution argue that creation is not scientific. But in all fairness, it could also be asked. Is evolution itself truly scientific ? On the other hand, is Genesis creation story another ancient creation myth, as many contend ? Or is it in harmony with recent discoveries in science ?

An examination of such questions and related issues will be the main thrust of this write-up. I am aware of the fact that in considering questions related to the origin of life, popular emotions way many. To avoid this and to reach accurate and logical conclusions, we need to consider the evidence with an open mind. Even evolution best-known advocate, Charles Darwin expressed his awareness of the fact that evolution has its limitations. He even suggested that the subject of the origin of life was subject to further examination.

WHAT IS EVOLUTION ?

Etymologically, the word 'evolution' is derived from the Latin word 'volvere', which means to roll out. Evolution, therefore, is the phenomenon by which things roll out in time and space. There are various kinds of evolution. They include :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(1) Organic evolution (This involves plants and animals)

(2) Inorganic evolution (This involves the planets)

(3) Lingual evolution (This involves tracing origins of human population by the similarities in the language they speak.

(4) Cosmic evolution (This involves the stars and the solar systems in the universe).

Of these types of evolution, our focus in this paper will be on organic evolution. Organic evolution is the theory that the first living organism developed from non living matter. Then, as it is reproduced, it changed into different kinds of living things, producing ultimately the different kinds of life, that have ever existed on earth, including humans. The theory of evolution literally speaking therefore, refers to the process of opening out or developing (e.g. the evolution of a plant from a seed), the Development of more complex or complicated forms of life (plants or animals) from earlier and simpler forms.

There are various theories on the origin of life on earth. The problem of life is still shredded in mystery. It is still not known what the first from of life was. Even people who do not know what the theory of evolution is all about or who do not believe it ask themselves how life first appeared on the earth. However, there are speculations or intelligent guesses about the probable origin of life. They include :

1. Abiogenesis (or Spontaneous generation Theory).

This is the theory that life came from non-living substances. This view was held between 300 B.C. and 17th century. Thales, Epicurus, Boethius, Anaximander, Aristotle, Plato, Empedocles, Newton, Descartes, Paracelaus and others held this theory. Aristotle, from instance, held that insects (maggots) originated from decaying meat while fishes originated from mud.

2. Biogenesis :

The increasing doubt about the possibility of spontaneous generations gave rise to the theory of biogenesis. This hold that life came from pre-existing life by reproduction. Insects can only come from insects, fish from fish, horses from horses, man from man. This has been proved experimentally.

3. The Cosmozon Theory (or Theory of Panspermia)

This was proposed by Richter in 1865 and stemmed from the idea that life come from pre-existing life. The theory states that the life of our planet came from other planets. Life was distributed through out the cosmos in the from of spores of living forms. These spores were called cosmozoa. When these cosmozoa reached the earth through floating in the atmosphere (Richter), or through meteorites (Von Helmhatz), or through pressure from Stellar rays (Arrthenius), and finding favourable conditions, they developed into organisms.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. The theory proposed by Meyer in 1980 states that :

Like non living matter, life also existed on the earth from the very beginning. The universe is unchangeable and life also exists as such without any change.

5. The Theory of Catastrophism or Cataclysm :

Proposed by Cuvier (1769-1832), the theory states that the universe has been subjected to catastrophes or sudden changes at different intervals in the past. Owing to the destruction the living organisms in such areas were destroyed. These areas were repopulated by organisms from other regions.

6. Organic Evolution Theory :

This theory seems to be more convincing that the ones discussed above. It explains how the large variety of plants and animals in the world came existence. Contrary to the Biblical creation account, it holds that the world has been evolved and not created. Life came spontaneously in the remote past from non-living substances. These non-living organic substances reacted to from organic compounds, which in turn developed into colloidal systems capable of step-wise improvement in order to give rise to simple life. It follows, therefore, that the more complex life of the present evolved from the simplest life formed in the remote past. In other words, higher animals of the present came from the lowest animals of the remote past. For example, we are told that coelenterates evolved from protozod, amphibians evolved from fishes; reptiles came from amphibians; birds and mammals evolved from reptiles; man evolved from monkey or ape.

A version of this theory is molecular evolution. This ascribes biochemical origin to life. It states that life in the remote past originated from chemical substances. Haechel formulated it and it was developed by Oparin (1922) and Haldane (1929). It is a new version of abiogenesis. It holds further that the early earth contained a large quantity of organic molecules over a vast span of time. These molecules became associated with each other in temporary complexes, one of which ultimately developed some sort of membrane capable of separating it from the "soup" and discharge others into it; developed the ability to incorporate the absorate molecules into a characteristic pattern of the complex and finally developed the ability to divide apart portions of itself that possessed all these features too. Such a complex, possessing metabolise, growth, reproduction and responsiveness could have been the first living thing. This first form is held to be simpler than the simplest micro-organism alive today. It is believed that the present diversity of life on earth could have evolved from this first form. Following this, the origin of life involves the following stages :

(i) Origin of the earth

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(ii) Formation of H_2O, NH_3, and CH_4

(iii) Formation of micromolecules

(iv) Formation of macro-molecules

(v) Formation of Nucleic acids

(vi) Formation of Nucleoproteins

(vii) Coarcevation

(viii) Pre-cell

(ix) Living cell.

EVIDENCES FOR EVOLUTION : AN EVALUATION :

1. Evidence from the Study of Fossils.

The first foassils ascribed to Home were found in both East and South Africa and have been dated 2.2 – 1.8 million years ago. Homo habilis were relatively short, with males measuring 114 metres tall and a recent fossil individual with a height of about 0.91 metres. Some stone tools were also discovered, supposedly uses in hunting and batchering animals include rodents, small reptiles, pigs and entelope.

About 1.8 million years ago, probably after the close of the Homo babilis fossils period, new groups of hominid fossils apparently taller than their predecessors (reaching about 1.67metres) appeared. These individuals are distinguished by smaller teeth, thicker skills, larger brain volumes and heavier brow ridges. The first of these fossils named Homo erectus was discovered by Dubois in 1891 in Java, and hence it is often called the Java-man. Subsequent discoveries have been made in China (Peking man), Germany, East, South and North Africa. In about 1856 in Neander valley, in Germany was discovered a hominid fossil named the Neantderthal man or Homo sapicris neanderthalensis. They had larger Jaws, some chins and some other anatomical relics. They had bulky body with short limbs. The variety of tools used by the Neanderthal man surpassed that of his predecessors. They included hand axes and knives. They were socially and behaviourally quite superior to their predecessors in many respects.

Because of the considerable variation displayed by the fossils of Neanderthat man, some paleontologists have grouped them into two. namely, the 'classical' and the 'progressive'. The progressive type resembles modern man in many respects. More recently, some progressive Neanderthals were discovered at Mount Carmel in Israel. Radio Carbon dating put their age at about 45,000 years. The Neanderthal fossils began to be replaced by the higher skulled races. modern wise men called Homo sapiens sapiens. Among early famous finds of Homo sapiens sapiens was excavated in Cro-Magnon in France.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Although the evidencs from fossile looks convincing, it is not without problems. The greatest of the difficulties posed by the evidence from fossils is the inability of paleontologists to find fossile of transitional forms between species, the so-called missing link. Darwin and his followers had theorized that the work of evolution was slow, gradual and continuous and that a complete lineage of ancestors could in theory be reconstructed for all living animals. In practice, Darwin conceded that fossil record was far too scanty to demonstrate those gradual changes. A century of digging has made the absence of fossils more glaring. Paleontologists have spent whole life time looking for examples of gradual transitions over time to no avail.

Darwin attempted to explain these naughty problems by attacking the fossil record. He saw the geological record as a history of the world imperfectly kept to an exireme degree. But he assumed like other that as time passed by the missing fossil link would surely be found. Apparently, many fossils have been excavated after a century of digging. After all this time, and the assembling of million of fossils, the record is still full of trends that paleontogists have been unable to explain. What has confounded such scientists is the fact that the massive fossil evidence now available reveals the very same thing that it did in Darwin's day, and that is that, basic kinds of living things appeared suddenly and did not change appreciably for long periods of time. No transitional links between one major kind of living thing and another have ever been found. So, what the fossil record says in just the opposite of what evolutionary theory had predicted.[1] Between species there was a complete absence of intermediate fossils. Experience teaches us that after their origins most species undergo little evolution before becoming extinct.

Great cars must be exercised in interpreting the fossil record. This is because the study has been plagued with fraud and forgery.[2] All that are available to us in any particular case are a few bones or a few artifacts. Obviously, the amount of guesswork involved in interpreting what the creatures were like is quite enormous. For this reason, the reconstructions by artists that are found in popular magazines and even in museums should be disregarded.

As far as the immediate ancestor of man is concerned, the fossil record has nothing to offer. The concept of man as a 'made-over' ape or monkey has been abandoned, such superapes as 'Java-man', 'Pekin-man' and 'Neantherthal-man'. The present evidence shows that man as we know him appears in the fossil record pretty well as we see him now.

On the basis of facts alone, on the basis of what is actually in the earth, the theory of sudden creative act in which the major forme of life were established fits best.[3] In short, the lack of any record of immediate ancestors for man tends to support the Biblical theory of creation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. Evidence from the study of comparative morphology :

It has been theorised by some evolutionists that structural similarity proves relationship. Thus every animal that has a back-bone must have a common ancestor. This is like saying that all motor vehicles having four wheels must have a common prototype or a boy with red hair is more closely related to all those parents both of whom have red hair, than he is to his own parents of whom only one has that colour hair. Similarity may show relationship, but in many cases it does not.[4]

3. Evidence from a study of comparative development or ontology:

This argument is sometimes called the Biogenic Hypothesis or embryological or recapitulation argument. It states that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny."[5] This means that the embryo of a living creature repeats the whole process of evolution up to that stage. The so-called "gill-slits" in human foetus is taken as evidence of fish ancestry. But it has been proved by Dr. A. Rendle Short, a renowned anatomist, that the features referred to are not gill slite but grooves between arches that support blood vessels. This has led to the abandonment of the hypothesis. The abandonment of the recapitulation hypothesis is therefore negative evidence against the theory of evolution itself.

4. Evidence from a study of 'Vestigial remains' :

This states that there are in the body of living things organs which are no longer useful, but were useful in a previous stage of development. An example often cited is the vermiform appendix in human beings. Against this argument, it has been contended that occurrences of these vestigial remains are so rare that one can attach little evidential value to them. Apparently, it is no longer regarded as having serious evidential value.

5. Evidence from the study of Inheritance :

Here we have the argument that cross-breeding of plants and animals is supposed to show evidence of evolution. While we must concede that it is possible to breed new forms differing from parent froms, obviously this is very limited. While it is possible to create hybrids, most cases of these are infertile. The variety, change, development within groups of living things is a scientific to say that this is evolution in action by supposing that this spread is unlimited and shows how one species develops into another. The fact is that organism of the same species are those that are most alike and which can freely interbread.

6. Evidence from Mutations :

The theory of mutations was fromulated by evries over 80 years ago. This theory suggests that new forms proceed out of previous changes inside the nucleus of the cell enable one type of living thing to evolve into another type. Foremost among thses changes are the accidental changes called mutations. It is believed that the particular

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

parts involved in these mutational changes are the genes and chromosomes in sex cells, since mutations in them can be passed along to one's descendants. It is argued that the environment selects those few mutations that enhance survival, resulting in a series of slow transformations of one lifeform into another, the origin of new species. It has also been argued that mutations may be a key to the rapid change called for by the 'punctuated equillibrium' theory. Mutations are said to be caused by normal process of cell reproduction and by external agents such as radiation and chemicals. It has also been proved that they occur infrequently.

A few criticisms can be levelled against the evidence from mutations. Frist it has been contended that if at all mutations are beneficial, they can produce nothing new. A mutation can only result in a variation of a trait that is already there. It provides variety, but never anything new. For instance, mutations may change the colour of one's hair, but the hair will always be hair. Second, mutations are likened to accidents in the genetic machinery. But accidents cause harm, not good. Mutations are believed to be responsibles for hundreds of diseases that are genetically determined. Mutation, then, seems to be a destructive rather than a constructive process. The message of mutations is quite clear and unmistakeable : Living things reproduce only after their kind.

7. Evidence from Natural Selection :

Natural selection means that living forms are perpetuated which happen to develop characteristics which give them an advantage in the struggle for survival.[6]

A few criticisms can be raised against the theory of natural selection. First, the hypothesis of natural selection has not been proved. Many facts are contrary to it. Nature is replete with features which cannot be explained in terms of usefulness in the survial struggle. It cannot give adequate explanation for such phenomena as beauty, culture, music and other luxuries of living. Second, handicapping features in man have a habit of surviving. His naked body and his long, helpless infancy made him a sitting duck for extinction, yet these features have developed. The timid, fearful, shy-looking and vulnerable sheep has survived, but ferocious reptiles have become extinct. Third, mimicry is strong point against natural selection. Some living creatures have harmless characteristics which strongly resemble deadly features in other creatures and which therefore serve as a protective mechanism by misleading potential enemies. For instance, if a harmless snake were to develop characteristics which could be mistaken for a dangerous snake, then this would prevent other creatures from attacking it and would therefore be a factor in its survival. Mimicry would include such things as imitative colouring, movement, sounds, pose, habit and environment. Fourth, a version of natural selection christened sexual

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

selection has been abandoned. It was believed that the reason why some creatures had gray colours was to be able to attract the opposite sex for mating purposes. The fatal blow to this theory is the realization that many of these creatures do not have the retina capacity to be able to distinguish these colours anyway.[7]

8. Evidence from the study of geographical distribution :

There are certain isolated regions of the world that have floras consisting largely of plants found in no other parts of the world. It is argued that is a proof that evolution has produced these peculiar plants and that natural barriers have prevented them from spreading to other parts of the earth. Well, this could be an explanation, but these are other possible explanations. Many plants and animals have also existed in other parts of the earth which have become extinct as a result of change in climatic or other conditions.

Creation

The only authentic source-book of the creation of the world is the Bible. The Bible is its doctrine of creation. The beauty, brevity, logic and simpleness of the story of creation and the theory of evolution examined above, is worthy of admiation. The Biblical doctrine of creation is the substructure upon which subsequent revelations conerning God's nature and his relationship to the Bible and man is based.

The importance of the Genesis creation account can be judged from the fact that it reveals the transcendence, ominipotence and sovereignty of God; it is basis of the unity of the human race (monogenism), universal sinfulness of humanity, the unity of the marriage relationship and the headship of the husband, and the trustworthiness of scriptures.

The creation story has it that there was a beginning before which God existed. The beginning could not have been the beginning of God, but the beginning of the heavens and the earth. It affirms that God created the heavens and the earth from the beginning and that the material from which man was created had been created by God from the beginning (Gen. 2:7). If there was a beginning of the heavens and the earth, there must have been a condition before the beginning when the heavens and the earth did not exist. This provides a strong basis for the doctrine of creation exnihilo (out of nothing). It further affirms that the work of the six days called the "days of creation" was mainly that of making the earth a suitable place for vegetable, animal and human life and the creation of such life upon it. Each of the six days is the literal 24 hour day. The order of creation as revealed in the Genesis account is as follows :

1st day - light

2nd day - sky

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

3rd day - land, sea and plant life

4th day sun, moon and stars

5th day - land animals, man and birds

6th day - land animals, man and woman.

There are certain facts which clearly support the Biblical theory of creation. Some of them are :

1.We can sense order and design in the division of the land and water, air and atmosphere. If the ocean level were to rise beyond its present level, large portion of land would have been submerged. Added to that, the air is perfectly balanced with oxygen and nitrogen (ratio : 21-79). There is no physical and chemical law maintaining this balance; it is kept by God's power.

2.The lavishness of oreation supports creation. There are hundreds of varieties of birds, flowers, animals, herbs, fruits, fish, trees etc. Evolution could not provide this.

3.The history of the primitive man reveals the savagery and natural brutality of man as mentioned in Genesis as a result of the fall. Thomas Hobbes said that life in the original state of man (the state of nature) was nasty, brutish and short. This is a mark of degenerate mankind. Brutality is the result of the fall.

These and other facts show that the Biblical view is more scientific than the so-called scientific view. The logic and order in it point to a masterful planner. The creation that came from God was pronounced 'good', for no evil comes from God.

The science of mathematical probability offers striking proof that the Genesis creation must have originated from a source with knowledge of the events. The account lists ten major stages of this order : (1) a beginning; (2) a primitive earth in darkness and enshrouded in heavy gases and water; (3) light; (4) an expanse or atmosphere; (5) large areas of dry land; (6) land plants; (7) sun, moon and stars discernible in the expanse, and seasons beginning ; (8) sea monsters and flying creatures; (9) wild and tame beasts, mammals; (10) man. Science agrees that these stages occurred in this general order. The famous geologist Wollance Pratt is quoted as saying that the order of events from the origin of the oceans, to the emergence of land, to the appearance of marine life, and then to birds and mammals is essentially the sequence of the principal division of geologic time. However, the theory of evolution does not allow for a creator who was there, knew the facts and could reveal them to humans. Instead, it attributes the appearance of life on earth to the spontaneous generation of living organisms from inanimate chemical. But it should be clear that undirected chemical reactions relying on more chance cannot create life.

CC-0.In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CONTRASTING EVOLUTION AND CREATION

S/N.	Predictions of Evolution Model	Predictions of Creation Model	Facts as Found in the Real World
1.	Life evolved from non-living substances by chance (spontaneous evolution)	Life comes from already existing life originally created by an intelligent creator.	Life comes only from previous life and there is no way to form complex genetic code by chance.
2.	Fossils should show simple life forms originating gradually, and transitional forms linking previous ones.	Fossils should show complex forms suddenly appearing in great variety, and gaps separating major kinds; no linking forms.	Fossils show sudden appearance of complex life in great variety; each new kind separate from previous kinds; no linking forms.
3.	New kinds arising gradually, beginnings of incomplete bones and organs in various transitional stages	No new kinds gradually appearing, no incomplete bones or organs, but all parts completely formed.	No raw kind gradually appearing, although many varieties; no incompletely formed bones or organs.
4.	Mutations: net result bene fial generate new features.	Mutations harmful to complex life; do not result in any thing new.	Small mutations harmful; large ones lethal, never result in anything new.
5.	Origin of civilization gradual arising out of crude, brutish beginning	Civilization contemporaneous with man,complex to begin with.	Civilization appears with man; any cave dwellers were contemporary with civilization.
6.	language evolved from simple animal sounds into complex modern language.	Language contemporanious with man; ancient languages complex and complete	Language , contemporaneous with man; ancient ones often more complex than modern.
7.	appearance of man millions of years ago.	Appearance of man about 6000 years ago	Oldest written records date back only about 5000 years.

From the table above, it is clear that the teachings of evolution are the very antithesis of the Biblical account of creation. While the Genesis account gives a noble, upright and perfect beginning, evolution trraces man's beginning to microbe in the primeval mud; while genesis speaks of man's fall at the garden of Eden, evolution says this story is merely

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

symbolic of man's evolving conscience; while the Bible says man is a sinner and that he must one day answer for this sins, evolution says sin is merely a relic of our animal nature for which we are no more responsible than we are for the colour of our eyes, and that future judgement is a myth; while the Bible tells of a saviour whose sacrifices and calavary was essential to the redemption of man, evolution explains away sin as a normal state of development, and denies the need of a saviour; while the Bible affirms the possibilities of such miracles as the virgin birth, the incarnation, the resurrection and the ascension of Jesus, evolution flatly denies them.

LOGICAL CONCLUSION

When we compare what is found in the real world to what evolution predicted and to what creation predicted, it is apparent which model fits the facts and which one contradicts them. In short, the evidence from the world of living things around us, and from the fossil record of things that lived long ago, testifies to the same conclusion, namely, that life was created, it did not evolve. Life did not get started in some mysterious primeval 'Soup', nor did humans get here by way of ape like ancestors. Evidence clearly shows that livings were created in abundance as distinct family types. Each could multiply in great veriety within its own 'kind', but could not cross the boundary separating different kinds. That boundary, as can be clearly observed in living things, is enforced by sterility. And the distinction between kinds is protected by each one's unique genetic machinery. However, there is much more that testifies to a creator than just the facts fitting the predictions of the creation model. Consider the amazing designs, order and complexities that are found throughout the universe, and you cannot but believe that these, too, point to the existence of a supreme Intelligence ?

NOTES/REFERENCES

1. *Life-How did it get Here ? By Evolution or by creation ?*
   (New York : Watcht ower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 1985), p.59.
2. *James Jauncey, Science Returns to God.*
   (Grand Rapids : Zondervan Publishing House, 1961), p.61.
3. *One above, p.63.*
4. *Charles F. Baker. Dispensational Theology.*
   (Grand Rapids : Grace Bible College Publications, 1971), p.192.
5. *Charles F. Baker, p. 192*
6. *James Jauncey, p. 64.*
7. *James Jauncey, p. 66.*
8. *One above, p.110.*
9. *One above, p. 111.*

Douglas, A. God's Answers to Man's Questions. Canada : 1966
Essiet, N.I. Evoscope : A Comprehensive Compendium Covering Key

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Topics in Evolution.. Unpublished.
Kumuyi, W. F. Complete Bible Studies Series in one Volume.
Lagos : Zoe Publishing and Printing Co. Ltd.
Ndome, C. B. & Udoh P.B. Evolution of Chordates. Unpublished.
Motani, N. K. "The Ascent of Darwinism", in Science Today,
Vol. 16. January-December.
Uduigwomen, A. F. A Textbook of History and Philosophy of
Science. Aba : AAU Industries, 1996.
Uduigwomen, A. F. "Cpeationism or Evolutionism." Unpublished.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

V

A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE PRINCIPAL TEACHING OF ISLAM IN SURATUL-IKHLAS

Kamaldeen A.Balogun

PREAMBLE

It would be indeed inadequate to examine the principal teaching of Islam, expressed in some technical terms, without an explanation of its intended meaning. The inadequancy becomes obvious if one fails to critically examine the issues or gloss over philosophical questions which Suratul-Ikhlas contains.' Some clarifications are needful on Surah's position on "being" "life" and "humanity".

It may be noted that due to the influence of philosophical materialism religious experience is often thought to be outside the scope of speculative philosophy with the suggestion that there is no relation between them[1]. Our belief is to the contrary : since every ideology is rooted in reality, we must inquire religiously and rationally into the nature of the religious claims relative to the question of being life and reality.

Historically, philosophers have asked question about how can this reality be obtained? Two methods have emerged: rational and empirical. Among the outstanding rationalists is Rene Descartes, Who attempted to demonstrate the validity of a priori knowledge, that is, knowledge independent of sense perception.

In contrast to Descartes and rationalists are the British empiricists: Locke, Berkeley and Hume. They insist that all knowledge is a posteriori, that is, it follows from experience. Kant's phenomenalism, an alternative to empiricism and rationalism, distinguishes between our experience of things (phenomena) and the things as they are (noumena). The mind, claimed Kant, possesses the ability to sort sense experiences and posits relationships among them. Through an awareness of these relationships, we come to knowledge.[2]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Our enquiry about reality becomes expedient and urgent against the background of the claim that God is One and Only One, the Creator and the Exalted. This assertion is in accordance with all known sacred scriptures. In the Qur'an, for instance, we read declarations like this: "Your God is One God; there is no God save Him, The Beneficent, The Merciful"[3] Interestingly this thought was stated some two thousand years earlier with the ancient call to Israel. The Holy Bible says:" Listen O Israel, Jehovah Our God is One Jehovah."[4] It is equally remarkable to discover that Jesus repeated this foremost command, which is recorded in the book of Mark[5] just about six hundred years before Muhammed started his mission in Saudi Arabia.

Having been inspired by the revelations in the Bible and the Qur'an that God is One, we are under pressure to question some of the absurdities which religious emotions have thrown up regarding the true nature of God.

A Philosophical critique of Suratul-Ikhlas with a view to enlightening Muslims and non-Muslims alike on the issue of divine unity become crucial. Let it be noted that the Qur'an speaks not only to the Muslims but also to the Jews and Christians as well as to idolaters and infidels. Attesting to the universality of the message of the Qur'an Allah declared to Muhammed as follows:

We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures.

Say inspiration is that your God is One God: Will ye

therefore bow to His will (in Islam).[6]

The issue of divine unit and the reality of Oneness of God should but cut across all the revealed religions. In fact all men and creatures other than men who have any spiritual responsibility, are expected to abide by the principle of One God on whom all depend.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE EXPLAINED

A word or two might be necessary to explain what is meant by the principal teaching of Islam which is sometimes referred to as the Shahadah or Kalimat-at-Tqwhid. The Shahadah is the confession of faith, which every Muslim knows by heart and recites. The formula is: La illha illa allah Muhammadun Rasulullah. This Kalimah summarises the belief of a Muslim that One God only is the Creator, Sustainer and Master of the Universe and of all that exists in it organic or inorganic. This principle of the oneness of God says Mawdudi, makes meaningless the concept of the legal and political sovereignty of human beings'[7]

Saratul-Ikhlas, one of the shortest and earliest chapters of the Holy Qur'an, contains the doctrine of the unity of God. The doctrine is beautifully summarised thus:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Say, He Allah is One,

Allah is He on whom all depend;

He begats not, nor is He begotten,

And there is none like unto Him.[8]

A CRITIQUE OF THE SURAH

Whatever the believers understanding of or attitude to this surah or their perception of its message, it seems to me to be underscoring three major principles one of which, I suppose, many are aware of, That is, the affirmation of the divine unity. The other two principles which might have eluded the thinking of others are: the principle of dependence and that of the impossibility of a substitute for God.

Now, let us examine how this surah expounds the idea of divine unity. The surah categorically states this idea in the very first verse. 'Say, He Allah is One'.

Here, the idea of the oneness of God is strongly and uncompromisingly emphasised.

Many writers and commentators have analysed the full meaning and implications of the oneness of God. One of them is Muhammad Ali, who in his lucidly written book 'the Religion of Islam' draws attention to the various ramifications of the Oneness of God. He writes:

THE UNITY OF GOD, ACCORDING TO THE HOLY QUR'AN

Implies that God is One in His persom (dhat), One in His attributes (sifat), and one in His works (afcal). His Oneness in His person means that there is neither plurality of Gods, or plurality of persons in the Godhead; His oneness in attributes implies that no other being possesses one or more of the divine attributes in perfection, His Oneness in works implies that none can do the works which God has done or which God may do.[9]

It is evident from the above commentary that divine unity consists of three components viz.: divine essence, divine attributes and divine works.

The implication of divine essence is that there is neither plurality of gods nor plurality of persons in the Godhead. The Holy Qur'an frowns on anything that may be done to undermine the divine essence of God through associating any partner or god with Him. Such association is regarded as Shirk. And Shirk in Islam is said to be the greatest of all sins.[10] We also read in the Qur'an that: 'Allah does not forgive the association of other gods with Him and forgives what is besides that to whom ever He pleases.' The forms of Shirk that are denounced in the most scathing terms in the Qur'an include: idolatory, nature work ship, deism and the trinity, the doctrine of sonship among others.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The notion of divine attributes helps to cast off the image of God which had enthralled human mind and implies that no other being possesses one or more of the attributes in perfection. When God is spoken of in the Holy Qur'an as seeing speaking hearing, moving and so on, we should not allow our imagination to apprehend the anthropomorphic conception of Divine Being. This explains why the anthropomorphic view has never found any favour among the Sunni Muslim thinkers.[12] Even both the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of God support the above claim.[13]

The concept of divine works (Afal) is established through the wonderful design and the great purpose of creation, that the act of the infinitely conscious, All-Knowing and Omnipotent God, the Creator, who creates with His infinite knowledge and absolute freedom. That Allah is the Only Creator is expressed thus in the Qur'an "Surely His is the Creation and the Command.[14]" "Allah is the Creator of everything.[15]" The creation is indeed His prerogative and exclusive privilege.[16]

PHILOSOPHY OF DEPENDENCE

The order adopted by the Qur'an in presenting the concept of dependence in Suratul-ikhlas is a highly "scientific" one. Allah, the Creator, comes first in the opening of the Surah, and this is followed by another divine attribute (as-Samad), the One on whom all depend.

Nothing demonstrate this idea of dependence more clearly than the reliance of everything God has created, in their various phases of development on Him. Man's "path" of development from the womb, childhood, adulthood, and old-age points to the fact that man will never be totally independent.

Reminding man of his humble beginning and showing him that he could not have created himself, the holy Qur'an calls man's attention to the seed of his body, out of which his physical life started. Regarding this fact the Qur'an says:

> It is we who have created you:
>
> why will ye not admit the truth?
>
> Do you then see? The (human seed)
>
> that ye emit, is it ye who create it, or are We the Creators.[17]

By way of illustration, let us look at the period of gestation during which the foetus cannot be reached and taken care of directly by the parents except by God. The period marks the beginning of man's dependence on God. Whatever information the scan machine can furnish about an unborn baby, the life of the foetus is not governed by man, rather, it is controlled by God's knowledge and law. The scan machine can, for instance, say something about the sex or perhaps the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

number of babies that the womb contains, but it cannot give any information concerning the life-span of the foetus, whether or not it will be born alive, what sort of a new individual it will be:- a blessing or a curse to its parents.-etc.

Claiming that the gradual physical growth of man in several successive stages is one of the signs of God's creative power and care, the Qur'an declares:

> O mankind if ye have a doubt about the
>
> Resurrection, (consider) that We have
>
> created you out of dust, then out of sperm...[18]

Any body who has witnessed a baby just moments after birth would realise the risky nature of the processes of delivery. Looking at the fragile little creature, One gets the overwhelming feeling that anything could have gone wrong. There must have been great help from "the Unseen" for the baby to have passed through the narrow path where it cannot be sent back. Childbirth teaches us a serious lesson in humility and speaks of man's utter dependence on God. Alluding to this indubitable fact, God says: Woe to man! What has made him reject God? From what stuff Hath created him. From a sperm-drop: He hath created him. And then mouldeth him in due proportions, Then doth He make His path smooth for Him.[19]

From that demonstration of man's insignificance and reliance on God as seen in the womb and delivery, the recurring cycle of dependence covers all facets of man's life on earth. God's provision of oxygen, water and food, for example, demonstrates man need of God and his complete dependence on Him. Let us inquire for a moment what sort of life man would have lived if God had not made provision for any of the five sense.

Our dependence on God can be seen in periods of illness in cases of immobility and terminal diseases; indeed the entire life of man returns to total dependence who alone is dependent, and on whom all depend. This is beautifully summed up by the Qur'an as follows;[20]

> It is we have created you: why will ye not admit the Truth? Do ye then see? The (human seed) that ye emit, is it ye who create it, or are We the creators?
>
> We have decreed death to be your common lot, and We are not to be frustrated from changing your forms and creating you (again) in (forms) that ye know not. And ye certainly know already the first form of creation. Why then do ye not take heed? See ye the seed that ye sow in the ground? Is it ye that cause it to grow, or are we the cause? were it our will we could

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

make it broken onts. And ye would be left in wonderment. (Saying), We are indeed left with the debts (for nothing) Indeed we are deprived. See ye the water which ye drink? Do ye bring it down (in rain) from the cloud or do we? Were it Our Will, We could make it saltish (and unpalatable) then why do not give thanks? See ye the fire which ye kindle?

Is it ye who grow the tree which feeds the fire, or do we grow it? We have made it reminder and an article of comfort and convenience for the denizens of deserts. Then glorify the name of thy Lord, the Supreme.

What further evidence could one add to those advanced by the crown to show that man depends on Allah for his existence? But can we find a substitute for God? That is the issue the latter part of Suratul-ikhlas addresses.

CAN GOD BE SUBSTITUTED?

Between his birth and death, man engages in activities which could bring him wealth power and influence, Ironically, his success in the earthly sense brings in the danger of conceit, which takes way from man the sense of humility which his first day on earth symbolises (as we noted earlier).

Man then behaves, immediately he has power, like the proverbial rich man who looked at his barn full of what, saying that he would now enjoy, but death came that very night. When man allows his earthly achievements to becloud his vision, he may have the illusory attitude that he is independent and that he does not need anything from God, meaning that he has found a substitute for Him.

There are philosophers today who hold that there is a gulf between man and God which no theory can bridge.[21] One of the most outstanding philosophers to expouse this idea was Soven Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855) It is important to note that Kierkegaard's" Fideisin" springs from a rejection of the claims on behalf of reason made by Hegel.

During Keirkegaard's age, the followers of Hegel seemed to have thought that reason by itself was sufficient to establish a relationship between man and God in the universe and to provide the foundations for religious faith.[22]

Particularly important and relevant to our discussion is Keirkeggrd's attitude, and the institution he represents-Existentialism-to the Western Culture and Christianity. He sees Christianity as the "gulf" between man and God which is bridged for the Christians by the doctrine of incarnation. He considers this doctrine as rationally absurd and see its absurdity as the reason why it should be challenged.[23]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Perhaps one of the greatest problems the despair of the philosophers has resulted in, in the twentieth century is the proposition of the death of God. Nietzsche happened to be one of such philosophers who pronounced God dead.[24]

According to Nietzsche, the churches and temples can be said to be responsible for that death. HE was said to have been extremely happy for God's death because 'that would enable man to live dangerously.[25] He explained further that by dangerous living man could take risk venture into what interest him and claim responsibility for his action. His slogan soon metamorphosed into movement in the 1960s focusing on the individuality of man and his total freedom.[26]

The nature of this freedom in a world without God was brought to the limelight by Jean Paul Sartre whose main slogan remained: "man is free, doomed to be free, sentence to total freedom[27]" It is evident from this that Sartre has given a powerful description of a world without God.

The above views represent those of Existentialist philosophers, the philosophical position had its main following on the continent of Europe. It also had adherents among writers and critics who were impressed by the novels and plays of Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Albert Camus. In theology its links with such anti rationalist and'personalists' theologians such as Karl Barth (1886 -1968), Martin Buber(1818 -1965) and Emil Brunner (1889-1966) gave it a worldwide appeal.

It goes without saying that the attitude of these philosophers to the relation between man and God and which culminated in the proclamation of the death of God has not undermined cannot undermine the Allha's assertion in the Surah under review that 'there is none like unto Him'.

This becomes clearer when it is known that the proclamation of God's death could only be meaningful within the Western context. This explains why one cannot agree less with Fadahunsi's submission that 'Since God's interpretation is only meaningful in certain context of experience, all we have to do is ascertain the context which God is interpreted to be dead' He argues further that the death of God is a commentary on the predicament in western man's that he has become self-alienated, lost his world and thereby lost God'.[28]

Today, in the Muslim World, there is a discussion of what role philosophy can play in religious thinking and experience. There are those who hold that philosophy provides a rational foundation for religious belief and a general frame work for their interpretation through which their truth may be demonstrated. This has been the dominant view among Muslim Philosophers.

It is in accordance with this popular view that the wisdom of the Quran and its latent philosophical reasoning must be expounded so

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as to direct Muslims and non- Muslims alike to the straight path since the message contain therein are not only meant for the Muslims but also the non-Muslims.

So, if the Quran employs its own special rationality it is one which others are expected to be able to understand.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The principal teaching of Islam which centers around Tawhid the oneness of Allah, has been established through the exposition of Suralul-ikhlas. The Surah establishes Tawhid through the affirmation of the divine unity and it denies the idea of man total in dependence. Similarly the doctrine rejects the concept of naturalism and strikes at the root of modern evolutionism.

Having considered the above Surah which is dominated by one theme, that is, Tawhid or the divine unity, which is the central theme of Islam one can safely assume that there would be no difficulty whatsoever for anybody who can reflect in realising that God does not only exist but that He is all-knowing and omnipotent, the creator on whom all depend for their existence.

It should be observed that a philosophical critique of religious ideas is necessary if we are to defend our beliefs against the possible charge that we have gone astray. Philosophical reflection will enable us to ,ascertain that religious emotions have not prompted us to accept absurdities. It is our conisdered opinion,therefore, that like other areas of culture religion should be subjected to intellectual scrutiny.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *See the aticle: 'The Philosophy of prophet Adam ('a)' by Dr. Mohammed Legenhausen in Message of THAQALAYN A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 3 No. 4. 1998 Pp. 88 - 106 Cf. The work of Blackwood, R.T. And Herman, A.L. (Eds.) Problems in Philosophy:*

   West And East., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975. Pp. 7-4
2. *For detailed information on these view Read: Barry, V. Philosophy: A Text with Readings.(U.S.A, 1980 Pp. 37-54).*
3. *See the Holy Quran: 2: 163*
4. *See Deuteronomy 6:4*
5. *Mark 12:29*
6. *Quran:21: 107-108*
7. *Read: Mawdudi, Abul A'la, Human Rights in Islam, 1976, (The Islamic Foundation. London) Pp.9*
8. *Quran, ! 12: 1-4*
9. *Ali, Muhammad, The Religion of Islam (U.A.R. National Publication and Printing House n.d. Pp. 144-5*
10. *Read Quran, 31: 13*
11. *See Quran, 4:48*
12. *Read Balogun K.A., 1988, ' Ulhman Bin fudi on the characteristics of a good Muslim' in The Islamic Quarterly London, Pp. 34-46*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

13. *For details see Shrif History of Muslim Philosophy Pp. 421 - 430*
14. *Quran, 7:54*
15. *Quran, 39:62*
16. *This is in accordance with the Quranic injunction as contained in the following verses: Quran 2:29, 25:2; 43:9; 10:34; 36;89; 6:102; 13:16; 35:3 etc.*
17. *Quran, 56:57-59*
18. *Quran, 22: 5-6*
19. *Quran, 80:17-20*
20. *Quran, 56: 57-74*
21. *Read the Article on Existentialism in Encyclopedia Britainca, Vol.8 Pp. 778*
22. *Read for a detailed information on this issue. Blackwood, R.T. And Herman, A.L.(Eds) Problems in Philosophy: West and East, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975)*
23. *See Encyclopedia Britanica, Op. Cit. Pp.779*
24. *See: The unpublished paper of Ayo Fadahunsi. 'The Death of God Theology' Pp.5*
25. *Ibid Pp.6*
26. *Ibid Pp.7*
27. *Ibid Pp.14*
28. *Ibid Pp.15*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VI

SUB - TERRANEAN REGIONS OF GEORGE ELIOT'S PSYCHE

Rupakshi Sharma

To be the 'last' on any ordinate scale means to be completely 'lost' Mary Ann was the last of Robert Evan's six children, three from his first wife Harriet Poynton and three from the second Christiana Pearson. She was probably the unwanted child because neither Cross[1] nor Haight[2] in George Eliot's Biography (1885, 1965) reports any incidence of Mary Ann's childhood indicating mother's love or even care. It is on record, however, that Mary Ann's birth had left Christiana very weak and sick. There is a great probability that the young infant was denied the warmth and affection of the mother, which was its great psychological need and which came, if at all it did, from father and from none else. Her mother's favourites were Mary Ann's elder brother. Isaac and her elder sister Chrissey. Chrissey's blond curls were always neat, while Mary Ann's straight light brown hair defied all measures of control. Chrissey's clothes were always tidy, delighting her critical Pearson aunts (depicted as Dodsons in the Mill on the Floss). She has been described at this time as a "queer three cornered awkard girl who sat in corners and shyly watching her elders."[3] The absence of love, lack of affection, want of warmth and need of belongingness had gone into her unconscious and she longed for love all her life.

Her next misfortunate lay in her being plain faced, lacking the charms of a beautiful girl. Once when her friend Chapman whose description in given ahead was disappointed with the ruins of the Kenilworth Castle and spoke at length of the wonderful and mysterious embodiment of all the elements, characteristics and beauties of nature which man and woman jointly presented, his words jarred upon Mary Evans; she wept bitterly. It was from a consciousness of her own want of beauty.[4]

Mary Evans (later known as George Eliot) could not win Herbert Spencer for marriage because of her lack of beauty. And she was unable to accept this inferiority, during her involvement with Spencer, she

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

wrote to the Brays, "I am a hideous hag now...sad and wizened...baggard as an old witch like one of those old hags we used to see by the wayside in Italy...only a little worse, for want of dark eyes and dark hair in contrast with the panchment."[5] Spencer in two essays on "Personal Beauty" published in Leader in 1854 singles out to illustrate ugliness some of the very features for which Marian's face was the most conspicuous - the heavy under jaw, the large mouth, the long upper lips, the long prominent nose - all so unlike the ideal Greek head. Moreover, he argues "a necessary relationship between ugly features and inferiority of intellect and character. The saying that beauty is but skin deep is but a skin-deep saying, he concluded."[6]

She was called 'Mental Beauty', which surely implied that she lacked physical attraction. It is not without reason that she decided to love Lewes the ugliest man of his age, usually referred to as an 'Ape' because of his narrow jaw and wide cheek bones and brow. "His face was pale and deeply pock-marked, the nose straight with rather large nostrils, the lips full and red, partly hidden by strangling nostrils."[7]

A feeling of loneliness, solitariness, separation or forced aloofness, was another irritant in her psyche. At birth she was separated from her mother who being terribly ill could not afford to look after her newly born child. When she was four or five months old, the family moved to a new place called Griff. Small associations and affinities which she had developed for her house were suddenly broken. Chrissey, her elder sister was sent off early to boarding school in Attborough and little Mary Ann was denied the affectionate love and care of her elder sister who was substituting for the child's mother. From sister's side, her association turned to her brother Isaac and they became inseparable playmates. The strong bond of love between brother and sister, was later immortalised by GeorgeEliot in the characters of Tom and Maggie Tulliver in the Mill on the Floss, "...that we used to gather with our tiny fingers as we sat lisping to ourselves on the grass..."[8] "Tom was never angry with her for forgetting things, and liked her to tell him tales, there were no bulls to run at her, or fierce dogs chained up and leaping out unexpeectedly...her mother never wanted her hair to curl or to have her wear frills that pricked her, ... Above all, Tom loved her ... oh, so much, ... more, even than she loved him."[9]

The dominating passion of her childhood was love for her brother Isaac. The 'Brother-sister' sonnets recall how she followed him everywhere, puppy-like. "No doll or childish toy" observes Haight, "could hold her interest if Isaac was near. He is the first example of what Cross called her 'absolute need of some one person who should be all in all to her, and to whom she should be all in all."[10]

But these blissful days were cut short suddenly. Isaac was sent to a school, near Coventry and little Mary Evans was left in the company of her reflections and tears. "Whatever traumatic effect the early

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

separation from her mother may have had on Mary Anne", observes Haight, "the separation from Issac hurt her most keenly."[11] Her delight at seeing him again when he came home for holidays, is clearly reflected in The Mill on the Floss. "Mrs Tulliver stood with her arms open. Maggie jumped first on one leg, and then on the other; while Tom descended from the gig and said with a masculine reticence as to the tender emotions, Hello : Yap - what : are you there? ... Maggie hung on his neck in rather a strangling fashion..."[12]

She was only five years old when she was sent to a boarding school. She was too tender to bear the separation. There were bigger girls around, but she would not mix with them, she was often seen sobbing and weeping. She began to have night fears "which were something like the susceptibility to terror, latter to haunt Gwondolen Harleth."[13]

Even as a child of five, she was serious (perhaps sad). "It may have been her unusual gravity" says Simcox, that prompted the girls at Miss Lathom's school, who were older to call her little 'Mamma'.[14]

Her gravity at the age of eight is illustrated by an authentic anecdote by Mrs Shaw who at a children's party noticed Mary Ann sitting alone. When asked whether she was happy and enjoying herself, she replied, "No, I am not, I don't like to play with children. I like to talk to grown-up people."[15] Psychologically speaking, a child who sits alone, who shuns the company of children, who suffers night-fears and who is seen sobbing and crying frequently, has some problems with its psyche. Mary Ann was a sufferer of isolation and separation having been firstly weaned away from her mother, then from her sister, then her brother and finally from the house - in sum, from everybody and everything she loved. In her unconscious was hotting up a grudge that she had been ignored, denied affection, love and needed care which as a child, was her need if not the right. This feeling she continued to nurse all her life. The examination of the cast of her head by George Combe showed that in her, social feelings were very active and that "she was of a most affectionate disposition, always requiring someone to lean upon, preferring what has hitherto been considered stronger sex, to the other and more impressible. She was not fitted to be alone."[16] In one of her letters to Miss Lewis, she wrote, "I long to have a friend...alone to me, to unburden every thought and difficulty - for I am still solitary."[17]

Another traumatic experience of George Eliot was her quarrel, in fact a serious confrontation with her father whom she so dearly loved and who was perhaps the only soul ever kind and considerate to her. As a child, Mary Ann came under the influence of evangelical views of her teacher Miss Lewis and a stage came when she refused to go to the church. She was shocked at the apparent union of feeling with a low sense of morality. While the Brays (her friends) certainly crystalised her rejection of orthodoxy, it was long in suspense and inevitable. Her father Robert Evans's Journal shows entries such as - "went to Trinity

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Church in the forenoon. Miss Lewis went with me. Mary Ann did not go ... (two weeks later) ..." went to church in the forenoon, Mary Ann did not go to the Church, unsuccessful in altering Mary Ann's opinion."[18]

Mr. Evans, after a fruitless outburst of parental authority lapsed into stony silence, refusing to discuss the question of religion with his disobedient child. He could see nothing but impropriety and rebellion. Having failed to bring Mary Ann to senses he got her brother and sister to try Famy, her half-sister, urged outward compliance, a course too devious for honest Mary. The goadings, cajolings, even coaxing from high placed priests, scholars and churchmen could do nothing. Nine weeks passed and the battle continued. Mary Ann explained her position in a long letter written to her father and pleaded "...my only desire is to walk in the path of rectitude which however rugged is the only path to peace, but the prospect of contempt and rejection shall not make me swerve from my determination so much as a hair's breadth until I feel I ought to do...I fear nothing but voluntarily leaving you. I can carefully do it if you desire it and shall go with deep gratitude for all the tenderness and rich kindness you have never been tired of showering me."[19]

But this heart-felt appeal failed to move the stony silence of her father. He was resolved to send Mary Evans away, not to see her again, till she had abandoned her so-called stubborn disobedience. Mary Evans was physically ousted. She went to her brother Isaac. She thought the kind father could relent, but no; for many days, no word came from the father. After nearly ten weeks through the efforts of Mrs Isacc Evans, the 'Holy war' ended in a truce. Mary Ann agreed to attend the church with her father as usual and he tacitly conceded her the right to think what she liked during service. This trauma - a war between the two beloveds, not on the issue of romance or property but on the freedom to think and believe independently must have left an indelible scar on the young and affection-hungry mind of Mary Ann. She earned reconciliation with her father at a great psychological cost. She did not believe in God and this belief remained with her till her end, but she attended Church only to be near her father who had been left alone after the death of his wife. She mended his clothes, looked after the servants, and in the evenings read him his favourite books of Walter scott. Even as a child, rather than the mother, she was fond of her father who would take her along on his tours. The Freudian complex called Electra, the reverse of oedipus complex was definitely operating in her. And this complex explains why finally she sacrificed her decision of going to the church and yielding before her father and remaining with him till his death. Robert Evans died in 1849. A few hours earlier Marian had written to Brays, "What shall I do without my father ? It will seem as if part of my moral nature were gone. I had a horrid vision of myself last night becoming earthly, sensual and devilish for want of the purifying restraining influence."[20]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This sentence is very meaningful psychologically. Inwardly, Marian was sensuous and earthly (as every young girl in twenties is) but her father (super ego) was acting as a moral authority curbing her unconscious; passion. This is proved true when we look to her repeated failures at love-making. "There was one pleasant young German of twenty-three with a bright, intelligent refined face, Alexander Von Herder, a grand son of Goethe's friend, the philosopher and the poet. He was very good natured but a most determined enemy to all gallantry...though he took me (Mary Ann) in his boat one light to the Fele-de-Navigation...after a week or so he left for the Pyrenees and was seen no more", wrote Mary Ann to one of her friends.[21]

How much heart broken must Marian be ? "There is a hint" says Height "that her heart had been caught by a young man who, not holding her evangelical views, was (on the advice of Miss Lewis) removed from her thoughts, perhaps without ever having realised that he occupied them."[22]

Then there was Joseph Brezzi, her language teacher whom she found "anything but uninteresting, all external grace and mental power", but "cease ye from man" is engraven on my amulet. And to tell you the truth (she writes to Marie Lewis) "I begin to feel involuntarily isolated, and without being humble, to have such a consciousness that I am a negation of all that finds love and esteem..."[23]

Once she told Patty Jackson, "Cupid listens to no entreaties, we must deal with him as an enemy, either boldly parry his shafts or flee."[24] This shows how much fire of passion was burning in her heart. Jerome Thale points out that 'a young picture restorer - whose beliefs are unknown - became "desperately smitten" but Marian decided that she did not love him enough to marry him."[25]

Years latter when she was invited by Dr Brabant to fill the place of his daughter Rufa (Marian's friend) who had been married, she could not resist the attraction for Dr Brabant. Mrs Brabant was blind and Marian found an opportunity to get nearer to Dr. Brabant who punningly baptized her 'Deutera' because she was to be a second daughter to her. Marian wrote to Cara, "I am in a little heaven here, Dr. Brabant being its archangel ... time would fail me to tell of all his charming qualities. We read and walk together and talk together, and I am never weary of his company...I am petted and fed with nice morsels and pretty speech...Dr spoils me for every one else, and the Trennung from such a companion will be very painful."[26]

Mrs Brabant, though blind, saw through the game through the eyes of her sister Miss Susan Hughes and she demanded Marian's instant departure. Marian had to leave with a bruised psyche. Dr Brabant is the original of Mr. Casaubon in middle march where in Dorothea like Mary Ann, found him 'as instructive as Milton's affable archangel."[27]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Walter Allen in 'George Eliot' has made the following comment on this episode : "For us the episode has two-fold interest. It brings out what may be called the Maggie Tulliver side of her character. However, well disciplined and masculine her mind might be, she was at the mercy of her emotions, perhaps at the mercy of her need for affection and self-sacrifice. In some ways, as her biographer shows, she was a born victim for she was to repeat a similar pattern of behaviour with Chapman a few years later. But the episode also provides us - in part, at any rate - with the genesis of Casaubon in Middle march. When asked by a friend to tell on whom the character was based, "with a humorous solemnity, which was quite in earnest she pointed to her own heart." As Dr. Gordon Haight conjectures : "There in her pain and humiliation lay the venom that was to give Casaubon his horrible vividness years later."[28]

Seven years after, Marian was invited by Chapman to work with him as assistant editor of the Westminster Review and she accepted the offer most happily because loneliness was hanging heavy on her mind. John Chapman, then twenty-nine, was a strikingly handsome fellow, tall, vigorous and magnetic. He had been married for seven years to Susanna who was fourteen years older than her. They had three children. Another permanent resident of Mr. Chapman's house was Miss Elizabeth Tilley, a pretty woman of thirty-two who served ostensibly as a governess but who occupied the more intimate position of Chapman's mistress. Susanna knew well about the sordid and sexy relation between her husband and Tilley but she was used to it. Very soon, Chapman and Marian were tied in love-knots. One day Mrs Chapman and Miss Tilley saw Chapman sitting close to Marian with her hand clasped in his own. Tilley too was burning with jealousy. Mrs Chapman and Tilley insisted that Marian be turned out of Chapman's house all at once. Resultantly Marian had to leave.

Gordon Haight has summarised this episode in the following words: "There can be little doubt that Marian was guilty of some indiscretion, probably more serious than holding hands...John Chapman was a notirous philanderer (called Byron by his friends). To his pervasive masculine attraction which few women could resist, Marian's yearning for affection, the stronger for lying behind a plain exterior, made her doubly susceptible. When her father died, she had her vision of becoming earthly, sensual, devilish. Did John Chapman help her realise it..."[29]

Walter Allen's comments are rather harsh. "The situation in which she found herself was indeed of old pattern. It is almost as though she wanted to be a member of a harem. The relationship with a man and with two woman - had worked with Brays.[30] But it has been disastrous with a man and with the Brabrants. It was just as disastrous with Chapmans..."[31] Marian was disgraced and humiliated but there was something in Chapman more than the business obligation, which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

compelled Marian to continue meeting him and writing to him. Although her letters were business-like yet into these cool missives, she sometimes slipped warmer billetrs douse to be disposed of secretly. After mentioning her calm letter of 20 June in his Diary, Chapman and deleted : Miss Evan's little note is inexpressively charming, so quick, intelligent and overflowing with love and sweetness. I feel her to be the living torment to my soul."[32]

The biographies of George Eliot also mention the courtship between her and Herbert Spencer. Marian had written to Brays about this friendship, "we have agreed that we are not in love with each other and that there is no reason why we should not have as much of each other's society as we like. He is a good delightful creature and I always feel better for being with him."[33] The sentence - 'we have agreed that we are not in love with each other' - was omitted by cross in 'George Eliot's Biography'. Was she telling the truth ? Surely not, because a month later she wrote to Sara, "My brightest spot is the delicicusly calm new friendship that Herbert spencer gives me. We see each other every day and have a delightful camaraderic in everything. But for him, my life would be desolate indeed."[34] It was certainly assumed in every quarter that Marian and Spencer had been engaged. In My Apprenticeship, Beatice Webb, who as a girl knew Spencer, says that it was an open secret that George Eliot was in love with him. But spencer was not a Chapman. Physical beauty was a sine-qua-non with him. Marian's plain looks proved disastrous and the marriage could not come off. This was another severe blow to Marian's psyche.

While working with Chapman's Westminster Review, Marian came in contact with George Henry Lewes through Herbert Spencer. He was the literary Editor of the Leader, a radical weekly. Carlyle called him "the prince of journalists." He was a great writer, a greater critic and the most important middle-man of ideas. He was quite ugly in appearance, usually an 'Ape'. His private life was a public scandal. He had married his pupil Agnes who was a dazzling beauty, a blonde with lovely pink cheeks. Between 1842 and 1846, the Lewes had four children. In 1850, Mrs Lewes gave birth to a fifth son whose father was Thornton Hunt. Lewes willy nilly registered him as Edmund Lewes. Hunt, Lewes and Agnes were all votaries of free social relations and this idea of social freedom included the dream and practice of sexual freedom. Agnes repeated the offence in 1851 and bore another child from Hunt. Lewes having once condoned her adultery was for ever precluded from appealing for divorce. Hunt, father of ten children by his own wife Eliza Lynn and four by Agnes had a child twice by his own wife and one by Agnes born within weeks of each other. Thornton's connections with Agnes continued as late as 1857 when Mildred Jane Lewes was born. Henry Lewes was thoroughly disillusioned with free love. But kept on supporting his wife and all her children.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Marian and Lewes were now meeting more often. The animal instinct in her was raising her head rather violently, it cared not for Lewes's scandalous life or ape-like appearance. Marian told Sara, "Mr. Goethe is one of my companions. It must be told here that Lewes had written The Biography of Goethe." Therefore, in Freudian psychology, her companion was Lewes in the form of Goethe. Gordon Haight, rightly remarks : "one wonders whether she was reading Goethe's works or whether his chief English exponent - George Henry Lewes, may not have been there (in Switzerland where she was staying on holidays) occasionally walking on the beach with her in the evening giving her the lock and the band of warm affection she craved so much."[35]

Sometime Lewes poured out to her the miserable story of his marriage and married life. One can imagine how Marian's ready expansiveness would respond with sympathy and affection, which in his cynical, lovely state he must have found more than welcome. Pity served as a common step to love. Marian too was a troubled, rejected soul, that had suffered heavily at the merciless hands of the German lad Alexander Von Harder, language teacher Joseph Brezzi, a book restorer, Dr Brabant, John Chapman and Herbert Spencer. They were both looking for sympathy, both were ugly, both were socially rejected, the bird needed a nest and the nest wanted occupation. They decided to live together as husband and wife.

At thirty four her deeply passionate nature had at last found a wholly satisfying love that responded keenly to Lewes's more experienced sexuality. "Both love pity prompted their union. With his heavy responsibilities and precarious health, Lewes needed her help and the need of being loved would always subdues her as did Maggie Tulliver."[36]

People including her friends, even her brother and his wife, did not take kindly to this alliance, decidedly unholy, irreligious, illegal, immoral and sinful. Mr. Lewes was charged with 'running away' from his wife and family. Deeply mortified and detressed Combe who had entertained Marian in his house, introduced her to his friends and urged thrice to travel with them, wrote to Bray, "I should like to know whether there is insanity in Miss Evan's family; for her conduct, with her brain, seems to me like morbid mental aberration..."[37] Most of Lewes's acquaintances blamed him as a seducer. But Chapman hinted that the responsibility was her's and he added, "Now I can only pray, against hope, that he may prove constant to her, otherwise she is utterly lost."[38]

Gordon S. Haight observes that "the satisfying sexual life gave Marian a sense of well being she had never known before."[39] It is after her uncelebrated, unwelcome, unregistered marriage with Lewes that her real creative life began.

But all through the twenty-four years that she lived as Mrs Lewes, she was only explaining her conduct and pleading not guilty. On her

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mind lay a heavy burden. The irregularity of her marriage to Lewes undoubtedly contributed to her morbid influence. Outwardly she gave an impression that she was enjoying writing the apex quality works, but inwardly she was a heavily troubled soul. She complained of physical weakness, feeble body, heavy eyes and hands and other vague symptoms. The worst of all was a state of mental depression on which Lewes's utmost efforts could not alleviate. It was a sort of neurosis which she was suffering from.

Again, when Lewes died, Marian who had named herself as George Eliot, George being the Christion name of her husband and Eliot being a word very mouth-filling, could not live without some company. She married Cross who was twenty years junior to her and who was already a married man having three children. At long last, she earned the much sought for status of a legally married woman. How Cross took this marriage, is any body's guess. The records, however, make clear that he suffered an acute mental depression. He jumped from his balcony into the Grand canal from where he was quickly pulled out and saved.

George Eliot could not enjoy the bliss of being a legally married wife of cross for a long time. Only eight months after her marriage she died.

When she was a child her father gave her a book The Linnet's Life which she kept until her death. She told Cross, "It made me very happy when I held it in my little hands and read it over and over again and thought the pictures beautiful, especially the one where the Linnet is feeding her young."[40] She liked (rather wished Linnet feeding her young. And all her like she longed to have children and feed them. This was clearly her repressed wish which she fulfilled either by feeding her dog pug or by pouring her love for Edith[41] who addressed her as mother.

She was nursing a death instinct which is usually the result of desperation and the situation when someone wants love and affection and the same are denied. Once she was turned out from the house by her father; her mother had already died, she moved for love towards many but except rejection and insult she got nothing from anywhere. Consequently she was unconsciously seeking her extinct. In her Diary were found copied poems such as given below :

Lord have mercy, and remove us
Early to the place of rest.

Her own poems had the same thing to convey :

As over the fields by evenings light I stray,

I hear a still, small whisper - 'Come away'.

Thou must to this bright, lovely world soon say

Farewell :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This instinct named as Thanatos by Freud is the reverse of Eros, and comes into being when one feels that one has lost everything.

Another window into George Eliot's psyche is her lesbianism. Her extra ordinary attraction for women is seen throughout her life. It appears in her relation with her teacher, Miss Lewis, with Sara Hennell, with Cara Bray, Barbara, Bodichon, Bessic Parkes and later with Mrs Congreve, Mrs Lehmann, Mrs. Burne Jones,Mrs. Pettison and many others. Men were only her acquaintances, woman were friends. By connecting with these morbidly passionate women, George Eliot was probably seeking to heal her wounded consciousness. Lesbianism was perhaps a sequel to disapproval of her depending so much on the arm of man.

Before she began living with Lewes as his unmarried wife, she usually dressed her in black. She declined invitations to balls explaining that her black velvet would not be appropriate. "It would be crucification of my own taste as well as other people's to appear like a withered cabbage in a flower garden", she wrote.[42] Her black robes and refusal to attend theatres are intimately connected with George Eliot's psyche.

Greeger has made mention of 'tension' as a lasting attribute of her mind and hinted that she was visibly conscious of illegal sinful living with Lewes as his unmarried wife and that her action was sustained at a great psychic cost.[43]

It is really unfortunate that George Eliot who is ranked with celebrities like Thackeray, Dickens and Trollope of the Victorian age has not been assessed from the psycho-analytical angle although her biography written by her former associate and for sometime her husband, have numerous episodes, some of which have been described in the foregoing pages, pertaining to her infantile distressing experiences and repeated failures and frustrating love encounters, her death instinct, feeling of acute loneliness, isolation and depression, guide for living with Lewes as his unmarried wife, social sarcasm and ridicule, rejection by members of the family, lesbianism, physical ugliness and resulting inferiority, yearning for admiration and affection and physical neurosis etc.

The examination and exploration of the unfathomable caverns and deep volcanic ranges lying embedded in the subterranean regions of her psyche is essential for a full understanding and appreciation of George Eliot's fiction. It is a measure of her moral courage and authenticity of her character that she dramatizes her personal experiences - the emotional and spiritual turbulence in her psyche - in her novels without any inhibitions or any facade of hypocrisy. It is this fact which imparts her works a special colour and slant, uniqueness and seminal character and accounts for her perennial appeal.

CC-0. Mumukshu Bhawan Varanasi Collection. Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

REFERENCES

1. John Walter Cross, George Eliot's Life, 1885.
2. Gordon S. Haight, George Eliot - A Biography, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1969.
3. Mitchilde Bhind, George Eliot (1883), p. 16.
4. Gordon S. Haight, op. cit., p.90.
5. Gordon S. Haight, Letters of George Eliot, II, 11, 25, 29, 38.
6. Leader, 15 April, 1864, pp. 356-357.
7. Gordon S. Haight, op. cit., p. 129.
8. The Mill on the Floss, Bk. I, ch. 5.
9. The Mill on the Floss, ed. G. S. Haight (Boston, 1961), p. 44.
10. Gordon S. Haight, op. cit., p.s.
11. Ibid., p.6.
12. The Mill on the Floss, Bk. I, Ch. 5.
13. Gordon S. Haight, op. cit., p.6.
14. Simox, Autobiography, 20 February, 1861. Fel. 133 (Bodlian).
15. Letters, I, 41.
16. C. Bray, Autobiography, pp. 74-75.
17. Letters, I,121.
18. Robert Evans Journal, 25 February, 1842.
19. Letters, I, 128-130.
20. Walter Allen, George Eliot, New York : The Macmillan Co., 1964, p. 52.
21. Letters, I, 293, 296, 306.
22. Gordon S. Haight, op. Cit., p. 27.
23. Letters I, 54.
24. Ibid., 46-47.
25. Jerome Thale, The Novels of George Eliot, London : Columbia University Press, 1961. p.4.
26. Letters, I, 163-168.
27. The Middlemarch, Ch. 29.
28. Walter Allen, op. cit., p.48.
29. M.A.P., 2 December, 1899, p.519.
30. Marian was charged with smelly relations with Bray.
31. Walter Allen, op. cit., p.59.
32. Gordon S. Haight, op. cit., 88.
33. Letters II, 22.
34. Walter Allen, op. cit., p.60.
35. Gordon S. Haight, op. cit., p.134.
36. Ibid., p. 145.
37. G. Combe to Charles Bray, 15 November, 1854 (NL S).
38. J. Chapman to R. Chambers, 16 October, 1854 (W and R chambers Ltd.).
39. Gordon S. Haight, op.cit., p. 181.
40. John Walter Cross, George Eliot's Life, I, 19.
41. Gordon S. Haight, op. cit., p. 494.
42. Letters, II, p. 138.
43. George R. Creeger, George Eliot : A Collection of Critical Essays. New Delhi : Prentic Hall of India, 1979, Introduction, p. 10.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VII

CULTURAL RELATIVISM

Hugo Meynell

There are two principal types of 'cultural relativism', as I understand the phrase; one of which may be labelled 'cultural cognitive relativism', the other 'cultural moral relativism'. According to the first, basically and crudely, what is true depends on who and where you are: according to the second, what is good and bad is so dependent. Both theses may be interpreted in a sense which makes them trivially true; what is 'true for you' and what is good for you what you believe to be the case and your scale of values, may probably be inferred with a high degree of reliability from your background and milieu. In all non-trivial senses, I believe, and shall try to argue in what follows, that congnitive relativism is wholly false that moral relativism is largely so. But there are motives apt to underlie both views which are worthy of respect, and which themselves seem due to revulsion from erroneous or unlovely opinions to which cultural congnitive and cultural moral relativisms may seem the only alternatives.I want to suggest how one may at once avoid the errors of both types of cultural relativism, and escape the mistakes and the evils associated with the attitudes to which they are often a reaction.

To profess a jack of confidence in the scientific world view which is so strikingly characteristic of Western culture is probably rather more usual now among intellectuals than it was a few decades ago.The technological utopia which we owe to science is often felt nowadays, whether fairly or not, to have failed to live up to the expectations made of it.Furthermore, many people have a more or less articulate notion that there are values tied up with traditional ways of living which have been lost, or are in process of being lost, due to the rapid proliferation of technology and the mental attitudes which it at once presupposes, demands and promotes. This change in the spirit of the age has been reflected in recent analytical philosophy. The phase of this school which derived its aims and methods from the Vienna Circle was confident that it had discovered, in principal at least, just how human beings could come to know the truth about things, and clear away once and for all the gigantic rubble of party false and meaningless belief with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which mankind has been encumbered up to now. However, the fact that the 'Verification Principle' by which they set such store was never successfully formulated, and that there turned out to be reasons for supposing that it never could be so[1], has led some recent philosophers to positions which are far more sceptical or relativist. It is often implied, and occasionally actually stated, that each society has its own conception of the truth about the world', and its own methods of finding it out' which it dignifies as valid or sound.' To say that scientific method' is somehow pre-eminently efficacious in finding out the real truth about things, it is held, is to make an unwarranted claim for the unique epistemological privilege of our own culture, or rather for one particular aspect of it[2]. Evidently these views amount to what I have called cultural cognitive relativism; cultural moral relativism ensues.

a fortiori.

Against these opinions and assumptions, which are very widely spread among sociologists and anthropologists and quite widely accepted by philosophers, I shall try briefly to argue:

(i) Human beings have a capacity to attend to empirical evidence, to envisage explanations for that evidence. and to judge as true the explanation which best fits it. I shall call this capacity rationality[1], and contrast it with the rationality[2] which consists of the methods of arriving at beliefs which are actually sanctioned by each culture.

(ii) Rationality[1] exists in all human cultures, though it seems to be exercised more thoroughly in some than in others. This is becauses human beings need a modicum of rationality[2] to survive at all in the world.

(iii) One tends to get at the truth about things—the truth absolutely,not just the truth for one's class or culture by the persistent and thorough exercise of rationality[1]. I shall call truth in this sense truth, as opposed to the truth[2] which consists of what is generally accepted as true by any particular society.

---

1. The principle is roughly to the effect that every meaningful non-analytic proposition is in principle verifiable or falsifiable in sense-experience. But it does seem impossible even in principle to verify or falsify in sense-experience the allegedly meaningful and presumably non-analytic proposition , that every meaningful non-analytic proposition is in principle verifiable or falsifiable in sense-experience.

2. As David Bloor puts it: To appraise an argument for validity is to apply the standards of a social group. It cannot be other or more than this because we have no access to other standards...

The objectivity of knowledge resides in its being the set of accepted beliefs of a social group (Popper's Mystification of Objective Knowledge', Science Studies 4 (1974),75-6). For the view of things from which such conclusions may be inferred see L. Wittgenstein On certainty (Oxford: Blackwells, 1969); Peter which the Idea of a Social Science (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958): T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962);P.K. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(iv) Since value-judgments are to be tested by evidence on the needs and feelings of sensitive beings, just as other judgments are to be tested by evidence of other kinds, there is a good[1] which has the same relation to the accepted value-judgments of any community and its related good[2] as truth[1] does to its accepted factual beliefs (its truth[2]).

(v) Truth is applicable to what one might call transcendental matters (beliefs about the gods, God ,Nirvana and so on): for all that it becomes possible to apply rationality to such matters only at a certain stage of culture.[3]

Both denial of the existence of rationality[1] and denial that one tend to get at the truth about things by its exercise, are self destructive. Suppose someone does deny that rationality[1] exists or that one tends to get at the truth by its exercise. Does he make his denials as a result of having attended to the relevant evidence, having thought of ways in which that evidence might be accounted for and having judged to be probably or certainly the case the account which seems best to fit the evidence? if he has not done all of these things he is not worth listening to; why attend to what anyone says when they admit that there is no good reason for it? if he has done each of these things he has exercised in order to get at the truth those very mental capacities whose existence, or whose usefulness for getting at the truth he purports to be denying.[4]

Rationality is a matter of degree few if any human beings are wholly determined by it in their thought and behaviour and one is scarcely human at all so far as one is altogether innocent of it. That it has great survival value is fairly obvious. I, will not last long in the primeval jungle if I cannot detect the proximity of a sabre-toothed tiger from the sights and sounds which might betray its presence, or the poisonusness of berries from their shape and texture or the hue of the leaves of the bushes on which they grow. And these mental achievements are a matter of the exercise of rationality.[1] It is important to note, in the context of contemporary philosophical discussion, that rationality[1] is not simply a matter of logic coupled with observation—unless one is using logic in

3. The view that I am putting forward is based on the philosophical principles of Bernard Lonergan. Cf. especially Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Longmans Green and Co. 1957). For a simplified account of these principles, see H.A. Meynell An Introduction to ,the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan (London: Macmillans, 1976).

4. Eliminative materialism and strict behaviourism are self destructive as implying such denial. Cf. Lonergan,Method in Theology (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1972), 16-17. The Point has been trenchantly expressed by Ayn Rand: "We know that we know nothing", they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are claiming knowledge— there are no absolutes", they chatter blanking out the fact that they are uttering an absolute— You cannot prove that you exist or that you're conscious", they chatter, blanking out the fact that proof presupposes existence, consciousness and a complex chain of knowledge; the existence of something to know of a consciousness able to know it, and of a knowledge that has learned to distinguish between such concepts as the proved and the unproved', atlas Shrugged (Newe York:New American Library, 1957),965.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a sense which is misleadingly broad, as designating all mental performances required in the achievement of knowledge other than observation Proof that it cannot be so seems to be what lies behind the curious. and (to me) very alarming, fact that so many contemporary philosophers have given up as hopeless the search for clear articulation of rationality.[1] Deductive logic will not provide you with any explanation for a set of data; nor will it enable you at least if the explanation is couched in terms of the theory of a mature science, to match deductions from it with more data. In other words,while logic is of enormous assistance in the whole business of hypothesizing and verifying which are of the essence of rationality[1] and so of science, it is no replacement for them.

The doctrine tnat there is no truth[1] is modish, particularly among those strongly influenced by considerations of a sociological nature; but the consequences of the doctrine are paradoxical in the extreme, and in the last analysis it is as self-destructive as the doctrine that there is no rationality.[1] If there is a world prior to and independent of society then there is a truth[1] which is a matter of saying what is the case about that world-of what the Scholastics called adequation tellectus ad rem. If there is no truth, it appears to follow this that there is no real world prior to and independent of society Common sense and science, for all their notorious differences, would unite in endorsing the opposite conviction that there is such a world, of which human society is a tiny part, which the (rest of the) world gave rise to at a very late stage of its development. It may seem merely paradixical to hold that there was no world prior to and independent of society; but there is worse to come. Is the alleged truth that all truth is merely a matter of truth[2] itself merelly a matter of truth?[2] If it is it is nothing more than the firmly-held opinion of the most influential members of some society which one might as well reject if one wishes to cause a revolution in that society, or if one is a member of some other society. If not it seems that there is at least one truth which is a matter of truth[1] which contradicts the view that all truth is merely a matter of truth.[2] What I have just said it should be noted in no way impugns the importance of what is called the sociology of knowledge For social pressures can enormously obstruct or enhance the exercise of rationality[1] by a person or a group, and so his or its capacity to apprehend truth[1], or the truth about the real world. It is also to be remarked that truth about other people's truth[2]—like all truth about what is and is as it is prior to and independently of oneself and one's community—can hardly be anything else than a matter of truth.[1] If I have true beleifs about what you believe they correspond to what you actually believe and not merely if at all to what the rest of our society confidently believes that you believe.

This last point has an important corollary. Anthropological research is often invoked in support of the point of view that there is no such thing as rationality[1] or methods which transcend particular cultures

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for arriving at the truth about the world. Such reasearch, it has been maintained reveals a bewildering variety of conceptions of rationality no one of which can without arbitrariness be set up as the criterion by which all the others are to be judged.[5] but though the results of anthropological may appear to entail such a view its very practice is really inconsistent with it. For it is presupposed by such research that we can, by the use of our own rationality or an extension of it, sufficiently transcend our own special point of view both to become aware that there are other special points of view, and to make informed guesses at least about the nature of the beliefs and assumptions which constitute these other special points of view. Short of rationality[1], we could not have good reason to suppose that there really were views of the world other than those characteristic of our own culture; let alone have good reason to believe anything specific about what those views were.

All that would be possible would be to convince others of our own culture about these matters by any methods (contingency reinforcement, bribery, threats and so on) which happened to be effective.

Someone might complain that to say so much is already to have fallen foul of that chauvinism which is associated with the scientific world view, reaction against which I have already suggested to be a respectable motive underlying cultural relativism. Is not Western anthropology an expression of the scientific world view, which merely exemplifies the rationality of western culture? To meet this point a distinction has to be made. What is meant by the scientific world view? The phrase may be understood I suggest in a relatively broad and a relatively narrow sense. In the broad sense, any world view is scientific so far as it tends to issue from a sustained practice of rationality.[1] In the narrow sense, it is the world view maintained by influential sections of Western culture. Now it may be admitted and indeed I would hold that the exponents of the scientific world view in the latter sense are inheritors of a tradition which has applied rationality in a thorough going way to some aspects of reality; but it remains an open question how far their usual opinions or prejudices on other aspects of reality are worthy of equal respect. The distinction in principle between the two conceptions of the scientific world view can be brought out in the following way. Suppose I am an anthropologist studying the sort of human group which is usually described as primitive, and I discover that they believe in the existence and influence on human affairs of discarnate spiritual beings.According to the set of truths which are the scientific world view in the narrow sense, belief that there are such

5. For the basis of this view, see Peter winch op.cit. and 'Understanding a Primitive Society in Religion and Understanding ed. D.Z. Phillips (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967). It seems to me a fundamental defect of the whole approach to interpretation shown by H.G. Gadamer's Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) that he denies that we can ever sufficiently transcend our historical perspective to know absolutely what is so. For criticism of Gadamer on this point see E.D.Hirsch Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). 245-264.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

beings is evidently false; the view of things constituted by physics., chemistry and evolutionary biology apparently leaves no room for such beings.

But though it may be false also according to the scientific world view as more broadly conceived, its falsity is by no means so clear. For is it not conceivable that evidence could accumulate which was best accounted for on the hypothesis of the existence and activity of such discarnate beings? It does not seem impossible in principle that (say) the Kachins or the Hopeis have attended to this evidence, and drawn the appropriate conclusions, whereas the typical Western intellectual has either not come across the evidence at all, or brushed it aside.[6]

And it is worth nothing that two incompatible beliefs may both be worthy of some respect, granted that they cannot both be true.[1] If one belief is demonstrably less supported than its contradictory by the thorough excrcise of rationality[1] the former belief does not necessarily deserve unmitigated contempt.

A great deal of harm has been done by the curious assumption that rationality[1] is bound to issue in empiricism. Which is apparently or even obviously so destructive of many aspects of culture which may be worth maitaining including morality and aspects of religion. It is perhaps no wonder that in the light of this assumption cultural cognitive relativism which as we have already seen is incompatible with the existence of rationality is resorted to as a kind of last-ditch defence. But I think it is fairly easy to show that rationality does not only not issue in empiricism but is not even compatible with it. Now empiricism is a hydra-headed monster if ever there was one; but the more closely most versions of it are examined the more they seem to amount to the conviction that what is real must be an actual or potential object of experience. If taken literally of course, this doctrine entails that neither the persons and events of the persons and events of the historical past nor the fundamental particles of nuclear physics nor the thoughts and feelings of other persons, are real. It is a comforting doctrine to many people becaues it seems to dispose of God; it becomes less comforting when it is seen to get rid of so many more respectable entities.[7] Its popularity among intellectuals is largely due so far a I can see, to the belief or assumption that it is a corollary of rationality.[1] It is a corollary that the real is what one tends by the exercise of understanding and

6. For remarkable applications of scientific method in the broadsense, or rationality to life after death and reincarnation see R. Crookall The Supreme Adventure (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1975), and I Stevenson Twenty Cases suggestive of Reincarnation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia press, 1974).

7. The fundamental problem of empiricism unsolved because it is insoluble, is how to combine the convenient consequences of Human Scepticism with the inconvenient in a consistent view. In cynical moments, it is hard not to agree with A.N. Whitehead Hume's doctrine has no recommendation except the pleasure which it gives to its adherents'. Process and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929).448.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

judgment to affirm as accounting for the objects of perception; but this is very different from saying that all real things must themselves be actual or even potential objects of perception. The former view is perfectly the historical past, and nuclear particles.[8]

The effective sealing-off of cultures from one another, by insistence that each has its own rationality[2] and truth[2] but that there is no rationality[1] or truth[1] may in the long run result in the treatment of other cultures than one's own with just as little respect as is involved in using one's rationality[2] as a juggernaut for crushing the beliefs and methods of inquiry characteristic of other cultures. At least it seems an equally effective prophylaxis against a genuine dialectic of cultures, where each may learn through conversation with the others. I believe Alasdair MacIntyre to be quite correct in his concession to Peter Winch that the understanding of a culture in its own terms is a neccessary condition of the understanding of that culture but that he is also correct in insisting that it is not a sufficient condition.[9] The beliefs which characterzie any culture as I have already must be due to the exercise of some degree of rationality[1] in relation to its environment. But they are also almost bound to be charcterized by limitations or omissions in respect of each of the three basic constituents of rationality:[1] desire, fear or mere custom is likely to have inhibited attention to evidence, envisagement of possibilities, and arrival at judgments which best fit the evidence. But—and this is the crucial point—exactly the same applies to the culture of the anthropologist himself. Certainly, the anthropologist may congratulate himself that he and his culture have reached a stage of development of rationality[1] such that knowledge of other cultures is posssible at all. but he may conceivably find that, in relation to some matters at least, what the other culture has achieved by its exercise of rationality[1] shows up some of the beliefs characteristic of his own culture as more determind by ideology in the bad sense than by rationality[1]—as more a matter of what people like to believe, or of what is convenient for them to believe than of what they ought to believe in accordance with the available evidence. To return to the topic of belief in discarnate spirits—it may very well fit the ideology of the anthropologist to suppose that there are no such beings; that the beliefs of the cultures which he is studying are false, or—to replace naked cultural chauvinism with bad faith—that they are merely picturesque. (To hold beliefs partly because they make you feel superior to other people is of the essence of ideology.) But it is not impossible in principle that a thorough going application of rationality.[1] To the relevant evidence might show the beliefs of the Hopis or the Kachins about discarnate

8. See Lonergan Insight 416: Empiricism amount to the assumption that what is obvious in knowing (i.e., perception) is what knowing obviously is'

9. See A.C. MacIntyre, The Idea of a Social Science, Rationality,ed. Bryan Wilson (Oxford: Blackwells, 1970),123.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

spirits to be more likely to be true[1] than the beliefs on the matter of the anthropologist who is studying them.[10]

Peter Winch has argued with great subtlety that if I say, for example that Zande beliefs that persons with certain characteristics cause certain kinds of harm to others (the 'witch-substance' which they are supposed to contain supposedly enabling them to exert a malign influence) are false, I am simply imposing on them the view of causality characteristic of my own culture, whereas their notion of causality is entirely different, but I do not see in what sense a notion is a notion of causality at all unless it is exemplified by a relation something like that between things or event X and Y, which are such that, if X does not exist or occur, then Y will not exist or occur where X and Y can be identified independently of one another. And such a relation is plainly to be detected by the exercise of rationality.[1] And in any case even if we assume that the basic notion of causality is the same as between the two cultures—as one might put it, that there are causes[1] to which our different sets of causes[2] tend to approximate so far as they are subjected to rationality—can we really be sure that certain persons do not have the capacity to exert malign influence on others by sheer force of mind, perhaps enhanced by certain quasi-ritual practices? One might conclude, from a brief perusal of the work of Vasiliev in Russia or of J.B. Rhine in the United States, that the limits of causal possibility taken for granted by the scientific world view in the narrow sense are unduly restricted.

As I have said, human beings in all communities must perceive,hypothesize and judge; they must do so in order to survive. But it is one thing to exercise rationality.[1] In the ordinary business of living; another thing to apply it to what has been called the sacred canopy[11] of those beliefs which are not at least immediately testable and the practices associated with them. This becomes possible only when a culture reaches a certain stage of development, and some individuals within it have the leisure and the capacity to ask questions like the following. Are those things which we zhave been told about the gods or about human destiny likely to be true? Or is it more likely that our fathers have been deceived or have lied to us about such matters? Is it or is it not the most intelligent and reasonable conclusion from

10. An instructive distinction has been made between the hermenutics of suspicion and the hermeneutics of recovery (ef.Lonergan Method in Theology, chapter 3). In effect the hermeneutics of supicion (typified by Marx, Freud and Nietzsche) aims to bring out how far the expression of any human meaning is due to ideology the hermeneutics of recovery how far it is due to good faith and rationality. (I suppose Sir Kari Popper's stress on falsification is a matter of applying the hermeneutics of suspicion to one's own position.)What is needed for a genuine dialectic of cultures is the application of the hermeneutics of suspicion, in addition to the hermeneuties of recovery to the truth and rationality of one's own culture; and the application of the hermeneutics of recovery as well as the hermeneuties of suspicion to the truth and rationality of alien cultures.

11. See Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden city N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the evidence available to us that Nirvana is or is not available and worth striving for; that there is or are not a God or Gods; that if there is just one God, he is or is not definitively revealed in the Bible or in the Koran?[12] Someone might protest that these high and holy matters are not a matter of rationality.[1] But it seems to me to follow inevitably from this that they are not a matter of truth;[13] and therefore not of truth at all in the sense understood by the vast majority of believers.[1] To them, what believe is the case prior to and independently of assent to it by themselves and their community; in other words, it is a matter of truth.[1] To any believer who is not pathologically sophisticated it must be a matter of truth[1] that his religious beliefs are a matter of truth[1] that the content of his faith does not depend on his or anyone else's act o faith. If God's existence, or the existence of Nirvana are only a matter of truth,[2] then their non-existence is a matter of truth.[1] A God whom you admit merely to exist for you is not the God of any of the great theistic religions.

In religious and associated types of belief, assumptions as to truth[1] are closely bound up with systems of symbols, and individuals and communities live out their lives against a background of both. Much of the system of symbols is articulated in what one might call deep stories', tales which are found somehow significant for or representative of typical aspects of human life and destiny which stories are deep in that kind of way for a person, and which symbols are otherwise effective for him, does depend to a great extent on cultural background and milieu: this, I think is what there is of truth[1] in the view that each religion is true for people of the culture within which the religion has developed. It is of course one thing for a deep story to be so for any group of persons; it is another thing for the cosmological, historical, or eschatological beliefs bound up with it to be true.[1] The story of Gautama's of enlightenment under the bo tree is wonderfully moving and profound; but did he so achieve it, and is it possible for us? The great picture of the Last Assize in the twenty-fifth chapter of St. Mathew's Gospel has enormous dramatic and moral impect; but is it really the case that those who have helped those less fortunate than themselves will in the long run be vindicated and rewarded, and that those who have failed to do so will in the long run be the worse for it?

To what extent religions in general or any partticular religion can survive the realization that all or most of the beliefs tied up with their deep stories are not a matter of truth[1] is a painful and unresolved question. Christian intellectuals, to take one example, seem largely to have given up the belief that the story of Adam and Eve at the beginning

12. It should be noted that this does not necessarily rule out any role for authority in religion. It might for example be in accordance with rationality to accept the Koran as an authority and consequently to accept everything which it clearly stated or entailed.

13. For more on this point, see H. Meynell Towards a New Dialectic of Religions (Religious Studies, December 1982).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the Book of Genesis is historically true, and to have come round to the idea that it should be taken as merely a deep story conveying the plight of man bereft of divine grace. It is doubtful how far they could apply the same treatment to the accounts of Jesus in the Gospels while remaining Christians in any useful sense. An obviously related question is whether a stringent exercise of rationality[1] tends to falsify or to corroborate beliefs as to truth associated with deep stories. There is some reason to believe that symbol systems along with their 'deep stories' are important for the very survival of the cultures within which they operate.[14] It does seem logically possible that the thorough application of rationality[1] might destroy the historical, cosmological or eschatological presuppositions of all of the sacred canopies which societies require in order to function. Perhaps we need to believe in God and the afterlife or Christ and the Last Judgment or the Buddha and reincarnation and nirvana or the ultimate inevitability of revolution bringing in the classless society, in order to survive; but a stringent exercise of rationality[1] will show that there is no .good reason to believe in any of them. But it is to be hoped that the prospects for mankind are better than that. How one can communicate religious truth[1] what ever it is (a priori one cannot discount the possibility that all religions are false), to different cultures, while leaving enough of their symbol system intact for them to survive, is another important unsolved question.

What I have claimed already is controversial enough but what I have to say next is perhaps more controversial still. There is a good[1] which is related to good[2] what particular societies happen to judge is of positive value much as truth[1] is related to truths.[2] The reason for this so far as moral good is in question is that no term in any language can at all plausibly be taken to be equivalent to good in the moral sense. unless it is on the whole attached to actions which are held to tend to promote happiness consistently with fairness in this life or in an alleged hereafter.[15] The nature of good[1] is to be established by the exerecise of rationality[1] in relation to data on the needs and feelings of sensitive or rational beings, just as truth[1] is to be established by rationality[1] in relation to data of all kinds. To put it crudely it is part of the truth[1] that some actions and situation are good[1] others the opposite.

However there is a sense, as I mentioned at the beginning, in which cultural moral relativism is true. I understand that there is a community somewhere in the Sudan where it causes great social scandal if a young unmarried woman wears any clothes in public. Evidently,just the opposite applies in Western society, even when the weather is a good deal warmer than it generally is in Europe or North America. This is just the kind of case of course which is typically invoked in favour of

14. See G.W. Allport. The Individual and His Religion (New York: macmillian .1959).21f.

15. Professor Zwi Werblowski stressed the need for a rational ethics at his concluding address to the International Society of Metaphysics in 1977. for some efforts in this direction see H. Meynell Freud, Marx and Morals (London: Macmillans, 1981).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

thoroughgoing cultural moral relativism. But it is much less misleading to say that the one general moral principle, that it is wrong to give offense and scandal unless there are strong compensatory reasons for doing so entails that you should behave in one way in the one social millieu, in the opposite way in the other.

Cultural relativism is I believe not so much a contemporary intellectual fad or philosophical fashion as a major cultural disaster; since so much of the best in culture consists in the attempt to find out what is the truth[1] and to find out and to implement what is the good,[1] whereas in accordance with a consistent cultural relativism neither truth[1] nor good[1] exist. I hope I have shown that there are excellent reasons for rejacting cultural relativism.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VIII

"POSSIBILITIES FOR UNENDING LIFE"

Frank B. Dilley

A DISCUSSION

There are two reasons for my interest in this topic. The straight forward reason is that the subject of personal survival of bodily death is one which philosophers have concerned themselves with for a long time. Recently some philosophers have argued that the major forms of unending life which have been defended historically -- bodily resurrection, immortality of the soul and reincarnation -- are either conclusively refutable or else meaningless. I think they are wrong.

The second reason for my interest in the topic is that it provides an interestingly different way of exploring the plausibility of the idea that the self just is a material being. Some of the possibilities of survival in that context lead to such counterintuitive conclusion that additional arguments against the usual physicalist bundle theory of the self are suggested. Such speculations cast an interesting light on physicalist notions of the self -- and it may be that some who find such a view of the self initially attractive may be dissuaded by some of the consequences it leads to.

I spoke of "unending life" in order to include all three of the traditional beliefs, plus a fourth, prolongation of ordinary life by total replacement of all its parts. For our discussion these four types will be reduced to two, those involving immortality of a separate soul (whether an immaterial or an ethereal material soul) and those involving reconstituted life of the body (whether naturally or supernaturally achieved). Reincarnation is just a special case of immortality, as a rule, where the soul occupies a succession of bodies, hence needs no separate discussion. I will not talk about ethereal material souls. Whether they exist or not is a factual matter and poses no interesting philosophical issues beyond certain methodological questions.

What differentiates immortality views from reconstitutionist views is what the self is identified as. In immortality views the self cannot be

CC-0. Mumukshu Bhawan Varanasi Collection. Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

identified with the physical brain or any of its ordinary processes. The self, according to such views, is to be found in the immaterial (or ethereal) soul, something which is in principle independent of the physical brain and could depart from it when that brain dies. In reconstitutionist views the self is believed to be identical with a particular physical thing or process. Thus the orthodox Christian belief is an example of an immortality view, on my classification, because it identifies selfhood with an immortal soul. The earlier Hebraic view, however, is a reconstitutionist view. Other examples of the latter may be the Egyptian view suggested by mummification of the Pharaohs in preparation for a later return to life, and what some people currently in deep freeze hope will happen to them.

There have always been objections to the idea of immortality and resurrection. Many people hold that both of these ideas are inconsistent in basic respects with the scientific picture of the universe, the view which they believe to be true. Gods and souls cannot be fit into the scientific world view, hence both immortality and the religious form of reconstitutionist views are held by them to be false. Such objections would have to be discussed along the lines of the traditional debates science and religion, and I will not engage in that battle now.

There are other objections however which are of a different sort and require discussion. These other objections allegedly do not depend upon assuming the truth of the scientific world view but are based, allegedly, on logical considerations. If it can be shown that there are logical objections to survival of the death of one's original body then there is no point looking any more for merely factual evidence that might bear on the matter, at least so Terence Penelhum says.[1] The "logical" difficulties, it is said, are twofold. I use Penelhumian versions of these arguments since they are the versions expounded most fully and frequently over the past twenty five years.

The "logical" problems very depending upon the different conceptions of personal survival. When survival is coupled with dualistic views of the self, the chief logical difficulties are with talking about meaningful personal existence apart from bodily states. Penelhum admits, at times, that you could have some sort of personal existence apart from the body, but not a sort that would be desirable or personally meaningful. More importantly, there is the logical difficulty that there is no way to establish that a particular body. How do you establish identity between

1. The most extended treatment of these issues has been given by Terence Penelhum in a succession of works. Particularly relevant are "Personal Identity, Memory and Survival." (Jorrnal of Philosophy, 1959, pp. 882-903), "Personal Identity" (Volume 6, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards, pp. 95-107), Survival And Disembodied Existence (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd. 1970) and Religion and Rationality (New York : Random House, 1971, especially chapters 24 and 25). The latter are designated Survival and Rationality in the text.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the bodied and disembodied states ? His conclusion is that notions of disembodied survival are "absurd." (Rationality, p. 354)

The chief logical problem with reconstitutionist views is that there seems to be no good reason to call the reconstituted self the same self as the original version. It seems reasonable to Penelhum to claim that unless there is something physical in common between two selves they cannot be the same. Since, on reconstitutionist views, the resurrected self is made of totally new material, nothing is held in common by the two selves. In short, the criticism goes, why call duplicate selves the same self ? Immortality views do not have this problem because they hold that a soul is had in common between the two successive selves, but reconstitutionist views cannot claim a common soul.

In my remarks I will consider first personal survival as it relates to selves considered as physical things or processes. To meet the Penelhumian objections I will argue that self-hood resides not in the matter of the self but simply in the patterned modification of its physical substance. I will further argue that such modifications, when repeated, constitute the same self in the only sense that matters for personal survival. Then I will consider the problems with immortality of the soul. By the way, I do not claim to show that Penelhum would agree with either of these two views of the self. He does not, preferring "ordinary language" views. What I want to show is that his line of argument does not constitute decisive refutation of either of these two views.

I. Physicalism and Survival of Bodily Death

There is little need to review the mounting evidence that our mental activities are at least brain dependent. It is not, however, clear exactly what that relation is, but let us assume for the sake of the argument that there is a one-to-one correlation of mental states and brain processes. If certain centers in your brain are damaged you apparently can no longer remember or speak. If your brain is cut in half then you have two different minds, recent researchers say. Brain chemistry certainly affects your mental states. Your consciousness can be turned on and off by drugs, blows, and your sleep-switch, and by direct input of electrodes to your brain, vivid mental experiences can be stimulated and various limbs can be made to move. It is likely that every mental state we have as bodied beings causes something to register on instruments which measure brain activity, and that memories are stored as modifications of brain substance.

Let us suppose that physicalism is true, that your states of awareness are just an organized physical system, that your personal responses are a set of brain processes, and what has been recorded in your brain in the form of habits, characteristic responses, personal memonal memories and the like. What I have in mind is what I take to be the standard "identity" theory of mind and brain. That theory holds

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that although there is no logically necessary relation between mental states and brain processes, there is an empirical connection. Brain science discovers that our sensations, emotions, and ideas are in fact processes which take place in our brain.

You might be tempted to think that your self is your whole body, but that is not essentially so. Your ideas, feelings, perceptions, in so far as they are parts of your conscious self, are brain states. Seeing is a brain process which occurs when a certain stimulus reaches the brain end of your optic nerve. Whether the stimulus comes from an organic eye, or a computer tape should make no difference in principle. The quickest proof that your consciousness is a brain process is a brain process is local anaesthesia. Your toe does not hurt if the nerves going to your brain are blocked.

The current problem with unending survival is keeping your brain cells alive. Artificial bodies can presumably replace the one you were born with without affecting your personal self, but once your brain cells die your self dies, at least with current technology. However, it seems in principle possible to circumvent this. After all, is it the case that your personal memories require the physical cells themselves, or merely what the cells have recorded ? Your memories, habitual responses, etc., exist as electro-chemical modifications of your brain substance. That being true, the persistence of those memories should not depend upon the life of particular cells but only upon the availability to your consciousness of the particular messages which those cells contained. No one supposes, after all, that a computer's memory is affected because the cells on which its memories were originally recorded have been replaced by new cells which are duplicates of the original or even translated forms of the original.

Imagine that a group of cells in your brain will die because of an inoperable blockage in their blood supply. Could we imagine recording the contents of those cells on fresh ones, cutting out the doomed cells and replacing them with the new ones which are then organically connected in ? You would presumably still remember what those original cells had stored. If this much is allowed, then the possibilities for survival have clearly been provided. We can imagine replacing the cells group by group, or all at once, perhaps by recording the total contents of the brain and imprinting those contents on a fresh brain. If the memories and responses are still there then you have survived the death of your brain.

Neither temporal differences (we now survive temporal gaps in consciousness called sleep and even comas) nor spatial differences (we could transmit the information by long distance telephone or even laser communications to Mars) should make any difference. The replacement brain may be assembled centuries from now or light years away without making any difference in principle, on this physicalist model.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Let us consider a reinforcing analogy. A tune is the same tune even when it is played on many records. It can be imprinted on several pieces of matter at once without destroying its identity as tune. In the record store you walk past a series of speakers each connected with a separate copy of a master record. You recognize the tune as the same, it's "Old Black Joe." Suppose you met several copies of now aging Josephine Premice, talked to each of them about her identity, about her memories, would you be willing to say of each of them, its "Old Black Jo"? If a self, physically considered, is a set of electro-chemical states, organized in a particular pattern, it should make no difference to selfhood whether the pattern is imprinted once or a hundred times.

This point can be reinforced by considering the following case. Suppose Jo's brain is erased and Meg's pattern is recorded on Jo's brain. Jo's brain now has been modified so that its states are duplicates of the ones originally recorded on Meg's brain. We wake her up and ask her who she is. I think we would all expect her to say that she is Meg, not that she is Jo. The reason we expect this is that all of her memories and responses would be Meg-memories and Meg-responses not Jo-memories and Jo-responses. We would expect identity to go with the brain contents.

Penelhum rejects this latter claim, opting for a bodily continuity theory of self-identity. For Penelhum, two selves, bodily discontinuous, are different selves, not the same self. Unless you can show that the body which remembers doing X is the same body which did X, you cannot prove that the self which remembers is the same self which did, Penelhum states. Commenting on a cobbler-Prince case, he notes that if there were such things as transfers of Meg's memory to Jo and vice versa, we probably would be inclined to say that Meg and Jo switched bodies, but he claims that this inelination results from mere prejudices and is not mendated by the facts. (Survival, pp. 85-89) Unless something actually leaves Meg and goes to Jo we do not have to speak of body switching. We could speak rather of memory switching. Without something which switches there is no reason to say that Meg now occupies Jo's old body. Instead we should say, Jo now has Meg's memories. Jo retrocogizes (Penelhum's word) Meg's memories instead of her own.

My counter claim would be that every psychological feature of being Jo passes with the brain contents. Many experiences, if not all, are ego-tagged. I remember my doing such and such and seldom explicitly recall my body's doing such and such. My identity is wrapped up in the conscious aspects of my experiences not my body's experience at all. The I, in short, goes with the memories. Penelhum's interpretation would seem to require Jo to reliable all her experiences according to the body which did them. She would have to note the dates of the "remembered" experiences and say of those which she remembered

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

doing before the switch, Meg (the person whose memories she retrocognizes) did them, and of those after the switch, I did them, even though the experiences seem to Jo equally to be experiences she remembers doing. Such a situation would seem very odd.

(Penelhum's choice would be natural if there were some referent to the "I" which is not some part of the bundle of experiences, but the view we are considering denies that sort of self. On the soul view of self, for instance, once any memories had been replaced by someone else's -- and there is no guarantee that putative memories are genuine -- I would have to remind myself that my "remembering" a particular action is no indication that I did the remembered thing. On the view we are examining, however, the self just is that set of experiences. What would be left of me to raise such questions if physicalism were true ? Hume's tests would decide for switching not retrocognizing.)

Penelhum's argument for bodily continuity is, basically, that unless you can show bodily continuity you have no way of showing that a person who remembers doing something is really the person who did it. I want to suggest that the problem of the validity of memories can be defined differently. Once the self is viewed as just a particularly structured set of electro-chemical modifications of some substance (the particular substance being irrelevant), then an altered memory criterion becomes necessary. Physical continuity of that memory no longer is essential (the computer has the same memory when duplicate memory tapes have been substituted). What is essential is that a duplicate memory be present, not that the physical substance by which that memory is delivered be the same physical matter as the matter which recorded it. It should be relevant to the content of the memory itself whether it came from the cells that originally recorded it or from an exact duplicate. (Like-wise, it should be irrelevant to the content of a color experience whether it is recorded by impulses from a physical optic nerve or by direct action of a computer. Consider how Arthur Clarke suggests that we may one day learn languages by direct recording on the brain.)

What differentiates true and false memories, on my proposal, would be whether the original of the memory was the result of the experience remembered, not whether the physical substance on which the memory is now impressed was the physical substance to which the original experience happened. As long as the bundle is made up of items which are correlated one-to-one with items in the original bundle, both as to content and as to arrangement, the self should be the "same self."

II. Multiple Selves and Physicalism

Let us complicate the case a bit. If duplicate selves are really the same, you do not have to make them spatially or temporally remote, you could set them side by side. This suggests a problem. How can two

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection, Pranawar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

numerically distinct but simultaneously existing selves be the same? The question is, is numerical identity crucial to physicalist conceptions of selfhood ? I have argued that temporal and spatial continuity are essential to self identity. It was one of Nietzsch's contributions to philosophy to recognize this consequence of materialistic conceptions of the self in his doctrine of eternal recurrence. We are merely adding a scientific technology, producing the recurrence by design instead of by chance. But how can two selves, side by side, be the same self ? What shall we do about the fact that duplicate selves have numerically different consciousness once they exist ? While it is true that newly created duplicate selves have all their memories in common until recently, and each of my duplicates claims to be me, once they exist you can ask me a question and none of the others will hear. We were the same self, so to speak, but we are not the same self now.

Moreover, I suspect I would be quite reluctant to enter a duplicating machine in which my matter would be destroyed in the process of duplication, even if I will be replaced by four of my duplicates. My reluctance would be based on the fact that it would not be obvious to me that I would survive the process even though four Frank Dilley selves would survive. Is this reluctance realistic or merely a vestige of the ghost in the machine ?

In the following section, two accounts of personality duplication are presented. One makes no claim that personality duplication constitutes personal survival and the other does.

III. Some Examples from Science Fiction

Frederick Pohl and Jack Williamson have raised some of the personal identity issues inherent in person duplication in their recent novel The Farthest Star (Ballantine Books, 1975). Tachyon transmission has been discovered, and since the lower limit of the speed of tachyons is that of light, tachyon transmission and duplication techniques have made rapid space travel feasible. The receiver of course had to be sent by normal means, but once it is there a much more rapid transit becomes a possibility.

Every atom and molecule in an object is scanned, and all positions and relationships among them recorded. The resultant information is transmitted to the remote receiver and a duplicate object is assembled at the receiving point. The original object, Pohl and Williamson suppose, is unharmed by the process and, as they describe it, "the man who volunteered for a tachyon trip stayed at home. What flashed across space was a description of himself, and what emerged from the receiving chamber at destination was a new-built identical copy. There was no detectable difference between original and copy."

Duplicated persons are unaffected by their duplicates, however those who are related in specific ways to duplicated selves feel the same

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

relationships to the duplicates that they felt to the originals. The fiancee Zara expressed grave concern about the fact that her husband-to-be, Ben Pertin, was going to die out in remote space, even though she knew that she would have the original of the husband at home. The duplicate self of that husband bitterly lamented the fact that he was not present with the wife that he loved. He had the same feeling toward Zara that his original had, although he had never actually seen her with his current body.

When asked about her concern for his duplicate, she said to the original, "I love you, and he is you, and I don't like to think about what is happening to him." Elsewhere she refers to "you. He." The duplicated self expressed his feelings this way:

> "So, on Sun One, one Ben Pertin had walked out of the chamber, in no way different than when he had gone in. He had done whatever he had to do in the balance of that working day, and at the end of it returned again to Zara, his/their wife.
>
> But on the wheel, another Ben Pertin had floated out of the receiving chamber and had felt the instant shock of knowing that he had lost the gamble. He was the one on the wheel."

That Ben notes further that between the selves there is only one real difference, one is still at home, the other is here.

One other relationship proves interesting. One of the Pertin duplicates eventually meets an apparent copy of the girl his original married. The complication is that this duplicate Zara came from an original who had preceded the duplicate self that his original had met and married. To the Pertin duplicate Zara seems the self he married, to Zara, he is an absolute unknown. In fact, he loses out in the struggle for this Zara's affections on "The Farthest Star."

The duplicates react just as would be anticipated from physicalist theory. Each duplicate is the same self as the original, each has had the same life up to the moment of duplication, but from that point on each is a separate conscious identity. Duplicates can meet each other without severe psychic shock. Whereas, to outsiders, duplicates appear the same, and relations toward one self apply to the duplicates also, the inner feelings of a self do not apply to its own duplicates. The Pertin copy is jealous of his original's happiness. One Pertin copy plans to beat out another Pertin copy for a duplicate Zara's affections. All this conforms to expectations, because each duplicated self has a separate consciousness, and has self-relations only to its own version of the self.

Pohl and Williamson do not ever suggest that their notion of duplication has any reincarnation overtones. Robert Silverberg,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

however, clearly believes personality duplication would constitute survival of bodily death.

The treatment of self transplants by Robert Silverberg in To Live Again (Dell, 1969) is a bit more complicated because the subject matter is multiple selves inhabiting a single organism. Pohl and Williamson just created totally new organisms when they needed duplicates, but the Silverberg idea supposes a state of technology less advanced. Possibilities of self-duplication have not been perfected, but techniques of brain-scanning and recording have been.

Through the development of the "Scheffing" process a person may have a self recording made. Periodically the recording is updated and the old version destroyed, so that when the recording is eventually imprinted as a secondary self (Silverberg calls it a "persona"), it will be the most completely developed version of that self that it is feasible to maintain.

The person who wishes to acquire a recorded self or selves, perhaps even acquiring a second or third or fourth persona, requests an appropriate one from the library of recorded personas. The instructions given those undergoing the Scheffing process promise them "complete access to the memories and life experiences of the imprinted persons," warn of some possible confusion of identities for a short while, and urge that the new persona be regarded as a guest and partner because the relationship with that persona is the most intimate possible personal relationship.

The new persona is recorded, and when it is awakened, it now shares the nervous system of the host. From the persona's point of view it is reincarnated, Silverberg says. From the point of view of the host, the host self has acquired the memories and experiences of another self, an addition which significantly augments the range of experiences available to a single self. It would be possible, of course, for the persona to take over the body of the host, called "going dybbuk," a process which could and sometimes does go on undetected but which if detected calls for erasure, a measure, a measure important in protecting host selves.

The Scheffing process is not really described in detail except as an imprinting of a persona on the brain of the host. It is legitimate to raise questions about that possibility. How can one self be imprinted on the brain without interfering with the pattern of the host self ? Perhaps separate parts of the brain could be used, but it is not at all clear that model would work. It cannot be one self in one hemisphere and one in another because neither would be whole selves and also each would have control of only one hand that way. The selves, have to be whole. each potentially in control of the whole organism, and related in the intimate way Silverberg requires for his story.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Yet in reality it does actually seem possible for several persons to co-exist in one body in a way similar to that described, if the literature of multiple personality can be believed at more or less face value. The Silverberg novel requires us to go a step beyond the three faces of eve to suppose that the multiple persons can be derived from separate sources, but it stands to reason that multiple selves which be acquired naturally could also be acquired artificially, so there should be no conceptual obstacle to the story. Like Eve's personalities, Silverberg's selves can block each other out, take control from each other on occasion, and can converse with each other within the same body.

The imprinted selves do in fact regard themselves as having had the same history as the person they were recorded from. What might be more controversial is the question whether the selves which have not yet died should regard their later imprinted versions as their own continuations. The imprinted self plainly regards itself as a reincarnation of the self which died, but should the self which died care about its successor imprinted self, and should it regard that self as its reincarnation ? Silverberg supposes that it should. The Scheffing process immortality.

Recall also that each copy in the Pohl and Williamson novel is a fully legitimate successor to the unduplicated original. From the point of duplication each self goes its own way, but as a genuine instance of the original. Each uses the personal pronoun "I" to refer to its own numerical instance of Ben Pertin, and experiences only the states of its instance. Ask each copy who it is and it replies unnesitatingly. Ask it if it is a continuation of the self before duplication and it would say that it is.

The problem comes from the standpoint of the prospective duplicate. Should my unduplicated self care about its successors and what will happen to them ? I think it should. Consider my own case when I go to sleep at night and awaken the next day. My self identity consists in the fact that the memory of my going to sleep is included in tomorrow's bundle. It is difficult to see what else could possible be meant by self identity on a bundle theory.

Suppose a Cartesian doubt intrudes. Is it possible that when I am asleep an evil demon switches my brain contents to a duplicate body or even wipes out my old body and replaces it with a perfect copy ? If that were so, would I ever even know ? And suppose someone told me, it should not bother my Humean continuity at all.

It would not follow, however, that there is any "I" that can be multiplied by this process of duplication. There will never be any instance of a personal consciousness which occupies more than one body, and it may be that fact which causes confusion. I can never be more than one self of "I", refers to a single center of consciousness, as it

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

always does. Several selves can, however, be successor selves to any single self on the bundle theory.

What I have suggested is that physicalist theories of the self, when properly analyzed, do provide for my personal survival of the death of every one of the material articles that constitute my present self. The self is a pattern of modifications of my brain substance that theoretically can be reproduced on other substances without loss of personal identity. So far we have talked only of scientifically realizable versions of survival, but plainly what could be managed by super-science could be managed by God. Resurrected selves, of the sort envisaged in Hebrew tradition, would of course be logically possible as well.

Most religious people, I suspect, would not find these two sorts of survival equally desirable. Those religious traditions which find it compatible with the belief system to think of selves as identical with the physical brain would not find the scientific substitute desirable. People who look for a resurrection look for transformed bodies and transformed worlds for those transformed resurrected bodies. Transformations seem to make the prospects for endless personal existence more tolerable than an endless succession of physical bodies under ordinary earthly conditions, however transformations do raise special problems with regard to continuity of bundles. I think that as long as the new bundle starts out as a one-for-one correlation of the old one these problems can be solved. Whether existing eternally in any conceivable condition or succession of conditions is desirable is a matter for another paper.

IV. Dualism and Immortality

What should be said about disembodied spirits ? Penelhum follows recent fashion by denying the very intelligibility of such spirits. When he speaks of something as unintelligible he means not merely that he does not understand it but that it can be shown to be incoherent in some way. He has decided that the doctrine of soul immortality is "absurd." (Rationality, p. 354)

You might think that the proper way to decide whether something exists or not would be to look for evidence of its existence, but Penelhum does not think that it is necessary to do that because the question of survival itself is logically prior. (Survival, p.17) If it could be shown that disembodied survival were logically impossible then one would not need to investigate such things as mediumistic phenomena because one would know that they were not due to disembodied souls.

Now that unusual kinds of exploration have been ruled out, all one can do is explore ordinary bodied existence. Now ordinary bodied existence does not lead us to the concept of a soul, for if we look at such things as human perceptions and actions we find that they are, in the ordinary instance, activities of bodies. So, dualism is deprived of support from extraordinary experience and also from ordinary.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

That is not quite all that is needed to prove the absurdity of disembodied survival. At times Penelhum admits that there might be a very attenuated sort of psychic life possible. Having already acquired concepts and information during bodied life, a soul could think those things over eternally, but it could not acquire information, communicate, move objects or itself about, and so on.

One problem with his analysis is that it presupposes what it attempts to prove. Having attributed all of the qualities of mind to bodies in the ordinary case and ruled out evidence that disembodied minds can do things in the extraordinary case, Penelhum has found a "quick way" to eliminate personal survival. He assumes its falsity in the very way he organizes his inquiry, a common enough fault among philosophers of his (and other) persuasions. Instead of merely saying correctly that the idea of immortality is false if his view of the human self is correct, he says that the idea is unintelligible, "absurd."

But why not say of ordinary cases that mind perceives and moves bodies about in the sort of way that would make a rich life possible in the next world ? Why not say that mind has memories which are part of its mental structure, memories that go with the mind wherever it does ? We need to stop for a moment and consider the proper relation of mental to physical in ordinary cases, then move to extra-ordinary ones.

To deal adequately with the notion of mind it is necessary to return to the great philosophical tradition, pre-Wittegenstein and Ryle, a tradition still very much alive among dualists and also among identity theorists as well. Both dualists and identity theorists recognize that the logic of minds and mental states is very different from the logic of brain states, so different as to make the claim that mind and brain are the same problematical.

Dualism maintains that the qualities of mind and brain are really incompatible, hence that persons are in some sense two-fold beings. They have brains which are very much part of the ordinary material world and interact electrochemically with it, and also they have minds which are where all of our conscious experiences take place. The fact that mental states have qualities which cannot be found in the brain itself is used to argue that mind exists in some sense separately.

Identity theory shares with dualism the belief that the language of mind and the language of brain are quite different and that the language of mind cannot be reduced to the language of brain as yet (although progress is being made, it is claimed). Nevertheless, Science discovers that mental states really are brain states as it frequently discovers that apparently different things are really the same. Whoever would have thought a priori that the Evening star would turn out to be the Morning star also, that lightning was electrical, water a combination of hydrogen and oxygen, and so on ?

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

My point in mentioning identity theory is its recognition of the logical independence of mind and brain. Wittgensteinians typically argue that the mind-brain distinction is a pseudo-distinction, denying that there are private mental states and that words refer to such private states, but their arguments have not carried the day.[2]

Identity theorists, often, admit the intelligibility of the idea of disembodied spirits. D. M. Armstrong is explicit on this matter and many others (Place, Smart) at least go as far as regarding the identity of mind body to be factual and not logical. Disembodied spirits could not be ruled out except on factual grounds.

Given this understanding of the relation, then it would be perfectly proper to imagine that disembodied souls, if there were such, could move things about without being bodies. It happens to be the case, for identity theory, that seeing is a brain and eye process, but it need not be so. For both identity theory and dualism we can rightly talk about perceptions as if logically they were (dualism) or could be (identity theory) two different and even unrelated things. When we talk about seeing red we are talking both about a visual color experience (mental state) and also a neural excitation (physical). For ordinary purposes it is not important to distinguish them, but it is important to distinguish them now. An idea is the object of consciousness (mental) but also appears as (identity theory) or as associated with (dualism) a parttern of electro-chemical discharges in a region of my brain, but they could be separate. Both dualists and identity theorists, then, concede the intelligibility of disembodied experiences.

For the dualist, body is something which the mind uses to acquire information about the world. Some dualists believe that some minds sometimes acquire this information directly, bypassing the ordinary senses by use of direct clairvoyance and telepathy. The senses and their information are merely the means by which the mental states called sensations are stimulated. Sensations occur after impulses have reached the brain and they do not occur in the brain but in the mind. Red patches are in the mind, not the brain, dualists say.

How does brain affect mind ? The only solution which works, getting around objections to mind-brain interaction involving energy flow from one to the other, is that mind just reads the brain directly in ordinary perception, and mind just moves the brain directly in ordinary mind-directed action. What is the relation between mind and brain in memory? It is just the same sort of relation. If a brain impulse triggers a stored

2. I propose a thirty year statute of limitations on arguments that such-and-such a position or debate results from linguistic confusion. If the claim that a philosophical position results from such a confusion fails to win the day in that time period, I propose that we return to regarding that position in the time-honored way.

By that rule, if you regard the Concept of Mind as the locus classicus of the linguistic demotion of dualism, time has just about run out. IT ran out long ago on the claims that free-will is a pseudo problem and that moral judgments are nonsense.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

memory, the counterpart occurs in the mind. When mind thinks, the accompanying brain actions record physical counterparts of the ideas mind uses.

This understanding of the relation would solve our problem about disembodied minds and how they learn and communicate. Ordinarily minds use bodies to communicate, but sometimes they do not and they need not when they do. The very same power that we just considered as the mind's ability to read the brain is what we call clairvoyance when it reads other material objects directly, and telepathy when it communicates to other minds directly. In short, there is no need for special powers for disembodied minds. They use the same powers they use here and now. In looking for psychic powers, then, the problem should be seen in a different way than we usually do. We have the power called clairvoyance. The question about psychic research is, can it be demonstrated that such powers can be extended to the perception of objects outside our bodies ?

Is it correct to analyse ordinary mind-brain interactions that way ? Dualists really have to say so. To think of interactions on ordinary models (telephone exchange, for example) is to get into serious trouble. Moreover, the sound evidence for the mind's ability to use those powers "extraordinarily" is increasing, suggesting possible factual evidence for such a way of interacting, to supplement the need for it as a way of resolving the theoretical difficulty of interaction.

Serious students of the literature of parapsychology have concluded that some of the experimental data and some of the mediumistic phenomena establish at the very least a strong case for clairvoyance and telepathy as powers of bodily persons. Antony Flew's admirable work A New Approach to Psychical Research (Watts, 1951) is a case in point. Flew "disposes" of the disembodied spirit hypothesis favoured by spiritualists by resorting to super-ESP. The mediums perhaps get their information telepathically from living persons. Gardner Murphy, a psychologist long involved in psychic research, favors the same solution. Murphy is quite can did about his reasons for preferring ESP solutions to disembodied spirit solutions even though the evidence favours the latter solution, he believes. As a Scientist he just cannot accept disembodied spirits (Challenge of Psychical Research, Harpers, 1961, p. 273).

My point, as I said at the outset, is not to prove that disembodied or disembodiable minds do exist but merely to argue for their intelligibility. Their intelligibility is established both by the intelligibility of ordinary dualism and by the apparent existence of parapsychological powers. Of course physicalists, cannot admit the reality of such powers without ceasing to be physicalists, but it is one thing to believe that such powers and objects do not exist and another to believe that they could not possibly exist. I remind us again that it is possible to be a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

physicalist and to admit to the intelligibility but falsity of disembodied minds. Intelligibility, however, is only part of the problem. How can continuity be established ? How can a recently disembodied soul be identified with a particular past bodies one ?

V. Memory and Identity

Terence Penelhum, following Sidney Shoemaker, claims that although memory is a criterion of personal identity across death, its use as a criterion depends upon the existence of a logically prior bodily criterion of identity. Before accepting the claims of "John", (a disembodied spirit who "remembers" the events which occurred to John's body up to the doctor's comment "he's sinking fast") to be John, we must have some way of physically identifying "John" with John. The reason for this need is that memory claims can be true or false, and in order to tell whether "John's" memory claims to be John are really true ones we have to be able to find out whether "John" really did do the events that he remembers doing. But how can we physically identify "John" with John on either the immortality view or the reconstitutionist view ? In neither case do we have a "John" body which can be claimed continuous with that of John.

It is correct that some link must be made between "John" and John, but that link need not be physical continuity, I would argue. Continuity of soul works sufficiently well. The Penelhum argument supposes that there is no way to identify continuity of memory except by continuity of body, but there might be several ways. The soul might give you evidence about John that no one else could know, evidence which would be in principle checkable. Gather the disembodied spirits that claim to be his wife, "Mary", and his best friend, "George". Have "John" discuss incidents involving John and Mary and ask "Mary" about them and so on. Now no conclusive verification can be gotten this way, but a very good cumulative case could be built. What sort of doubts would it be rational to hold in such a case ?

In the face of doubts about the existence of an external world, other minds or my own past, two types of moves have been made. A number of philosophers have taken the "quick way" of claiming that it is impossible to doubt these, although, in my opinion, we could very well imagine cases in which doubts would be correct and could imagine that our own cases could be such cases. We have, after all, noted the possibility of producing all my experiences by direct stimulation of the brain, in which case all inferences drawn from the objects of my experience to real objects in the world would be false.

The usual way for resolving doubts is to build a cumulative case against them. For example, it is argued that an external world is the best available hypothesis to explain the order of our experiences. We do not demand certainty, but we justify belief in an external world in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

terms of the credibility of that view in contrast to alternatives such as solipsism, absolute idealism, etc. While solipsism is logically possible, there are better explanations available to us. Such a tactic should enable us to resolve after life doubts as well.

Our imagined situation is this -- disembodied soul "John", "George", "Mary", and "friends" are telepathically discussing the problem of former lives. Each "remembers" events from the life of one and only one earthly person, John, George, Mary, and so on. There are no crossover memories, "John" does not remember writing Survival and Disembodied Existence, only "Terence" remembers doing that, and so on with all their memories.

It could be logically possible that the souls had no connection with the previous embodied persons. After all some technologically talented historian could be writing a dissertation and in order to get authenticity have temporarily robbed a group of souls of their memories, giving each a set of false memories in order to reconstruct a great moment in philosophy. There could be no logical refutation of that possibility, but in the absence of supporting evidence, who would think it rational ? We would think the talented historian hypothesis to be just as strange as the "evil demon" one, although a logically possible explanation.

Penelhum insists that the only way to establish identity with the previous embodied persons is to show bodily continuity between each soul and the corresponding person. He never tells us what hypothesis he would use to account for the correspondences, only that without the direct physical link he would not be forced to accept the hypothesis that the souls were who they claimed to be. Surely only a Cartesian scepticism would find such doubts warranted. Once I had the confirmation that is found in the one-to-one correlation of souls and previous embodied lives (and one-to-one correlation there would be since personal lives each have one and only one soul), given my own memories of only one such life and absence of any cross-over memories, the most rational hypothesis is disembodied survival.[3]

When Penelhum discussed the notion of reconstituted soul and cobbler/prince cases he insisted that to establish continuity we would need to supply something which persists between the two cases or something which left one person and went to the other. Could we add to our previous test (which amounts to asking the soul who it is) some

3. Robert Young has already noted that once Penelhum admits that it is even possible to interpret such gap-inclusive persons as would be involved in resurrections as the same person he is in trouble. What Penelhum should have said was that there would be absolutely no reason to interpret the persons as the same. See Young, "Professor Penelhum on the Resurrection of the Body" (Religious Studies, June, 1973, pp. 181-87) and Penelhum's Survival (p. 97) and Rationality (pp. 353-54).
Another article arguing for the compatibility of physicalism and immortality is David Mouton's "Physicalism and Immortality" (Religious Studies, March, 1971, pp. 45-53).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

others which actually involve direct recognition of souls and tracking their movements ?

I now recognize persons by their bodies, but in cobbler/prince cases would have to resolve the puzzle by recognizing the prince's character from his words, actions, etc. Not body but character would be the deciding thing. Granted telepathy, I should be able to recognize other souls directly. There could thus be external observer corroboration of personal identity.

Are there beings which actually track souls ? According to Moody, Life After Life, and others, souls are met after death by spiritual beings who induct them into the spirit world. We could ask his tutor, is this the soul that left John's body ?

The most obvious guarantor of continuity would, of course, be God. Given the role God played in the solution to the external world problem in Descartes, it would not be strange to find similar appeal made here. In fact it is strange, given the whole history of this sort of discussion, that Penelhum does not even treat this possibility at all, neither in connection with immortality nor in connection with reconstituted physical existence.

Our reply to Penelhum, then, is two fold. In the resurrection case, considering that a physicalist conception of the self is involved, duplicate selves are the same self, although numerically different. In disembodied soul cases, continuity is adequately provided by memory, given appropriate corroborating detail in the form of other selves in circumstances which could be imagined to be likely. While certainty based on memory is not possible, the possibility of evidence which would satisfy all reasonable doubts has been provided. In addition, several possibilities for external observer validation of personal identity have been supplied.

VI. Final Comments

There are two possibilities under discussion, in one the self just is a particular patterned set of states. I have argued that if that is an adequate view of the self then the self survives wherever a copy of the pattern occurs. (I do not think that is an adequate conception of the self, and I also think our intuitive rejection of the idea of duplicate selves is right-headed. The reason it is right-headed is that the self is a unit, a subject which contains its experiences. Duplication of the experiences would not duplicate the subject of those experiences.) If the self is as dualists think, it is clearly logically possible for a self to persist after its associated body has died.

I do not say it does persists after death. I do not know of any convincing arguments that it does continue to exist and, as I remarked before, I do not find it desirable that it should persist eternally. The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hindu and the early Hebrew united in the belief that individual immortality was not part of the divine plan. The Hindu hoped to be re-united with God and the Hebrew expected to be re-united with the dust, but neither expected individual immortality.

W. T. Stace once wrote, rightly, "If owning a marble leaves your metaphysical and religious thirst unquenched, so will owning all the planets. If living on the earth for three-score years and ten leaves it unsatisfied, neither will living in a fabled Heaven for endless ages satisfy it." (Time and Eternity, Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 5) He said it in behalf of the Hindu but it could be said in behalf of the Hebrew as well.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IX

PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND REPEATABILITY

S. Braude

Critics of parapsychology— and, in fact, sometimes even defenders of parapsychology— often claim that the major obstacle to this Field's acceptance by the scientific community at large is its failure to produce a repeatable experiment. In my view, this is a rather shallow charge. I want to argue, first, that claim rests on a native conception of what experimental repeatability is, both in parapsychology and in science generally; second, that it fails to take seriously the subject of parapsychology and reasons why, in principle, it should be difficult to repeat experiments in this field; and third, that once we see how loose a notion experimental repeatability is, the claim that there have been no experimental replications in parapsychology seems patently false.

It is clear enough why so much emphasis is placed on replication of experiments, both in parapsychology and in orthodox science. This is considered the principal means of legitimizing experimental results. The underlying idea is that if an experiment E gives a certain kind of result, while replication attempts do not reproduce these results, we have good reason to regard the results of E as unacceptable or inconclusive. If continued attempts to replicate E fail to duplicate E's results, we have, it would seem prima facie evidence for taking E's results to be due to a flaw in the experimental design, or to experimenter negligence or incompetence, or perhaps to chicanery. As a rule, then, only those experiments whose results can be repeated are considered genuine and reliable, and in this way experimental repeatability serves as a kind of demarcation criterion between science and non- science. Thus according to the common wisdom, If a field like parapsychology claims to be scientific, but cannot design repeatable—and hence reliable— experiments, we simply must refuse to grant it the status of a science.

It seems to me, however, that experimental repeatability is at best only a very crude demarcation criterion between science and non

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

science. Not only may criteria of repeatability vary from one area of science to another (most dramatically, between behavioural and non behavioural sciences), but in parapsychology these criteria may be so difficult to apply—or even formulate—that the results of replication attempts may not be a reliable guide to parapsychology's, status as a science. If the phenomena of parapsychology have some of the features they appear to have, or are alleged to have, then repeating an experiment in parapsychology is not nearly so straight forward a matter as some have suggested. Many of my remarks in what follows are inspired and guided by some first-rate and philosophically sophisticated papers by a British sociologist of science, Harry M Collins[1].

Perhaps the best way to see just how crude the notion of experimental repeatability is, is to begin by asking: in what respects can replication attempts differ from the original experiment? It is clear, first of all, that no replication attempt can ever be exactly the same as the original, if only in virtue of such things as the time and the place of the experiment. But of course differences in time and place tend to be accompanied by differences in the general conditions of the experiment, or in the experimental environment. These may be differences in the actual participants in the experiment. But even if the participants remain the same, we can expect differences in such things as the attitude or the mood of the participants, or even in the conditions of the experimental apparatus (especially very sophisticated, sensitive and delicate equipment), all of which can vary subtly or flagrantly from one test to another.

These differences between experiments and their replication attempts may be found, to some extent, even in the hard sciences like physics. An experiment at one laboratory with a certain kind of particle accelerator may be replicated at another with a different design of accelerator. And in a field like microbiology, experiments conducted with a microorganism M in a solution S may be replicated by studying M in a different solution S' (which at the time may be more convenient to use, but whose differences would be considered as not making a difference) or even with a different microorganism M' in S (or in S'). And of course notwithstanding the expectations of the replicating scientist, it is always possible that these differences between experiments can lead to differences in experimental outcome. In physics, for example, some of the inevitable differences between experiments and their replications may account for the mixed results of attempts to carry out the crucial experiment suggested by Einstein, Podolsky and

1. 'Science and the Rule of Replicability: A Sociological Study of Scientific Method' presented at the AAAS symposium on Replication and Experimenter Influence, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1978; 'Upon the Replication of Scientific Findings: A Discussion Illuminated by the Experiences of Researchers into Parapsychology', presented at the 4S/ISA First Int. Conf. on Social Studies of Science, Cornell Univ., June, 1976.
2. Scientific American 239 (July, 1978): 72ff.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Rosen, which addresses the issue of whether the world can be said to be in a fixed state independent of any observer. In fact, the attempts to test this famous thought experiment do not even study the same particles. One uses proton pairs and the others involve photons[2]. Yet they are all considered versions of the same experiment.

If, for example, one of these experiments supports—against Einstein et al—the predictions of quantum mechanics, then the other experiments that likewise support the predictions of quantum mechanics will be considered to be replications of the first. Thus the differences between these experiments can be ignored when the results of the experiments agree, though these differences may be deemed important when the different experiments produce different sorts of results.

Although replication attempts in parapsychology may differ from one another in respects similar to those in the hard sciences, the problems of repeatability in parapsychology are for the most part more akin to those in the behavioural sciences, and have to do with the ways in which (possibly inevitable) differences concerning the participants are relevant to the outcomes of an experiment and its replication attempts. Among the inevitable differences between an experiment E1 and a replication attempt E accompanying the differences in time and place of the experiments, will be differences in the state of mind of the participants. Now it is reasonable to suppose that psiphenomena, assuming they exist, are like ordinary behavioural phenomena in being critically dependent for their manifestation not only on the state of mind of the subject, but also on the state of mind of those around him. Presumably, then, just as variations in the psychological environment or atmosphere may alter the outcome of experiments in psychology proper, such variations may likewise affect the results of experiments in parapsychology. From the very start, then, parapsychologists are faced with the problem that if a person's ability to manifest psi phenomena is as context-dependent and fragile as such ordinary abilities as the ability to be witty, or the ability to be sensual, or the ability to shoot free-throws, then the experimental outcome of E may differ from that of E simply in virtue of ordinary psychological changes in the subject or experimenter, perhaps due even to such mundane things as changes in the weather, or something one of the participants read that morning in a newspaper.

What is extremely important about all this, for the hard sciences as well as for the behavioural sciences, is that (as I have already mentioned) despite the inevitable and potentially relevant differences between E and replication attempt E_2 when scientists agree that E_2 successfully replicates E_1 these differences will be discounted, even though they exist. So we see that the notion of replication used in science is rather loose. Moreover, since there will inevitably be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

differences in experimental conditions between an experiment and any attempt to repeat it, and since these differences in principle may lead to a difference in outcome for the two experiments, we must concede that the failure of E to secure the same results as E_1 does not automatically discredit or even cast serious doubt on E_1. The situation changes somewhat when a series of replication attempts fails to produce the results of the original experiment. But as I shall discuss in more detail shortly, even this will not automatically discredit the original experiment.

Those who stress the importance of experimental repeatability in parapsychology might protest here that these considerations are simply ways of avoiding being scientific in assessing the merits of parapsychological experimentation, and that they amount to a tacit admission that parapsychology (perhaps like much, if not all, of psychology proper) is not really a science. They would argue that even after granting the inevitable differences between E_1 and E_2 and the fact that in practice (even in the hard sciences) many such differences may be ignored, nevertheless it should not be difficult to specify in what ways E_1 and E_2 must be alike for one to count as a replication of the other.

But this hope that such general criteria of repeatability are specifiable, I want now to argue, is nothing more than wishful thinking, and ignores not only some interesting facts about the ways scientists actually operate, but also most of what is interesting about experimentation in parapsychology. The appeal for criteria of replicability also ignores some important basic philosophical truths, but I will come to that shortly.

Perhaps the best way to approach this topic is to consider various sorts of reasonable possible differences between an experiment and its replication attempts, and to see whether we can sensibly specify ground rules which lay down which such differences are admissible.

a. Differences in the Domain of Phenomena.

Suppose that parapsychology experiment E i conducted at time and that we search through all the activities occurring after t to see which, if any, count as replications of $E._1$ As Collins observes, one might think that a reasonable first step would be to reject all those activities that do not concern the phenomena of parapsychology. But how do we do even this, if (as some maintain) psi phenomena manifest themselves in the most rudimentary sort of physical phenomena? Some maintain that such things as cell differentiation and embryonic development are actually functions of paranormal occurrences at the cellular level. Moreover, there is now a large body of evidence suggesting that humans and other animals can affect subatomic processes. If these suggestions are true, or even just reasonable, then we cannot be sure when psiphenomena are occurring and when they are not.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But let us not get bogged down so soon. Let us suppose that we have some idea which activities after t are experiments (and not just preliminary observation) and which of these concern the domain of phenomena investigated in E_1. And now let us consider various possible differences between these experiments and E_1.

b. Differences in Design.

In what ways may the experimental design of E_2 differ from that of E_1? Although this question concerns some matters mentioned already, such as differences in experimental apparatus, it also goes far beyond such differences between experiments. Even if we were clear on the extent to which the equipment used in E_1 and E_2 may differ, we can still wonder whether such things as experimental protocols must be the same if E_2 is to replicate E_1. In the behavioural sciences, certainly, this is not a requirement, and parapsychology follows this lead. E_2 may differ from E_1 With respect to such things as the method of stimulating a subject or eliciting a response from the subject, or the method of providing the subject with feedback, or the method of evaluating responses from the subject, or in the type of interaction permitted between experimenter and subject, or even in the type of response demanded of the subject. In the actual life of the experimenting scientist such differences between experimental designs may be considered to be unimportant. It seems, then, that there is a range of allowed variations in design between an experiment and its replications, and that there are no clear boundaries for this range, much less any that can be specified in advance.

With respect to the importance actually given these kinds of differences in psi experiments, Collins observes a very interesting conflict on this matter within parapsychology itself. Some parapsychologists over that it is desirable for replication attempts to employ different designs from those used in E_1. They would argue that one reason the evidence for psiphenomena is as good as it is, is that the phenomena have been demonstrated under more than one sort of experimental situation.

From this point of view, confirmatory experiments in parapsychology perhaps should not—or least need not—be replications of experimental designs. On the other hand, many (and perhaps even some of the some) parapsychologists would not hesitate to dismiss negative results of experiments which employed designs different from their own.

Of course these two positions are not incompatible. They simply reveal the widespread conviction that while it is possible (and perhaps desirable) for psi phenomena to be demonstrated by different means. nevertheless departures from a successful experimental design may omit something essential to the demonstration or manifestation of the phenomena. After all, so little is known about psi phenomena (assuming

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

they exist) that we cannot say in advance which deviation from an experimental design will affect the experimental outcome, and whether the outcome will be affected positively or negatively.

But now let us suppose that we are clear on how the designs of E_1 and E_2 may differ, and let us consider what other sorts of differences between these experiments are permissible.

c. Differences in Participants.

So far we have considered cases where the participants in experiments E_1 and E_2 are the same. But we may wonder, for example, whether the results of E_2 would carry more weight as a replication if the subjects for the two experiments had been different. On the assumption that most people are incapable of manifesting psi abilities either dramatically or reliably enough for laboratory studies, it is clear that not just any old person can serve as a subject. I suppose that while similar results in E_2 obtained with a different subject could strengthen our confidence in E_1's results, we must leave open the possibility that the subject of E_1 is unique, or that the subject/experimenter combination works uniquely well. E_2 so it looks as if E_2 can successfully replicate E_1 whether or not the subjects in the two experiments are the same or different. At least there does not seem to be any general requirement we must observe on this matter.

But what about the experimenter? Must the experimenter in E_2 be the same as the experimenter in E_1? Ordinarily in science a replication attempt is considered successful and convincing when it is conducted by someone other then the original scientist. Proper, for example, writes.

> any empirical scientific statement can be presented (by describing experimental arrangements etc.) in such a way that anyone who has learned the relevant techniques can test it. (Emphasis added)[3]

In parapsychology, however, it may be unreasonable to insist that successful replications be conducted by someone other than the original experimenter. Although successful replications by different experimenters will still be desirable in most cases, we should perhaps modify our demand for this kind of replication in light of the possibility of an experimenter effect in parapsychology (including the possibility of experimenter PK), as well as the widely acknowledged existence of an experimenter effect in orthodox psychological experimentation.

It is presumably possible that only a few experimenters are capable of producing environments conducive to good psi demonstrations, either

3. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 99.

4. See R. Rosenthal, Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research (New York: Irvington, 1976), with subjects generally or with specific subjects. But if so, then we will not want to insist that replication attempts always be conducted by an experimenter different from that in the original experiment.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Moreover, taking this possibility seriously is not just a way of letting parapsychology off the hook. In fact, the situation we are envisioning, in which only a few experimenters are able to create psi- conducive environments, has important analogues to familiar life situations. Most people realize that there are certain sides of them selves they can reveal only to, or certain things they feel free or able to do only with, certain other people For example, some people causing, tell jokes, or act sexy only with people in whose company they are extremely comfortable. But even if we ignore the more intimate or vulnerable sides of ourselves (one may not, after all, feel it to be scary or revealing to demonstrate his psi abilities), theres may still be certain sides of ourselves which only a few people are able to encourage or stimulate. For example, perhaps only a few people will excite in us a certain kind or style of humour. Perhaps in the company of most people I feel like joking in the style of certain nightclub comedians, while with a small circle of friends I tend to manifest a more Oscar-wildish sense of humour. Or perhaps with some people my humor tends to be gentle and compassionate while with others it tends to be hard, cutting and sarcastic.

I see no reason for denying that a similar situation might obtain in parapsychology—that is, that certain experimenters might be able to make subjects feel that it is all right to demonstrate psi abilities, or that they might simply inspire their subjects, while others might not be able to do this at all. The evidence is certainly compatible with the idea that psi manifestation is a fragile ability, and that only certain experimenters create psi-conducive environments, and that certain subjects can work only with certain experimenters. But in that case we must concede that knowing the relevant techniques may not qualify a scientist to replicate a parapsychology experiment, and that we may not be able to ,determine in advance of experimentation which people are able to repeat a certain experimental result.

Actually, if experimenter Pk is possible (as the evidence suggests), and if the nature of this or less exotic experimenter effects in parapsychology is (like some experimenter effects in psychology) connected with the expectations, hostility, or other aspects of the attitude of the experimenter, then we might even expect different results from replication attempts by different experimenters. In fact, the alleged existence of this sort of experimenter effect is perhaps even well-supported by the continual and rather notorious failure of many British parapsychologists to get positive results with subjects and experimental procedures used elsewhere. Thus if the British recally do exert a negative experimenter effect, it would be counter-productive to seek British replications. And of course an analogous problem may obtain on a smaller scale—for example, perhaps all the people at a certain laboratory exert such an effect.

It is tempting to suppose— at least with certain experimenters whose biases are well-know—that we could actually predict the appearance

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of such effects and thereby use our successful predictions in evaluating the results of replication attempts. But the situation seems more complicated than this. We allow the possibility that the state of mind of the experimenter might be causally —and especially psychokinetically—related to the experimental outcome, and when we realize that the relevant factors in the experimenter's influence or psi functioning can be either long-term or short-term, and that they might be unknown to the experimenter or to anyone, else, it is not clear how we could know in any particular case whether the experimenter's attitude or interests renders him inappropriate for serving as a replicating scientist—for example, whether he would tend to suppress or cencel out the subject's manifestation of some psi ability. For these reasons, even if the replicating scientist repeatedly fails to duplicate the results of E_1, this does not conclusively discredit E_1.

d. Differences in Kind of Result.

An especially vexing problem in the attempt to distinguish successful from unsuccessful replication attempts concerns the topic of positive and negative results in experiments. On the surface, one would think that once we have determined that the design of E_2 copies that of E_1 (even though there may be no general criteria for determining this), all we need to do is to see if E_2, like E_1, gives positive results. But in parapsychology the very notion of positive experimental results is extremely unclear.

From one point of view, the result of an attempt to replicate E_1 is negative when it fails to produce positive deviations from mean chance expectation over a series of trials. From another point of view, however, E_2's failure to produce positive scores needn't undermine the legitimacy of E_1" since the absence of positive deviations in E_2 could be a manifestation, either of experimenter incompetence or of a persistant experimenter effect. In this last case, moreover, the failure to get positive results can sometimes be regarded as a kind of positive result itself—evidence for a different sort of psi phenomenon, one in which the experimenter's psi functioning serves to inhibit or cancel out the results of the subject's psi functioning. In this way we could interpret the failure of British scientists to get positive results as a kind of evidence (albeit not conclusive) for the existence of psi phenomena.

A related— and more important— respect in which the distinction between positive and negative results has been blurred concerns the alleged phenomenon of negative psi or psi missing. For many years in parapsychology extending in to the early portion of Rhine's work at Duke University, only one kind of quantitative measure of psi abilities was recognized. In order to demonstrate the existence of such abilities, subjects in quantitative experiments had to score significantly and consistently above chance levels. Some experimenters noticed, however, that certain subjects scored significantly and consistently below chance

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

levels, and it appeared to many that this sort of deviation from chance scoring might furnish a new sort of evidence for psi phenomena, a kind of psi-missing rather than psi-hitting.

This conjecture was further supported by the evidence for the sheep/goat effect, which showed that subjects who scored below chance levels tended to have different personality and attitudinal characteristics than those scoring above chance. Most importantly, the negative scorers tended to be skeptical or hostile to parapsychological research generally, or to the particular experimental situation in which they were involved. So since negative scoring or psi-missing may be a function of the existence of some psi ability plus certain appropriate psychological dispositions, which themselves may not be experimentally discernible, and thus since this sort of negative scoring can be interpreted as furnishing evidence for the existence of psi phenomena, it is not clear in general whether negative results of attempts to replicate experiment E_1 tend to disconfirm E_1's positive results. And to make matters worse, if we allow for the occurrence of both psi-hitting and psi-missing either in a single experiment or in a series of experiments, the combined results of the scoring may iron out these different sorts of deviations, and the total score may hover around chance levels, thus further obscuring signs of the existence of some psi ability.

Having seen now that replications of an experiment will not be exact duplicates of that experiment, either in principle or in practice, and having observed that considerable differences between experiments and replications are actually openly tolerated both in and out of parapsychology, we can now reappraise parapsychology's replication score card.

Charles Honorton was for awhile collecting data on replication attempts. At the time he stopped it seemed that some work in parapsychology had been replicated fairly impressively—enough, it would seem, to quiet the claim that parapsychology has no repeatable experiments. To give just one example of what Honorton found, according to his tabulation the PK experiment with a random number generator first reported by Schmidt in 1970 had received 54 replications attempts in 7 different laboratories, 65 percent of which (i.e., 35/54) attained statistical significance at least the .05 level, 35 percent of which are significant at the more stringent .Ol level, and 20 percent of which are still significant at the .001 level. Honorton also reports further such figures for replication attempts of work conducted at Maimonides Hospital.

Incidentally, on the standard null hypothesis that 5 percent of the replication attempts would give significant positive results by chance alone, the odds against obtaining 35/54 significant experiments is 50 billion to 1. And even if we assume that for each of the 35 significant replication attempts there are 10 unreported failures (which is highly

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unlikely considering how little parapsychological experimentation is actually conducted), the 35 successes are still significant with odds against chance of more than 2,000 to 1.

I want now to lend a somewhat broader perspective to this discussion by observing that some of the difficulties in determining when an experiment has been repeated are not peculiar to the scientific enterprise or to the process of experimentation. Rather, they are instances of the more general problem of determining when any sort of event has been repeated. These problems, in other words, concern the general concept of recurrence. Suppose that A tells a certain joke J and that J is funny as A tells it. But suppose that B, who is not as gifted a comedian as A, tries to tell J, but that he uses different words than A uses, and that his inflection and timing are such that his joke-attempt J' is not funny. How, then, do we answer the question: Does joke-attempt J' constitute a recurrence of joke J? The important thing to observe here is that this question has no straight answer. There are perfectly acceptable reasons for answering this question affirmatively or negatively. Many people might recognize that B is telling more or less the same story as A, and would say that while J had been repeated in J', it had simply not been repeated with any comedic skill. On the other hand, since A and B did not utter the same strings of words, and since J'had not been funny while J had been very funny, it would also be quite reasonable to say that A's joke had not been repeated by B.

The important point to grasp here is that neither of these responses is intrinsically preferable to the other. Whether we take B's story as a recurrence of the story told By A will depend on what is appropriate for the context in which the question arises. Suppose we are at a party where people are taking turns telling jokes, and where it is expected that people will try to tell jokes not already told by others at the party. In this case, when B tells his story we might feel justified in complaining that he did not tell a new joke, and, in fact, that he merely told A's joke rather poorly. On the other hand, suppose the party guests are playing a different game, one in which the participants have to memorize and repeat verbatim what the previous person said. Suppose, then, that A tells joke J and then B, whom we may suppose is mnemonically handicapped, tries unsuccessfully to repeat the same string of words as spoken by A. Even if we recognize in this context that the content of what A And B said is similar— that is, that B succeeded in producing another version of A's joke, B's performance (the string of words he produced in the way he produced them) will not count as a replication of A's performance.

We can imagine even more stringent requirements of replicability. Suppose B is studying the comedic arts, and that his task is to repeat, not just the same words as those of his mentor A, but also A's inflection and timing (and note, criteria of sameness for inflection and timing are

CC-0. In Public Domain. GurukuL Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

not hard and fast—we needn't suppose, for example, that A and B have voices of similar quality). In this context, what B says will not be a recurrence or replication of what A says, if all B does is to get the words exactly right.

The moral of all this is that whether or not the sequence of words spoken by B constitutes a recurrence of the joke J told by A is not simply a function of formal features of what A and B say. B's sequence of words may in one context count as a recurrence of J, while in other contexts it may not.

To some extent we find a similar situation with regard to scientific experimentation. Whether E_2 replicates E_1 is not strictly a function of formal features of the two experiments, and may depend in part on the social and professional contexts in which they are embedded. I have already observed that replication attempts will inevitably differ in some respects from the original experiment, but that in the ordinary course of the established sciences these differences tend to be discounted when a replication attempt is deemed successful. In parapsychology, however, the very same sorts of differences between an experiment and its replication attempts are regarded as potentially relevant to the experimental outcome, although even in parapsychology such differences may also be discounted when replication attempts are deemed successful. The extremely important point to which these observations have been leading all along, is that whether the differences between E_1 and E_2 count as relevant is not determined independently of the decision to regard (or not to regard) one as a replication of the other. Scientists tend to regard the differences as important only if the outcomes of the experiments differ. Before knowing the results of E_2, it is pretty much an open question whether the differences between E_1 and E_2 matter. Scientists may, of course, claim in advance that the differences do not matter, but if the replication attempt fails to give the same results as the original experiment, this judgment may be retracted.

Moreover, as I will explain in more detail in a moment, the importance we attach to formal differences between E_1 and E_2 is also a function of larger considerations concerning the status of the science itself. In a context where parapsychological experimentation generally is suspect, and in which positive results of E_1 are automatically open to suspicion, the status of E_2 will be far less clear than in a context in which the existence of psi abilities or the legitimacy of parapsychological research is taken for granted. This is one big reason why the sorts of questions we have been considering concerning experiment repeatability arise in principle in other more established sciences, but rarely arise in practice.

It would be a waste of time, then to seek a set of purely formal criteria for experiment repeatability. The formal features of E_1 and E_2 will not themselves determine whether the latter experiment replicates the former, much as the formal features of the stories told by A and B

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

do not themselves determine whether B has told the same joke as A. And when we add to this the observation that inevitable and perhaps intangible differences between an experiment and any attempt to replicate it can lead to differences in experimental outcome (in physics as well as in parapsychology—although especially in branches of science dealing with human subjects), and when we consider the difficulties encountered in trying to state general criteria of replicability, it seems unreasonable to expect any such general criteria to be very useful. Nevertheless, replication attempts in parapsychology can still be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and some replication attempts may be-and in fact seem to be-sufficiently convincing despite difficulties in specifying general criteria of replicability.

I want now to tie up a couple of loose ends. First, I want to consider briefly to what extent appeals to replication attempts can support claims that some ostensibly new or unexplained phenomenon is a genuine phenomenon. Suppose that our original scientist (os) conducts experiment E_1, and that E_1 appears to give evidence for the reality of some hitherto unrecognized phenomenon P. And suppose that our replicating scientist (Rs) conducts experiment E_2 in an attempt to replicate the work of OS. the question I want as now to consider is :when the legitimacy or P is in question, of what value is E_2?

Suppose, first, that both E_1 and E_2 yield positive results, and that these results seem prima facie inexplicable in terms of ordinary processes and seem to suggest the existence of some strange new phenomenon P. Now if there is genuine doubt as to whether a phenomenon such as P appears to be is even possible (e.g., if we can doubt whether such a phenomenon as telepathy is possible), numerous questions will have arisen already in connection with E_1 which carry over to E_2. Those who question the reality of P may have already wondered about the intergrity of OS or his experimental design. But if, say a flaw in the design of F_1 could account for F_1's positive results, then we can wonder whether a similar flaw permitted the positive results of E_2. So even if RS gets the same sort of positive results in E_2 that OS got in E_1, this would not settle the issue of whether P is a genuine new phenomenon. It would show only that certain experimental results are repeatable, and not that a certain explanation of them must be accepted.

Suppose, on the other hand, that RS gets negative results in E_2. here again, in the case where we are trying to establish the existence of some hitherto unrecognized novel phenomenon P, these results are inconclusive. If we already have doubts about the soundness of E_1 and the genuineness of P, then the negative results of E_2 and the discrepancy between the results of E_1 and E_2 do not settle the issue of whether P is genuine. If we are not certain how to assess E_1, this uncertainty carries over to some extent to E_2, and so E_2's negative results will leave open the question of whether the results of E_1 are spurious or whether those of E_2 are.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It seems, then, that when attempting to establish experimentally the existence of some novel phenomenon P, questions concerning such things as competence of the experimenter or intergrity of experimental design are inevitably live questions. But since these questions carry OVER FROM E_1 to its replication attempts, appeals to replication attempts in the defence or rejection of claims for the reality of P seem question-begging. Perhaps the most we can say is that when the results of replication attempts are consistently positive (or negative), this is good presumptive evidence that the phenomenon tested for is (or is not) genuine, although it is not conclusive evidence.

This situation may not be quite as bleak as it sounds, since the same problems concerning replicability afflict any science attempting to establish experimentally the existence of some novel phenomenon. In parapsychology, of course, these problems are somewhat more acute, since unlike such established sciences as physics, the legitimacy of the field itself is continually being challenged, and parapsychology lacks a clear theoretical framework which can be used to generate in advance of experimentation detailed predictions about the nature of novel phenomena. We would expect, then, that as the theoretical foundations of parapsychology become more organized, unified, and sophisticated, certain questions concerning the value of replication attempts will recede into the background.

One last point. July Eisenbud has proposed that parapsychology'5., Psi and the Nture of Things', Int. J. of Parapsychology 5 (1963): 245-269.

Failure to design experiments as reliably repeatable as those in other areas of science may be a function of large-scale cosmic constraints on psi functioning. Although he regards dramatic laboratory evidence for psi as a kind of chance occurrence, he does not deny the existence of psi functioning. Rather, he argues that psi functioning may be such that it tends to operate in all of us, but also unobtrusively, and that occasional dramatic occurrences of psi in the lab are random fluctuations in what is by its very nature a non-dramatic range of phenomena.

For this reason, Eisenbud suggests that we should abandon the quest for greater repeatability in parapsychology, since this quest is tantamount to trying to upset the laws of psi functioning which keep the manifestation of psi phenomena generally hidden from public view. Esienbub thus opposes the view of parapsychological experimentation according to which the experimenter attempts to uncover or tap into the underlying laws of psi functioning in such a way as to obtain reliably repeatable demonstrations of psi. He maintains instead that the underlying laws are such that demonstrable psi is a kind of deviant event in nature, and that larger natural forces tend to balance out its occasional overt manifestations.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Although I think this position must be taken seriously, I would suggest that we do not adopt it too hastily. I don't have data on this but my impression is that, as far as reliability of replication attempt is concerned, parapsychology's score card compares poorly only with certain areas of the hard sciences, but not so poorly with certain areas of experimentation in biology or in the behavioral sciences. This suggests to me, at any rate, that the difficulty of repeating psi experiments has less to do with the cosmic matters proposed by Eisenbud, according to which replication failure represents a kind of operation of the laws of probability, and more to do with the variable nature and behaviour of human beings. There are numerous kinds of behaviour, which, like the ability to control one's feelings, or the ability to be witty, or seductive, or poetic, or the ability to draw inspiring lessons from everyday occurrences, would presumably be difficult to test for under rigid laboratory conditions, and which are manifest in day-to-day life only under certain kinds of conditions. And it seems still to be a very live hypothesis that psi functioning is a perhaps unusually fragile phenomenon even for this class.

References

1. *Sara R. Feather and Robert Brier. "The Possible Effect of the Checker in Precognition Tests." Journal of Parapsychology, 32 (1968) pp. 167-75.*
2. *Antony flew. "Can an effect precede its cause?" proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supp. 27 (1954) pp.45-62.*
3. *Richard M.Gale. "Why a Cause Cannot be Later than its Effects. "Review of Metaphysics, 19 (1965) pp. 209-34.*
4. *Richard G.Swinburne. "Affecting the Past." Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1965) pp. 3417.*
5. *Bob Brier. Precognition and the Philosophy of Science.(Humanities Press: New York). 1974.*
6. *G. Feinberg. "Possibility of Faster-than-light Particles." Physical Review, 157 (1967) pp. 1089-1105.*
7. *M.E. Arons and E.C.C. Sudarshan. "Lorentz Invariance.Local Field Theory, and Faster-than-light Particals."Physical Review, 173 (1968)pp. 1622-8.*
8. *Torsten Alvager and Michael N. Kreisler. "Quest for Faster-than-light matter." Physical Review, 183 (1969) pp. 1357-61.*
9. *Rolnick, William B. "Implications of Causality for Faster-than -light matter. "Physical Review, 183 (1969) pp. 1105-8.*
10. *G.A. Benford et al. "The Tachyonic Antitelephone."Physical R view d. 2 (1970) pp.2635.*
11. *Paul L. Csonka. "Advanced Effects in Particle Physics I." Physical Review, 180 (1969) pp. 1266-81.*
12. *H.W.B. Joseph. An Introduction to Logic. (Oxford University Press: Oxford) 1916. p.401.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

X

SOLITUDE IN LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY

Hywel D. Lewis

"I understood that the world was nothing, a mechanical chaos of casual, brute enmity on which we stupidly impose our hopes and fears. I understood that, finally and absolutely, I alone exist. All the rest, I saw, is merely what pushes me, or what I push against, blindly-as blindly as all that is not myself pushes back. I create the whole universe, blink by blink,- An ugly god pitifully dying in a tree".

These words are from a novel which will be, I imagine, familiar to many of you. It is by John Gardner and was first published in 1971. Some greeted it with wild enthusiasm, as a modern masterpiece of imaginative writing, others were repelled by the stark horror which the occasional pity does little to relieve as the terrible story unfolds itself. The title of the novel is Grondel and it offers a terrifying picture of a modern Beownlf.

The torment of Grendel lies in his inability to communicate. He has grown out of the world of his beast-mother though remaining partly dependent upon her, on her mindless pity and affection as well as her help. But she provides nothing that he needs even though they both move at some kind of supernatural level. But neither can he communicate with men, he makes nothing of their talk; and while he aspires initially to be like them or with them, their total inability to make anything of him, beyond the menace of his power and preternatural presence, drives him to unmitigated hate and destructive malice. An object of pity to itself, he is otherwise the symbol of total evil.

This is the theme, proclaimed in less colourfully fantastic forms, of a great deal of recent literature. On occasion the world of fantasy becomes mandant again, and one is not certain when one is moving in a realm of table and allegory and when in the community of real persons, as in another much admired and perplexing work of fiction, Surfacing

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by Margaret Atwood. But the upshot, even when not so explicitly stated, is the same rejection of the world as we initially have it, the retreat into a world sometimes a very hateful one where we ourselves weave all that matters into some fashion of a projection of ourselves know to be most repulsively degrading. There is even a craving, but in a horrifyingly sophisticated human way, for animal existence without the unawareness of beasts. We cannot escape our destiny to be human, but we also fail to relate to the world as we ourselves apprehend it in the proper community of our awareness of each other.

When fantasy is not invoked to bring out the full horror of this incarceration in a world that is not fitted an our proper needs and aptitudes, there is a more explicit portenyal of essentially the same situation in a there wartly and peppery human context. We are dealing with people as they normally are, but in the same appalling situation of a failure of involvement, an arrangement for which there is no easement in outright madness.

Take a novel that moves lively in the normal liberated culture of lay. It is the instrument by John O Hated. The author is, I suspect, a little aulerest matted by our finest cities. Few would deny that he is a highly quoted and lively story teller. He gets on with his uninhibited, unvarnished story, without pausing to ponder the impact of it or point his moral, obliquely or in any other way. The story is everything. But it is in its forthright narrative, very profound all the same. The main character, Yank lucas is a line and friendly person, with complete integrity at threat without any ostentation-there is no parade of virtues. Not all his standards would be widely endowed. But he is in a detached and genuinely amused way, interested in people that concerned about them for just what they are. He is fully and perceptively aware that he cannot pass from his fantasies about Annaphelpe with whom he lodges in the New England village, to which he has escaped from the complications and publicity of sudden fame, as he can flirt and amuse himself with the more wanton girl at the post office. His much more serious involvement had been with Zena Gollum the glamorous star of the play which had brought him instant prominence and assured success. But an affair with Zena even a deep and lasting one, would make demands upon him not consistent with total commitment to his art and future projects. At all costs these must come first. His break with Zena is savagely ruthless, though kindlier in that way. It is also tragic and prepares for the disintegration of the character of Zena Gollum, already on the way and her suicide. Lucas returns to new york, grieving but not devastated, his art and his career still untarnished. But he has another deeper tragedy of which he will never be rid namely vicissitudes will never break him for he can never be sufficiently involved for them to touch him at the core of his being. Nice fellow though he is he cannot take on the burden of any ultimate care. He never gets properly outside himself.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The story of Yuak Lucas is the story of the failure of ultimate involvement for deepen and more desperate than ordinary destitution, and it is not inappropriate that he should sum it up himself, in the closing words of novel with the simple but frightening detachment of his clear sighted understanding of himself, and ,as he sees it and rightly in one way, of all others why he exclaims ,

It is the same course that is taken another work of fiction that is much better known, Memoirs of Hacate county, by Edmund Wilson. This is usually considered by literary critics in the context of an author's reaction to life and attitudes in America at the time (the book was first published in 1946). But it has importance of a much less transitory kind, and much profundity. The mood for the book is set by the story of the man beautiful ducks that were the admiration of a man on whose pond they settled who shot snapping turtles, the turtles steadily eliminating the Evil and ugliness seemed invariably to triumph.

In the main story, the princes with the Golden Hair, the narrator writes on a love affair simultaneously with two very different persons.

One of these the Princes' in the title is the sophisticated, elegant wife of a business acquaintance, the other is the very simple but not girl he has got to know at the Tango Casino where she works. In both cases there is deep affection women in her physical disability, tenderness and practical kindness towards the girl from the Casino caught up in the wretchedness of her background and distressful family relations and her affections. But when various circumstances bring the two affair abruptly to end , the lover is not really deprived of anything vital in his own existence. He declares at the close of the story:

"She had given me this vision ..... it was something so strong and instinctive that it could outlive the hurts and intections the defilements, among which we lived so organic that it could not be analysed. She had transmitted a belief and a beauty that could not be justified or explained. Nor could they ever be paid for or sold And what had I been able to give in return? What had I to compare with these? My passion for painting, perhaps. But I had not been able to give her even that".

In all his admiration and concern for the one lovely and superior person, and his tender sharing of the wry humour and trust of the other, a sort of saintliness that shone through the sordidness of their encounters, he had remained inviolable, he had given away nothing that was truly himself there was no totality in any of his generosity or his pity; at the deepest level he had not been hurt, for his love had not touched him there. He remained confined in the solitariness of his proper existence, radically unaffected but lost; I was felled by a sudden glumness as I knew, and found it bitter to know, that I was back now in Hecate County.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A similar strain runs through much of the work of this Murdoch, both in explicit philosophical discussion and in fiction. In The sovereignty of God we are warned against the false consolation of self pity, resentment, fantasy and despair and urged to seek help through art and the world of nature, to pierce "the falsifying veil" and look at the world and it really is to "be realistic, to perceive justly". In some passages in her novels, Miss Murdoch presents in very vivid imagery the horror of the enclosure in one's own inner existence that comes about by failure of involvement. For example:

But the theme and central course of the novels present much the same situation. In The sea. The sea, we have two young persons deeply and unaffectedly in love with all prospect of a happy life together, but the girl feels the demand of this particular love so excessive that she breaks away from it altogether and in due course enters into another happy but more commonplace marriage. Many years later the two meet by sheer chance, the man by now at the peek of a fine career, and a celebrity. In fancy at least the flame of the earlier romance is kindled, nothing in all the man's amours and successes having filled the void. He seeks to re-establish their love more deliberately, but the woman feels the force and the depth of it as well and there ensued in this way a bizarre situation of partially requited love between an ageing and not too obviously attractive women and almost her opposite in the confident liberated and much admired person the man has become. Only exceptional literary skill can redeem this. In the end it all comes to nothing , the opportunity for the one involvement that would have been properly fulfilling having been lost and abandoned in the first failure to come to terms with it.

In Nuns and soldiers we have the many convolutions of several loves leading, by their desperation again, into near bizarre situations where an almost too determined, cultivated, giving of oneself is frustrated at all crucial points, (alike for a young couple- a raftish and rather shiftless young man and his girl-friend determined to wound herself with a rebellious bloody-mindedness which does not seem to be her true nature-and the phisticated sensitive group into which their lives are strangely drawn) by an equally inevitable drawing away into the security of life as each person seems to see it to be for himself. A center is Anne who, having left her bright and talented existence at Oxford to spend many years in a conwent, came out to find that the impulse and name of mind which sent her there is still with her, a need, surviving the loss of her initial faith. To give herself wholly without knowing how this could be done.

"She had been so wise not to tell her love.... some great necessary intergrity, some absolute availability, some eternal aloneness would have been lost by that revelation. She had kept her mouth shut, she had never told her love, and that at least was for her salvation. She

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

was still empty and clean, transparent and invisible although the voice that said this was still the voice of her pride. And she was homeless and free. She had left the convent because it was a home. Foxes have holes, but the some of Man..... only now, after the safety of her service to Gertrude was she facing the void which she had chosen.

But was not the idea of void itself an illusion.....or would she perhaps end up after all as a priest in another church? At least she knew that she must now seek solitude, innocence and the silence of being totally uninteresting ."

It would be easy to multiply examples in the same vein. Indeed, a most impressive survey has in fact been undertaken by professor on Mijuskovic of the University of Carbondale in his fine book homeliness in philosophy, Psychology and literature. He shows most effectively how prominent the themes of homeliness and inwardness have been in creative literature from quite early times, in the myth of Prometheas, the Odyssey, in parts of Plato and Aristophances, and in the upanishads, down to most recent writers of fiction and philosophy. Robinson Crusoe recovers the importance it had earlier for speculative thought, (the "History of Robinson and Friday" as we have it in Hegel's "outlines of the Phenomenology") and is shown to be put of a concern which continues through Proust to the British novelist Author Machen and his frightening portrayal, in his own words, of "a Robinson crusoe of the soul." and to Thomas Wolfe's "we walk the streets of life **alone**[2]" Matched by Conrad's Heart of Darkness and Golding's pincher Martin.

Mijuskovic concludes that, on the "philosophical foundation" of the ability of thought to "curl back on itself," "the disciplines of literature, philosophy and psychology have erected a significant and true insight into man's fundamental nature, namely that each of us, separately, exists in isopation in a state of desolate loneliness, enclosed within the confines of a `nomadic prison which we continually strive to escape.[3]"

But having indicated, if only in outline but, I trust, with some of the starkness of which the subject allows, how persistent and deep is the preoccupation in general literature with inwardness and a radical isolation, it is new time to turn to a more expressly philosophical consideration of the situation which is presented to us in these disturbing works of literature, and to assess its proper significance.

It will. I hope be evident that the loneliness with which these notable writers are concerned is not just some occasional condition into which some unfortunate persons are plunged by peculiar and distressful circumstances the old the deprived the bereaved and their like. Turns of fortune may indeed high -light a state in which we all find ourselves, and lend it a peculiar bitterness. But we are not all of us cut off from

1. Memoirs of Hecate Country,p.313.
2. op.cit..p.313

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

our fellows in these overt ways. Many lead very full lives but are still subject, in the deepest understanding of their state to the desolation of which the novelists and dramatists write. What is this and what can the philosopher say about it?

He will not have much if anything to say if he subscribes to the prevailing fashion in the philosophy of mind namely to deny that we have any inner existence or to insist that there is no important sense in which our experiences are private. It has been widely held that mental processes contrary to what may seem to be obviously the case are in reality identical with states and changes of the brain. Others without seeming to endorse an outlight materialist view, have sought to dissolve the issue between a corporealist and a dualist view by reducing all our experiences to our public observable behaviour plus the dispositions to behave which are disclosed in our actual conduct. This in essentials, was the well known procedure of Prof. Ryle; and whatever else may be said about it, it seems to be deliberately contrived to climate any significant sense in which experiences are private and exclusive, initially and inherently to the people who have them.

There could no doubt be some ingenious way in which a distinction might be drawn between experiences which are public and those which are private and some sense of desolate isolation in terms of a Rylean account of mental existence. Ingenuity can go a long way, as outright materialists have shown from time to time. Misunderstanding could have some place in a Rylean view or its like; and this could be a source of painful isolation and distress. But it would at most be partial and occasional; it would have little to match up to the sense of a despairing imprisonment within consent as a constant liability of being as we are which is so disturbingly vivid in the literature to which I have alluded.

To appreciate that we have I submit to draw a sharp distinction in the first place between mental processes of all kinds and occurrences of a radically different nature in the physical world. Mental events are not extended and locatable. The thoughts I have now as on-going processes are radically different in nature from any observable physical processes, and this I know in knowing what thoughts are like in the process of having them. This is true not only of more severely intellectual reflection, but of all forms of experience, including so-called physical sensation. There is admittedly a sense in which pains for example are locatable; but whatever we say on this head it seems certainly not the case that I can ever observe a pain in my tooth though I may well be able to indicate the case of it there; the dentist can tell me exactly what is wrong, but he does not see or touch the pain that is something I feel.

I have presented this view at length on other occasions and in other writing. I will not recapitulate further here what I have set out fully already. The close interaction of mind and the importance of the body in other ways is also readily allowed. But this does not make mental

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

existence itself bodily. Nor is there any access to mental existence other than through each person's awareness of what it is like in his own case. This is not to be identified though many have thought otherwise with statements about states of mind. It is on the contrary a matter of being aware of out own states of mind in the process of having them as I have also set out more fully elsewhere.

I have also maintained that states of mind or all experience, belong to or are had by a subject which is the same in all experience. This is established not only as in Kant by an analysis of what is involved in our having the sort of experience we do have but also more unmistakably and firmly by each person knowing himself as the person he is in having any experience whatsoever. A person is not an imaginary focus or its like but the actual being that each one finds himself to be. The person, as known in this way is not any pattern or continuity of the experiences themselves. He remains the one he is whatever the experiences, and in all changes of experience. If my thoughts and perceptions now were altogether different, It would still be me having them. Nor an I merely my dispositions. These may be described as I may be described in terms of all that has happened to me. But the me who is so described is more than that. But it is known, not by description, but initially by each one in having any experience.

We must, however avoid the temptation of isolating the self as known in this way, from the course of the experience or the dispositions and character which it discloses. My thoughts, my likes, my sensations and so on are truly me and not just related to me. But in another sense they are not me; if those were different I would still be me. Time will not allow me to go further into the way we must philosophically handle this seeming paradox. I have tried to do so elsewhere. Here I Can only insist that there are not two selves, but only the one self; who may be identified by description and also in a more basic way by each one directly in his own case as the unique being be is a mode of identity altogether peculiar to persons.

Memory in the strict form of recalling some event in which we ourselves have involved, including the awareness each one had of himself at the time, provides the more explicit guarantee of continued identity though much that be filled up further around this. His memory is of course personal identity and there is no reason why he should not be the same person, in the basic form noted in the situations of which all trace of memory is sunk. It is these terms that we must approach the problem as e.g.; as they called although this is not the place to pursue that further.

It is for these reasons that I can never be in doubt at the time about my being the subject in any experience. I may be wrong about the causes of a pain I have, but I cannot be wrong at the time about its being he who has it, and so far all experience. But I may be mistaken

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

about many events in my past; for I learn about these in essentially the same way as I learn about other persons from evidence of one sort or another. I do not even in telepathy, have-or share the experience of another person as he has it. I learn about it from what he says or from his demeanour or behaviour. I do not even intimate relationships, know another person's experience, his thoughts or sensations for example, in the same way as his actually having it. I do not know another person properly from within but only myself. This is where the issue relates very closely to the latters noted earlier.

If my view is sound there is a very profound and important sense in which every individual is unavoidably is what it is to be a conscious being, or to have experience a world to himself. This is not the whole story, far from it. We are aware of the world around us and we have rich and fulfilling encounters with one another. Life, as we know it would not be possible otherwise. Solipsism is the way of madness, strictly not even that but it does not follow by any means, as so many of our contemporaries suppose, that the rejection of Solipsism commits us to the view that we know one another in the same way as we know ourselves. There is an unavoidable away in human being the finite conscious beings that we are. We can never step out of this and the failure to come to terms with this unavoidable basic feature of the only existence we can have is a prime source of wretchedness and disaster and the very stuff of tragedy.

The finality of our initial isolation cannot be stressed too much. This is not relative but total. There is no way in the nature of what it is to be conscious, by which one consciousness can invade another. This is a hard fact of our finite existence. We can have no one else's experience. There is an awesomeness in this but it is the price of our dignity as the being we are, and the condition of all that we find of worth. It is the glory and mystery of how we are made, each in one way his own world, unavoidably and always but not solely so. If it were all we could not be. But it is not all.

We also apprehend what is presented to us, whatever, as philosophers, we may say about its status; and from within this general apprehension of the world around us we recognise the items in which these are unfolded, as the obvious explanation of what we find, what other persons are like and intend. This is not infallible, but it also comes about easily and spontaneously and normally, with all the certainty we need. In reflection it may seem remote and elaborate, and indeed it is elaborate like much else in human existence which comes to seem simple and operates with ease and swiftness. But it makes possible the full and easy communication we have with one another, the warmth and tenderness and intimacy of close personal fellowship. Bodily contact has its part here though it is never as more bodies that we meet. The marvel of out essential inwardness is matched by the ease and richness of mediated human mutual encounter.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But this has its perils the risk involved in creating as with such a vast potential. It is only too easy to slide from a world that exists in its own right a world with which we must come to terms, and from encounters which ignores their own requirements and the respect and attention due to persons as real as ourselves it is easy to slide from this to a more contemplating inner citadel of our own consciousness the world as we would just like it to be a world of fantasy and dreams. This does not happen merely in situations of acute abnormality in madness and delusion. It is person, in some measure to characterize all our concerns and attitudes, even in the normal daily round.

Bertrand Russel is a good example. No one would normally think of him as a lonely of solitary person. Even when he was most unpopular he was surrounded by people devoted to him. He was at the centre of much public attention and esteem. He was married many times. He had children in whom he took the closest interest, he had many lovers. And yet he returns, in his autobiography many times to the theme of a 'sombre solitude' by which he was oppressed for most of his life. These are not the terms in which we would normally expect him to speak. His diagnosis of the malaise from which he thought D.H. Lawrence suffered is also significant. Russell wrote:

"His thought was a mass of self-deception masquerading as stark feadlism..... when he realized that other people existed he hated term. But most of the time he lived in a solitrary world of his own interesting people by phantoms as fierce as he wished them to be. His excessive emphasis on sex was due to his fact that in sex alone he was apelled to within that he was not the only human being in the universe. That it was so painful that he conceived of sex relations as a perpetual light in which cach is attempting to destroy the other. Little is said very explicitly is the contexts to which I have referred about quilt and wrong doing. But a brooding sense of quilt runs through: much of these writings. The authors are not primarily moralist. They do not denounce, they expose they are more full of pity than condemnation. They have a fair place for genuine goodness and describe it well. All the same there run through all dismay and sadness a deep undercurrent of guilty as well. It lies at the heart of the horror, not disentangled from other ingredients, but starkly there. It is not an unhealthy affection. as in much theology and psychology today, it is not collective but a form of the nemesis to which each one contributes.

This is in line with sound understanding of persons and morals. Much in our lives is shaped for us, though not mainly by sheer pressure from without. We absorb into our own natures the influences which make as what we are. But at the very core of moral accountability is the genuine open choice between what our main inclinations on some occasions require and opposing moral obligation. Nothing preordains this choice, the person, in the respect which is more that the course of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

one's life or one's nature, makes it. No one is more lonely than in ultimate moral choice. Here one is wholly on one's own.

But it is for this very reason that failure to conform with what we ourselves feel to be appropriate at the time helps significantly to turn us away from world as it really seems to the inner world of our own fantasies and wishful thinking. If you betray the world you find it hard to face it you escape to a convenient world of your own. This is not the only reason for such turning away, but it is a factor which makes for bitterness and hardness of heart. It is in the conflation these ethical repercussions with others, including a religions sense at desolation, which are not so wholly of our own making that we find the key to a persistent sense of vileness which is at old with properly ethical notions of blame and wrong doing. The part of unconscious repression in these convolutions has been noted and discussed by me elsewhere.

One peculiarly significant form of the misguided ways in which we react to the inevitable inwardness of our existence is when in frustration and despair we try to establish an assured contact with others as other by seeking to penetrate directly to their own inner existence. This is bound to fail it is for reasons noted already inherently impossible. But there is deep in our nature, induced by dismay and misery an urge, unformulated and not usually reflective to seek relief and fulfilment in these essentiality impossible ways to push beyond the barrier which finitude itself imposes open us. This is perverse but understandable.

The most overt and immediately damaging forms of this perversion are found when we force one another into situation where the normal disguises and adaptations are dropped, when we see as we seem to think the naked goal. The pretences the normal conformities go in extremes of passionate excitation or in anguish and terror. At last we are truly at one with the other as he really is. In one way this is true there is some kind of bond between the tormentor and his victim passion is often stark. But it is also wrong-headed it provides realism without worth. The impulse which induces it defeats itself. For the inner citadel of the being of the other remains unsatisfied as it should be.

How extensively these reactions affect our lives today may not be easy to determine and I must leave the matter mainly with you to consider.

As well aware of the danger, so expertly exhibited by Lady Wotton. of providing one exclusive explanation or solution of same social malaise. But it seems plain that all over the world, people are lapsing into various forms of madness and destructiveness. In part this is due to the exceeding rapidity of some of our advances, the ensuing complexities and alarmed reaction, it is helped by the kind of power, and the concentration of power that can be wielded today. The evil in our lives

1. Our Experience of God, chapter IV.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can also be high-lighted and exaggerated, to the disregard of extensive normality and decency by the threat it poses and its news value. Even so, when all caution is exercised and allowance is made we seem raced with an astounding appearence of violence and barbarism, in our own community and in unbelievably degraded and fanatical regimes all over the world.

My submission is that this may not be accounted for entirely in terms of complexities of our social situation, but rather that the final explanation, the disclosure of the basic factors involved-and with that the ultimate solution must be sought deep in our nature and finite existence; and in this enterprise, we need to heed especially the implications of the limited finite existence we have and the proper way to cope with the inwardness which is an inescapable feature of our being creatures with the sort of potentialities we do have.

What is the proper way to cope? It must clearly be round in the compensating apprehension of the world around us including other persons, existing in its own right with appropriate claim to our interest and regard. A sickly interest in the world merely as it relates to us will not do. We have to acquire the right sort of realism. This will involve our own role, in contemplation and action, as well as the impact of the world itself. In the case of persons, there must be the regard which takes them on their own merit establishing a rapport with them in and for themselves, but which is also distanced. There is a restraints holding back, in genuine have not in the cautions reluctance to enter into total commitment but in the concern not to violate the sanctity of the genuine inner existence of the other. We should not aspire to possess one another, or to be one another, but to love with appreciation and reverence. We have to put off our shoes when we step on the holy ground of the genuine being of others. They are not extensions of ourselves.

Iris Murdoch has taught us much about the way to achieve this kind of realism. I have referred to her work in this vein with approval elsewhere. For her the remedy is found pre-eminently in art. Art she says, pierces the veil and gives sense to the notion of a reality which lies beyond appearance. The love which brings the right answer is an exercise of justice and realism and really looking. The difficulty is so keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it from returning surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity resentment fantasy and despair. A persons may be brooding over same hurt to his prestige. Then suddenly he observes a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altrerd. The brooding self with its hurt vanity

1. In her social Science and social pathology, and elsewhere.
2. Jesus in the Faith of Christians, p.23-27. 3. Op,cit.,p. 91
3. The Sovereignty of Good, p. 88. 4. Ibid., p.84

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. Miss Murdoch has much to say in the same vein in works of fiction as in her essays and I have myself given much prominence elsewhere to the healing power of art. This in its many forms, available to high and low in diverse ways has certainly a central place in the restoration of men and societies. But it is not enough.

Or so it seems to me. There is a void which the world mere alive and articulate to us in art does not fill, a despair and destructiveness which it cannot wholly correct, a hunger which it does not assuage. In my view, but I can only touch on this in closing this evening there is only one ultimate solution the salve in which our distinctness and its dignity remains unimpaired. It is found in our openness to transcendent being, the inexhaustible richness of an ultimate which not only sustains us but keeps us as it will keep as straining after a surpassing holiness which does hot crush or overwhelm us or eliminate what we generally are, but which it own as in ever more complete and satisfying ways measured in the modes in which it may be received of as to varieties of worth and attainment that do not pull.

The main wonder of this its crown and glory, is the tempering of what is given to what can be received in mode as in substance. This is in itself an abiding amazement and we should reduce it by belittling what we are or on the other hand trying to over-reach ourselves. As we revere one another there is reverence in the love of God for us. He alone knows from within and that is an awesome thought. But he does not come with the majesty that obliterates. He comes in the gentle ways of unclosure, of lights that shine peculiarly in our own awareness, the enchantment and through of a tender restraint. We may vulgarise this also to a certainly much distort it, and seek to bring God himself within our possessiveness we may try to contemplate him within limited understanding. That he returns not to be eliminated by rude presumptions and it is here that we find the triumphant solution to the distinctness, without which we are nothing and solitariness ever prone to engulf us and impel to destructive despair. It is a triumph to which the solitariness itself contributes. These are further large issues to which I can only allude. I have resisted, not altogether successfully, you may think the temptation to preach to you or pass beyond the limits of my assignment in this lecture. I hope you will not be disconcerted if I venture to add that in my opinion the restoration and fulfilment to which I have referred is found finally and supremely in the marvel of the giving of himself with all that this is known to involve by God in the man Jesus of Hayareth.

Reference & Foot Notes

1. *Nuns and Soldiers, pp. 498-499.*
2. *1979, Van Corcum Press, Assen, The Netherlands.*
3. *The Hill of Dreams, Introduction, p. xxiii.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. *Of Time and the River XIV*
5. *op. cit.. p. 25.*
6. *The autobiography of Bertrand Russell, Volume 11,(Allen and Unwin 1968).p. 23. The quotation does not mean that Russell had no regard for Lawrence. He despised Lawrence's ideas. and found him impossible personally, but he was fully aware of Lawrence's gifts-"His descriptive powers were remarkable," op. cit. p. 23.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ISSN - 0011 - 6734

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARIDWAR

An

INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

154

MORADABAD (India)

Vol. XXXIX APRIL 1999 NUMBER 2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DEDICATION

This issue of the Darshana International is most respectfully dedicated to **Prof. N.K Devraj** an eminent Professer of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University and the Director of a Advanced Studies in Philosophy. He had a humanistic out look on values. He was an eminent poet, novelist and critic in Hindi literature and had over twenty works to his credit in these areas. He had about thirty works on philosophy - such as. *Philosophy, Religion and Culture, Introduction to Sankara's Theory of knowledge, Hinduism and Christianity, and Mind and Spirit of India.* He developed his own philosophical view point which he described as Creative (and Qualitative) Humanism. His particular brand of humanism was firmly rooted in the great Vedantic tradition.

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Editor

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

EDITORIAL

JAIN EPISTEMOLOGY AND PARAPSYCHOLOGY

Parapsychology is the newest branch of science which originated in the year 1882 in England as Society for Psychical Research. It started as a purely empirical and experimental enquiry into the so called extraordinary happening in human life which were believed to be occurring from time immemorial and in all countries of the world, such as extra ordinary powers of mind and survival after death, and miraculous cures of serious diseases. Very soon its branches were established in other countries of Europe and in America. Within almost a century of its existence and investigation it has made starting discoveries about the nature of man and his extraordinary powers of knowledge and action and today it stands on par with other sciences dealing with the nature of man, such as scientific Psychology, Psychoanalysis, Psycho - synthesis, and Psychosomatics etc. Parapsychology (the name given to the new science by Dr. J.B. Rhine of the Duke University of North Carilina, U.S.A.) has by now to its credit a number of marvellous and at astounding discoveries about man's powers of knowledge, and action, among the hither to unrecognised prowlers of knowledge, Parapsychology has discovered that man is capable of various kinds of supernormal cognition such as Extra - Sensory Perception, Clairvoyance. Telepathy, Precognition, Retrocognition, Psychometry, vision of the other world where the spirits of the dead survive and live; vision of the ghosts, etc. On Telepathy, the knowledge of the thought of other men, and on Clairvoyance, Knowledge of the hidden and remote things remote in space and in time, a lot, thousands, of tests and experiments have been made with the help of statics they have been carefully evaluated, and it has been fully ascertained that the subjects on whom the experiments have been made definitely and without any doubt, possessed such powers of knowledge. The fact of supernormal Cognition (Such as Extra - sensory Perception. Clairvoyance, Clair audience, Precognition, Retrocognition, and psychometry) has been accepted and proved by almost every psychical researcher" (B.L Atreya. An Introduction to Parapsychology, p.97). A few of them may be quoted here, William Mc Dougall, a great psychologist, says, "In my view the evidence for Telepathy is very strong, and I foretell with considerable confidence that it will become stronger and stronger the more we investigate and sift the evidence" (Mc Dougall : Religion and Science of Life, p.80) Hans Driesh, the great German Biologist, observes, "We have spontaneous Telepathy as a quite certain fundamental phenomenon ... quite certainly established further is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

thought - reading .... Prophecy (Premonition) is highly probable", (Psychical Research). Even the founder of Psychoanalysis, Dr. Sigmund Freud, writes "Taking all the evidence together there remains a heavyweight of probability in favour of the reality of thought - transference (telepathy)" (New Introductory Lectures, p.60), Prof. Richet, a great French Physiologist who devoted more than 30 years to Psychical Research, writes, "That telepathic lucidity certainly exists has been proved by numerous experiments" (Thereby years of Psychical Research, p. 95)" . There is a strange faculty in human beings that brings information which could not possibly be acquired by the normal senses" (Ibid, p.203). This faculty of Cryptesthesia is not limited to time and space" (Ibid, p.204). Hereward Carrington, who devoted more than 50 years to Psychical Research, writes. "It should be emphasized that lacking all explanantory theories, the fact of telepathy must be granted. We may regard it as so thoroughly established that no question whatsoever exists as to its occurrence ..... At all events it is accepted as a fact by all psychic students and employed by them as explanatory of more complex problems" (Carrington, The story of Psychic Science, p.264). According to Tyrrel, another great Psychical Researcher, "We have solid empirical evidence of Extra Sensory Perception" (Science and Psychic Phenomana p.117). Dr. Alexis Carrel, a great scientist and noble prize winner says,"Clairvoyance and Telepathy are a primary data of scientific observation. Those endowed with the power, grasp the secret thoughts of other individuals without using their sense - organs, they also perceive events more or less remote in space and time. ..... It brings them a knowledge which is more certain than gained through the sense organs". (Man the Unknown, p.124). Mc Dougall writes, "The ancient belief in clairvoyance, the obtaining of knowledge of the objective world not possessed by any other living person, by means utterly different from sense perception, and utterly mysterious at present, seems also in a fair way established. "(The Riddle of Life, p.235).Bavink a great German Scientist writes "It is agreed that there is such a thing as true knowledge of the contents of another person's mental life which is not transmitted in the normal way by the known sense. Even such critical investigator as Lehasnn, Dessoir, and Baerwald admit today the existence of genuine telepathy (Anatomy of Modern Science, p. 523). Prof. H.H Price of Oxford writes, "the evidence for Telepathy and Clairvoyance is both abundant and good, (Philosophy, October, 1940). Dr. T.W Mitchell is reported to have said, "Telepathy or some mode of acquiring knowledge which for the present we might call supernormal must be admitted, (London Times, Sept. 6, 1927). Flammarion a French thinker writes, "The soul, by its interior vision may see not only what is passing at a great distance, but it may also know in advance what is to happen in the future". (The Unknown, p. 481). Thouless, a great British Psychologist, writes in the British Journal of Psychology, July 1942, "Apart from the considerable body of earlier evidence, the recent

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

experiments of Rhine and his collaborators, of Soal, of Tyrrell, and of Whatley Carrington, have put beyond question both the reality of the phenomenon and the possibility of its demonstration.

About precognition, (Knowledge of future events) Carrington says, "We have the undoubted and stubborn facts to deal with, and premonitions seem to be, at times, exceedingly well evidenced and circumstantial" (The story of Paychic Science, p. 266). Retrocognition, knowledge of the past, and long past events, is also a fact. Rosemary, an English girl described very correctly, the historical events of ancient Egypt, as it appears from the back, After Thirty Centuries, by H. Wood. There are other verified cases of Retrocognition on the records of Psychical Research. Psychometry is a strange capacity of mind or soul, possessed by certain individuals, by which they are capable of divining the past history or past events, connected with a material object the mediums come in contact. They are able to describe all that is connected with the object, persons, events and things. Mrs. Piper was capable of doing it. Dr. Eugene Oaty, describes in his book, Supernormal Faculties of Men, the case of Mr. Morel, who could, on handling an object, describe all the persons and their characteristics who handled it previously. The information covered very correctly the past, present and future. Thus the powers of Precognition. Retrocognition, and Psychemetry together with the information received through automatic speeh and writing when the medium is in trance (as in the case of Mrs. Piper) verge on something like Omniscience, which is a siddhi acquired by practice of Yoga, according to Patanjali (Yoga Sutras, Chapter III, Sutra 49).

Such quotations of Psychic Researcher can be multiples and infinitum to prove that Telepathy and Clairvoyance and Psychometry, which verges on omniscience, are real facts and kinds of knowledge of which some persons at least are capable. They are the potential powers of human beings, in some of whom they are in working conditions. It is a pity that modern scientific psychology and modern philosophy does not take notice of them for building a comprehensive and satisfactory philosophy of life.

In ancient India, however, it was admitted and recognised that the practice of Yoga enabled men to prossess and acquire some supernormal forms of cognition which was called Yogic perception and alokika cognition. But no serious notice of this supernormal knowledge has been taken by most of the systems of philosophy. It is only the Jain system of thought that gives recognition in its epistemology or theory of knowledge, that among the kinds of knowledge three kinds of extraordinary knowledge are admitted.

When we study the kinds of knowledge admitted by different systems of Indian Philosophy we find that most other than Jainism admit one, two or three of four or five or six kinds of knowledge

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection. Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

attained through sense perception inference, comparison, scripture and presumption. Hardly any mention is made of any other kind of knowledge available to man or any class of men. It is only the Jain system of Philosophy which admits five kinds of knowledge, Namely, (1) Shruti : That is, the knowledge gained from the scriptures or from a trustworthy person like a thirthankara, (2) Mati : Direct knowledge which arises through senses, including the manas. It includes also the inferential knowledge. (3) Avadhi : Direct knowledge of an object, distant in time or place, derived without the use of senses, Clairvoyance or extra sensory perception and Manahparavava, direct knowledge of the states of other's minds Telepathy or and Kevala Jnana, the perfect and complete direct knowledge of everything and all its aspects, which is not restricted by time or space. Compare Psychometry, Dowsing and Precognition and Retracognition.

In no other system of Indian or Western Philosophy we find such a complete of comprehensive survey of all kinds of knowledge possible and available to man, except as obtained through the practice of Yoga. The study of modern psychical research called Parapsychology admits that all the kinds of knowledge admitted by Jain philosophy are available to some men or women, and none of them should be neglected as a kind of possible knowledge.

What Jainism calls Avadhi is what Parapsychology calls Extra Sensory Perception or Clairvoyance, and what Jainism calls manahpraya jnana is what Parapsychology calls Telepathy or thought reading or thought transference. And what Parapsychology calls Pre - congnition, Retrocongnition, and Psychometry, Dowsing and Trancevision may be comprised in what Jaina Philosophy calls Kevala Jnana. Thus we find that the Jain Survey of knowledge is what may be called the most up to date and most comprehensive survey of all kinds of knowledge known to men upto this time in the light of the most recent science, Psychical Research, or Parapsychology as it is called today. There must have existed in India in ancient times when the Jain Philosophy was constructed, men who were capable of the various kinds of knowledge mentioned by Jain thinkers and the thinkers must have been liberal enough to give recognition to them. It is real due to the Jaina view of Anekantavada that no aspect of knowledge was neglected by the followers of Anekantavad, which aims at the most complete and comprehensive knowledge of every thing. May we all the seekers of knowledge and wisdom become Anekantavadis in our search.

J.P Atreya.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I

PROTAGORAS

Anna C. Avey
Albert E. Avey

Protagoras is a paradoxical personality who goes about Greece lecturing to young men on how to be good citizens. He assumes thereby that there are certain standards of virtue which can form the basis of such instruction. But this is inconsistent with his conviction as a sophist that there are no objective standards, the real objects of knowledge. On the other hand, Socrates who believes in universally valid ideas is puzzled over the fact that so many upright men fail to teach their sons to be upright. Why is this if there are objective principles of conduct? If virtue were based on intelligence it ought to be teachable, for knowledge is the most teachable of all things. But if this is the implication of the practice of Protagoras then he is really opposed to the sophistic conviction. On the other hand, Socrates seems to be asking for evidence for his belief. Both need to think further on the problem.

Persons of the Dialogue

Socrates, the Narrator of the Dialogue to his Companion.

Hippocrates, Alcibiades, Critics

The Sophists-- Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus

Callias, a wealthy Athenian

Scene-- the home of Callias.

Companion-- so you have been with the fair Alcibiades; how was he and was he gracious to you?

Socrates-- I thought him very gracious, yet several times I forgot he was with me for I have found a fairer than he.

Com.-- One fairer than the son of clinias? Whence does he come? You say of Abdera? A foreigner?

Soc.-- Is not the wiser always the fairer? And I have been with the wisest of men, if you call Protagoras wisest.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Com.-- What? Is Protagoras in Athens?

Soc.-- He has been here for two days, but let me tell you something else. Long before daylight this morning I heard a thumping at my door and Hippocrates bawling out: "Socrates are you awake? Protagoras has come". Yes, I answered, he came two days ago and is at the home of ? Callias. Has he robbed you? "Yes", replied Hippocarates laughing, "of the wisdom he is keeping from me. I am young, will you not speak to him on my behalf. He will be at home if we go now". "Not so early", I replied; "but let us walk about till it is daylight".

As we walked I asked him what he would have Protagoras, a sophist, make of him. Knowing the opinion that the Athenians have of this new learning, he blushed and said, "I suppose a sophist". To this I asked him if he knew the morning of sophistry and he said that it is the art of talking eloquently; but when asked 'eloquent about what?" he did not know. So, I told him that it was worse to pay money ignorantly to one who might harm his soul than to unwittingly buy meat which might poison the body.

Upon our arrival at the house of Callias the porter at first refused us entrance, saying we were sophists, but when I persuaded him otherwise, he let us in. We found Protagoras in the court accompanied by Callias and an orderly band of listeners who had come with him from countries. They were walking back and fourth in regimental orderliness as they talked together.

In an opposite cloister at Hippias, the Elian, surrounded by Eryximachus, Phaedrus and Andron as some one who had come from Elis with him. Prodicus, the Cean, was in an adjoining room. Lying on a couch near which a number of young men were sitting as they talked to him.

Walking up to Protagoras i told him of Hippocrates, explaining that he aspired to political eminence and believed that conversing with him would be of great value.

Protagoras hearing this explained his position, saying that his teachers, although good sophists, had called themselves by other names, because they feared the odium of being called sophists. But that he, preferred to speak openly of himself as a sophist.

I suggested that we call Prodicus and Hippias with their friends to hear him also. To this he readily agreed and soon all in the court came together was great delight at the prospect of hearing wise men talk together.

When we were seated repeated Hippocrates' desire for training and asked what would happen to him if he become Protagoras' disciple. The answer was that he would daily grow wiser and better. But in what? I asked. In the ability to speak and act for the best in the affairs of the state, he answered.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Do you teach the art of politics and promise to make good citizens? I asked. That is what I profess, Socrates, he answered. Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art. The best and wisest of our Athenian statesmen cannot impart their political wisdom to others. Pericles could not teach his own sons, nor could he teach virtue to his ward Cleinias. Thus, I am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught; but I wish that you could show us that it can be.

There is a myth, he answered, that once there were gods only, so the gods created men and other animals from earth and fire, ordering prometheus to equip them with fur and feathers and other things necessary for their preservation. But man alone was left naked and defenseless. To meet this need Prometheus gave the mechanical arts and fire to man for his protection. But he had no power to give them political wisdom. Being without this, men gathered together in cities to protect themselves from the beasts; but having no sense of right they began killing each other. Then Zeus, seeing their strait, sent Hermes to impart justice and reverence, not to a few only but to all. This the reason that all should share in deliberations of justice without which states could not exist. All men are expected to have honesty, justice and other political virtue, and are punished for the want of them; which proves that they can be taught.

Why then, Protagoras, do virtuous men not always teach their sons virtue when they give them knowledge?

They do in fact teach them in all stages, Socrates, with the help of nurses, tutors, teachers and professors; and later the laws become their teachers. So you see, they can be taught virtue but not all learn virtue any more than all may necessarily become musicians.

Then, I said, are the virtues as justice, temperance and holiness parts of the whole or the names of one and the same thing?

Virtue is a whole and these others are, just as the eyes, nose, mouth and ears are parts, of face.

To this I asked him whether all men have courage and wisdom and honesty and all other parts of virtue, at which he said, certainly not, for many men are brave but not just; or just but not wise.

Then, I said, that I should certainly the nature of holiness to be like that of justice and justice to be nearly the same as holiness. Protagoras recognized the resemblance between holiness and justice but denied their identity, and asserted that each thing has its own particular opposite and no other; such as black and white, good and evil, etc. At this point I interrupted and asked if wisdom is not the opposite of folly and if temperate men are not wise, acting temperately rather than foolishly. To this he assented. Once more then, I continued, is not the opposite of temperance folly and therefore, the opposite of folly temperance; and if it is also the opposite of wisdom then our earlier

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conclusion about each virtue having its own opposite and no other would make wisdom and temperance seem to be the same. This he conceded with great reluctance.

And now since temperance and wisdom are the same and justice and holiness seem nearly the same, do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

He responded by saying that he would be ashamed to say that, yet there might be those who would assert it.

Now, I said, if some men are temperate and unjust and if temperance is good sense, and good sense is good counsel in doing injustice, then is it good counsel if they succeed or it they do not succeed? If they succeed, he answered.

So it would seem, then, that the expedient is the good?

Yes, he replied, but I would also say that some things, although inexpedient are yet good, but not always good when entirely expedient.

He then began to great length, and I asked him to speak more briefly, which he refused to do, saying that if he did as others requested his name would be nowhere.

Seeing that he was not satisfied with his previous answers I arose to depart, at which Callias held me and begged me to stay. I explained I was not able to talk in long speeches but could only discuss matters in short sentences and to the point. Critias and Prodicus begged us to continue our discussion and were applauded by the crowd. Then Hippias reminded us of our obligation to wisdom and asked us to compromise on the length in an ocean of words. He further suggested that I appoint an arbiter.

To this I answered that there could be no better arbiter than Protagoras, suggesting that he ask the questions until tired of asking, and then I would begin to ask them. This being generally approved, Protagoras reluctantly said he would change the subject of discussion by quoting a passage from of Simonides which he did thus:

"Hardly, on the one hand, can a man become truly good; built four square in hands and mind and feet, a work without a flaw". Now, he continued, Simonides says this himself but later in the poem he states: "I do not agree with these words of Pittacus: 'Hardly can a man be geed'". Is Simonides then, not self-contradictory?

Hearing this and the cheering crowd I felt almost dizzy, and the remembering the whole poem, I answered that the apparent inconsistency was not really such because there is a difference between being good and becoming good, and on this Simonides had based his statement. But, I said, I would rather have done with poems and odes which are more for entertainment than for finding truth through thoughtful conversation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Protagoras, being loath to continue, remained silent for some time, but with the urging of Callias and others was induced to argue with me as questioner.

Do not imagine, Protagoras, I said, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you than that of clearing up my own uncertainties. Now, I need to ask you questions and consult with you. So, to go back to our earlier discussion, our question is; are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names for the same thing?

To this he answered that four of them are to some extent similar but that courage is very different from the others and that the courageous are confident but not all the confident are truly courageous.

Then, if the courageous are the confident are they wisest, and bravest, and upon that basis wisdom would be courage.

Now you have misrepresented me, said Protagoras, and by your method you could deduce that wisdom is strength, whereas the strong might be able, but the able not strong. Strength comes from nature and a healthy body. Then I asked if knowledge was not the strongest thing in the world and to this he not only agreed but added that knowledge and wisdom are the highest human attributes.

Then came the question of whether the pleasant is the good, to which Protagoras demurred but we finally agreed that the pleasant is evil when it deprives us of some greater pleasure, and that good is good when it gives pain and is at the same time remedial, bringing future good. Furthermore, we reasoned the measure of pleasure and pain is found in excess and defect: and is a difference in degree. When weighing pleasure we naturally choose the greater and when estimating pain we take the less. Now, I asked do not the same things appear larger when near and smaller from a distance? Then in choosing happiness would not the art of measurement help us to avoid that deceptive power of appearance which causes us to take things at one time of which we repent at another ? Then the art of measurement and knowledge would do away with the ill effect of appearance and, showing the truth, would at last teach our soul to find rest in the truth, thus saving our life.

Thus, I said, we may conclude that men err through ignorance in their choice of good and evil, for no one would choose the greater of two evils when he might choose the less; nor will he, unnecessarily, follow that which he fears. If, as you said at first, some of the most ignorant and immoderate of men are the most courageous, would this not show that courage is very different from other parts of virtue? Yes, said Protagoras, the brave are the confident who consider honour rather than danger, whereas the coward, desiring safety, goes into danger unwillingly. The brave and the cowardly have different notions as to what constitutes danger.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Then I questioned him further, leading him into the admission that while the cowards prefer the pleasant rather than the noble, yet we had said that things noble and honourable are also pleasant, thus showing that the coward fears and rejects the pleasanter and better. To this he assented and I added that knowledge of that which is and is not is the essence of courage.

At this point Protagoras no longer continued to nod assent but said 'finish the argument yourself'.

I want to ask only one more question, I said. Do you still think there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?

You seem to want to make me answer, he responded, so I will gratify you and say that this seems to be impossible in consistency with the argument.

My only purpose in continuing so long an argument, I replied, is to ascertain the nature of virtue; for if this were clear I am sure that the other controversy -- you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught -- would also be clear. The result of our discussion seems singular, for if the argument had a human voice it would be heard laughing at us and saying : "Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings. You, Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, now contradict yourself in your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge -- including justice, temperance and courage -- which shows that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught. But if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you, Socrates, were attempting to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue can be taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started out by saying that virtue might be taught is now eager to prove it to be anything other than knowledge; which , if true, it is quite incapable of being taught. Now, Protagoras, I should like to have your help in further inquiry concerning virtue.

Protagoras replied : Socrates, I am not of a base nature and I am the last man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy and conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I said, I admire you above all men whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you will become eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to the subject some other time.

By all means, I said, if that is what you wish. So the conversation ended and we went our way.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

CULTURE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Albert Shalom

For the purposes of this paper, I will interpret the word "culture" to refer, at its most basic level, to the fundamental categories in terms of which the peoples of that culture spontaneously express their most basic presuppositions. These fundamental categorise, or basic presuppositions, designate the specific ways of conceiving reality which are expressed by the sense of the categories themselves. From the standpoint adopted here, they are not to be regarded as impositions of something called "the mind": neither in the from of Kantian a priori categories, nor in the from of Collingwoodian "absolute" presuppositions. They do not form internally coherent "tables" of categories or "constellations" of absolute presuppositions. They constitute contingent ways of trying to understand the complexities of reality, and they are, themselves, a function of the reality of which they constitute a variety of interpretations. And the significant point to underline is that it is precisely when certain fundamental categories of this sort show themselves increasingly, and with increasing urgency, to be mutually incompatible that the stage is set for the necessary emergence of a new orientation in the history of human thinking -- an orientation which constitutes an overcoming of the strongly felt incompatibility between whatever fundamental presuppositions are in question.

Again for the purposes of this paper, I will limit the word "psychoanalysis" to mean the work of Freud himself. The object of this limitation is not simply to reduce the scope of the field to be discussed. It is to obviate the misconception which Freud himself tried to foster, the misconception of implicitly supposing that the word "psychoanalysis" is to be assimilated to words like "physics", "chemistry" or "biology". For this assimilation, implying that psychoanalysis is a science in the same kind of sense that "physics" or "biology" are science, has no experimental foundation. "Psychoanalysis" means "Freud's psychophilosophical theory of the structure and processes of the human subject", in very much the same way as "criticist philosophy" means "Kant's Philosophical theory of the transcendental structure and processes of mind". The difference lies in the fact that there are "human

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subjects", whereas it may well be the case that there is no such thing as Kant's " transcendental mind". In other words, Freud certainly did have a valid subject-matter for his analyses, whereas it may well be the case that the proper object of Kant's analyses is misleadingly conceived from the start. But it remains nonetheless true that the criteria used by the authentic sciences cannot be used by psychoanalysis.

Thus, for instance, in the Introduction to an International Conference of the Manfred Sakel Foundation held in New York in 1962, Dr. Percival Balley pointed out that "... all of the various forms of psychological treatment (i.e. of mental disease) produce the same results: approximately one- third of the patients get well, one-third get better and one-third get worse or become chronic."[1] Results of that kind would simply not be tolerated in the authentic sciences. Even among the psychological theorists basically sympathetic to Freud's approach, we constantly find the kind of language which is appropriate less to the verifiable or falsifiable hypothesizing of a brilliant physicist or biologist than to the necessarily speculative hypothesizing of a brilliant theorist about a subject-matter for which there can be neither verification nor falsification. Thus, for instance, the authors of The Scientific Credibility of Freud's Theories and Therapy, write sentences such as the following: "When we add up the totals resulting from our search, balancing the positive against the negative, we find that Freud has fared rather well. But like all theorists, he has proved in the long run to have far from a perfect score. He seems to have been right about a respectable number of issues, but he was also wrong about some important things."[2] This is not the language which would be appropriate to disciplines which depend on the sifting out of errors and results which must be definitive if that discipline is to develop. For here, Of course, even the positive "faring rather well" and "seeming to have been right", would be contested by psychotherapists with different fundamental options and orientations. It therefore seems quite clear that it would be entirely misleading to treat psychoanalysis as a science on the model of the physical sciences. Psychoanalysis is a psychophilosophical theory of the person, and it is as such that I shall refer to it for the rest of this paper.

After this preamble, I can now formulate in the following terms the exact question which I will very briefly try to answer: "what is the significance of the writings of Freud for some of the basic presuppositions of modern Western civilization?" If I had to answer this question in one sentence, I would reply as follows: "It is Freud's theorizing, more than that of anybody else, which has demonstrated the inadequacy of one of the basic presuppositions of the modern period: a conceptual framework in terms of a dichotomy between "body" and "mind", a dichotomy which was formulated in its most extreme form in Descartes' 1637 Discourse de La Methode". Such a summary reply

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

would, however, be entirely inadequate if for no other reason than that we know perfectly well that the Cartesian dichotomy was brought into question in variety of ways, from Descartes' lifetime on. Why, then, should it be supposed that it is Freud's theorizing, rather than that of Spinoza or Hume or Hegel, which demonstrates the inadequacy of the modern period's framework in terms of a basic division between"the physical" and "the mental"? Clearly, It is necessary to try to elaborate more fully the sense of the proposed reply.

When a fundamental re-orientation occurs in the course of human thinking, the individual who appears to represent that re-orientation most clearly cannot, of course, be regarded as its creator or initiator. In terms of the foregoing analysis, he is the thinker who has grasped most clearly what I might call the "incompossibility" of certain of the fundamental presuppositions dominating his period, and who consequently attempts to work out a system designed to overcome that incompossibility. The radical Cartesian dichotomy between "body" and "wind" -- which Descartes, more ambiguously, differentiated as a division between "res extensa" and "res cogitans" -- was the culmination of a complex movement, probably starting towards the end of the XIIIth century, In which a number of different stands can be discerned. Two of these strands were of particular importance: the elimination of the Greek and Medieval notion of "substantial forms", a notion which served to link the physical with the mental, and the gradual methematisation of mechanics, which appears to have taken a great leap forward in the so-called Merton School in XIVth century Oxford. However, the problem of the origin of the modern conceptual framework is not the concern of this paper.[3] What we are concerned with here are some of the consequences of that framework, and in particular Freud's role relatively to that framework.

As a result of the rise of European mechanism and of the increasing domination of the physical sciences form the XVIIth century to the present, the Cartesian dichotomy has meant that philosophy during this period has been tacitly and increasingly identified with the study of a supposedly separate and independent domain called "mind". And it is from the standpoint of this supposedly independent domain that philosophers attacked or defended the Cartesian dichotomy almost from the start. It does not seem to be an exaggeration to suggest that most of the major philosophical movements during the modern period have been, at least in part, attempts to overcome or otherwise deal with the consequences of the Cartesian dichotomy. It was from the standpoint of "the philosophy of mind" that the rationalists, the empiricists, the idealists, the phenomenologists ... have tried to develop systems or modes of thinking which, explicitly or implicitly, try to come to terms with that dichotomy.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But at the same time during the same period the increasing success of the physical sciences gradually established the fundamental presupposition of the priority of the physical over the mental, a fundamental presupposition which came to define one of the spontaneous convictions of Western civilisation. That fundamental presupposition can certainly be regarded as valid, provided that the principles of the physical include explanatory grounds for the rise of the mental, But it is just this that the physical sciences could not, and still cannot, do. For the condition for the development of the physical sciences was precisely the Cartesian separation of the mental from the physical. And that condition for the rise of the physical sciences was written into the fundamental presupposition of the priority of the physical over the mental. The consequence of this position was the essential alienation of the mental from the physical, the result being the various attempts to "reduce" the mental to the physical: For such a reduction seemed to be the only way to satisfy the fundamental presupposition of the priority of the physical over the mental.

It is for this reason that any solution to the Cartesian dichotomy which based itself on the "mind" could not possibly become a solution which would command widespread assent. For such a solution simply contradicts the fundamental presupposition which derived from the rise and the development of the physical sciences, namely the priority of the physical over the mental.. The very methods of the physical sciences depend on a narrowing of the mental to the point where "mental", simply means an observer of the physical. Since what is needed is an analysis of the status of a "physical" which can give rise to what we call "the mental",[4] it is difficult to see how the methods or the concepts of the physical sciences can possibly provide the tools for such an analysis. This impasse to which the Cartesian framework led is perhaps one of the reasons for the decline, even among philosophers themselves, in the prestige which philosophy once enjoyed. It is the impossible nature of this same impasses which Freud has brought to a head and which constitutes, in my view, Freud's fundamental importance for philosophy.

For though Freud did not, in fact, find any solution to that impasse, the philosophical implications of his theory consititute a clear indication that the theory is one of the most determined and sophisticated attempts to come to terms with the Cartesian dichotomy. The stages in this attempt on the part of Freud can be briefly described in the following way. After an early adherence to the ambiguously reductive dynamic materialism advocated by the leading members do Bois-Reymond[5] -- Freud's involvement with the methods of hypnotism and suggestion used by Charcot and Bernheim led him, by a very "circuitous route",[6] to his own position, which he called "psychoanalysis". In the course of this evolution he formulated three successive positions concerning the relationship of "body" to "mind".

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The first of these positions was a straightforward abstract parallelism which he adopted from the English neurologist, Hughlings Jackson. This is the doctrine which is formulated in his 1891 text called on Aphasia. The keypassage in that text, as regards our particular problem, reads as follows: "Considering the tendencies of earlier medical periods to localize whole mental faculties ... in certain areas of the brain, it was bound to appear as a great advance when Wernicke declared that only the simplest psychic elements, i.e. the various sensory perceptions, could be localized in the cortex, the areas concerned being those of central terminations of the sensory nerves. But does one not in principle make the same mistake, irrespective of whether one tries to localize a complicated concept, a whole mental faculty or a psychic element? Is it justified to immerse a nerve fibre, which over the whole length of its course has been only a physiological; structure subject to physiological modifications, with its end in the psyche and to furnish this end with an idea or memory?" And his answer, of course, is that it is not justified. And therefore he concludes by adopting Jackson's parallelism, and even quotes Jackson's expression for it: "the psychic is, therefore, a process parallel to the physiological, 'a dependent concomitant' ... "[7]

The second of Freud's positions was a very much muted parallelism in which he attempted to mould "the psychical" in terms of a specific neurological description, a position which he formulated in 1895 in a text which has come to be known as the "Project for a Scientific Psychology".[8] The philosophical significance of this text cannot be over-rated. It is at the root of Freud's later development, and can already serve to illustrate the manner of his attempt to deal with the presuppositions derived from the Cartesian dichotomy. The abstract parallelism of on Aphasia is transmuted into a different way of conceiving that parallelism. This change is brought about in the following way. Against the general background of an apparently ineluctable parallelism, Freud describes "the psychical" in terms of processes which approximate, to the manner in which he conceived the neurological processes of the three "agencies" or subsystems which he held to constitute the overall functioning of the nervous system.

Those three agencies have to do with the organism's reaction to the external environment, its reactions to endogenous stimuli, and its awareness of both. Approached from this standpoint, what is called "the mental" is seen as constituting first and foremost the organism's autonomous drives subserving survival and procreation, itself a matter of the species' survival. The psychical is therefore seen as initially designating the awareness of drives such as hunger and sexuality, and the mechanism by which such awareness occurs is attributed to a translating device which he called "periodicity". The philosophical significance of this move is that Descartes' absolutizing of "pure thinking" is transposed to a translation mechanism of the physical itself, a mechanism designed to subserve the organism's survival in a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

physical environment capable of providing for the organism's instinctual drives. In a sense, Freud's notion of "periodicity" can be conceived as his antithetical response to the role attributed by Descartes to the pineal gland, where Descartes localized the "thinking substance". But the difference lies, of course, in the rejecting of any such notion of the as "pure thinking"' which can now only be conceived as a sublimation of the instinctual drives themselves.

But this second position could only be provisional, because it was unable to account for a process he needed to understand in order to make sense of the cases with which he was confronted in his clinical work, namely the process of "repression". Thus, at the every time that he sends the project to Wilhelm Fliess ha adds the comment that "What does not hang together yet is not the mechanism -- I could be patient about that -- but the explanation of repression ... the mechanical explanation is not coming off, and I am inclined to listen to the still, small voice which tells me that my explanation will not do."[9] And a month later he writes that " I no longer understand the state of mind in which I concocted the psychology ... "[10] though he did try to recuperate "the machanical explanation" in January 1896, the recuperation was not a success, and the failure of this machanical explanation is what led Freud, by the detour of his so-called "self-analysis", to his third and final position, the position called "psychoanalysis".

That third position is the substance of The Interpretation of Dreams, of which chapter 7 constitutes the general psychology. Philosophically, what has happened between 1895 and 1899, date at which The Intrepretation of Dreams was completed, is that the fundamental presupposition of the priority of the physical over the mental is simply taken for the granted and eliminated as a problem, and this now allows Freud to concentrate on "the psychical" as he had come to conceive it whilst formulating the project. A book on dreams is the foundation of his system because he believed that dreams express the original mode in which biological drives become psychical manifestations. Since his concern was these psychical manifestations and not their source in the physicochemical processes of the nervous system, he simply left aside the problem of the relationship between "body" and "mind". That is why he writes, in chapter 7 of The Interpretation of Dreams, that "I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the from of an anatomical preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine psychical location in any anatomical fashion. I shall remain upon psychological grounds."[11] I have, elsewhere, called this ambiguous position Freud's "conflation"[12] of matter and mind, a conflation which constitutes the ambiguous foundation of "psychoanalysis"' and I will not here pursue the remarkable structure built on this questionable foundation. For what concerns us here is not the detail of Freud's system, but the significance of his theory for contemporary culture.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It will, however, be useful to indicate that at the end of his life Freud was entirely aware that his many analyses of "the unconscious" which is what he called the original mode of the psychical, had not been able to integrate the fundamental presupposition of the priority of the physical with the reality of the mental. In his last work, the 1938 text called An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud writes, at the very start, that "we know two kinds of things about what we call our psyche (or mental life): firstly, its bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (or nervous system) and, on the other hand, our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be further explained by any sort of description. Everything that lies between is unknown to us, and the data do not include any direct relation between these two terminal points of our knowledge. If it existed, it would at the most afford an exact localization of the processes of consciousness and would give us no help towards understanding them."[13]

Thus at the end of his life as at the beginning, and in spite of his assertion in The Interpretation of Dreams that psychoanalysis constitutes the solution to what "we have searched for in vain from philosophy"[14] the apparently antithetical presuppositions of "body" and "psyche" remain irreducibly antithetical. But there is positive side to this negative conclusion, and it is with that positive side that we must first be concerned, for it is here that freud's positive contribution to modern culture is to be found. If we think in spatial terms, Freud's concept of " the unconscious" occupies a half-way position between what we ordinarily understand by "body" and "mind", and in Freud's system "the unconscious" partakes of both. Referring to the body/mind problem in another 1938 text, called Some Elementary Lessons in Psychoanalysis, Freud writes as follows: "If ever human thought found itself in an impasse it was here. To find a way out, the philosophers at least were obliged to assume that there were organic processes parallel to the conscious psychical ones ... But this solution remained unsatisfactory. Psychoanalysis escaped such difficulties as these by energetically denying the equation between what is psychical and what is conscious. No; being conscious cannot be the essence of what is psychical ... The psychical, whatever its nature may be, is in itself unconscious and probably similar in kind to all the other natural processes of which we have obtained knowledge."[15]

Of course, this does not escape the difficulty referred to by Freud: it simply pushes that difficulty back to the problem of the relationship between organic processes and the unconscious. But it is clear from the last sentence, as well as from several texts in which Freud holds that the vocabulary of neurophysiology, that he viewed his analyses of unconscious processes as analyses of proto-physical processes. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this conviction is to be found in his acceptance and analysis of telepathy. In lecture XXX of the 1933 text called New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud explains that telepathy

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is thought-transference and that the process is understandable If the psychical is assimilated to electrical impulses. Though it is, I think, a conceptual confusion to identify the measurable means by which subjective experience occurs and that experience itself, the significant point is the following.

Freud has formulated a series of remarkable psychological analyses with the aid of a concept, the unconscious, which belongs neither to the physical per se, nor to the mental per se. The unconscious is situated in a kind of limbo between both, so that Freud's psychological analyses are, in effect, a demonstration in act of the fundamental inadequacy of the Cartesian dichotomy between "body" and "mind". It is here, I believe, that we must situate Freud's greatest contribution to modern culture: in the demonstration of the inadequacy of a framework which is part and parcel of our culture. In a certain sense, one might say that the Cartesian era has been brought to an end not by the successive philosophies of mind, but by a thinker who demonstrated the psychology cannot be conceived independently of biological processes.

But conversely, If psychology is conceived as derivable from nothing but biological processes, we may well be adopting an equal and opposite mistake. By Freud's own admission, the concept of "the unconscious" is not a solution to the Cartesian dichotomy. And for the reason , it seems clear that Freud saw no alternative to an ultimate reduction of psychical processes to physical processes, which he projected as a future hope. And in so conceiving the situation, it seems to me that the influence of Freud can be regarded in a far more negative manner. The future hope which Freud confidently ascribed to the future development of the neurological sciences cohabits, in his writings, with a pessimism which permeates much of those writings. It is not the natural pessimism of spectator of human folly and human savagery: it is an ultimate, metaphysical pessimism which can give ground and justification to that folly and savagery. The uncompromising determinism which Freud held throughout his life, [17] as the ground for his conviction that psychoanalysis is a science, divests the human being not only of responsibility, but of the very idea of striving for a goal.

This determinism, associated with the theory that the fundamental nature of the psyche is a naturalistically and ruthlessly egocentric pleasure and power-drive at the expense of everything else, could not but ultimately put into question the "repressive" and "sublimation" processes which he also posited. If it is generally acknowledged that the group of complex activities which can conceivably be classified as "repressive" are evil or dangerous, then an earlier "repressive" society will tend to be transformed into a later "permissive" society. And when that occurs, a great deal more scope will be given to the naturalistic power-drive of the id. At the same time, the process of "sublimation", considered by Freud to be the motor of civilization, will

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

also tend to fall into a decline since the search for the pleasure-principle will no longer carry the same taboo. The consequence here appears to be the inflecting of a civilization towards the search for power and pleasure with a minimum of what we ordinarily call "responsibility".

One might even theorize that as this process develops, the hopes and expectations of the new society will be increasingly riveted to those elements which can satisfy the increasingly "liberated" pleasure-drives and power-drives of a society which will, thereby, become increasingly vulnerable and prone to violence should anything occur which blocks the road to the new orientation. Anger, violence and despair will be closer to such a society than to a society the hopes of which are more closely related to a self-discipline which can so easily be assimilated to "repression". That these elements are widespread in Western society today seems to me evident; and that the theories of Freud have been instrumental in fostering the development of such elements seems to me equally evident.

If we now add the effects of Freud's fundamental pessimism to the possible effects of his determinism, we may discern another dimension to this negative influence of Freud. In the Project the human subject is conceived as an unexplained integration of neurological agencies subserving biological needs. Aims and needs of a different order are attributed, without any serious explanation, to a group of neurons which he calls the "ego". By the time we reach the 1905 Three Essays on Sexuality we are presented with the doctrine of sublimation: the biological drive of sexuality is asserted to be the source of different kinds of aims such as knowledge etc., which he now calls "Instincts".[18] As an aside, I would remark that to derive the more obscure "drives" of knowledge, understanding and sympathy from the sexual drive itself, is to try to explain the emergence of certain potentialities in the human subject from an activity which cannot per se contain those potentialities. Unless we attribute to the human entity a potentiality capable of using sexuality for other ends, there is nothing in the general biological fact of sexuality which can lead it to go beyond its biological function.

However, pursuing his essentially biological mode of thinking, Freud reaches what looks like the reductio ad absurdum of biology it self: namely the concept of a living death-wish. This is how he expresses it in the 1920 Beyond the Pleasure Principle: " ... we may have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general ... It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things, which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of disturbing forces ... If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for internal reasons -- becomes inorganic once again -- then we shall be compelled to say that the aim of all life is death' ... "[19]. Leaving aside the thrust of the psychological consequences of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such a view if generally adopted.

No doubt if, like Freud, one is born with a specific aim or ambition, the consequences would be little more than the intellectual expression of a theoretical belief. But when we observe, or hear of, large segments of young people in our present culture seeming to drift from the premissive society to the drug society or the violent society, this supposed de-mystification of physical existence itself bears a close resemblance to a death-trap, As against this view, I would suggest that it seems to be a profound psychological truth that the absence of a very fundamental mode of hope has an adverse effect on human existence. The point has been made more than once in connection with the prospects of a cure in serious diseases. And if this phenomenon is, in fact, a basic psychological truth, then it may well be that the absence of this fundamental mode of hope constitutes one of the agents of destruction of cultures and civilizations. Of course, it would still be necessary to analyse what is meant by such a fundamental mode of hope, thereby trying to find the real foundation of the phenomenon itself. But that is a search in itself. What is quite certain is that the solution will not be found in the writings of Freud.

REFERENCES

1. The Biological Treatment of Mental Illness, Max Rinkel M.D., ed., Proceedings of the II International Conference of the Manfred Sakel Foundation, held Oct. 31 to Nov. 3.1962, at the New York Academy of Medicine (New York, L.C. Page & Co., 1966 p.v.
2. Seymour Fisher & Roger P. Greenberg, The Scientific Credibility of Freud's Theories and Therapy (New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1977). pp. 395-6.
3. Apart from the historians of medieval science, the most important contemporary writers who deal with this problems appear to be Alexandre Koyre and Ivor Leclerc.
4. The attempt to define the status of 'the physical' itself is the fundamental aim of Ivor Leclerc's Nature of Physical Existence (London & New York, George Allen & Unwin & Humanities Press, 1972). For an attempt to derive subjectivity from the priority of the physical, I venture to refer to my paper called "A Prolegomenon to What is Called the 'Soul', Review of Metaphysics, XXXVI (1983), 3. pp. 569-590.
5. Freud's intellectual background has been recently described by Frank J. Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind (New York, Basic Books, 1979).
6. Sigmund Freud: The Origins of Psychoanalysis M. Bonaparte, A. Freud & E. Kris (eds.), (New York, Basic Books, 1954) p. 141.
7. S. Freud, On Aphasia, tr. E. Stengel (London, Imago, 1953), ch.V pp. 54-55.
8. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Strachey (London, Hogarth Press, 1966ff.). vol. I pp. 281-391. Hereafter abbreviated in the usual manner.
9. Freud. Origins, p. 126. Letter 29, dated 8th October 1895.
10. Ibid. p. 134. Letter 36, dated 29th November, 1895.
11. S.E. IV, 536.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

12. In part IV of a ms. not yet published, called The Body/Mind Framework & the Problem of Personal Identity. Conceptual
13. S.E. XXIII, 144-145.
14. S.E. IV, 145.
15. S.E. XXIII, 283.
16. S.E. XXII, pp. 31 sq.
17. The clearest expression of Freud's determinism is to be found in the last chapter of the 1901 Psychopathology of Everyday Life, S.E. IV, and in the 1916/17 Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, S.E. XV.
18. S.E. VII, 173 sq.
19. S.E. XVIII, 36-8.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

ON STRAWSON'S NON- RATIONAL FOUNDATION OF MORAL REALITY

ARCHANA BARUA

As a naturalist of non-reductive kind strawson defends the reality of the moral life against the threat of universal determinism. In 'Scepticism and naturalism : Some Varieties', Strawson was concerned to bring out the specific features of our ordinary moral talk the distinctiveness of which could be preserved though there were challenges to our acceptance of them as justifiable. Strawson's descriptive metaphysics was an attempt, on his part, to describe the most general structures and features presented within our moral thought and practice and to lay bare the general conceptual connections senmeshed within that practice. In order to defend the distinctive features of our moral talk, Strawson felt, one ought to face the traditional philosophical scepticism and the other from reductive scientism. While traditional scepticism doubted the adequacy of grounds for our belief in some basic matters (for eg. the meaningfulness of 'responsibility' in moral talk), for a sort of reductive scientism it would be an illusion to suppose the reality of anything other than the subject matter of physical science. It would be an illusion to hold that moral attributes objectively characterize human action.

Strawson is close to Hume in his response to traditional scepticism. Hume showed that the philosopher's more to meet sceptical arguments with counter arguments was futile; "This is so because of our being what we naturally are. Our nature that no rational or critical philosophy can shake or weaker it".[1]

In his response to traditional secpticism, Strawson. like his predecessors Hume and Wittgenstein contented that we are naturally and inescapably committed to certain beliefs such as the reality of the external world, the reality of the moral life etc. Made as we are, there is in us a moral committment to such beliefs. Even a strong assertion of the thesis of universal determinism would remain ineffective against the force of our nature. We are humanly committed to this moralistic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

view, no scientific claim would effect our having reactive attitudes and our practice of ascribing responsibility. Our strong committments to certain range of reality of mankind. This non-scientific perspective reveals what is unique in us . We are so constituted as sinevitably to occupy this standpoint. Moral realism derives its essential meaning only in relation to the personal standpoint. The logic of our reactive attitude decides when it is appropriate to have it. There are certain conditions which keep an act beyond the preview of moral assessment. Actions done under compulsion, actions of children and of insanes, accidental actions etc. are exempted from moral judgement, we suspend our reactive attitude to such actions and adopt an objective attitude.

Strawson observes that morality in practice does not require any metaphysical enchoring. In his response to Mark Platt's article, 'on the Metaphysics of Morals' Strawson comments : "If Nietzche had in fact successfully identified the essential nature of morality or, more precisely, the theoretical foundation of the whole institution, then that institution would indeed be, as Platts puts it, 'in a less philosophical scepticism about morality; would be justified. According to Nietzche, the theory internal to moral thought and practice, whether tacitly held or explicitly acknowledged, incorporated one variety or another of false or incoherent conception of the nature of obligation and the freedom of the human will, either the notion that moral obligation is to be understood in terms of divine commands which human beings are endowed, by God, with the capacity freely to obey or disobey, or the kind of noumenal freedom mysteriously associated by Kant with reason as the source of the moral imperative, or some other equally obscure idea of 'spiritual causality'. Platts points out that when we turn to consider our actual practices with such notions as those of duty and obligation, moral responsibility, blame worthiness etc. it becomes clear that these practices have in fact no such theoretical attachments and can survive their abandonment without loss or demise. Morality in practice requires no such metaphysical enchoring, even if some of its practitioners are disposed in their reflective moments to imagine that it does".[2] Strawson finds Platt's contributions substantial as she has freed the actual grounds of our ascriptions of responsibility and accountability form any entanglement with the almost entirely abstract debate between 'determinist' and 'liberatians'.

Strawson considered the traditional sceptices doubt as purely theoretical it never represented a 'stance that it was in practice open to us to occupy'. A moral practioner is not under any obligation to defend or reject a theoretical on determinism in order to ascribe responsibility to actions. For the moralist, a responsible person knew what he was doing, who was not subjected to external or internal compulsion etc.. Strawson remarks, "But I find in none of this an explicit or implicit denial of a thesis of determinism stated for example in such simple and familiar terms as 'Every event has a cause'".[3]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Some scholars have taken a serious note of Strawson, contention that our moral committments do not require any adequate theoretical justification. They observe that a belief in determinism and the moral practice of ascribing responsibility manifest a profound irrationality in our nature. Professor Rajendra Prasad observes: "According to ordinary interpersonal attitudes 'is part of the general frame-work of human life, not some thing that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for review within this general framework". Therefore we can ask for a rational justification of ordinary interpersonal attitudes in general. That is we can ask the question whether or not it is rational to have reactive attitudes if determinism is true, since we can not live without them. I have mentioned above that it is not rational for a person to have them If he believes or acknowledges that determinism is true".[4]

Strawson believes that moral practices of ascribing responsibility etc. can survive the abandonment of any related theoretical claim. The moral practices with such notions as duty and obligation need not be understood in terms of divine commands etc.., as our actual grounds for them lies in our natural human committment to interpersonal relationships, as such reactive attitudes we not be brought under scrutiny though their application in special particular cases can be restrained. To abandon this structure, because theoretical reason demands such an abandonments, is humanly impossible. It would be a demand to transcend our human situation.

Strawson observes that morality faces another challenge from reductive scientism which recognises the ultimate reality of the scientific perspective alone. For Strawson, reality is many faced, it has human face as well which is revealed in our inter personal relationships, while the objective perspective concentrates on the objective and the impersonal face of the same phenomena. "The person then ceases to be a relatum of inter personal relationship. 'If your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, says Strawson, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you can not reason with him, you can at most pretend to quarrel or reason with him".[5]

In reductive scientism one is in a slightly better position, this standpoint is open to one and all as we have access to both this view points. Each position has its own validity 'from its own standpoint". However, once can not sencroach the other : "So while concession is made to it - it is allowed exclusive rights, so to speak, in a certain territory of human thought - the challenge it seems to present to the natural human stand point is decisively rejected."[6]

Thomas Nagel in his article, 'Moral Luck',*and in 'The view from Nowhere'** draws a gloomy picture of human destiny. His objective perspective reveals the naked truth: "Nothing of the agent is left out as an ultimate source of contributing to the outcome - the action in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

question. Rather than facing the world in the role of an actor, we become part of the world. As such, we and our lives are seen as products and manifestations of the world as a whole. And in thus being part of the world , whatever we do gets assimilated to the larger course of cosmic events that are nobody's doing's but mere happenings".[7]

Nagel's scepticism challenges the validity of the non-sceptical conclusions of Strawson's theory of freedom and morality. When the scientific standpoint naturally encroaches the moral perspective and undermines the latter, all we can have is a sentimental plea, an wishful thinking that the human dimension of life could be safeguarded for the good of the mankind: "Yet, I think, even Nagel would adimt that the life of the internalist must not be allowed to evaporate, the overwhelming pressure of the externalist theory not withstanding, pragmatic wisdom must prevail. But the ghost of theory also can not be exercised as Nagel would add. I therefore see on all this our being effortlessly capable of tolerating a magnificant inconsistency".[8]

The principal contension of Strawson's part is that our objective stand point is not a substitute for the reactive one; "A sustained objectivity of interpersonal attitude and the human isolation which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which human being would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it."[9]

We can sustain our reactive attitude when there is a practical necessity for it. One can imagine a situation when only the objective view of reality prevails, even then the reactive attitude, the moral and the personal stand point can not be wholly undermined. To remove it compeletly is to transcend our human situation.

There may be other priorities and the highest value may be accorded to a stage in which the limitations of the human situation are transcended. In the classical Indian tradition the goal of life is one such relationless, non-dual stage of existence - consciousness and bliss. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad iv 4.19 describes the real nature of the soul as non-dual. "Only by the mind is it to be perceived.In it there is no diversity. He goes from death to death, who sees in it, as it were, diversity". One who attains liberation is free from duality but the reality accorded to the inter personal relationship and the reactive attitude is a concession to the empirical consciousness which refueses to, part with the idea of the reality of the world. As the Bhakti mysticism and the philosophy of qualified Non-dualism strongly reacted to such relationless non-dual stage of existence, they saw in it a threat to bhakti and to the interpersonal relationship. It also threatens the absolute reality of separate individuals, which would, in its turn eliminate all relationships and all communal ties. It also eliminates inter personal dependence, people who do not need people lack an essential ingredient of what it means to be a human being. As a noted scholar observes :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"Animals are content when their needs are satisfied; man insists not only on being satisfied but also on being able to satisfy, or being a need not only on having needs. Personal needs come and go, but one anxiety remains: 'Am I needed ?". There is no man who has not been moved by that anxiety".[12] To sustain reactive attitudes and to transcend the limitations of interpersonal relationships is a conceivable state of life, although the quality of life will be different in that state. It is like 'living death', that is now the wisdom of the following parable depicts it:

"The Parrot said, 'If you can only achieve death in life, you attain salvation. Such a being does not suffer from hunger or thirst, is indifferent to pleasure and pain. He has attained his goal, nirvana, moksa or salvation. Try to achieve death in life".[10]

"Kabir had said that there are some rare noble soul who achieve death in life".[11]

It seems both naturalism and absolute idealism posed a threat to the human dimension of life as they denied the reality of the human personality in the ultimate stage : "Naturalism and Absolutism, antagonistic as they seem to be, combine in assuring that personality is an illusion"[12]

However, the supporters of reductive scientism consider it to be the more sophisticated standpoint, which would ultimately under the moral standpoint. "It is needless to say that the internal outlook is the less sophisticated one in being more localized to the human prespective of feelings, attitudes and related practice. And indeed the sophisticated repurcession on the unsophisticated, natural and original view of the matter".[14]

For Strawson, such a drastic switching over to the detached objective attitude is inconceivable because our committment to attached and reactive attitude is a part of the general frame work of human life. Both the reductive and reactive prespectives are distinct and unique, there is no third way to reconcile them. For Nagel, the objective vision can be widened to include as well as explain the earlier local, narrower vision of the internal view and "The push to objectivity is after all a part of the framework of human life".[15]

The implications of the 'personal' or 'normative' attitude can be pursued further in the light of the following observation : "Those who are concerned with human affairs are committed to the use of moral categories and concepts which normal language incorporates and expressed. Chemists, Philologists, Logicians, even Sociology with a strong quantitative bias, by using mosrally neutral technical terms, can avoid doing so. But historians can scarcely do this. They need not - they are certainly not obliged to - moralize: but neither can they aviod the use of normal language with all its associations and 'built in' moral categories. To seek to avoid this is to adopt another moral outlook, not none at all".[16]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Strawson's relativizing mode is one way to resolve the coflict of views by allowing each position its own validity from its own standpoint. But the reductive standpoint is a strictly limited one, which can not consistently occupy in practice all the time. In our ordinary moral discourse, it is diffcult to use morally neutral technical terms. but can we use value neutral technical terms in other areas? Michael Polany's obsevation is of a different nature. For Polanyi the detached objective ideal of knowledge is a sickness because it denies the healthy functions of the individual and society. Our reactive attitude is connected with involvement and participation in a human relationship' which is rejected by the detached objective attitude. Polyani is critical of this detached impersona; objectivity of science : "First objectivism repudiates our valid contribution to what we know by trying to reject the framework of knowledge transmitted to us as our natural habitat through which we continue our explorations. Such attempts are not mere ideas but deformations of the structure of our own existence. Persistent efforts to deny our nature would be bound to produce pathological condition"[17]

"The time will come when men will wonder how this strange view. which combines a misunderstanding of the relation of value to fact with cynicism disguised as stern impartiality, can ever have achieved such remarkable frame and influence and responsibility".[18]

Strawson's relativizing more can be seen as the "putting of a decent theoretical gloss on the practicalities of the matter".*. It is to bring us beyond a danger line which, to remain true to the 'human' or 'reality , we should not cross.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV

AN EXISTENTIALIST ACCOUNT OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS

SANTOSH KUMAR PAL

The problem of interpersonal relations is a philosophic one in so far as it involves a point of view towards the world in which I and other people exist. As different philosophers see the world differently, they make divergent reflections on this problem. The twentieth century existentialist philosophers are the only thinkers who have seen the problem of interpersonal relations from a concrete human viewpoint, and their analyses of human relations, in fact, have surpassed all traditional interpretations. The traditional philosophers, needless to say, do no see the matter from a concrete individual standpoint. In what follows we shall discuss the problem of man-to-man relations from the viewpoint of existentialism.

According to the existentialist ontology, the human reality does not stand alone; it is cast into the concrete world. The world obviously is not simply an object - world, but a world invested by human beings, who, in turn, create room for the other to come in and help him prepare himself to fully realize his potentialities. Thus from the very beginning he is in direct interaction with his fellow individuals. This mode of existence is, in existentialist terminology, called being-with-others. The existentialists do not, however overlook the communal character of our existence, even though they take primary interest in seeing man in his very uniqueness, as a being characterized by mineness. The problem of solipsism does not here arise, since the existentialist philosophy neither beings with pure thinking being, nor with a solitary individual, but always with 'being- in -the -world' and 'being- with - others'. The I exist is meaningful only where there are other persons like I. that is why Sartre holds that the other has an ontological tie to my consciousness.

There seem to be at least two factors that lend support to the contention that communality is fundamental to human existence and is constitutive of it. These are sexuality and linguistics. Both these

CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection, Haridwar.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

human features imply no human individual is complete without others. Sex signifies the fact that although the individual human body contains several complete systems, like the digestive system, the nervous system, etc. it has only half of the reproductive system and is thus incomplete without the body of a second person of the opposite sex. And so is the case with language. The essence of language is interpersonal communication which means that there are other persona too.

Heidegger, among other existentialist, describes the relation between individual self and others in terms of solicitude. Solicitude is a word taken from a German expression, die Fursorge, which signifies this particular mode of human existence. Solicitude does not, however always, take the form of actively caring for others. It has, according to Heigeger, two extreme possibilities; In one case, we 'leap in' for the other. 'This kind of solicitude takes over for the other that with which he is to concern himself. The other is thrown out of his own position he steps back, so that, afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal or disburden himself of it completely[1]. In this we recognise the dominating mode of solicitude. In the other, the individual shows authentic care for the other and it 'helps the other transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it[2].

Although we have started the discussion with Heidegger, yet it is Buber who has surely had pre-eminance in this field of interpersonal relations. Buber has introduced[3] two primary words, viz. I- Thou and I-It, in order to explain different modes of interpersonal relations. Such primary words are more than mere labels or grammatical operators; they have existential force. He holds that when a primary word is spoken, the speaker enters the word and takes his stand in it. In the 'I-Thou' relation, we relate totally to the other, and we do so by becoming open to him. He is not just externally there for me, nor he is a means to some satisfaction beyond himself. But in 'I-It' we are not completely open to him; rather we take him as a means of some of my satisfacition, and so it is partial, and that with which we are concerned remains external to us.

But the tragic aspect is that 'I-thou' relation frequently degenerates into 'I-It'. We relate to the order not in wholeness and openness, but turn him to a thing, an instrument. It happens in thousand more subtle ways. Whenever there is exploitation or discrimination, or prejudice, persons are treated as less than personal. Extreme instance of this are slavery and prostitution. There is, of course, the shop-keeper is only a means to satisfy some of my needs, but there may also develop an 'I-thou' relation between me and the shopkeeper.

Harvey Cox, however, has sensibly suggested that in many cases an 'I-You' relation is more appropriate than the 'I -Thou' relation. The 'I -You' relation is the one that respects the personality of the other, but

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

does not want to establish with him the depth and intimacy that is customarily associated with the relation of 'I-Thou'. Buber, of course, does not mean that one should go around forming intense personal of relation is an indiscriminate way. However, the distinction is clear in Cox's terminology.

In order to further elucidate the theme Buber has introduced some other notions too. The very characteristic of Buber's thought is his use of the word dialogue. To say, that interpersonal relation is dialogical is to insist on the mutual characters of our relations. A genuine relation to another personal cannot be one sided, dominating, or possessive; it must consist in openness and willingness to listen to receive as well as to speak and to give. This, of course, does not mean that one has to merge into the other leaving all his uniqueness and individuality. A true relation preserves the other in his uniqueness. In so far as I wish to be united with my beloved, preserving the mineness of my existence, so I must leave her to be 'herself' and never should try to mould her according to my personal ideas, although there may be interaction of ideas. There is still another idea Buber plucks up and this is confirmation. I do not establish a genuine and cordial relation with my friend, if I am not attended to and not welcomed. I do not wish to be belittled in the eyes of my near and dear ones.

Marcel, too has given a detailed and appreciative study of human relations. He has used two characteristic expressions, viz., availability and fidelity. If a person is hardly available, an interpersonal relation cannot, in general, be established and preserved. The truth, however, is that people are largely unavailable to one another. The unavailable person is preoccupied with himself and is thus closed against the other. It is by virtue of availability that a person acquires presence to another. 'Presence', says Marcel, 'denotes something rather different and more comprehensive than the fact of just being there; to be quite exact, one should not actually say that an object is present[4]. It depends on a person's coming out of himself, or transcending himself towards the other.

One characteristic way in which a man goes out of himself is by making promises and engagements. these are typically human affairs: for man is the only being who may make promises. By making promises a man binds himself with others and determines his future. My promise means that I want to turn away from the boundless world of course and effects which I can not control, nor can I always foresee. Community is built on the basis of fidelity', our faithfulness to those promises and appointments. Fidelity is the active recognition of something abiding idea of loyalty expounded by Josiah Royce, who saw in 'loyalty-to- loyalty the foundation of morality and human community.

Thus far is positive aspect of interpersonal relations. But there is another side of the story. There are philosophers who lay much emphasis

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on the uniqueness of the individual and entertain an hostile attitude towards the other. Kierkegaard holds that the other stands in the way of our relation with God, the union with whom is our ultimate goal. In some of this later writings however, Kierkeggard has reconsidered his position. In Sartre, again, we meet a philosopher with whom individual being seems to weigh more than the communal being. We are familiar with his No Exit, assertion: 'Hell is other people'. In being and Nothingness he has made an extensive analysis on the concrete relations with others, but has come to the tragic conclusion that the relation between man and man is one of eternal conflict. He reiterates, 'Conflict is the original meaning of being - for -others.[5]

In a sense one might say that Sartre's attitude in this regard is very similar to Kierkegaard's : It is for the sake of being united with God that the other is to be adjudged an obstacle. For Sartre, however, God is not an independent personal. Being as is traditionally conceived. God is, according to him, only a name that may conveniently designate that fulfilment which every human being seeks. Every finite individual wants to materialize his imagined future, and in the way to his realization the other stands out as an obstacle. Sartre wants to say that there can be no genuine interpersonal relations, since everyone of us is in competition with the other. But in some of his later writings, especially in Existentialism is Humanism and Critique of Dialectical Reason, we find that Sartre has some how compromised with his earlier position to allow for the possibility of interpersonal communication.

Nevertheless, there is no gain denying that the committed existentialists are primarily individualists in their attitude, even though the thinkers, like Buber, Marcel, lay more stress on communal character of our existence. But an excessive negative attitude towards the other is not a healthy position. To say the truth, neither collectivism nor individualism is a happy solution to interpersonal relations. Man's individuality, it seems to us, has to be developed in such a way that it can be in perfect harmony with that of others. In this mechanical society of modern era existentialism plays a unique role of making man conscious of his individuality, his inward subjectivity, but this is welcome only to the extent that it does not obstruct the becoming of other.

REFERENCES

1. Martin Heidegger : Being and Time, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978 p.157.
2. Ibid : P. 159
3. Martin Buber : 'I - Thou', (trans. R.C. Smith) Edinburgh, 1958, p.3
4. Gabriel Marcel : 'The Ego and its Relation to Others' in Homo Viator (trans.E. Craufurd), New York, 1951, p.15.
5. J.P. Sartre : Being and Nothingness, Philosophical Library, New York, 1956, p.475.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

V

MATTER LIKE CHRIST CRUCIFIED

M.P. Gairola

During the years 1943-44 and 1944-45 in my M.A.(Philosophy) classes in the Allahabad university, I had the proud privilage of learning Vedant from the saintly Professor, Dr. R.D. Pande, the then Head of Philosophy Department and Dean, Faculty of Arts and later Vice chancellor of that university. He not only taught Vedant, but also lived it, taking only tea, thrice a day, for the last 26 years till 1943. Prior to that I passed my LL.B. previous exam from the Allahabad university in 1943 and was a student of the good college, Lahore from June, 1938 to April 1942. I graduated from there in 1942.

At Lahore, while studying in the govt. college, I lived with the princes of the then Tehri Garhwal state, went to the cottage with them in their car and took most rich and delicious food, there by developing in me a desire to lead an aristocrate life and dream of possessing cars and kothies. Professor Ranade's influence and teaching crucified the materialist in me and planned for my resurrection as a staunch spiritualist.

Destiny gave me several jerks and jolts by resigning twice from goverment service and working in sculpture without any training during 1947 and presenting the Plaster of Paris last of Dr. Sir Ganga Nath Jha to his son. Dr. Amarnath Jha and Mirjapuri Stone bust of Pt. Jawahal Lal Nehru to him on 1.8.1947, when he had come to Allahabad on a short flight to have some important discussion with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru who was on sick -bed at his residence, at 19 Albert Road, Allahabad. With the cooperation of Mr. Justice, Shankar Saran I had worked on the marble bust of his father, Munshi Ishwar Saran, but unfortunately could not finish it as I had to suddenly leave Allahabad for Tehri Garhwal on 16th January 1948, after the people of that state through a non violant revolution had taken over administration of Tehri, the capital of that state. I therefore could not return to Allahabad and worked as Lecturer in Logic at Pratap Inter College Tehri from May 1948 to Jan 1952. From 3rd January 1953, I am in the legal profession in Tehri Garhwal.

In Feb. 1976 I was mysteriously invited to attend the Inaugural Function of the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, Garhwal Mandal, organised at

CC-0 In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the Nari Shilpa Mandir, Dehradun, where I was abruptly requested to experss my views, immediately after the famous Historian the late Dr. Bhagwat Saran had delivered his talk saying, "There are many problems facing him today of which he had no solution. By slip of tongue Smt. Pande had introduced me to the audience as Acharya Mahabeer Prasad Gaurola. In my address I said, but I have only one problem - why man everywhere is so panic-strucken and restless today? - before me and I have its answer - He has forgotten God and his real self as well!

The Hindustan daily next morning giving the news about that function referred me as Dr. Gaurola, whereas I was simply M.A,. I had read that Napolean held that every step of tongue or pen was a forecast of a coming event, do I only in simple humour wrote to the late capt. Shoorbeer Singh Panwar, a close friend of Dr. Bhagawat Saran that in my case the slip of tongue of Smt Pande was a forecast of my getting a Ph.D. degree. That humour in due course turned into a reality and I finally decided to get myself registered for Ph.D. reseach at the Rohilkhand University with the title - 'Re-investigation of matter Spirit relationship' in the light of recent discoveries at the late age of 55 and am now registered for D.Litt. research. The late age of 76, I was born at Tehri on 21.04.1922. The late Dr. B.L. Areya of the Benaras Hindu University in his postcard encouraged me to go ahead with my research and his son Dr. J.P. Atreya was my guide for Ph.D. research got the Ph.D. degree in 1983. The topic approved for my D.Litt. research was previously - 'Synthetic Spritualism as approved to Dialectical Materialism' and I had to submit my D.Litt. thesis by 30th June 1992. But I could not submit it in time due to cataract in health of my eyes and had to get myself re-registered with a new title - 'The Relevance of Dialectical Matrialism in Atomic age'. The synopsis is the same but I got its chapters re-numbered and slightly improved.

My main findings in my Ph.D. thesis, that was published by me in 1990 as 'Matter is dead, long live Matter' are (1) Reality appears at that point where Matter and Spirit meet to Exhaust each other and duality disappears, (2) Matter and Spirit are the two faces of the same coin, (3) Matter without spirit has no roots and spirit without matter leaves no fruits, (4) Fort forms of reality let philosophy combal, which elevates the seeker the best is that, (5) Philosophy, Sociology and science should get together to evolve a better social system on Earth, in which disparities of all kinds disappear and people throughout the world live, work and act like members of one family, (6) The universe is neither Geocentrics nor Helio - Centric, it is in fact Homo - centric, as man the creater is always of life where self realisation is posible.

Now, I have reached the stage in my life where I can advice the world at large to discard the matrialistic way of life and help in its re-surection as the most potent synthetic spiritual force that will solve unsolved mystries about life, According to me the wisest statement will be, "Know thyself and you know every thing about the universe and its creater as well." Matter is dead, Long live Matter.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VI

FREEDOM FROM 'FREEDOM' ITSELF (J.KRISHNAMURTI'S VIEWS OF FREEDOM)

Subrata Roy

1929, August 3, J.Krishanmurti delivered his famous Ommen Camp speech. He declared, - "I have only one purpose : to make man free, to urge him towards freedom, to help him to break away from all limitations, for that alone will give him eternal happiness". But what is that freedom. Is there anything remarkable about him ? What is that? What are the unique and exeptional features of Krisnhanmurti's freedom*?....These are some of the questions which this paper wants to deal with.

However, at the very beginning, we need to be clear about the kind of freedom that Krishnamurti has talked about. Krishnamurti once said, "I, never opposed the ideas of others but I would not accept their authority, their theory of life".[1] Similarly, like life itself, Krishnamurti never accepted anyone's theory of freedom. His freedom depends on understanding life in its actuality and never on the understanding of any theory or so.

FREEDOM IS FREEDOM FROM THE KNOWN :

Krishnamurti's freedom is 'freedom from the known', from the knowledge of the past and also of the future, from concepts, from the chain of cause and effect, or from any mechanical (deterministic) approach. His freedom is free from time and measurement, from seeking or hunting after it. Since Krishnamurti's freedom is not a concept, it is free from the concept of freedom itself and it can not be defined. Freedom can only be negatively felt, when there is a no mental conditioning, no fragmentation, no limitation then there is freedom. Krishnamurti's freedom is nameless, conceptless and so absolute. Krishnamurti always talked about absolute freedom.This absolutism, however, has a special meaning. Freedom lies in one's own self, and in the development and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the purification and in the incorruptibility of that self, says Krishnamurti. This is the absolute and unconditioned nature of freedom (and truth). Krishnamurti once said, "My only concern is to set man absolutely, unconditionally free"[2].

Various theories of freedom - political, economic or otherwise, have nothing to do with Krishnamurti's freedom.Freedom for him, is not a theory, so it cannot be explained in theoretical terms e.g., 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. Freedom is freedom in itself. It is neither a reaction nor a goal nor an ideal. Freedom through revolution or reformation is a sham, a relative freedom, a new bondage under new names and values. Krishnamurti's freedom has nothing to do with relativety.

Any concept or theory has a past and also a future. A theory (or concept) develops gradually, takes its meaning through use; it has thought and reason as its ground (source) which is based on a certain period of time, and as a theory it must have a picture of a certain future. But Krishnamurit's freedom, which is not a theory, is therefore free from all demands and dreams of a theory.

FREEDOM IS FREE FROM CASUAL NETWORK :

"There is no freedom within the network of cause -effect,"[3] Krishnamurti commented. That cause-effect network, the chain of Karma, the ever association of fear and sorrow with religion, caste, creed, or with every human activity should be broken (dissolved) to understand Krishnamurti's kind of freedom. This network is a psychologically made one and has no factual basis. However, Krishnamurti had said nothing against the casual relationship prevalent in the nature as a mango seed producing only a mango tree and not a banyan. But the cause -effect chain experienceed by human beings in their own lives can never be final, according to Krishnamurti. It can be snapped at any moment though understanding, as light destorys darkness immediately. Krishnamurti's says -

"Through the understanding of what is actually taking place.This process (chain of cause & effect) can be stopped instantaneously, and there is freedom from that which has been. Karma is not an ever-enduring chain; it's a chain that can be broken at any time. What was done yesterday can be undone today; there's no permanent continuous of anything. Continuance can and must be dissipated through the understanding of its process".[4]

Only man can break, this casual nexus because human mind, unlike animals is not permanently framed, and interstingly, it has a self capacity; so 'it needn't be a slave to tradition. 'However to break this casual chain man needs self-knowledge or understanding of the various functionings of the self, for it (self) being the source and base of all casual network, except the physical (natural) one. According to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Krishnamurti, self is an illusion, a past, a long history and tradition; it has to be understood and dissolved any way to step into the kingdom of psychological freedom. ("Surely, freedom from the self..... is the true function of man."- Krishnamurti). And when there is no individual self, no casual network which is sustained by the self, then there is a death to tradition, to past, to any idea. Then there is moment to moment living, giving full measure of attention to each and every activity that we do, then there is real freedom to look and to act. (If you put away all that, which means dying to all that you know freedom from the known this is death and then you are living. You are living, not in some fantastic world of concepts but actually living.[5] - Krishnamurti)

FREEDOM IS IN CHOICELESS AWARENESS :

To have real freedom in life, to live from moment to moment one needs to be choicelessly aware. Choiceless awareness without any motive or interest, any condition or selection. It is not an imbibed or practiced awareness rather it is an effortless and emergent awareness. Though pure and objectless, this awareness can be directed to any where when necessary. In essence, choiceless awareness is a distinct state of mind above psychological conditionings, and so free from any sorrow and worry of life. It's a state of perfect detachment of the Bhagavat Gita's kind, a state of sthitaprajna (stable intelligence) where ups and downs of life have no effect. Choiceless awareness also indicates a state of mind which is integrated and whole; a mind which enjoys freedom from fragmentation of life.

For Krishnamurti, choiceless awareness is the only way to tackle mental phenomena like anger or envy which often bother and torture us. Anger etc., flower and die inwardly when there is sheer awareness of those facts, without naming or condemning them in any way. When one is aware without choice or distinction, name or description to every mental phenomena, there is then an instant freedom, not like any freedom derived from theoretical or mechanical activity. This is psychological freedom through choiceless awareness, when former is the result, the later is the way. Here we can consider one of Krishnamurti's saying -

> Freedom is pure observation without direction, without fear of punishment and reward. Freedom is without motive;..... Freedom is found in the choiceless awareness of our daily Existence and activity."[6]

So real freedom is where there is awareness - pure and objectless, without any choice or condition.

FREEDOM IS TURTH ITSELF :

Truth 'is the state of search',[7] said Krishnamurti. This search cannot be possible without one being completely psychologically free; free from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conditions of culture, interests, or of ideological commitments. Truth manifests only in this state of freedom. Truth is not a static thing, it is living and moving. "truth is not something abstract, something final but it is a living thing, it is perpetually in creation." (Talks by Krishnamurti in India 1965, p. 137). It needs tremendous courage and sensitivity to bring it to light. Freedom too is not static. it cannot be a goal or ideal. It also needs tremendous courage to attain it. And so, in Krishnamutri's view truth is freedom, and freedom is truth. Actually the state of psychological freedom, of truth and of search are all one and the same. They indicates a single state of mind. In Krishnamurit, freedom and truth are not ideals, they cannot be so; instead they imply a state of living with love and understanding. Truth and freedom cannot be anybody's property; nobody can claim over them - neither a religious teacher nor a political leader. This is unique in Krishnamurti.

FREEDOM CANNOT BE THROUGH EFFORT:

Should man make effort to become free? Krishnamurti will say - No. "Effort is the very denial of understanding", Krishnamurti said, 'It is only the quiet mind, the simple mind, the mind that is still, that is not overtaxed by its own effort - only such a mind shall understand shall see truth."[8] In a different occassion Krishnamurti remarked, "Truth alone liberates, and not your desire to be free. The very desire and effort to be free is a hindrance to liberation."[9] Any effort indicates a plan of action, a theory, a concept according to which the plan proceeds, a goal or destination, a mental readiness to invest great energy towards that goal and also a fear of unsuccessfulness, and so on all these things obstruct psychological freedom, and thereby distort free enquiry.

Since Krishnamurti's freedom is not a theory it has nothing to do with effort. Otherwise that would be a sheer jumping in the dark. His freedom cannot be invited, if it comes it comes without any invitation. Effort, endeavour, search has importance only in respect of thing or theories prepared by mind or thought.

FREEDOM IS WHERE THERE IS NO FEAR :

Freedom, of Krishnamurti's kind, cannot appear so long fear in any from exists in man.* There should be freedom from all sorts of fear-'from the fear of religion, from the fear of salvation, from the fear of love, from the fear of death, from the fear of life itself."[10] Fear always limits mind. A limited (fearful) mind cannot function wholly or properly; it shrinks, it shivers, it takes limited view of things, it distorts facts, it cannot see the actuality, the what is. So, in Krishnamurti's mind which is economically or politically free, but always afraid of subjects like God or fate, cannot be a free mind. To overcome fear an individual needs alertness and great understanding. Freedom, for Krishnamurti is a state of mind without a stint of fear.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A FREEDOM ONLY UNDERSTANDS REALITY :

Reality comprises facts of the world. Facts take into account everything mental and external, except any theoretical interruption. When any individual interpretation in the from of evaluation or so takes place a fact becomes a fiction. Krishnamurti's reality is a freeman's domain; only a man who is psychologically free or uninterrupted by any theory or idea can comprehend reality. Krishnamurti's reality has nothing to do with any esotericness, and it is not a metaphysical concept. For him, "What has validity is the life that you lead everyday, that is the only life you have, and without understanding it, you will never understand either love, beauty, or death."[11] There is no life in general, conceptual; no scope of saying Jaganmityha world a fiasco. This world is real and here anyone has to understand one's own life - no sanction can help there. Krishnamurti's freedom, unlike Advaitin's moksa (liberation), implies that there is no place of any concept (theory) - formation in regard to one's life's understanding.

CRITICAL APPRECIATION

Freedom for Krishnamurti is neither esoteric, nor religious, nor behavioural, nor metaphysical in nature and essence.

Krishnamurti's freedom stands in the negation - in fact, the whole philosophy of J.Krishnamurti stands so - and is neither a result nor a reaction nor an end. Freedom is in understanding ' what is'; it is ever present, never past or future. It is always there at the back of one's mind when one is free from any condition, motive or interest. A child when lives and acts in wholeness, when he looks to a bird, listens to song or learns a lesson wholly or with rapt attention he is in freedom. "Freedom is not at the end,... It must be at the begining, otherwise you cannot discover,"[12] reminded Krishnamurti. So freedom is not an attainment, a goal, when there is love and care for everything without any distinction the man, whoever he is, is surely enjoying Krishnamurti's freedom. In everyway his freedom is more like a blessing or a boon than an achievement; more ordinary* (natural) than artificial, more negatively ascertained that positively; more wide and all comprehensive than only relative or partial; more psychological than theoretical moral or otherwise more a different kind of awareness (choiceless or passive awareness) than an exercised or a sum totalled view.

In no way, Krishnamurti's freedom can be demonstrated; it is reflected only in activities and approaches. It is not a result of a great erudition, rather it's natural like air and water only its greatness can be realised in contrast with our miserable living. Krishnamurti's freedom is never an addition or an accumulation, on the contrary, it is a dissolution of what is wrongly accumulated in the mind as humanity's treasure. Freedom symbolizes a mind what it was at the begnining of civilization unpolluted, clear and wide awake, and not a primitive mind. A

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

primitive mind is an underdeveloped and unsophisticated mind, afraid of all natural phenomena. Krishnamurti's freedom cannot be identified with such a native mind. To become free, in Krishnamurti's sense is a way of becoming naked to our very own self (what is) and so, of becoming simple, and sensitive humble, and united with everything.

However, contradictions and confusions in Krishnamurti's views of freedom are always there, and they need clarification. For example, how Krishnamurti made so many positive statements regrading freedom when, according to him, freedom is not a concept, an idea? To reconcile between these two apparently contradictory situations we can refer to one of the enlightening stories on Zen Budhism.

Once a monk asked a master - "Show me the way without appealing to words."

And, the master said, "Ask me without using words."[13]

So asking a question guarantees, to some extent, answering it; but both asking and answering become meaningless when truth (freedom) is realized.

Then, there may be another question, may a common one, such as - in what way Krishnamurti's freedom can help the world. True, his freedom never guarantees any political or social change; it never aims at any result or goal. It only effects ones attitude or approach toward life and world. His freedom is individualistic and phenomenological which desire to make an individual mind healthy and whole. A mind which is wide open, not fractured and fragmented, is a free mind; it lives in eternity and boundlessness. Such a mind, which Krishnamurti desires, makes a life worth living which has a never ending effect for the world. "when once the mind is free, then what is its responsibility' is not applicable to such a mind. Its very existance has an explosive action on time, on the past. It is this explosive action that is of the higest importance ..... that explosive freedom acts on the bondage of time."[14] And that eventually creates a new Society.

REFERENCES

1. Fouere, Rene : *The Man and His Teaching, Introduction.*
2. Vas, Luis S.R. (ed) : *The Mind of J. Krishnamurty,p.300.*
3. Krishnamurti, J : *Commentaries on Living, Third Series p. 220*
4. Krishnamurti, J. : *ibid. p. 280*
5. Krishnamurti, J. : *Awakening of Intelligence, p. 206*
6. Lutyens, Mary : *Krishnamurti - The years of fulfilment, p. 204.*
7. Krishnamurti, J. : *Commentaries on Living, Third Series p.220*
8. Weeraperuma, S : *Philosophy of J. Krishnamurti, p. 65*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

9. Krishnamurti. J. : Commentaries of Living. 2nd Series p.220
10. Krishnamurti. J. : Ommen Camp Speech - 1929
11. Krishnamurti. J. : Awakening of Intelligence. p. 206
12. Weeraperuma. S. : Sayings of J. Krishnamurti. p. 77
13. Watts. Alan : The Spirit of Zen. p. 147
14. Krishnamurti.J. : Commentaries on Living. 3rd Series p.220

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VII

MAN AND HIS CONCEPTS OF NATURE

Ranjan Ghosh

Upto our own day there has been three major coneptions of the universe: the hylozoic, held by the Greeks and Medievals the opposite conception, the machanistic wold of Newtonian science; and the modern conception, which reconciles the mechanism of the second with the vitalism and teleology of the first.

Properly speaking, the idea of nature arises only as the concommitant of science, for it is the idea of the world as a single structure of interelated bodies and events determinded by uniform laws, the indispensable presupposition of scientific thinking. Accordingly, we find the idea of nature coming into being in the Western world concurrently with the scientific thinking of the early Ionian philosophers from Thales onward. First, the nature of things - what determined their mutual disposition and activity - was conceived as the stuff of which they were made, and the unitary, systematic relations among them were maintained by regarding this substance as one and pervasive. All things were held to be water or air or fire, and their diversity was explained as the differentiation of the one fundamental stuff (or nature) according to single principle of change (for example, rarefaction and condenasation). Hence, the idea of nature become extended to the general way in which things are constructed, interrelated, and mutually affected. Scientific treatises were those 'on the nature of things', and they explored precisely these features of the experienced world. Finally, the world as a whole, as a system of interrelated entitles governed by universal laws, come to be thought of as a single individual - Nature - Frequently personified and conceived as ubiquitous, omnicompetent, and all inclusive.

The Greeks conceived the world as a living organism, constantly changing and in motion, which, however, they could make intelligible to themselves only in terms of a permanent, unchanging, eternal form, both yet was the source of all change - an unmoved mover at once both final and efficient cause. (This Aristotelian concept developed, of course form the earlier variants, of which Plato's idea of the good was the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

most significant). Because the eternal from was final cause, the world was conceived taleologically, as a scale of terms each striving to actualize a higher form. The ultimate form must therefore be the final object of desire toward which all things perposively tend. This nisus is judged in a material thing, the matter of which is the potentiality of becoming informed. Matter as such, is unintelligible and is the presupposed condition of the deficiency of finite existents from the pure translucence of the intelligible form. But all matter is infused with soul, which is the source of all motion and change and the seat of the nisus to the actualization of form.

In the detail of Aristotle's system, although in essentials it prevailed for centuries as the most advanced scientific theory, there were further contradictions, especially with respect to his theory of motion. These sorely troubled the Medievals and led eventually to modifications introducing Ideas precursory to inertia and finally ushering in the Copernican and Galilean revolution. The detail of the history need not be repeated here. We can lend frank admittance to the consequence following from the ensuring world-wide as that of a technical universe, 'objective' in the sense of being external to consciousness leading to an unbridgeable gulf between matter and mind, and an intractable separation of facts from values. Here we find the origins of the problems in the practical and social field which mankind is facing today.

But mechanism in physics suffered a decline in the late nineteenth century with the successive failures of attempts to give mechanistic accounts of electro - magnetic phenomena. The physics of the twentieth century, in contrast, has abandoned both mechanism and materialism, replacing forces by space time curvature and viewing the occurances of matter as a singulartity in the metrical field. The effect of the change has indeed been widely recognised.

The most far reaching result both of Relativity and of Quantum Theory has been to reverse the logical order of explanation of phenomena. Instead of tracing back events to the external relations between separate and mutually independent particles, contemporary physics locates and identifies particles in energy systems or fields, which exist if at all only as intregal wholes. Structure has become prior to particularization, so that if either the position or the velocity of a particle is sought on isolation, the other becomes indeterminable.

Such priority of the soul to its constitutents is both in the nature of things and is epistomological; it is epistomological because it also ontological. To explain and describe the entities of the world, they must be referred to the structural wholes to which they only exist, are distinguishable, and have the properties they do have as inseparable features of a structure whole.

The Greeks found no hiatus between matter and mind but saw them as continuous phases of one scales of degrees. For the Presocratics it was a material scale, the soul always belonging to the purest or most

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unmixed grade, be it air with Anaximines and Diogenes of Apollonia, fire with Heraclitus, or 'the thinnest of all things', the Nous of Anaxagoreas. One must not regard these ideas as 'materialistic', because the matter of the Presocratics was living matter and the soul was its purest unadulterated form. In a sense, all matter was simply downgraded soul. With Plato, soul floats loose from the body and is 'akin to the forms' but yet not one of them; while for Aristotle, the two concept are combined and the soul is the proximate form the body, and the passive intellect is the place of forms, so that continuity between matter and form is preserved. Objectivity, accordingly, is a notion not yet explicit in the Greek mind, although its chief ingredient, universality is their main discovery. Pythagorean numbers translated into Platonic forms are the progenitors of the objective truth in modern thought.

This is not the appropriate place to expound or to criticise in detail this conception of the universe, although it is immediately apparent that it holds conflicts implicit in it. For example, the dualism between matter and form is never wholly or satisfactorily overcome, and the soul remains an ambiguous entity which is somehow neither yet also somehow both. Aristotle comes nearest to solving the inherent problems, but he fails in the end by his inability to demonstrate how God, as pure form can be both immanent in and transcendent beyond the world. He asserts both immanence transcendence while insisting equally on the absence of all matter in God, and so he is committed to the sheer transcendence of the unmoved mover, to the detriment of his entire system.

The hylozoic world concept is not, however a mere error, but is an embryonic from of a truth yet to be derived from it. Indeed, there is much in it to which our own age has returned, although in a more sophisticated version. The Greek philosophers were the first to conceive of dialectic and to construct systems, knowingly or inadvertently, as continua of graded forms. Their grasp of the real as teleoligical was a sound insight, as was also the evolutionary notion of the world discoverable in Anaximander's speculations, in Empedocles', and in Aristotle's. The objective world as they conceived it was not simply subjective to them, but was the essential basis on which later science was built; and that, for all its apparent rejection of much which now seems fantastic, has preserved fundamental and important elements of truth.

Nature for the Greeks was one vast living organism, sentient, self moving and conscious, in which human and other living being were localized centres of the pervasive soul-substance. This soul-subtance was, in the last report, identical with, and the purest form of, that ultimate stuff for nature of which all things were made. The lesser souls, whether of Gods, men or animals were differentiated by varying degrees of adulteration of the original stuff by its own less appropriate

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

form. The problem for the Greeks, therefore both metaphysical and practical, was how the human soul could be purified and become wholly reidentified with the universal substance.

The birth of modern science in the sixteenth century A.D. produced an entirely different and opposite conception of nature. With the development of the notion of gravity and inertia, nature come to be viewed as an aggregation of bodies moved by forces calculable solely from their masses and positions. It was one great machine. This conception involves a cleavage between the machine - the total aggregate of material existence or of man (the subject of scientific - knowledge). various attitudes to nature arise from the dichotomy so created. Nature is first the object of human knowledge set over against the knowing mind as an alien other to be observed from without. Next, as science succeeds in discovering natural laws, nature becomes an opponent to be conquered and controlled, a combination of forces to be subdued and domesticated, to serve the purposes of man. Subsequently, it becomes apparent that nature in the service of man has limitations that resources of matter and energy can become exhausted or so modified that man's purposes may be defeated by the very technology he employs to serve them.

Supervening upon these attitudes to nature, however, a third conception has arisen which complicates more radically the relation between nature and men. This new view emerged with the conception, in the mid nineteenth century, of the idea of evolotion. Hence forth nature could not be regarded simply as a machine, but was conceived as a process of continuous development. Laws of mechanics are reciprocal and reversible, but an evolutionary process is unidirectional and progressive. Further under this conception of nature, man is recognized as a product of evolution and his knowledge the outcome of biological development. His relation to nature now comes to be envisaged in terms of that between organism and environment. The effect of this modification was not immediate or total, although its implications were revolutionary. Environment, at least in the first instance, was still regarded as external and set in opposition to the organism, which must adapt itself to alien conditions in order to survive. Man's adaptation follows upon that of lower species, which involves the development of sensibility, sense organs for distance reception and cognitive apparatus. His capacity to know and to act intelligently, his conquest and control of nature, his social and technical advance, are thus seen as aspects of his adaptation to enviroment.

So conceived, social progress though very different in character and in principle from biological evolution, appears as an extension of the same process. Yet as it proceeds, the development of human social organisation, with its accompanying technical advanced, reacts upon and bedevils biological adaptations. Species are decimated energy

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sources are tapped and drained, the ambient life-giving envelopes of atmosphere and sea are polluted and the balance of nature is upset.

With the advance of biological science and the study of ecology, it has become apparent that the idea of adaptation of organism to environment was a misconception, for the environment is not static, nor is it a mere external setting for indwelling life. Evolutionary change involves the environment equally with the living thing. The two constitute a single organic whole, an open system in dynamic equllibrium. Modification of, or 'control' over, the environment, therefore, becomes less a means than a menace to human survival, and the exploitation of nature more inimical than advantageous. Voices are then raised advocating conservation; but that involves a conflict between the demands of technical progress already made and those of environmental preservation. In same sense, the demand is for a reverse of the evolutionary process, which runs counter to the very concept of evolution itself. The use of technology to mitigate the ravages of technology is severely limited. The preservation of resources. Pollution of atmosphere and water can be limited by new devices, but not eliminated. If population can be controlled consumption may be limited, but the demand for progress and 'development' will persist. The evolutionary process can not be arrested and if social progress could not be reversed, it is not obvious that the result would be beneficial. The idea of nature neither to engendered by science has, in its effects on practice led man into an impasse - a labyrinth to escape from which we need a new guiding thread, in the form of a new concept of nature and our own place in it.

It is not simply that the idea of nature in the advance of science has come full circle and has returned to that entertained by the Greeks. In some sense this has occurred, but the new conception is much more elaborate and sophisticated than the original one, and is rather a combination and reconcillation of the two opposite notions of mechanism and organism. The earlier mechanism rested in Newtonian physics, which has today given place to relativity and quantum mechanics. Physics has ceased to be mechanistic and has even adopted a conception of matter which is itself non- materialistic. The relation of mankind to nature has to be understood in the light of this dialectic conception.

Three major metaphysical questions arise out of this conception of mankind and nature. The first concerns the individually and self - identity of man as a person, the degree of his self sufficiency and freedom. How far is his identity submerged and overwhelmed in such a conception ? If, prima facie, it may seem to be fatally subordinated to an all absorbing totality, two considerations forbid any such conclusion. Apart from human thought and self-reflective consciousness there would be no idea of nature. It is his own self determining and free thought that makes man aware of his world and his relation to it. So, whatever idea of nature science generates, it is man's own science, his own

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

constuction, his own judgement of the world, and the interpretation, self made, of his own experience. It can not therefore, be wholly subordinated to, and submerged within, the totality concevied as nature. Further, this reflection is not in conflict with that conception itself. For it is one form of a totality, self generating in a scale of forms, each of which is more self- complete and self maintaining than its predecessors. The human mind supervenes at a relatively highly developed stage and accordingly, represents a high degree of self sufficiency, integrity, and self-determination. It is the fruition of the natural process and cannot be reengulfed and submerged in its more primitive matrix.

The second major question is that of the ultimate character of the totality. Is it, as a whole a consciousness, self aware of its own identity ? The latter is hardly plausible and is not consistant with the conception or a scale of concretely existing phases. First, so far from being a mere scheme, the totality must be seen as a continum of interwoven forms; and. secondly, among these forms human presonally is one of the more highly developed, though in obvious ways incomplete and limited. Whatever transcends human consciousness can hardly be something more abstract, more diffuse, and less intregally whole.

The third question follows naturally from these two. How does human life and purpose relate to the totality in which it is intregal? What sort of self determining conduct on the part of making is most appropriate to the conception or nature above outlines ? The espiration to conquer and control nature is now revealed as arrogant folly, liable to lead as in our own day looks probable, to self destrruction. Man must somehow see himself as the instrument of nature's own purposes, which his science must divine and follow. Perphaps, in a new and more significant sense we shall have to revive the ancient exhortation to live accordingly to nautre if we are to live successfully, satisfactorily and virtuously. But that does not mean that we must revert to what is primitives. Rather it implies that when nature is adequately understood, the general direction of evolution will be more clearly been, and human action and policy can then be properly alligned and assimilated to it.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VIII

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF SPECULATIVE THINKING

Girish Chand Baruah

Thinking is a natural gift to man. He cannot but think. It is necessary in every activity of man. So Descartes, deemed to be the father of modern Western Philosophy, is not wrong when he says that our being hood consists in our thinking.

We shall consider in this paper two types of thinking: scientific thinking and metaphysical thinking. If we are allowed to designate scientific thinking as logical thinking, we may give the name speculate thinking to metaphysical one.

Logical thinking may be of two types: inductive and deductive. But inductive thinking (sometimes Known as empirical thinking) is much more necessary or used in science. Deductive thinking is, however, not debarred from using in scientific thinking. It is very common in mathematics.

Deduction is employed not only in science, but also in metaphysics. But in metaphysics deduction mostly takes the from of speculation thinking. Now let us see whether it is a lengthening of deduction or an entirely different type of thinking.

In this connection we are to deal with the nature of metaphysics. We are to answer here such questions : What do we search for in metaphysics ? Is it confined to this world or something we do not receive in our empirical experience?

We know that logical thinking is a case of inference. Inference is generally based on our sensuous experience. But many philosophy hold that it is based on our intuitive experience.

In inference we work with judgements or propositions with or without refernce to sensuous experience. When we infer without reference to sensuous experience we may pass beyond fact or reality. This type of inference may loosely be called speculation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

To speculate means to "form opinions without having definite or complete knowledge or evidence" so as to refer to the Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Oxford. It amounts to guessing. Suppose a certain person resigns from his post, we may speculate on the reasons for his resignation in many ways. The person concerned knows very well why he has resigned. But to us it is difficult to know the reasons of it if he does not divulge the same faithfully. If we assume any reason we can do so only on speculation. Similarly when there is an air crash we may speculate in many ways. Again we are all acquainted with commercial speculation.

Metaphysics has been described as speculative philosophy in derogatory sense by its critics specially by the Marxists. They distinguish it from dialectics. But Hegel called the dialectic thinking as speculative.

With these mixing ups it has been made imperative on us to find out the distinguishing characteristics of speculative thinking, howsoever, difficult it may be. We are trying here to undertake such a venture in our own accord.

Speculation may be characterised as abstract thinking, although all thinking may involve it. According to any thinkers too much abstraction does not lead to practicial results. It often becomes negative, as something like 'neti neti' concept of the Upanisads.

In speculative thinking the observational method is not adopted. As in it we first postulate something theoretically and then deduce conclusion, observation becomes unnecessary.

Mostly speculative thinking rests on contemplation and contemplation is opposed to manual action. Thus in speculation we are away from both observaed phenomena and action. As in it we generally perceive the correspondence of ideas by means of reason, So we are there in the realm of ideas alone. In this way it often leads to barren thinkinking as like sophistry.

Marxism holds that speculative thinking consists in empty phrases about consciousness. But the advocate of it hold that man's speculative impulse makes him try to save him from the interference of crude facts. They say that it is sometimes necessary to go outside the experimental bounds of our thinking. Although it involves a transgression of some epistemic claims, confining thinking to the limits of sense experience alone. In their opinion objective validity alone cannot satisfy a philosopher.

But the critic of speculative thinking hold that it gives us validity which is true only to hom who speculates. So such truths become fantastic to others. Again as it engages itself in theoretical deduction alone its validity is simply formal without any material content. It can connect even the most diverse concepts . It shuns reality. So the critics hold that real life cannot begin unless we bury speculation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Speculation thinking or reasoning is of the nature of esoteric thinking as opposed to exoteric one. In Advaita Vedanta all types of exoteric knowledge are dubbed as avidya i.e. nescience. Unless thinking breaks away itself from facts it cannot be pure thinking, they hold. But in the long run the Advaitins shun all types of thinking. They simply opt for intuition alone.

Being trans-empirical is one of the important characteristics of speculation. In loose sense we may also call it transcendental. It flies over to a transempirical field leaving behind the empirical things. Thus it survives on possibilities.

Speculative thinking is an uncontrolled one. It is not limited by facts. This characteristic makes it degenerate into conjecture. It is concerned with transcendental principles and so it is devoid of certainty. It can give us probability alone.

Too much speculation leads to unintelligibility, barrenness and nothingness like ultra modern poetry or art. It rather bewilders men come to philosophy for wisdom and guidance. It cuts at the very root of the enterprise of philosophising. It advocates such formalism that results in vacuous immaculation. Being an exercise of detached deduction, it forgets about the storn reality on which it is bound to survive. Being detached from life and reality it wanders or 'roams' (to use Wordsworth's term) in the realm of wilderness of thought. There is no harm if it soars high by maintaining 'the kindred points of Heaven and Home.'

We cannot say that formal logic is wholly unimportant, for mathematics uses it. But whem formalism is taken to the extent of unreality, it becomes barren and sterile.

we are to consider whether speculative thinking has humanistic significance or not. Does it keep us in solving our day to problems - either in our daily life or intellectual life ? It does not have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the investigation of our empirical, thinking, it will not be considered a true philosophical method. If it does not have any implication of our realistic thinking, it is fit to be avoided. It is true that we should try to have refined knowledge of the physical world, and in this respect we shall welcome any type of thinking. If the speculative constructions have no any relation whatsoever with the real world, then it is as good as unnecessary and useless. If it lacks the profound study of nature, it ceases to be fertile and productive.

We should not think that there is another reality like the speculative one, which is mental, constructed independent of empirical facts. The so called higher orders of abstraction of speculative thinking simply present us sterile contemplation about life and reality. They rather present us a concept of unreality. It is an effort to convert unreality to reality and vice versa. In such a thinking we are confronted simply tautologies.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In going to establish or follow the laws of logic, we should not neglect or ignore the laws of nature. We should not think that the laws of thought have higher values than the laws of nature. The laws of thought is nothing but the reflection of those of nature. Logic being a tool of thought is nothing but the reflection of those of nature. Logic being a tool of philosophy, should not play the apprehend over the latter. Our mind should not dictate or legislate reality. We feel logic is necessary, although its scope is limited.

Speculation mainly rests on man's meditative power which is deemed to be coming from within. But too much subjectivism leads us away from reality. We cannot avoid subjectivism in speculation as it begins with consciousness. In scientific thinking we begin with nature or reality, and so it is mostly objective. But in speculation we rather mystify reality instead of unveiling it. Therefore metaphysics, being speculative science, cannot avoid a subjective element. Personal elements are much more traceable in it. So it approaches much to poetry or fiction than to science. Personal view point play dominant role in it. It is as if a man is writing his own odes and ballads, lyrics and sonnets. Being a private view of the universe, it becomes a social. Social content cannot be traced it. Here the personal element is much more dominant than the social one.

Metaphysical speculation often leads to establishing a static reality detached from the developing or changeable world. the reality detached from the world is as good as a pseudo-reality. Even mechanical materialism gives us a detached reality, as it also deems reality to be static.

We know that logic seeks to establish truth, while philosophy, reality. Again we know that truth and reality are identical. So a strict logic approaches philosophy most, for the rules of logic may be identical with those of reality. But it is not the case with personal or subjective logic. Logic, if it tries to approach reality, must have an objective basis; the deduction we employ in it must not lead us to an unreal world. Let us refer here to Purandra, to know the Carvaka view in this regard : But Purandra said that even according to the Carvakas inference was valid within the range of the empirically known world, if, however, one proposed to extend its application beyond the range of this worldly objects, one's claim would be a forbidden one." (Lokayata, D.P.Chattopadhyay, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1968, pp. 28-29)

Inspite of all its defects and limitations speculative thinking is not wholly unimportant. When science did not develop, it helped to a great extent to discover many things both in the natural and rational worlds. Thus, as for example, we may refer to Democritus, the great Greek philosopher, who said many things of atoms which were accepted as true till the recent times. Although it is proved to be fallacy now, it provided

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the very basis for the Vaisesika Philosophy which discovered many things speculatively, which if development could have paved the way for scientific development in India. But now the use of speculation in science has become unnecessary, as the scientific method has become more useful. Although it is said that for modren science speculation is unnecessary yet it is very much used in the formulation of the theories like the 'Big Bang', 'Expanding Universe' etc. Similarly in philosophy also its use is questioned by many. If speculation, is, however, taken in the sense of deduction it has not lost its ground altogther.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IX

RELIGION AS A COHENSIVE FORCE

Gauri Prasad Chattopadhyay

Is religion a cohensive force or a distintegrating force ? Does it help in strengthening social unity or it breaks social unity?

In our view Religion is a cohesive force. It can be made a basis for social unity. Religion has two aspects, an individual aspect and a social aspect. Religion is more or less a matter of personal concern. But that religion has a social aspect cannot be ignored. Man while attempting to seek alliance with higher order of being either through church or other religious institutions enters into social intercourse with other persons of the community. The religious institutions are the media for social intercourse and develop a common fellow feeling among its members. People for prayer and worship require a common meeting place and asssemble in churches or other religious institutions.These common meeting places stimulate common feelings and help in the generation of common sentiments which strengthen social solidarity.Religious rites and ceremonies also contribute to social unity. They develop formation of habits or cooperation, a uniform order of conduct and imbue in them a common social idea. All these help social integration. Religious associations try to develop a common religious belief which brings about unity of thought and feeling and acts a strong influence unifying social groups. Religious consciousness in man inspires him, to perform activities of social welfare. The church and other religious associations organize various humanitarian functions which contribute to the well being of society. They run schools, charitable hospitals, destitute homes, orphanages etc. All such actions strengthen the bond of unity between man and man.Religion also acts as a strong influence in the development of common fellow feelings. A man with true religious consciousness not only identifies himself with his religious community but also develops a sense of oneness with humanity at large, believes in the noble ideal of universal brotherhood and looks upon all as the creations of one almighty of God. Naturally he is imbued with a sense of fellow feeling not only with those who belong to his own faith also with those who profess a different faith.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

That religion can be a ground for social unity will be evident from the early form of human culture. Religion played a vital role in the matter of securing primitive social unity. Religion was an effective mode of social control in the primitive community. W. Trotter, Emile Durkheim and others look upon religion as the manifestation of collective feeling.

But while many considers religion to be a cohensive force, there are others who consider it to be a negative, destructive and disintegrating force. They point out that religion puts too much emphasis on the aspect of personal realisation or personal solvation and this makes man negligent of his social obligations. Too much attention on personal upliftment may result in the neglect of social duties. Religion is too much interested in its dogmas and institutions as a result of which the development of a Man's spirituality becomes a secondary affair. Howsoever,every religion may preach the ideal of universal brotherhood, it has a local and particular character and as such, suffers from various limitations.Variations of ideas, dogmas and institutions in the realm of religion are permanent obstacles in the matter of fostering universal unity and amity. That religion creates social conflict and disunity will be evident from the pages of history. The conflict betweem the Protestants and Roman Catholics, between the Hindus and the Muslims and the religious wars of the sixteenth century are examlpes of much human bloodshed. Religion has also attempted to check the free spirit of the common people and a particular community upon another. Religion checked free Marxists who consider religion to be the opium of the people and an instrument in the hands of dominent economic class to exploit the vast number of poor wage earners.

It is true that religion has sometime been the cause of many social conflicts and many bloodshed. It has on many occasions retarded the free spirit of the common people, has acted an instrument of coercion, has arrested scientific development. In short, it has acted as a divider and not as unifier, but a little conscientious thought will convince us that it is not the true religious spirit of man which has caused all these devastations, but a perverted form of religion. religious fanaticism amd dogmatism as we may call it, is at the root of all these social conflicts and has caused social disorder and disunity. Different religions may differ from one another in their outward form, but the very essence of religion consists in its being a cohesive or intergrating force. Every religion believes in the existence of supreme reality which is the empodiment of the highest values of life. When men do realise that it is the same supreme reality that reveals through each man and woman, that service to God consists in service to humanity and that a true religious spirit consists in developing one self to the pursuit of truth, goodness and beauty, only then man can realise the true essence of religion. If man is imbued with a true religious spirit he can transcend the narrow limits of individuality and be bound to others by enduring ties of love and friendship. True religion unites, false religion divides.

CC-0. Mumukshu Bhawan Varanasi Collection. Digitized by eGangotri

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Too much emphasis on the dogmas and institutions of religion neglecting its inner spirit makes man think that religion has a disintegrating rather than an integrating influence.

Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan says, "When we dispute over dogmas and definitions we are divided. But when we take the religious life of prayer and contemplation we are brought together.'*

An appreciation of the essence of religion will convince man that the relation between one man and another is a spiritual relation and all men are manifestations of one ultimate reality or God. All men are bound to each other by a strong bond of unity.

Dr. Sarvapalli Radhkrishnan says, "The recognition of this fundamental unity should make possible a certain measures of cooperation on a common basis for the good of mankind as a whole."**

REFERENCES

1. *Akolkar V.V* : *Social Psychology*
2. *A.P. Stokes* : *Church and State in the United States.*
3. *Barnes & Noble* : *Principles of Sociology.*
4. *Blackmer and Gillin* : *Out lines of Social Theory.*
5. *Cole G.D.H.* : *Essays in Social Theory.*
6. *Cunningham G.W.* : *Problems of Philosophy.*
7. *Edwards Miall D.* : *The Philosophy of Religion.*
8. *Gisbert P.* : *Fundamentals of Sociology.*
9. *Gallowy George* : *Philosophy of Religion.*
10. *Ginsberg M.* : *Psychology and Society.*
11. *Joshi N.V.* : *Social Philosophy.*
12. *Lonin V.I.* : *Social Philosophy.*
13. *Vackenzine J.S.* : *Outlines of Social Philosophy.*
14. *Maciver and Page* : *Society.*
15. *Maciver* : *Community.*
16. *Marx Karl* : *On Religion.*
17. *Radhakrishnan S.* : *Religion and Society.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

X

DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS AND REVISIONARY METAPHYSICS AN INTER-RELATIONSHIP

Jashobanta Roy

Metaphysics has often been used to describe our conceptual framework. To describe our conceptual framework, it requires a speculative metaphysical task. If we look into the field of contemporary metaphysics, we find that there are two major views. According to one group metaphysics is concerned to describe the actual structure of our thought and the other group views that metaphysics is to produce a better structure of our thought. In this paper, I shall try to show the inter relationship between these two types of metaphysics. My task will be to show that both these metaphysics are required to give an account of our conceptual framework. To accomplish this task I shall begin with Strawson's views of metaphysics.

Strawson in his book "Individuals" makes use of the term descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, In the introduction of that book Strawson draws a distinction between these two types of metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics is concerned to "describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" while revisionary metaphysics is" concerned to produce a better structure." Revisionary metaphysics requires justification of some sort whereas descriptive metaphysics does not. Strawson makes this point when he says, "Revisionary metaphysics is at the service of descriptive metaphysics."[1]

Thus descriptive metaphysics have the task of elucidating our conceptual scheme, while the revisionary metaphysicians have the speculate job of inventing a new conceptual scheme. The job of both revisionary and descriptive metaphysics is to produce account of thought structure. The former type invents them while the latter describes those which we actually possess. The central idea around which everything in Strawson's essay comes to focus is that of "our conceptual system." This is the subject of his analysis throughout . It is that which in his

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

view descriptive metaphysics must attempt to expose and explain, Strawson conceives this system as constituting the essential structure of ordinary language. It is the dependably functioning medium of communication between people, their way of thinking about the object in their world that can be publicly identified and re-identified. He thinks that metaphysics primarily concerned with the interconnections and the structure formed by categories and cocepts of our thought. Because metaphysics has long and distinguished history of concern with these changeless categories, Strawson argues that it is unlikely that there are any new truths to be discovered in descriptive metaphysics. But he argues that it does not mean that the task of metaphysics can be done once for all. Strawson says, "If there are no new truths to be discovered, there are old truths to be rediscoverd. For though the central subject matter of descriptive metaphysics does not change, the critical and analytical idom of philosophy change constantly. Permanent relationship are described in impermanent idom wich reflects both the age's climate of thought and the individual philosopher's personal style of thinking. No philosopher understands his predecessors until he has re-thought their thought in his own contemporary terms."[2]

From the adove quote, we can understand Strawson's general attitude toward revisionary metaphysics. If metaphysics is concerned with furthering conceptual changes which occur not merely on the specialist periphery but near the central core of our communicative system, there is obviously constructive role for the revisionary metaphysics. Strawson however is confident that the essential metaphysical tasks is descriptive rather revisionary, this follows from his belief in a massive and changeless core of categories whose interconnections and structure need to be exposed it is also clear that there is hidden scepticism about the argue to engage in the labours of the revisionary metaphysics.

From the above discussion it follows that Strawson has given more importance to deseriptive metaphysics. But I would like to say that the task of metaphysics is not only descriptive but also revisionary. It is true that descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world. But it cannot be said that descriptive metaphysics which is content to give a better structure of our thought, our conceptual frame work always is in need of correction and revision. It cannot be said that all categories and concepts are changeless in our thought structure. If it is the case then metaphysics we find that there are new truths and categories are being discovered in metaphysics. But revisionay and descriptive metaphysics assume a thought structure which needs descriptive and revision. It is true that metaphysics is to describe the conceptual framework but this description cannot be said only to one and correct description. It needs to be revised and re-ordered. Revisionary metaphysics argue that the actual structure about the world does not always give an accurate picture of the world's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

structure and stands in need on revision in the interest of the correctness. Metaphysics has sometime been treated as conceptual revision. If metaphysics is content to register conceptual changes which takes place in the core of our communicative system, revisionary metaphysics certainly has a constructive role to play. I, therefore conclude that to give an accoubt of our conceptual framework we need both descriptive metaphysics and revisionary metaphysics - one describes the structure and the other revises it. And revision is as much necessary as description.

NOTES AND REFERENCE

1. *Individuals* : *Strawson, P.F. P-9*
2. *Ibid* : *p-10-11*
3. *Strawson,P.F.* : *Logico Linguistic Papers Methuen and Co.Ltd. London.*
4. *Straaten, Zak Van* : *Philosophical Subjects Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980*
5. *Burtt, E.A.* : *"Descriptive Metaphysics" in Mind (vol - 72), 1963*
6. *Eduard, Nicol* : *"The Return of Metaphysics" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (vol - 22), 1961 - 62.*
7. *Leclerc, Ivor* : *"The Nature of Metaphysics" in Review of Metaphysics (vol - 11), 1957.*
8. *Susan, Haack* : *"Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics" in Philosophical Studies, (vol - 35), 1979.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

XI

C.G. JUNG'S CONCEPT OF RELIGION

Madhuri Verma

C.G Jung holds the phenomenological stand point. Like other Psychoanalysts, he analysed the contents of the conscious (and of dreams which are the expressions of the unconscious and showed that). According to him religion has roots in the conscious mind. The contents of the subconscious can be divided according to him in two classes; superficial or personal unconscious and collective or racial unconscious. These two are found in each person. We have in our conscious many beliefs like religious (beliefs), sexual (beliefs) self-assertive, self submissive, parental and social beliefs etc. Some of these are personal which may differ from one person to other and are common to all men. Thses beliefs contained in the mind are of the racial unconscious. According to Jung this racial unconscious, the lowest part of the deepest level of the unconscious explains religion. Thus Jung connects his analytic psychology with his conception of religion.

Jung was a disciple of freud but differed from him. Freud held that unconscious is the totality of rejected sexual wishes. But jung goes deeper into the layers of the unconscious and says that there is the racial unconscious containing primitives beliefs and dogmas, which are transmitted from generation to generation. Hence our religious behaviour according to Jung is the manifestation of racial unconscious or of primitive beliefs: where in Freud's view it is the manifestation of disguised sexual wishes.

According to Jung the unconscious is not acquired as Freud held. But is transmitted from our ancestors. Thirdly, the desire of unconscious are not sexual as Freud said, but may be religious, social etc. All desire exist in the unconscious. Religious instinct is one of them. Jung thus presents a wider conception of unconscious upon which his conception of religion is based.

Jung perceives the structrue of unconscious as common and similar in the race of mankind. He calls this portion of mind as racial unconscious, the deepest layer of the unconscious, which is herits the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

primitive beliefs. Within the particular race of man the premordial images are common. Jung conceives that the primitive beliefs are transmitted from one to another generation.

Dreams, according to him, also manifest the racial contents the primitive ideas, beliefs, superstitions, dogmas and rituals. The behaviour of an abnormal person is primitive. Dreams are the product of motivation in the unconscious. The dogmas are like a dream, as the dogma is the most expressive manifestation of some ideas in respect of some beliefs. It lasts for centuries e.g. the trinity of Christanity which is many thousand years old. Similarly the Godman Christ is a dogma centuries older to Christ. Thus the main symbolic figures of religion refer to the primitive dogmas. Hence, the religious beliefs has their root in racial unconscious.

Jung held that racial unconscious has many instincts like social, parental, self assertive self submissive instincts. All instincts exist in the mind. Religious instinct is stronger of all we have an inner urge to perform religious rituals. The moment some religious or moral principles are destructed we are disturbed. We try to fulfill this instinct also. Hence fulfillment of religious instinct is necessary, otherwise man will become abnormal, just like the fulfillment of parental, social, self assertive motive is necessary. It is their fulfillment alone that man can have healthy and happy life. Hence the cause of neurosis in Jung's view, is the absence of religion. The repression of these motives is the cause of abnormality.

On the basis of his experiments Jung says that unconscious plays vital role on human activities. The effect of the uncounscious is visibly seen in case of dreams or in the mob. In dreams or in mob man behaves like primitive man when his intellect gets lowered, whereas man becomes wise in isolation. In these two states we have unchecked uncontrolled and free manifestation of the unconscious thoughts, beliefs and dogmas.

Jung observes that there is the presence of "numinouson" within us, which means something dynamic existing in the mind and controlling the thought and behaviour of the man. We have sometimes to activise the numinouson by the sacrifice, the meditation, Yoga practices and so on. Jung says that the priests are the dogmatised form of the religious experience. Thus 'numinouson' is the phenomena under which an individual is influenced to believe or experience or do things by some outside agency existing within us or without us.

Jung further says that we have in our unconcious a faith in the existence of God transmitted to us from heredity. We have in us the "libido", the generalised power, which is active, dynamic principle. God is sometimes identified with this "libido", the generalised energy. God is one of the arche - types of thought. The conception of God is here based on of the racial unconscious. Jung accepts the psychic reality of God. He accepts the primitive myths of God, where there is no reality.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

So long man remains intelligent, conscious and alert, he does not believe in God, but the moment he represses to the infantile stage, there is the child like belief of 'God'. Hence, God is a primitive and infantile beliefs. Thus religion stands on the repression of man into the infantile status.

Jung rejects the prophet's claims of eternal truth or revealing truth. Jung is a psychoanalyst and tries to derive the truth of religious experience and behaviour from the contents of unconscious. The arche types of thought are not innate, but are motivated in the unconscious. Jung is an empricist. His enpirical approach consists in taking the religious experience as materials, the contents of the unconscious, which are receiveed from our ancestors. This approach is also Phenomenological, for Jung claims to observe and relate the truthful accounts of facts or Phenomena. He restricted himself to the phenomena only from the empirical point of view and did not idulge in metaphysical and spiritual considerations. Thus he rejected the spiritual source of religion.

To sum up Jung's view; religion is rooted in the history of people, which finds expression in thought and behaviour. Religion has its contents and basic principles in the unconscious, which inherits the dogmas. The religious principles from the contents of unconscious which finds expression in the dreams. Thus the religious experience is the experience of some beliefs. There is no spiritual elements in Jung's religious account.

Jung is against spiritualism and divine experience. He is empiricist and phenomenological in approach. He explains religion from the contents of the unconscious mind which is open and manifested. But religious phenomena cannot be explained as natural and phenomenal experience. Religion ever embodies spiritual experience. Hence Jung's account of religion is subject to criticisms. His contention that religion is the totality of rituals and dogmas, is not tenable. The true religion is non dogmatic and non ritualistic. The modern religions are non dogmatic and non retualistic, cultless, all comprehending and universal. It is true that rituals and dogmas have imprint in our minds, but they do not constitute the religion.

Jung has given much importance to the racial unconscious, which has been rejected by many psychoanalysts. The racial unconscious is a myth or a purely imaginary concept.They say that a child is not born with this unconscious idea, rather he learns the religious practices from the society. Again Jung did not explain the religious phenomena. He rather remained confined within the boundary of psychological experience. Psychological experience is not the divine experience. Hence his contention that psychological ideas are religious ideas is not acceptable to modern mind. As religious idea differs from psychological idea. For in mystic or religious idea there is the feeling of joy, ommiscience, and identity with God, where as Psychological idea is merely phenomenal or sensory.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Jung's treatment of religion contains elements of truth to some extent but there are inconsistencies too. He has taken arguments only to the extent he has to prove his assumptions. The assumptions are, firstly, the racial unconscious is common to all; and secondly the racial unconscious is the basis of religion. If we take religion in the strict sense, Jung's conception of religion is not religion.

REFERENCES

1. *Religion and the Psychology of Jung* : *Raymond Hastie S.J. Tr. by G.R. Lamb. Sheed and Ward, New York 3 (1957).*
2. *Collected Works* : *X - Vol G.G. Jung. Edit by Sir Edevert Read.*
3. *The Psychology of the Unconscious* : *By G. Jung (1911)*
4. *God and the Unconscious Gebhard.* : *Vector. White and an Appendix By Ferci Hunury Regnery Co. Chicago (1953).*
5. *Soul and Psyche* : *Vector. White, Collins and Harvill Press London.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

XII

A COMPERATIVE STUDY OF THE ELEMENT OF INTUTIVE SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE IN 'THE IDEA OF THE HOLY' AND 'THE GEETA'

D.R.BHANDARI

The culmination of the gospel of the Gita is to be experienced or is to be manifested through cosmic vision or Vishvarupadarshna, explored in the 11th Canto. Hence, so far as spiritualistic point of view is concerned, the 'intuitive experience' of the 'cosmic vision' of the Gita is definitely a landmark in the history of mystical experience and considered to be summon-Bonum of the Gita, the Summon-Bonum of mankind. For an aspirant of the Gita, it will at once be the culmination of his spiritual life and the high water-mark of the Divine grace. The description of the cosmic vision of the Gita is factual without any admixture of imagination. But, the phenomenon itself is so variegated, so marvellous, unique resplendent and sublime that whosoever will even read about it or listen to it would be thrilled with joy and awe and dread. This cosmic vision would appeal to anyone as the most charming one, not because the description in it is a poetry of high order but because the spiritual experience described in it is so sublime, beautiful and awe inspiring that it cannot but make the description also equally sublime and beautiful.

'The idea of the Holy' a monumental spiritual work of Rudolf Otto describes the intuitive spiritual experience which can be compared with that of the cosmic vision of the Gita. Otto coined a term for intutive spiritual experience - Mysterium Tremendum. Before analysing Mysterium Tremendum it would be in fitness of things if we try to understand what Rudolf Otto has to say about the element 'Numinous'. He says that in moment of deep religious experience there are, feelings of gratitude, trust, love, reliance, humble,submission and dedication in the mind of the devotee. Schliermacher isolates a very important element in such an experience, this is the feeling of dependence. But

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

his mistake lies in making the distinction merely between, that "Absolute" and "Relative Dependence" Whereas, the feeling is qualitatively different from analogous states of mind. In the 'idea of the Holy' Otto observes that when Abrahim Ventures to plead with God for the men of sodom, he says - "Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes". As such Otto refers to call this feeling of dependence as "Creature consciousness" or creature feeling. It is the emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures. God to such a devotee is not the result of any Inference but the creature feeling is itself a first subjective concomittance and effect of another feeling element which has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self. The nature of the 'Numinous' is such that it grips or stirs the human mind with this and that determinate effective state. The deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious emotion is 'Mysterium Tremendum'. It has its wild and demoniao forms and can sink to an almost grisly horor and shuddering and again it may be developed in to something beautiful and pure and glorious. There is speechless humility of the creature in the presence of that which is mystery, inexpressible above all creatures. Conceptually 'Mysterium' denotes merely that which is hidden escteric that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and unfamilliar. Though the description of world here is negative. The term does not define the object more positively in its qualitative character but though what is enunciated in the word of negative, what is meant is something absolutely and intensely positive.

Otto's doctrine of numinism is based on the conception of the 'Numen' which means supra-natured divine power, the Ishvara of the Bhagwad Gita in his wholly transcendent and pre-determinations and instrumentalism being the two-focal round which Numenism moves. Otto's doctrine of the 'Mysterium Tremendum' regards the Numinous as a complex of feelings of mystry, wonder, power, terror, reverence and joy, which are closely allied to the feelings expressed in 11th Canto of the Bhagwad Gita.

Otto is famous for his doctrine of the Holy. The Holy he regards as a category of value (Sui Generis), beyond, the categories of the 'Satyam-Shivam-Sundram' or the Good, the True and the Beautiful. This is his original contribution to Philosophy. He regards the Holy as a priori category, and speaks of the rational and the irrational as constituting its wrap and roof. Somehow he strasses the conception of the irrational following Bradley, James and Bergson. That's why Otto coined the word 'Neuman' to signify this category of value which has according to him, supreme Divine power lying inside it. This supra-natural Divine power is what Otto calls the 'Extra' in explaining the meaning of the Holy, something which cannot be accounted for and which is to be regarded as beyond the scope of reason.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Otto is also very careful to tell us that the Bhagwad Gita is a sublime illustration particularly of the psychology of horror. Such a psychology of horror has never been written in the West. Otto is a great Theologian and Philosopher and Psychologist of a repute. His knowledge of Sanskrit is also remarkable. According to Otto the original form of the Gita consisted of a very short portion which is supplemented both by appendices and marginalia. Even though his theory about the original from of the Gita may not be correct, still his interpretation of the real meaning of the Gita is magnificent. All the more so, because he is a good Christian Theologian, has very wide heart and great sympathy with Indian aspirations and does not find any ultimate distinction between the Indian Philosophy and European Philosophy.

According to Otto the vision of the 'Vishvarupa' of Krishna by Arjuna is one of the Strong statements. Otto has translated the 11th Canto of the Gita in verse and added it as an appendix to the Idea of the Holy. In this book Otto has advanced the new conception like one own's conception of intution. Here, he says that his idea of the Holy rises above the conceptions of the truth the good and the beautiful. This category of sui-Generis cannot be deduced to any other.

Otto tells us that the God of the Gita is the God of pre-destination prior to all human will and work. God has already willed that certain thing will happen. This is what might be called the doctrine of pre-destination. Before the fight took place between the Kauravas and Pandavas,the fight had already been planned by God. It was the will and work of God himself. If, God creates battles, he has also the power to end them. God decides the fate of battles. Instead of speaking in the present, may we might even speak of the pre - present. Instead of saying that God decides the fate of battles, we might even say that God was already decided them. The future has been already decided, fixed by God. This is the central point in the doctrine of pre-destination. Whatever Arjuna may will or may not will, God has already willed that such a thing shall happen, that the Kauravas will be defeated and Pandavas will win,and the justice and God-devotion will reign supreme in the world. To quote Otto's statement from his "Das Bhagwad Gita" (Translated in English). "It is not the work of man, this cruel, horrible fight, the fight is the work and will of God Himself. This is the meaning of the magnificant theophany and this is the aesthetic purpose of the Gita in general and of the 11th Canto in particular".

The God of the Gita is the God of Absolute pre-destination as the verses 32 and 33 of this Canto show him to be. Here God shows that, independently of and prior to all human will and work, the future has long been fixed unalterably by him, that all human will, in comparison with, is absolutely powerless, and that man is nothing else than a transitory phase of His activity, activity, which man's 'Ahamkaar' resists. The so-called human, social and political duties are no duties at all. The only duty is to raconcile oneself to a divine will and power. This is the pitch of original Gita according to Otto.

CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Deemed University, Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Otto's doctrine of Ishvara in the Bhagwad Gita is absolutely unchristianed. He is not unmindful of the claims of World-whole in the conception of the personal God. According to Otto the Ishvara of the Gita is a peculiar combination of a personal God and the world-whole. To him personalism and impersoanalism do not apper antagonistic. Also the Ishvara of Gita is the transcendent God, the 'wholly other'. We may say that God is super-ultimate. We have only to reconcile ourselves to the will of 'super powerful'. We have only to surrender ourselves entirely to His will. In the great theophany in the 11th discourse of the Gita we are lifted from the earthly region to the celestial and there brought face to face with the manifestation of God as he pervades, the whole universe. Otto compared the "Mysterium Tremendum' of the Idea of the Holy with that of the wonderous manifestations of God, his dazzling splendour, his terror striking form, the competition of the feeling of joy and fear as they arise in the mind of the aspirant and the vision of the future. In a wonderous manifestation of God Arjuna saw that there was neither any beginning, nor any middle nor any end to the cosmic vision. The entire space between earth and heaven seemed to have been occupied by God. In the dazzling splendour of God, the cosmisc vision offers His form which is regared as equalling the splendour of a thousand suns.

The terror striking form of God of the cosmic vision is the terrible theophany. God shows Himself with number of mouths having terrible fangs. This is as much as to say that God here takes a form of terrible death. It is no wonder that such a terrible form should fill Arjuna with fear. We find here striking description of the conception of the feelings of fear and joy, a pain and bliss. Arjuna confesses that he was greatly satisfied of seeing the form which he had not seen before but at the same time he confesses that form he has seen was so terrible that it inspired him on moral fear. And consequently, he said that he had lost all sense of direction and neither could he gather course nor find peace and the flow of his vital force seemed to have been absolutely checked. In this cosmic vision Arjuna was placed in the situation of the future. Krishna showed him a penorama where Bhishma and Drona and Karna along with the foremost warriors even on the side of the Pandavas were rushing headlong with great speed into the opened mouths of Krishna like moths in flaming fires. The vision which Krishna showed to Arjuna was the vision not merely of speed but acceleration and it was showed to give him a glimpse of the vision of the future.

Thus, it can be concluded that the experience of revelation of "Mysterium Trendom" of "The Idea of the Holy" and numinous are one and the same thing as that of the revelation of the experience of the Geeta's Cosmic Vision. In such type of experience an aspirant anticipates to be blissful in which there seems concealed a very deep truth. An aspirant of Otto is felt in awe and surrender and worship rather than in a clear conception just as Arjuna felt in visualising the cosmic form

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of Lord Krishna. An aspirant dwells in the moments of tender, vague mystry often being distinctly the feeling of the presence of God. In such type of mystical experiences the experiencer, experiences the creature consciousness that he is none but he is the minutest part of the Whole (God) and then impression of experience becomes Wholly Other meaning thereby he becomes dumb and begin praying the almighty from all sides for protecting himself from the mishapes. The experiences of mysterium includes the experiences of Tremendum Arjuna's experience of Cosmic Vision was the unique as that of the Otto's. The experience of fear with joy compells an aspirant to pay, for, he becomes spell-bound. Such type of spiritual experiences, experienced by several persons are one and the same but the impression of that experience is different and consequences or effect of the experience of Mysterium Tremendum and the experience of the Cosmic Vision of the Gita are same. Creature consciousness is the central theme of Otto and the Gita. The manifestation of these two types of mystical interpretations may be different but a consequences on the minds of aspirants are such that one can only pray. A realiser experiences the creature consciousness and this experience of creature conciousness is the rejection of total surrenderance. The total surrenderance paves the path way of God realisation. Hence, devotion is the only way through which one can attain his goal.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

XIII

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE

Torben Peter Kemp

1. THE NEW CULTURE OF COMMUNICATION.

Human beings are living bodies capable of perceiving, working, speaking and thinking; 1) They not only perceive things with the aid of their various sensory organs (for touch, sight, hearing, etc.) but can also perceive the presence of others; 2) They are able to shape things with their limbs, especially their hands; 3) They can communicate their knowledge of what they perceive to others with the aid of mouth and ear; their intelligence enables them to remember and compute and combine this knowledge, and thereby to plan, compute and combine this knowledge so that, after processing the information, they are able to control the things concerned.

These perceiving, working, speaking and thinking beings seem to have been deprived of one after another of these activities as the result of technological development. In the first instance the growth of industry has meant that physical work has been replaced by machines: the energy supplied by the steam engine and, later, by the electric motor has replaced muscle power, for instance. But nowadays automatization (from the conveyor belt to the modern robot) is making manual power superfluous.

Long before this development took place people had discovered writing as a substitute for speech and as a means of stabilizing thought. But however revolutionary this writing may have been for culture (because, for example, it could communicate messages and legislating over a long distance in space and time), it did not necessarily mean that people who wrote and read spent less time perceiving and thinking than when they were only able to communicate by means of speech and hearing.

Modern system of communication tend, however, to replace human communication in its original form, where contract with others required constant physical and perceptual activity: it required both voice and ear, and hand and eye to receive and form the words. Nowadays

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

microphones and cameras can perceive whatever is audible and visible. Via satellites and wideband networks, radio and TV-systems transfer information to radios and TV-sets. Apart from cases in which the people themselves are filmed, all they have to do is to control the system and receive the messages.

This tendency for machines to take over human communication has been further increased by the advent of the computer. As you know, this is able in a very small space to store up the memory of a great deal of information. It is then able to process these "data" in order subsequently to solve the specific tasks demanded of it and to answer specific questions.

Thus, man's role as a remembering and constructive, thinking being has been taken over by the computer, which is able to replace the human intelligence employed in the sending and reception of communications.

Hereafter the human contribution to communication seems to be restricted to programming, surveillance and the passive reception of information. Only a few specialists have chance to do true creative work - in the construction of few machines and the programming of complicated tasks. The rest are restricted to pressing a few buttons and vegetating in front of the screens.

Thus the computerization of communication of society means first and fore-most the computerization of communication. So nowadays we not only speak of informatics, or computer science (the word informatics is seldom used in English), but of telematics or the computer network (the word telematics is pure French), which unites computer science with the communication systems. We are well on our way to a new culture of communication, which is just as revolutionary in comparison to the previous one (which was largely founded on writing and books) as the transition from speech to writing.

WHAT DO I MEAN BY CULTURE?

Culture is the development and creation of a conscious mental life concurrently with the development of skills, behavioural patterns and institutions. Our previous culture has been formed and created by the book and the newspaper, although this education or Bildung has not totally repressed speech and body language. As a role, speech has even been regarded as the true language compared with writing[1]), and whenever writing and book culture has seemed to threaten direct relations between people, emphasis has been placed upon speech as the foundation of culture (Rousseau in France, Grunting in Denmark).

1) cf. Jacques Derrida's criticism of Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours in De la Grammatologie (Paris:Minuit, 1967), p. 46 sq., transl. of Grammatology (Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press, 1974)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This communication culture - with its state of tension between speech and writing - has provided the basis for modern democracy, which builds in principle on the ideas of man's right to communicate creatively (his possibility for self-expression) and to freedom of opinion (his possibility of being heard) and on the idea of the government of society on different levels by way of elected representatives to whom the population has access, i.e. on the right of participation.

The question now is, what will happen to democracy the new communication culture starts to repress the old one? If our mental life is to be formed and educated under the influence of the computer network (which people have to learn almost from the cradle), is creativity then to be restricted (for the few) to programming, and is the freedom to opinion to be restricted (for the majority) to the freedom to choose programmes? If machines have reached the stage of being able to "think for us", what will we then think for ourselves, and what use is our own thinking - in politics, for instance? What place will there be for our senses, our creativity and our participation in computerized society, if machines do the perceiving, acting and thinking instead of us?

The new communication culture constitutes a challenge to democracy. How are we to take up this challenge?

2. EFFECTIVITY AND ETHICS.

In recent years Carnival at Whitsuntide has become popular in Denmark. It may be because the Danes need to take a complete break from the computerization and need just to feel, invent, sing and dance for a couple of days. But to take a break is not sufficient. On the other hand, we cannot fight the computerization as such. Such a fight would be doomed to failure, because the prospects for industry and bureaucracy of being able to save money and manpower by means of the computerization of production and administration is so attractive that nobody can prevent it.

However, the correct form of computerization in a specific field is seldom decided upon beforehand. And thus it is possible to encourage a debate about the best form of computerization thereby about how we ought to develop computerization so that we - ordinary people - can stand living with it.

It is of primary importance in this debate to clarify our conceptions as to what is meant by leading a truly human life. What are our intentions as regards our own life, and what do we own with respect to other people's lives? The answer to these question constitute our ethics.

An ethic is a view of human life, of what is the true life, and especially, of what we owe the other person. An ethic which takes no heed of the other, but merely concerns how we ourselves are to become happy in associating with others could rightly be called an erotic, in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the original sense of the word, i.e. a view of life based on desire, or the search for pleasure. In relation to this desire the other person is, strictly speaking , only a chance means of attaining this pleasure, not a person to whom we owe consideration, respect, openness and help - for his or her own sake. Such an ethic has its roots in a Greek tradition which goes back to Plato and Aristotle, for whom ethics only applied to friends, not to strangers.

For centuries man has concentrated on developing his intelligence- his ability to formalize, i.e to simplify and thereby to discover the general or logical elements in his knowledge. These make it possible for him to manipulate his knowledge in order for him to be able to use it for making his actions more efficient. This development has culminated so far in the invention and use of the computer and microprocessor, which can accomplish quite incredible things in the field of intelligence.

At the same time man has tried to develop an ethics. This endeavour is just as old as the endeavour to formalize and manipulate knowledge. But ethics is not a matter of intelligence; it is derived from the imagination. It builds not on formalization and logic but on a concrete view of man as an active and perceiving subject living together with others. In other words, the language which sustains ethics does not consist of data or data processing but of situation description and narrative. Data are formal symbols which represent general features of our knowledge of the world, and data processing is the carrying out of systematic operations with these data. On the other hand, a story or a narrative consists of metaphorical language which deals with the inherent meaning in a sequence of events or a life story. Precisely therefore, a narrative - without necessarily moralizing or being superior- can tell us what is the correct way experience this "plot" as an ideal or a warning where our own life's "plot" is concerned.

A narrative is created by writing, Dichtung - it cannot be produced by data processing. True enough, a computer can manipulate with texts; it can break up a text into its logical or structural components so that these may be treated as data. But what we can get out of a text can never be other than an answer to the question as to what is the most effective action, i.e. the action which quickest and most profitably would reach a specific goal in the light of a systematic selection and computation of information regarding the pros and cons of the chosen path. Data processing cannot - like poetry - advise us as to what is the most considerate action to be taken in respect of another person. Nor can it advise us as to which goal we should set for the organization and development of society, let alone which type of computerization we should aim at. This guidance we can only obtain from poetry, i.e. from another person who is able to establish a life goal and describe life as good or bad in relation to that goal. All types of narrative are in a sense poetic, whether they be purely fictional, historical or documentary.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But the essence of ethical guidance is not whether the narrative concerns something which has really taken place or not, but whether it expresses a view of human life which could theoretically have existed or would be possible to realize.

3. AN ETHICAL CASE: THE COMPUTERIZATION OF PAYMENT TRANSACTION IN DENMARK.

An example of the fact that the type of computerization cannot itself be determined by computerization or further data processing but only from an ethical point of view is the current debate in Denmark about the introduction of the "Dankort", or Dancard. Although the matter is extremely complicated one can roughly distinguish between three of computerization of our action of payment where purchase/ sale is concerned.

The first alternative lies in the purchase of goods and services. This card, known in Denmark as the "Dankort", is furnished with its - owner's name together with a magnetic track in which the numbers of the card, the owner's bank and - bank account as well as a safety code have been coded in. Together with the card the user also receives a PIN-code (Personal Identification Number). This must not be disclosed to others but is typed in on a screened keyboard beside the terminal where the card is read, the shop assistant etc. having already typed in the price of the customer's purchases. Information regarding the purchase is then sent from the terminal to a central transaction register which reports back information regarding the customer's bank balance (or cash credit). If the answer is in the affirmative the purchase may go through. This Dancard system presents a number of problems, however. Many people will not be able to remember their PIN-code or be able to keep it secret; the central registration of all purchases is in itself problematic: the act of purchasing becomes impersonal, and theoretically the shop assistant could in the end become redundant and replaced by TV-surveillance coupled with an electronic registration of the price of the goods.

An alternative to this was presented by an independent group of experts as the Danish "pung" - (money purse[1]), which - as opposed to the centralist Dancard would retain the same decentral method of payment as in ordinary cash payment . The Danpurse is a combination of the "intelligent card" or (memory card"[2]) and the pocket calculator. It can store electronic "money" and is furnished with a contact which enables it to be interconnected with all the other Danpurses. It keeps check on all in goings and outgoings and, since most people would probably at any one time only have a limited sum in the Danpurses an arrangement could be made with the bank concerned to refurnish it

2) M. Soleil, "New payment technique: The memory card,"Journal of Bank Research, 11 (Winter 1981), p. 214-18.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with fixed amounts which could be transferred by telephone - at night, for example, when people are usually at home and the telephone network is not overloaded. Since both purchasers and sellers would have Danpurses there would be no need for the shops to install payment terminals or for the existence of transaction registers. The PIN-code would also be superfluous, but naturally each Danpurse could be supplied with a code "lock". The advantage of the Danpurse as compared with a purse containing cash is that one could automatically keep account of one's purchases and credit balance and that it would cut down the number of visits to the bank. Nevertheless there are certain security problems connected with the Danpurse and no electronic payment system can be completely fool-proof against "intelligent crime".

A third alternative consists in various ways of developing the present system, in which cheques, credit cards and cash are equally important means of payment. The advantage of cheques and credit cards is that the customer's signature is retained as surety. But the ever-expanding credit card system presents a problem. Not only because many of these credit system are connected with a high rate of interest (this could also apply to the Dancard if it were combinaed with a credit system), but especially because of the multitude of cards the individual would eventually be running around with at any one time (so that the loss of a wallet would constitute a serious problem). Thus, it might appear an advantage to replace the majority of credit cards with a single national payment and credit card.

No form of calculation, i.e. not even the most complicated computer would be able to decide which of the three solutions (or others) should be chosen. The criticism of the various solutions is ethical, and concerns choosing which computerization of payment we wish to live with.

We can only answer this question by seeing what narratives have to say about life.

For example, resistance towards central registration plays an important part in this debate. This registration is regarded as a surveillance which would inhibit the creativity of the individual and ultimately lead to a totalitarian state. We are familiar with this state both in literary and historical narrative. Amongst others, Orwell and Huxley have described it in their novels, and historians and journalists, in their accounts and reports.

Another aspect of the debate is the idea of people being excluded from a system because they are handicapped or considered "unworthy". Literary, historical and journalistic accounts of class privileges and oppression - and all the preceding religious literature about sufferers and outcasts in society - have created the basis of that ethics which demands social justice. Even the criticism of the concentration of people's money in banks, and thereby the risk of increased dependence on powerful capitalists, is founded on an ethics derived from tales of social justice and injustice.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A third aspect is the reduction of the open, corporeal relations between people which the computerization of communication necessarily involves. In the case of the Dancard, the transaction which was once a direct transaction and ended with a handshake would become burdened by the electronic intermediary stages interposed between purchaser and seller. In fact, computerization as such increases the risk of our creating a world where we seldom meet each other face, but where each one of us lives in his or her own world in front of a private screen. Such a world would conflict with the ethics that is expressed in all our cultural wealth of stories about the true fellowship - and its destruction. Nor is that "global village", regrated by some as computerization's goal, a true fellowship, but a world where each person is isolated from all the others by screens.

4. THE TECHNICIAN AND THE MAN IN THE STREET

The Danish debate about the Dancard, the Danpurse and the credit card systems has, moreover, revealed the paradox that the new communication culture has not made it easier for people to communicate with one another. The promoters of the Dancard apparently sought to postpone a public debate on its introduction for as long as possible. True enough, they travelled all over the country holding information meetings, but these were only for a select few - and the press were not admitted. When the Minister of Industry finally issued a special Report on Payment Cards[3]) the matter seemed to be too complicated for the ordinary citizen to understand, and it was some time before it become a subject for public debate. This debate started when the banks and saving banks committed the strategic error of openly declaring that they would introduce a charge for cheques from September 1983 so that the Dancard, which would be introduced at the same time, should not be dearer to use for the consumer than an ordinary cheque. At the same time a strong criticism appeared in the press. Rapidly, an ill-will towards the Dancard spread among the general public, and the banks negotiations with both the Consumer Council and the retail trade were disrupted. The dialogue came to a halt, and the banks have now decided to introduce the card, although the majority of the population appears to be against it. It is doubtful, however, whether the original idea of an electronic card (with PIN-code, etc.) will ever be realized, or whether the introduction of a card which functions like yet another credit card side by side with all the others is more likely to be the case.

This situation illustrates how one of the greatest problems in the modern communication society is the lack of communication between

3) Industriministeriet, Rapport om Betalingskort (Copenhagen: The Ministry of Industry, Betankning nr. 965, december 1982)

4) Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do. The Limits of Artificial Intelligence (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972, revised edition 1979).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the technician and the man in the street. Apart from the conflicting economic and power interests involved, the cause of this unhappy state is that the expert operates with a formalized language whereby he or she can formulate technical solutions to a problem, where as, when faced with the new technologies, the average person resorts to narrative language (especially newspaper stories about new technology) capable of conveying what life would be like with these new technologies. Thus the man in the street confines himself to narrative language in order to find a human solution to the problem.

The technician says, as a rule: I quite understand the emotions aroused by technical changes, but technical development cannot be halted and we are obliged to seek the most effective solutions. The man in the street says: I am a machine breaker, but I will not accept technical changes that make life more difficult and which create greater barriers between people.

Since it is generally technicians (together with those who are in a position to call them in as experts) who have the upper hand, the man in the street often only has any influence if the technicians happy not to agree, and he is then able to play the most human group of technicians up against the others. This is not happy situation. If democracy - which is based possible also in computerized society, the technician and the man in the street have some reciprocal demands which they might reasonably expect to be fulfilled.

The technicians can rightly expect the citizens - or at least their chosen representatives - to acquaint themselves with the various new technical solutions available in the specific field under discussion. On the other hand, the technicians themselves should make an effort to popularize their knowledge of these alternatives and to present this knowledge openly.

The man in the street could likewise expect the technicians to evaluate the technical alternatives from an ethical point of view, and not to reject these considerations as irrational emotions which cannot stand their ground against expertise. The man in the street, however, must help to support the study of the humanities at all levels in the educational system. Ethics cannot be kept alive in society without a thorough study of literature and history.

In a truly human communication culture, not only computer science and the humanities but technology and humanism as such would not be strangers to one another.

5. THE COMPUTER'S INTELLIGENCES AND MAN'S IMAGINATION.

We can now return to the question as to how democratic participation is possible in computerized society when the machines

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

do our thinking for us. The answer must obviously be that the machines only "think for us" in so far as they take over the work of the intelligence. They can never take over the function of the imagination, and so can never really replace human reason, which is an interplay between imagination and intelligence. In particular, the computer network with its computers and communication systems can only make an action efficient; it cannot make it considerate, because consideration requires the imagination to put overselves into other people's places. The computer system can only be logical, not ethical. It can manipulate with formalized texts pertaining to the questions we ask and the goals we set. It can never ask the questions or set the goals. We arrive at our questions and goals as the result of viewing life itself, and our view of life is formed by listening to the stories which have arisen from human experience of what "went well" and - not least - of what "went badly" and caused us unhappiness. To "listen" to a story is to follow its plot so instensely that it is possible to derive from it a model for human action. It does not consist of manipulating with a story's logical structure, which latter is not in any case what the story is about but only a means of shaping the plot.

It might perhaps be argued that a Shakespeare play, a novel by George Orwell, an account by Solzhenitsyn or a report by an important journalist can be coded into a computer programme and read via a projection of the test on to a screen, and that this example illustrates that even literature and history can be computerized.

But if a literary or an historical text is merely coded in and thereafter communicated and projected via the computer network, it does not mean to say that the text itself has been computerized. This would only be the case if that text we saw on the screen were composed by the computer entirely alone and not by a human being. No matter what texts a computer might compose, they will never have any ethical significance unless they can in some way or the other be related to some story told by one or more people in order to convey something about life. How should a computer be able to say anything of any significance about life? It is we who have to live with the computer, and not vice versa. Just as it is we, and not computers, who have to live with one another. The human race could eradicate all computers and still survive. But computers cannot cause the eradication of the human race and continue to have any significance. When a computer is out-dated it is thrown on the rubbish-heap, but a computer does not grieve about the loss of other computers. When a person grows old we feel a moral obligation to give him or her as good conditions as possible, and when he or she dies we feel the loss and we grieve.

To put it short, it is only man who knows anything about the significance of life, and so it is only man who can question our manner of living. Only man, not the computer, requires an ethic.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

6. THE HUMAN AND THE ROBOT.

What I have said up till now provides a basis for a discussion of the fundamental differences between human beings and computers. This question has for a long time been a subject for debate, not least since the publication of two important books by the philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus and the computer specialist Joseph Weisenbaum respectively. It is not my intention here to deal with their separate views and their discussion with one another, but it should be borne in mind that there is a difference between an empirical discussion as to what a computer cannot yet do and what it may never be able to do and a reasoned argument as to why the computer will never according to its very nature be able in certain respects to think like human beings. Both Dreyfus and Weisenboum do not always clearly distinguish between those two types of argument. I shall confine myself here to the fundamental questions as to what is the essential difference between a human being and a computer and why a human being as such cannot be replaced by a robot.

The idea of the thinking computer was presented by Alan Turing in an article in 1950 entitled "Computing Machinery and Intelligence"[6]. He showed that it is possible to deceive a human into believing that the thinking computer is another person. He established this by means of the "Turning Test". In this a human is placed in a room where there are two computer terminals, one connected to a computer, the other to a person. The person acting as guinea-pig does not know which terminal is connected to which, but he can type into either terminal and receive typed messages back on them. His job is to decide which terminal is connected with a computer, and if he cannot make up his mind it is thereby established that a thinking machine can replace a thinking human being.

It is not surprising, however, if a computer turns out to be able to think just as well or better than a human being in the sphere of intelligence. It is always problems concerned with intelligence that are cited when attempting to prove that a computer can think. It is emphasized, for instance, that computers can beat human things at chess, or that they can translate a text from one language to the other. Weisenbaum has also demonstrated that the computer can act as a "psychiatrist" in replying according to a specific method to a patient's questions and remarks (i.e. the Rogerian technique of encouraging a patient to keep on talking).

Since superficial communication between people remains on the level of intelligence, and the dialogue follows certain logical rules, there

5) Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason, From Judgement to Calculation (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976).

6) A. M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", reprinted in Minds and Machines, ed. Alan Ross Anderson (Englewood Cliff: Prentice Hall, 1964). P. 5.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is nothing surprising about the fact that a human being can be deceived into believing that he or she is conversing with another human though is in fact only receiving answers from a machine. This does not nevertheless prove that there is no essential difference between the thinking of a human being and that of the perfect robot. It only shows that a person can be deceived as regards his partner in the discussion. As soon as he discovers this deception his partner's utterances no longer enters into an ethical dialogue about how we should lead our lives; it becomes obvious that his partner lacks the imagination required in order to be a true human being.

The differences between human beings and computers are to be found on a number of different levels:

1. **The level of perception.** The Computer can receive texts but cannot perceive them. Thus, the computer requires a living being able to perceive the data shown on the screen. On the other hand, perceiving beings can exist without computers. Accordingly, a computer is neither an animal nor a human being that perceives something, but only an instrument of perception.

2. **The level of the will.** Humans are beings who wish to "control their lives", partly by controlling things (by becoming "maitres et possesseurs de la nature", according to Descrtes' famous remark), and partly by entering into fellowship with others who wish the same. This fellowship need not contain any element of oppression, and it is possible to set out to found a non-oppression form of society. Nor does the control over things need to consist of a destruction of nature, but it is possible to control things in such a way that human beings utilize nature's potentialities in the best possible way for both parties. But precisely in wishing to "control their lives" with nature and the others, human beings may be radically distinguished from any type of a machine whatsoever, including the computer. A computer does not per definition wish for any thing at all - neither control over things (e.g. computers) nor social relations with others. It is not will, but is an instrument of will.

3. **The linguistic level.** Human beings express their will in language, and use it to formulate their questions and their goals. Constantly faced with new situations, they are by virtue of their imagination able to ask new questions and to re-formulate their goals according to new considerations as to which things it is possible to realize. They can express these questions and considerations by virtue of the openness of language. i.e. because they are able to ask questions and create imaginative and unpredictable writing. The computer too operates with language, but it cannot "open" it. Computer language remains closed; it is a product of questions that have already been asked and metaphors that have already been invented. True enough, a computer's formalized language can arrive at new syntheses and new solutions, but no matter

CC-0.In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

how unexpected they may be and no matter how much better they may be in relation to previous syntheses and solutions human beings have put to them. Moreover, the computer will never be able to answer questions demanding "creative answers", i.e. answers that discover new solutions, for example, to the question of how we are to control the computer'. The computer cannot speak creatively but can at most be a speech-instrument for living speech.

4. The level of knowledge. Human beings can recognize themselves as perceiving, willing and questioning beings, because they themselves are such beings. They can likewise recognize the human world in which such beings exist. Since all knowledge depends on this recognition of the world, the computer cannot know anything at all, since it neither perceives, wills nor questions. It can only express knowledge human beings may possess. The information provided by a computer is an interpretation of knowledge, but only human beings themselves possess knowledge. The computer is an instrument of knowledge.

5. The emotional level. As beings with physical needs and will, humans feel attracted or repulsed by things and another human beings. This attraction or repulsion they experience as an emotion; among other such emotions are like and dislike, love and hate, hope and fear, and contentment and anxiety. Since computers have neither needs nor will, they have no emotions. They are emotionally cold. The emotions they can express are human emotions. They have no emotions of their own.

6. The ethical level. Human beings are able to form an opinion of what constitutes the true life and what they owe the other. By virture of this ethic they are able to form their lives and their societies and to develop a culture. But a computer does not know what is right or wrong in relation to human life. Only human beings themselves can know that, and therefore only human beings can determine which ethic should apply to the use of the computer. Only humans can be responsible. Computers have no sense of responsibility. Consequently, human beings are alone responsible for the communication culture which is evolving from the modern computerization of society.

The six different levels mentioned above together constitute an argument against the suitability of empirical grounds for stating that there is "still some time to go" before the robot replaces the human being. This replacement is a logical and an ontological impossibility. It is fundamentally impossible and not just empirically improbable.

Against this it is often argued that we can never know what kind of machine will be invented in the future and that we could imagine, for instance, that genetic manipulation combined with computer science would make it possible to create artificial people. But even if this were possible and those beings were creatures with perception, will and an open language etc, they could in that case no longer and not any longer

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

robots. And so people could be said to have discovered now ways of reproducing themselves, and the same differences between the human being and the robot would still apply.

But artificial reproduction would involve a serious ethical problem, if we do not by this imply the reproduction of volitional beings just as free as a human can be today. To create slave-people or people who are handicapped in comparison reprehensible. Therefore the creation of a kind of "intermediary stage" between a robot and a human could also be regarded as ethically reprehensible, if indeed it were possible.

Finally, one could ask whether it would be possible to create a "superman" who was better than man is today. But if it were really possible to improve on the man of today, both physically, creatively and ethically, by means of artificial reproduction, the same differences between the human and the robot mentioned above would also 6) A. M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", reprinted in Minds and Machines, ed. Alan Ross Anderson (Englowood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice - Hall, 1964), P. 5.apply to this "superman". Added to this, a new ethical problem would present itself both for man and for "superman": the problem of their mutual relations should man not "defend" himself against superman in order to live, and would not superman be morally obliged to "defend" old time man's possibilities of living?

This question still belongs to science fiction. But good science fiction is not just wild fantasy. It presses man's present situation and the vital questions with which he is grouping. Thus we too have ended up with an imaginary science fictional situation, which raises our present basic question: how shall we manage to live with the modern communication culture? Or - what is man's responsibility in computerized society?

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ISSN - 0011 - 6734

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An

INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

LIBRARY Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya HARIDWAR

155

MORADABAD (India)

Vol. XXXIX July 1999 NUMBER 3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DEDICATION

This 155 issue of the Darshana International is most respectfully dedicated to Acharya Baldev Upadhayay, a great Sanskrit scholar. He had his education from Kashi Hindu Vishyavidyalaya where he served as a professor of Sanskrit literature. He wrote a number of books. His great forty works are the beacon in the literary world of Hindi, Buddhist, Religious-Philosophy and Linguistics. His works have been translated in all Indian languages as well as in Burmese and Singhali. Acharya Baldev Upadhayay held a string of titles and was awarded Padmabhushan. He passed away on 10th August, 1999.

May his soul rest in peace and may his contributions be helpful to the society forever.

ANURAG ATREYA

Managing Editor

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

EDITORIAL

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL WELFARE

J. P. Atreya

Whatever may be the meaning of Philosophy in this age, in India, Philosophy has always been deep and right thinking on the most vital problems of life and death and to discover ways and means to make human life prosperous and happy here and hereafter. It was a thinking about the ultimate reality or realities underlying the Universe and about the ultimate object of life and existence and to establish a society in which all living creatures, including men, animals and plants could function harmoniously, benefiting each other and helping human beings to realize the highest value of life—Truth, Goodness and Beauty. And on this philosophy was set the proper way of individual life, called Yoga. and proper Social Organisation called the Vyavastha. In every kind of yoga the individual was required first to practice yama andNiyama, Which consisted in the control of natural and antisocial nature propensities of cruelty, avarice and self-indulgence etc, and cultivation of socially and individually beneficial habits. And the Vyavasthya organisation consisted in the Institution of Yajna Sacrifice and Services in which offering was made of one's property for the service of others. On a smaller scale, the yajnas came to Pancha Mahayajnas to be performed by every individual household which included atithi-seva, or service to strangers, and feed animals and birds, and service to the parents. The Vyavastha consisted also of Varana Vyavastha. division of Society into four functional classes which the society needs for its maintenance prosperity and well being. The Brahmanas, the Vaishyas; the Kshatriyas and theShudrs, and in planning the individual life in four stages or Ashrama, Brahmacharya, Grihasths, Vanaprastha, and Sanyas Duties for social harmony and prosperity are laid down by social philosopher like Manu for each Ashrama, Which could be followed a well- organised Society. The Bhagavadgita teaches man to do every social duty for the sake of Loka Sangraha, Welfare of the society and Manu teaches his principles of Ethics for the maintenance of Society in proper or Dharma. The Vaisheshika Philosopher. Kanada defined Ethics as that which conduces to prosperity and well-being (Abhudaya

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and Nishreyasa). It is in this way that Philosopher contributed to the well being of the Individual and the society.

INDIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Indian Social Philosophy is concerned not only with Indian humanity, it concerns with the welfare of the whole humanity which it regards as one Family; all being the children of one God, the Creator of all. It concerns itself not only with the human beings but also of all creatures, animals as well as vegetables. One sloka of Sanskrit is well-known, namely, Ayam Nijah, Porvoti Ganana Laghu Chetsam, Udar Chittanamtu Vasudhaiva Kutumbkam" which means that to consider same as our own kith and kin and others as others i.e, not related to us is the chatactcristic of petty-mindedness. For the magnimous ones the whole earth is one home and all the creatures from one family". So, the Indian Rishis (seers) planned a way of life for every individual in which due consideration was given to the welfare of each creature on earth. Among the essential duties of every man are included Pancha Mahayajnas which include entertainment and feeding of not only one's parents and family members but also of strangers (atithis) and animals, like cows and crows etc., and even the surviving spirits of the dead ones (prets). Individual life was planned in such a way that every individual can be able to live efficiently and serve the society by his own living into the four Ashramas. Brahmacharya, Grihastha, Vanapraprastha and Sannyasa. A Brahmachary has to acquire knowledge and power stern by begging his food from other families than his own and thus to realise that all human beings were related to him. A Grahasthta had to live a life of service and sacrifice for all humanity and all living creatures. Atithi satkar or entertainment of strangers in his home were regarded as the most sacred duty of a grihastha, and the life of a vanprasthi was that a service to the society, and that of a Sanyasi was wholly concerned with cultivating spirituality and teaching others to be spiritual. He had no name, having forsaken his own home. The entire world was his home and the whole humanity as his kith and kin. Thus the Ashram Vyavastha was a great social instituation as an individual one; regarded as a social being. And the Varna Vyavastha, according to which the whole human Society, not only Indian, was divided into four functional divisions: the academic, the military, the financial and the service-rendeing ones. They are the castes like the present ones, but they scientifically psychologically determined groups of individuals according to their natural capacities and characteristic traits. ("Guna, Karma Vibhagshah, the Bhagavadgita) All these four classes fulfilled the social need of the Whole Society as knowledge, valour, wealth and physical service all are needed in a healthy society. The rishis laid down a comprehensive and perfect code of conduct (ethics-dharma) for people of all these classes to avoid competition and conflict among them, which if studied properly and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

impartially, will give great guidence to modern social thinkers. Even the general ethics for all the human beings is so social and socialistic that we can get a great light from it. The whole social structure of Hindus is socialistic in which the welfare of all creatures - men, animals and plants is kept in view. The Bhagwata Mahapurana says (VII-14), "A man should possess only as much as he needs for the Maintenance of his, and he who accumulates more than he needs for this purpose is a thief and he should be treated and punished as such culprit." The Gita also teaches that all our activities should aim at the good and benefit of all creatures- (Sarva Bhuta hito ratah). According to the Bhagavata, the best and only way to worship and please God is to serve all the creatures. God is not pleased with those who hate men.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I

GANESHA: HARMONIZER OF THE MUNDANE AND THE SPIRITUAL

R.N. VYAS

Indian philosophical thinking had always been quite liberal. While the other religons could not rise to the thought that there is only one single Real which is conceived in various forms by the worshippers in the light of their likings and ways of thinking even by this time, the oldest book of India, the Rigveda declared 'The Ultimate is One; but the learned persons conceive It variously' (Ekam sad viprah bahudha vedanti).

The Indians have therefore many gods who are merely the different names assigned to the one single Real. The Infinite appears in infinite varities before infinite number of individuals. As Kalidasa has stated 'People have divergent likings' (bhinnaruchrhi lokah). Hence, no restriction of name and form in the realm of worship is desirable. But it has never to be forgotten that whatever the name, the ultimate Truth is one. Divergence of names should not lead us to think that the gods are different. Even if one worships Devi or Ganga or the Narmada or Vishnu or Shiva, one in fact worships the Supreme God head.

The Western people cannot understand it. They look to the different names and rush to the conclusion that Indians are believers in polytheism. To correct this mistake Max Muller has coined a new word viz. 'henotheism' to describe the real nature of Indian worship. An Indian worshipper extols his God as the supreme God, the only God. Therefore it is in fact monotheism. That is why the Personal God of an Indian is only an aspect of the Impersonal Absolute. Let us think about Genesha in this context. Ganesha is the god of wisdom and success, prosperity and happiness opulence and megnificance. Our temporal life needs all these in ample measure. Hindu religon gives due importance to mundane life. Body is the temple of the immortal spirit. It needs all those comforts which make life enjoyable. The Taittiriya Upanishad accepts food as the Brahman (annam brahmopasate — II anuvaka). Here food represents the entire material world. Universe is as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

manifestation of the Real. Hence, everything here has some reality. The mundane and the spiritual are not to be treated as separate entities. They form one integral whole. Lord Ganesha is a symbol of this very harmony between the mundane and the spiritual.

Shri Ganapati Atharvashirsha declares this very fact."Lord, You are the Brahman.... You are Sat-chit-ananda.... The whole universe has emerged from You. It is maintained by You. It is lost in you in the end ..... You are Brahma, You are Vishnu, You are Rudra..."

Lord Ganesha is the master of obstacles. If He is pleased, no obstacle can come in the way of a person. He has two mistresses viz. goddess of wealth (Lakshmi) and goddess of learning (Sarasvati). This suggests that the Real itself has manifested itself in the form of material as well as spiritual power.

Ganesha has the head of an elephant. This big head suggests that His thinking capacity is bigger than of any person. His big ears suggest that He is a patient hearer. All the grievances reach Him. His trunk suggests that he can get things done as per His own desire-whether it is the toughest or the tenderest.

Two tusks represent good and evil, shreyas and preyas, spiritually elevating and spiritually degrading tendencies. Discrimination is possible. Only when these two factors are present.

The big belley suggests that He can digest everything. Shiva drank poison for the sake of the welfare of the universe. But even that poison could not harm him. The presence of modakas (sweets) suggest that if a person has spiritual basis, the world cannot but be sweet for him, because no event can upset him. Lord Ganesha rides over mouse suggesting thereby that those elements which destroy human being cannot succeed if Ganesha is pleased. Ganesha is too strong and bulky for any type of obstacle in the path of human welfare.

Ganesha is the son of Shiva and Parvati which are embodiments of welfare and strength. Philosophically, Shiva is the Brahman and Paravati is Its Maha Shakti. Ganesha is the power which helps every worshipper to do his job without the danger of any kind of failure. Worship of Ganesha implies generation of the faith that nobody can hamper the path of one's success if the grace of the Lord is invoked.

Ganesha's form is non-human. This implies that no human form can be found adequate to symbolize the God of success. Just as no words can describe the Ultimate Truth, in the same way no symbol can express the Supreme. This has been expressed very wisely and mysteriously through the form of Ganesha.

The worship of Ganesha at the beginning of every sacred occasion like a marriage ceremony implies that one should not be negligent about mundane prosperity even if one aims at spiritual truth. The principal objectives are Dharma, Artha, Kama and Moksha. They imply a cohesion

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of worldly prosperity with spiritual maturity. Lord Ganesha is the bestower of Artha and Kama which are to be used for the ultimate objective of liberation. Body and spirit both have to be given nourishment. Gandhi had rightly declared 'God shall have to appear before a hungry person only in the form of bread. A hungry man cannot think about God. Ganesha is the power that bestows prosperity to enable a person to walk steadily in the path of spiritual perfection.

In this context, I will like to quote the following words of Plato: "I wonder if we could contrive... some magnificent myth that would in itself carry conviction to our whole community". (Republic, Bk3, 414)

Even if Ganesha is supposed to be a myth, it is a myth that can bring happiness and creative conviction to a human heart. It has rightly been declared that the just live by faith.

In this context, it will be worthwhile to remember Narasimha form of godhead. Narasimha has the head of a lion. He is the destroyer of the oppressors of devotees. When Prahalada was given extreme type of torture by demon Harinakashyapu, his own father, it was necessary for God to destroy the oppressor.

In my opinion, both the forms of godhead viz. Ganapati and Narasimha are complementary in nature. World needs both opolence as well as the destruction of those elements who terrorise the virtuous people. God Ganesha bestows riches and prosperity, mangalya and good luck and removes the obstacles that lie in the way of their attainment. But if the oppression is tremendous, Narasimha should be prayed to eliminate the oppressor totally.

Faith is the salt of life. The Bhagavadgita declares that there is no person who is totally free from faith. The point is that Satvika type of faith yields prosperity and bounty, while Tamasika type of faith gives a spirit of destructive pleasure. A person having Satvika faith shall get the blessings of Ganapati and Narasimha which will make his worldly life full of pleasures and happiness and free from the dangers of every type of trouble shooter and destructive element.

Thus a person pursuing a religious life in the real sense of the term is guaranteed full assurance of a meaningful mundane life. Where there is rightousness, there dwells victory (yato dharmah tato jayah). Dharmat arthashcha kamasheha, sa dharmah kim na sevyate. Dharma gives riches as well as satisfaction of mundane desires. It is surprising that even then Dharma is practised only by some people. This is the view of Veda Vyasa.

Will we attend to this very sagacious advice of the greatest sage of all time in our own interests?

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

A CRITIQUE OF RORTY ON EPISTEMOLOGY

Yunusa Kehinde Salami

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to show that in spite of Rorty's stated intention to argue that epistemology has outlived its usefulness, and that there is no need spinning any theory of knowledge or of truth, Rorty hasnot succeeded. Rorty is still not able to divest himself of the normative feature of traditional Epistemology. Indeed, he still ends up offering an epistemology of a kind.

2. RORTY ON EPISTEMOLOGY

Rorty sees the works of epistemoplogists as attempts to defend our claims to knowledge from the skeptical challenges. For the skeptics, knowledge implies certainty, but we can not know with certainty, so, knowledge is impossible. Confronted with such an argument, Rorty construes epistemology as a normative discipline which tries to prescribe a natural starting point, like the archimedean point, for the defence of knowledge-claims. He considers various epistemological answers as attempts to set some criteria of knowledge; the conditions which a claim must satisfy to qualify for knowledge.

Rorty attempts to undermine philosophers' confidence in knowledge as something about which there ought to be a theory, and as something which has foundation. He does not seek an alternative way of answering epistemological questions as traditionally posed; rather he thinks that these questions should no longer be raised.[1]

Unlike Quine who remains convinced that there is something to be said concerning how inquiry may best proceed even after the demise of traditional epistemology,[2] Rorty denies that such speculations serve any positive purpose. Indeed, he maintains that such philosophising only fosters what he calls "dehumanization". He strongly holds that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

there is nothing to be gained by speculating about how to perpetuate the success of science.

Rorty's challenge to epistemology is, in a sense basically historical. Looking at the various attempts in history by different schools of epistemology to find a foundation or a starting point of knowledge, Rorty sees different schools building their own 'foundations' in order to destroy the starting points of foundations built by others.

For him, the history of epistemology is a concatenation of positions and counter-positions on what the adequate foundation of knowledge is, or should be.[3] For instance, while Plato and others like him thought that the starting point of knowledge is something transcendental, Rorty sees scholars such as Hobbes and Marx as arguing that space and time make only reality there is, and consequently, he says, Hobbes and Marx make the starting point a correspondence to that reality. It was disagreements of this sort, which, according to Rorty, led to transcendental/empirical, rationalist/empiricist,idealist/ realist, analytic/synthetic, apriori/aposteriori, distinctions, and so forth.

Given the various disagreements that typify traditional epistemology on the question of a starting point, Rorty argues that there is really nothing which can serve as a foundation of knowledge. Thus he assumes that it is a sheer waste of time and energy engaging in any attempt to provide such a foundation. Rorty holds that the futility of traditional epistemological outlook is exemplified by the multitudes of disagreements among epistemologists about what actually constitute foundation of knowledge.

Based on this argument, Rorty urges epistemologists to move to a post-epistemoplogical and, by extension, to a post-philosophical culture, in which there will not be such strict distinctions between what the traditional epistemologists would call "first-rate-truth-by-correspondence-to-reality, and second- rate-truth-as-what-it-is-good-to-believe".[4] He thinks that there should be abandonment of "the Platonic attempt to sift out the merely contingent and conventional truths from the truths which were something more than that.[5]

For Rorty, epistemological issues such as truth, knowledge, justification, perception, etc. are not the sort of things one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. So, in Rorty's view, rather than involving any general theory about the nature and scope of knowledge (as traditional epistemologists try to do) the subject should be changed. He rejects the idea that there are, or, could be, some propositions which are true throughout all generations. He sees all criteria as nothing but temporary resting places constructed for specific utilitarian ends.[6] In fact, Rorty maintains, in agreement with James and Dewey that "the sort of thing philosophers typically have said, that truth is some sort of correspondence to, or accurate representation of, reality; seemed empty and pointless."[7]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Rorty advises that philosophers should refrain from the traditional epistemologists' business of spinning theories, and that philosophy must resign any dream of a privilege access to "objectivity" not open to ordinary humans.

Rorty takes "objectivity" simply as a 'property" of theories which, having been thoroughly discussed, are chosen by a consensus of a community of rational discussants.[8] Literally, Rorty seems to be saying that by calling a statement "objective." We are only signifying that it conforms with the consensus of participants in a rational debate. For Rorty, not some epistemic theory but the community is the source of epistemic authoriity. So also, at least so he argues, what justifies our knowledge claims is not a special relation between ideas and objects. Rather, what he claims to justify a knowledge-claim is 'Conversation' and social practice

For Rorty:

"...there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones... no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow inquirers" [9]

Although Rorty fails to specify his conception of "Conversation", I think he uses the concept of conversation to mean rational discussion. Thus, unlike the traditional search for an indubitable foundation, Rorty's claim amounts to saying that what justifies a knowledge - claim are rational discussion and social practice. In his pejorative usage of the term 'epistemology', epistemology inhibits conversation by "freezing" or "fixing" according to some prescribed routine, the direction which a conversation can take. Conversation rules out epistemology because, according to Rorty, epistemology is incompatible with letting conversation go its own way. According to Paul Roth for instance, the sort of conversation which Rorty believes ought to be encouraged is not to be constrained in advance by any admonition about what may or may not be challenged or subject to revision.[10]

Rorty, who is an acclaimed pragmatist, seems to hold a relativist thesis. Relativism is suggested by Rorty's tendency to base the justification of knowledge-claims on the agreement among rational discussants. On this reading, it may be assumed that whether or not a belief is justified at a particular time depends on what rational discussants, as at that time, agree on. Thus there is no set of propositions which can be taken to be justified at all times, In other words, there is no basic belief, no "foundation", and so, the traditional epistemologists' search for the foundation of knowledge."... may be simply apologetics, attempts to eternalise a certain contemporary language-game".[11]

If relativism is thus granted in Rorty's thesis, we cannot refer to any set of knowledge - claims as being an unshakable foundation on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which other propositions are erected. Based on this reading, there follows a denial of the traditional foundationalist thesis.[12] So, there is no need to erect any edifice on the traditionally supposed unshakable foundation.

But, can we be justified if we take Rorty to be espousing epistemic relativism? If we take Rorty to be expressing epistemic relativism, we would seem to be accepting a too simplistic interpretation of Rorty's work. Perhaps, it would be more accurate of us to understand him to be holding, not that truth is defined as consensus, but, as was interpreted by Gallagher, that, in attempting to determine the truth-status of a proposition, we have nothing at our disposal but the methods of justification which a consensus provides for us.[13] Rorty, according to this reading, does not claim that social practice is an evidence for the truth of a statement; he could be understood as saying that only social practice is the source of what it means in a given instance to find evidence for the truth of a proposition.[14]

Nevertheless, Rorty follows Wittgenstein and others in refuting the notion that knowledge is accurate representation, "made possible by special mental process, and intelligible through a general theory of representation". Rorty states categorically that:

> the world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak.[15]

Rorty jettisons the view that beyond the language of human beings, there is something which these languages and the users themselves must try to mirror. This, I think agrees, with Gabe Eisenstein's view that a sentence can refer to what is out there, just in case, the 'language -game' to which it belongs at once establishes what kinds of things can be said to be (out there) and what counts as referring to them. Thus Gabe concludes, in line with Rorty, that we can speak of discovering knowledge not in the sense of finding a ready made proposition, but of experimentally creating a set of satisfactory responses to the natural and cultural environment in a historical context.[16]

My reading of Rorty in this regard is that, contra traditional epistemology, Rorty denies that there are such beliefs so certain as to be free from all epistemic defects. While he may agree that some beliefs are more secure than others, he denies that some are absolutely secure. Here, Rorty would want us to think of 'rational certainty' as a matter of victory in argument rather than of relation to an object.

Rorty's objection to traditional epistemology then, is that: Our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a matter of interaction with non-human reality. So we shall not see a difference in kind between 'necessary' and 'contingent' truths. At most, we shall see differences in degree of ease in objecting to our beliefs. We

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

shall be looking for airtight case rather than an unshakable foundation.[17]

Rorty, I presume, accuses traditional epistemology of asking for such foundations which are as certain as mathematical truths. Rorty condemns traditional epistemology and its foundationalist program which, for him, is like engaging in a futile exercise of looking for such paradigmatically necessary truths as the axioms of geometry which are supposed to have no need of justification, of argument, nor of discussion.

In Rorty's view, traditional epistemology is wrong in asserting that: (1) knowledge is a relation between the proposition in question and other propositions from which the former may be inferred or (2) both knowledge and justification are privileged relations of proposition to the objects those propositions are about.[18]

To accept (1), according to Rorty, it is not necessary to end the infinite regress of justification. There shall be no need to keep conversation on the subject going once everyone among the rational discussants is satisfied. That is, the problem of regress of justification does not arise.

However, if we take (2) Rorty seems to take traditional epistemology to be stating that there would be no need to go beyond the level at which both knowledge and justification correspond to an object in the external world. Such, for Rorty, is "... a situation in which argument would be not just silly, but impossible." [19] To reach that point in traditional epistemology, according to Rorty, is to reach the foundations of knowledge.

Standpoints (1) and (2) above succinctly describe the rationalist coherence theory and the empiricist correspondence theory respectively. Rorty maintains that his pragmatism is neutral to both standpoints.[20]

However, despite his intention to be neutral, Rorty seems to accept (1) above. This is because Rorty thinks that the thorough discussion of the evidence for the knowledge-claim may make the rational discussants agree at a point where there would be no reason to warrant further debate or disagreement.

Rorty strongly challenges (2) above .His main point here is that any account of 'epistemic foundations' in form of (2) should be discarded, and epistemology needs to be:

Separated from psychology by being viewed as a study of the evidential relations between basic and non-basic propositions, where these relations are viewed as a matter of "logic" rather than of empirical facts.[21]

The consequence of this is Rorty's attack on the view that knowledge is "an assemblage of accurate representations." [22] Rorty thinks that if

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

we take knowledge as an epistemic relation to an object, there would be one right way of describing and explaining reality. This, to him, is objectionable because it calls up "the notion of having reality unveiled to us ... with some incorrigible immediacy which would make discourse and description superfluous."[23]

This objection stems from Rorty's belief that all the various candidates for the position of "natural starting point" of thought, which are prior to and independent of the way some culture speaks or spoke, have failed. The objection is also based on Rorty's view that there is no such reality to which various texts are trying to be adequate, and also on his understanding of objectivity as social consensus.

For Rorty, the most that we can find in the realm of empirical discourse is how some beliefs are comparatively more reliable than others. No empirical proposition can be known with that degree of certainly which, as traditional epistemologists assumed, is characteristic of mathematical or geometrical axioms.

Rorty argues that there is no notion of truth which would enable anyone to make sense of the claim that if we achieved everything we ever hoped to achieve by making assertions we might still be making false assertions, which fails to "correspond to something". This is, truth is not a matter of correspondence with reality, but a matter of what can be said.[24]

3. ASSESSMENT OF RORTY'S ATTACK ON TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

It is interesting to note that Rorty's challenge so far suggest that traditional epistemology and its attendant foundationalist program make discourse and description superfluous. Rorty thinks foundationalism must be jettisoned in all its entirety. The point, however, is that the more modest versions of traditional-epistemology need not fall into the same pit as the traditional foundationalist program.

Rorty errs in generalizing his criticism to all forms of foundationalism. For instance, apart from traditional foundationalism which requires that epistemologists provide absolute and indubitable foundation in order to justify claims, there is the more modest version which relaxes the requirements of traditional foundationalism to make foundationalism less restrictive than the traditional version.[25] As Gallagher argues, modest foundationalism should not be conceived as:

"Making 'one right description' acceptable or as doing away with all discourse, It is not that which makes thought unnecessary, but that which makes it possible, and we cannot treat the fact that all truths arise for us through conversation as precluding the possibility that some of the truths which so arise may be necessary truths.[26]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Given Gallagher's argument, one can argue that Rorty's wholesale rejection of foundationalism is wrong. It shows that the modest foundationalist thesis can be freed from Rorty's objection. In fact, Rorty's pragmatist thesis can be further shown not to vitiate modest foundationalism.[27] Goldman's position becomes relevant in this regard. According to Goldman:

Standards for judging beliefs to be justified, or judging them to be pieces of knowledge; are socially evolved. But what these social standards or linguistic conventions require often involves accuracy of representation or appropriate processes of belief causation. Hence, knowledge is (partly) accuracy of representation, though its being so is a matter of there being a certain socially evolved concepts.[28]

Following Goldman, justifiedness, is, contrary to Rorty's view, partly a matter of mental causes. For Goldman, Rorty is wrong in saying that knowledge is a matter of what society 'lets us say'; because, if a proposition is true and a person has an appropriately formed belief in it, then he does know, no matter what his peers think.

This point is also emphasized by Putnam. For Putnam, although a claim's been right and someone's being in a position to make it are relative to the sort of language we use and the context we are in, yet, this does not mean that a claim is right whenever those who employ the language in question would accept it as right in its context. For Putnam, while it is true that "talk of what is 'right' and 'wrong' in any area only makes sense against the background of an inherited tradition, traditions themselves can be criticized."[29]

An extension of this point is that the internal "standards" adopted by a society or a culture cannot define what a reason is, since the standards themselves presuppose reason or reasonableness for their interpretation. After all, it is not our task to mechanically apply cultural or social norms "as if they were a computer program, and we were the computer"[30] Rather, it behoves us to interpret them, to bring them and the ideals that inform them into what Putnam called the "reflective equilibrium."

Another interesting aspect of Rorty's work is on his professed denial of epistemology and all kinds of general normative theory. For him, there is no need spinning any theory of truth or of knowledge. The question is, can epistemology or all normative theories be successfully denied? For Putnam to embark on such a denial is to commit a mental suicide.[31]

There is a legion of problems associated with such a denial. For instance, a denial of the normative nature of epistemology amounts to a postulation that there is no need for any general epistemological theory for determining which of our beliefs qualifies for knowledge, or what constitutes an epistemic justification. However, such a postulation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is itself a normative position. It merely sets the norm that no theory should be normative. This is problematic because, such a theory, if it is right, then, it is false.

Contrary to Rorty, Henderson maintains that since epistemology is to provide us with a set of hypothetical imperatives with the purpose of improving our epistemic practice, then "epistemology is properly a normative discipline."[32]

Even if we take Rorty's favorite definition of philosophy in his positive, post-realist sence as "an attempt to see how things in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term", Rorty may still not be able to divest himself of the normative feature of traditional philosophy which he derides. After all, the greatest problem with which traditional philosophy is confronted and which it aims to resolve, is how to make conflicting ideas hang together. For instance, how can we hang atheism together with theism or materialism with idealism without being normative in our position? In this regard, Rorty has not succeeded in fully disengaging himself from the traditional conception of epistemology.

Moreover, Rorty indeed offers a general and a normative theory of knowledge. He can be located within the general traditional epistemological framework. His work expresses a coherentist thesis. Rorty's view is coherentist to the extent that he makes both truth and rational acceptability dependent on an agreement with a system of beliefs accepted in a linguistic and cultural community. It is not by accident that Rorty abandons the idea of 'conformity" and takes justification as "a relation between the propositions in question and other propositions from which the former may be inferred".

4. CONCLUSION

The paper has examined Rorty's arguments for the denial of epistemology as a normative enterprise. A critical examination of Rorty's position that epistemology has outlived its usefulness is found to be confronted with some serious problems. Moreover, Rorty, as the reading shows, offers a general and a normative theory of knowledge.

REFERENCES

1. Rorty Richard — Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) p.7.
2. Rorty Richard — "Pragmatism and Philosophy" In Kenneth Baynes, Bohman James and McCarthy Thomas (eds.) After Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of technology, 1987) p26.
3. See Quine — W.V.O.Ontological Relativity And Other Essays (NewYork: Columbus University, 1969) Quine W.V.O. Theories And Things. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1981), Kornblith Hilary (ed.); Naturalizing Epistemology. 2nd ed. (Massachusetts:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Massachusetts Insitute of Technology, 1994), among others.

4. Rorty Richard — Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1982) pp. XIII-XXI.

5. Rorty Richard — Consequences of Pragmatism p. XXXVII.

6. Rorty Richard — Consequences of Pragmtism. p XXXVII.

7. Rorty Richard — Contingency, Irony And Solidarity. (Cambridge University Press, 1989) p4.

8. Rorty Richard — "Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson Vs Wright" in The Philosophical Quarterly. VOL 45 No 180 July 1995; 281.

9. Rorty Richard — Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature p.338.

10. Rorty Richard — Consequences of Pragmatism p. 165.

11. Roth Paul A — Meaning And Methods On Social Sciences (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

12. Rorty Richard — Philosophy And the Mirror of Nature p.10.

13. The traditional — Pre-occupation of epistemology and epistmologists was a search for the absolutely certain or absolutely secure beliefs such that the absolute can serve as foundation on which other less privileged beliefs can be rested for justification. All this results from the attempts to meet the skeptical challanges that knowledge is impossible or that we cannot know. Tradition epistemologists set out to stop the epistemic regress of justifiction.

14. Gallagher K.T. — "Rorty On Objectivity, Truth, And Social Consensus" in International Philosophical Quarterly 24, 2 (1984): 111-116.

15. Rorty tries very much to exonerate his view from relativism. While he holds to pragmatism, he is of the opinion that his pragmatic thesis does not entail relativism. For more of this, see Rorty Richard; Objectivity, Relativism And Truth (Cambridge University Press.1994) pp.22-24.

16. Rorty Richard — Contingency, Irony And Solidarity pp.6 and 21. for more of this discussion, see Rorty Richard "Pragmatism And Philosophy.",p.55 and Rorty Richard Objectivity Relativism And Truth pp 1-17.

17. See Eisenstein — Gabe,"Contingency And Pessimism: Rorty on Creativity and Understanding" in The Philosophical Forum 23 (1992): 181-182,and also Rorty Richard;"Pragmatism and Philosophy" p.60. The point should be made at this point that Rorty is greatly influenced by pragmatism. In fact, Rorty emphatically identifies himself as a pragmatist. For this, see Kenneth Baynes et al (eds.); p. 63 Ftn 21. see also Rorty Richard; Contingency, Irony And Solidarity. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.41.

18. Rorty Richard — Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature p.157.

19. Rorty Richard — Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature p.158-159.

20. Rorty Richard — Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature p.159.

21. Rorty Richard — pp.178, see Rorty Richard. "Is Truth A Goal of Enquiry? Davidson Vs Wright" in The Philosophical Quarterly 45,180 (1995): 281-300, Blackburn Simon,"Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism" in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy Vol. 107 No. 425 (1998): 157-181, Wright Crispin "Comrades Against Quietism: Reply To Simon Blackburn On Truth And Objectivity" in mind Vol.107 No.425 (1998): 183-203. and Rorty Richard; Objectivity, Relativism, And Truth: Philosophical Papers Vol.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Press, 1994) pp 12-14.

22. Rorty Richard — Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature p.162.

23. Rorty Richard — Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature p.163, Rorty Richard; consequences of Pragmatism p.165, Rorty Richard; contingency, Irony and Solidary p.41 and Rorty Richard; Objectivity, Relativism, And Truth pp. 23-24.

24. Rorty Richard — Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature p.375.

25. Rorty Richard — "Pragmatism and Philosophy" pp. 38-39. For a very related point, see Lewis C.I. Mind And The World Order (New York: Dover, 1956) pp. 22-24.

26. This distinction between the traditional and the Modest versions of foundationalism is well discussed in both Yunusa Kehinde Salami "A critical Assessment of Epistemic Foundationalism" (Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria,Unpublished m. A. Thesis, 1988) and Yunusa Kehinde Salami "Towards A Marxist Epistemology"(Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile - Ife, Nigeria, Unpublished ph. D. Thesis, 1995). For more on this, see Pappas G.S.; and Swain M. (eds); Essays On Knowledge And Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1978), Alston W.P. "Two Types of Foundationlism" in the Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 165-185, Boujour L;"Can Empirical Knowledge Have A Foundation? "In American Philosophical Quarterly, 15,1(1978).

27. Gallagher K.R — "Rorty On Objectivity, Truth, and Social Consensus": 118-119.

28. Gallagher K.R. — 124.

29. Goldman A.l — "Review of philosophy and The Mirror of Nature" in The PhilosophicalReview, 90 (1981): 426-427.

30. Putnam Hilary — "Why Reason can't be Naturalized" in Baynes kenneth et al (eds.) After Philosophy: End or Transformation? pp. 227-228.

31. Putnam Hilary — "Why Reason can't Be Naturalized" pp. 234.

32. Putnam Hilary — "Why Reason can't Be Naturalized" p.241.

33. Henderson David K "Epistemic Competence And Contexualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is not just The Poor Person's Coherentism" InThe Journal of Philosophy Vol XCI, No. 12, (1994): 627.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

AN ENQUIRY INTO SECOND COPERNICAN REVOLUTION IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Sanjay Kumar Shukla

I

Every event of an idea that comes in the course of history cannot be designated as revolution. Evolution is slow gradual change in our life style beliefs, customs and ideas while revolution is sudden abrupt change. Revolution is sharp break from the past and it explodes our old beliefs, myths and ideas. Immanuel Kant has created revolution in the realm of ideas as Copernican did in the field of astronomy, which is termed as "Copernican revolution". He has occupied himself with epistemological inquiry that how knowledge is generated, what are the limits of our knowing capability and questions associated wiith cognising validity. He pointed out that its source of validity is not experience itself, but its point of reference must be experience. Ptolemy propounded geocentric theory which remained unchallenged for many centuries. Copernicus discarded this theory and in its place formulated novel Heliocentric Hypothesis which has been proved true by subsequent works of Galileo, Kepler and Newton. Immanuel Kant had firm conviction about apriori knowledge and therefore tried the opposite hypothesis that objects instead of determining our knowledge is really determined by it. Thus in reply to Ptolemic like belief in the field of epistemology that knowledge must confirm to the objects, Kant introduced Copernican revolution that object must confirm to our congnition or in famous Kantian terminology "Understanding maketh nature". His Copernican revolution consisted in saying that mind brings something to the object it experiences. The mind is structured in such a way that it imposes its way of knowing upon its objects. Compared critically both the revolution of Copernicus (astronomy) and of Kant (in epistemology) had different themes but their impulse was the same, both had the tradition as challenge and succeeded in changing the course towards the illuminating trace of truth.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

Husserl, although acknowledging the importance of Descartes and Kant, has pointed out their limitations. Descartes could not understand transcendental subjectivity because he could not free himself from tradition prejudices of mind-body dualism. The route of cogito in Cartesian philosophy is empirico-analytical method and never phenomenological. Husserl recognizes the importance of Kant in establishing the transcendental subjectivity as the ground of all our knowledge. Husserl still thinks that Kantian, doctrine of apriori knowledge involves, 'anthropologism' and 'relativism'. Kant's statement about the universal and necessary character of apriori knowledge may be true, but the universality and the necessity may have to be understood in terms of the universal constitution of human nature.

Kant has talked about in detail regarding apodictic certainty and logical necessity but could not provide its real nature. It is because he thought of regulative reason as sufficient enough to explain necessity, but truly speaking all questions involving validity of cognition is intimately associated with rational constitution of experience. Edmund Husserl pointed out that problem concerning nature and validity of cognition is finally resolved by him. The aspect of human subjectivity is more thoroughly discussed and critically analysed in his phenomenological investigation.

The advent of Husserl was period of acute crisis and deep perplexity in Europe. Scientific positivism, relativism and scepticism are responsible for this theoretical crisis. We can reach certainty only by rising above relativistic and sceptical tendencies. So phenomenology was developed as a, reaction against 'naturalism' and 'historicism'. It is a sort of intellectual revolution which can be said to be "Second Copernican revolution". He had the ideal of presuppositionless philosophy and for that he gave a radical method in philosophy. Negatively it means freedom from assumptions or beliefs of any kind, and positively it signifies the grounding of all elements of knowledge by intuition. Phenomenology is an attempt to locate the principle of objectivity in the element of subjectivity. He gave phenomenological method of bracketing ('epoche') and reduction in which consciousness is completely withdrawn from the natural world by suspending beliefs in such a world, lays bare the world of transcendental subjectivity. Husserl explains three different conceptions of the world - the natural, phenomenological and life world. The natural world contains things and beings of infinite variety and infinite magnitude. Husserl regards his phenomenology as transcendental - a science that transcends the scope of natural attitude of mind. The world with which transcendental phenomenology is concerned is denaturalised world or phenomenological world. Husserl replaces natural world by life world or lebenswelt which depicts the crisis of modern man. The world is inconceivable apart from living being and human existence.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

Philosophy is search after truth and should carry us from probability to certainty. Descartes in his famous method of universal doubt has laid emphasis on elimination of naturalistic beliefs and tendencies and gives a clarion call of denovo. The outcome of Cartesian method is indubitable certainty of cogito ergo sum. Husserl is highly indebted to Descartes for cultivating free rational critical inquiry and phenomenological method of bracketing (epoche') and reduction has genuine kinship with Cartesian method. But he pointed out that Descartes could not carry his critical spirit for long time and he becomes dogmatic when he accepts the existence of world on the ground of "Veracitas dei". Husserl remarks that Descartes failed to realize the real implication of "doubting" and as a result, his philosophy could not take the transcendental leap which was expected of it. It could not move from "naive objectivism to transcendental subjectivisim."Husserl has pointed out that the essential feature of Cartesian philosophy is emphasis upon the primacy of consciousness. The primacy of consciousness arises because consciousness is self-reflexive; consciousness is not merely consciousness of something but is also self-consciousness. Husserl like Descartes and Kant wanted to establish philosophy on solid secure foundation of science and has gone to the extent of calling philosophy as rigorous science. Kant maintains that the objects must conform to our cognition. This indicates that elements of phenomenology are present in the Kantian analysis of experience. He has expressed in (Descartes problematic Idealism) his refutation of idealism that inner experience is possible only through mediately outer experience which anticipates Husserl's theory of intentionality according to which all consciousness is consciousness of something. Thus, it is crystal clear that both Kant and Husserl gave prime importance to consciousness as factor of knowledge. However, Husserl disclosed greater tendency to establish the ego as the existential metaphysical reality showing a shift "from the condition of knowledge to the condition of being". Husserl judges that Kant marks a decisive phase in the Copernican turning towards the constituting life of subjectivity and yet the Copernican turning as fully executed and transcendental turn is actualised only in Husserl's phenomenology. Kant discovered the conditions of knowledge in the subject and to Husserl, subjectivity is the principle on which knowledge of the world depends. In Husserl's later work we observe idealistic turn when he maintains that the constitution of the experiential is traced back to pure ego or transcendental subjectivity.

IV

I would like to analyse few Central concepts of Husserl's phenomenology in order to substantiate my claim of second copernican revolution. Phenomenology is best known for its phenomenological

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

method. Phenomenology is more a mode of investigating and analysing the essential structures of experience than a theory of reality. It is called phenomenology as it deals directly with the integral phenomena given in immediate experience. The word 'phenomenon' is applicable to that which is apparent or manifest to our consciousness and therefore objects may be regarded as phenomena only after we have bracketed or suspended our belief in the existence of the objects. The object as meant rather than the object as real constitutes the subject matter of phenomenological investigation. Husserl attempts to mark a midway between the two extremes of uncritical objectivism and arbitrary subjectivism. The phenomenological method is neither deductive, nor empirical inductive. It rather lies in exhibiting what is given and the clarification of that given. It includes epoche or bracketing and series or reductions. Husserl however does not mean an outright negation or denial of the existential reality of the objects posited in natural attitude. Such reality is rather sought to be disconnected or bracketed, no cognitive use of such objects is to be made. The object as fact remains, but in relation to knowing consciousness it remains disconnected, in so far as any judgement concerning its actual or factual existence would be subjected to a moment of suspension. It is through this significant step alone can a realm of purified consciousness be obtained. The epoche changes nothing in the world and after applying the epoche we have literally lost nothing but rather have won the whole of Absolute being. Simultaneously by virtue of the epoche, all phenomenology becomes transcendental "egology". The power of this discovery lies in understanding the world as a correlate of consciousness. The concept of reduction is an important device and serves the purpose of discovering the transcendental field of all constitution.

It is through reduction the focus can retreat even further, from the objects (cogitata), beind the acts (cogitationes) and rest on the ego itself (ego).[1] What remains then when the whole world is bracketed? Husserl maintains that it is the world of "eidos" which is the last phenomenological residuum when all has been suspended.[2] His phenomenology tries to discover the world of essences in the pure field of intentional life of transcendental subjectivity. Husserl's theory of reduction eliminates not only the empirical ego; it also suspends the transcendental ego. After the elimination of these two layers of egos, Husserl discovers the third and the deepest layer of the pure constituting ego. The most radical reduction aims at the discovery of endless realm of transcendental pure subjectivity in which all the eliminated is present in the form of transcendental phenomena.[3] The important concept of reduction includes series of steps-

(1) **Eidetic Reduction**: It is a type of reduction in which all references to particulars are dropped and only the phenomena exhibiting the essences are given. It is movement from particular facts to general essences or platonic eidos with a purpose of obtaining purified phenomena.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(2) Penomenological Reduction: We bracket the belief in the existence of the objective phenomenon under consideration. By abstracting from all possible contingencies, the phenomenological epoche reaches the ultimate, simplest and absolutely general character of all experience. The character is the intentional stream of consciousness with its fundamental triadic structure-"ego cogito cogitata". To isolate the ego itself is a function relegated to the transcendental reduction.

(3) Transcendental Reduction: When we bracket literally everything, that is, the transcendental reality, all that remains is the pure ego. This operation is the transcendental reduction. There must be an Ego inorder to bracket everything. The difference between Husserl and Descartes is primarily that the transcendental reduction enables us to examine the structure of experience and transcendental ego as source of constitutive principle, whereas Descartes cogito Ergosum leads to certain metaphysical conception.[4]

So reduction is not to be understood as a deduction, rather it is a gradual penetration into the purified essential residue by a constant application of the epoche. It reveals pure subjectivity as the exclusive source of all objectivity.[5] Heidegger has made use of phenomenological method but its task is not to analyse cognition but being or reality. He thought that Husserl's phenomenology neglects individual existenz. He doesnot agree with Husserl that it is transcendental ego which constitutes the world. In Heidegger's opinion there is no ego, there is simply what he calls 'Being in the world'. So the world is not bracketable, nor the concept of ego necessary.

V

The critical procedural techniques of epoche and reduction thus reveal the processes of temporal constitution that are normally hidden to the involved consciousness of everyday experience. Husserl's transcendental idealism gives account of constitutional analysis which describes the processes by which consciousness constitutes the world. Constitutional analysis involves a retrogressive - progressive procedures that Husserl sometimes calls the "zig-zag" procedure. Any worldly object that has been bracketed is maintained as an intentionally implicated entity, yet suspended as an ontological or judgemental assumption.[6]

The central problem confronting transcendental phenomenology is typical problem of "transcendental constitution". The notion of constitution is derived from the conception of subjectivity as the source of all original formation of meanings of objectivity. In that sense all objectivity itself becomes a universalised objectivation of consciousness. In the light of phenomenological analysis, the world of experience would reduce itself to the world of objectivty which is meant by the subject. The being of an object would be equivalent to the intentional correlate,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which entails the conception of subjectivity as functional, for intentionality implies functionality on the part of subjectivity. The constitution is used here neither in an ontological sense nor in empirical or factual sense, it is rather to be taken as transcendental what is ideally presupposed. Husserl characterizes subjectivity as "accomplishing" and on final analysis it is recognized as "world constituting". It is by an uncovering of the horizon of experience the reality and transcendency of the world become ultimately clarified and the world is shown to be inseparable from transcendental subjectivity.[7] The entire second volume of Husserl's "Ideas"- "Phenomenological investigation into constitution" is devoted to the question of constitution pertaining to respective regions - or the problems of regional constitution. Thus the problem of transcendental constitution in respect of the three major regions is undertaken - (1) The material nature (2) The animal nature (3) The mental or personal world. The first of these region would include constitution of thing like material object, material causality and human body. The second region would include the significant concept of what Husserl expresses as "I-man"; and the third region of spirit is chiefly centred round the concept of person in the world or society of persons.

Husserl divides the constitution into two types - active genesis and passive genesis. In active genesis the ego functions as productively constitutive by means of lived experiences which are ego-acts of special sort. These ego-acts are concatenated through socialization in certain community, constitute new objects on the basis of objects already given in the modes of consciousness.[8] Anything built up by active genesis necessarily presupposes a passivity that gives something before hand. The readymade objects encountered in life as existent such as star and mountains are given with the originality of thing in itself in the synthesis of a passive experience. We have to depend on pregiven material, the hyletic data in case of passive constitution. The existence of such material as well as the whole process of passive constitution involves the dependence of the transcendental constitution on factors independent of the ego and contains a realistic element in the very heart of constitutive phenomenology.[9]

Husserl believed that consciousness of time contains the clue to the problem of constitution. The primordial impression of a streaming present is surrounded by horizon of immediate retention of the past and also contains an immediate protention of the future. He hoped to demonstrate the present constitution of the stream of time by the hidden achievements of the transcendental ego. All other constitution such as the constitution of hyletic data and of the full intentional objectivities are based on these data. Immanual Kant has to accept transcendental unity of pure apperception for synthesizing our manifold sensations and in similar fashion, Husserl accepts transcendental ego. But the major difference between the two is that for Kant Transcendental unity

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of apperception, is logical presupposition of all our knowledge and experience and while for Husserl transcendental ego has decidedly ontological status. The unity of ego is one of the most fundamental acts of constitution and hence of intentionality. The most important and also most puzzling, constituted cogitatum is the ego itself. The contemporary Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden emphasized the paradox of Husserl's position, which is that the constituted ego is also the agent of its own constitution.[10] A possible solution to this can be found in Husserl implicit conceptions of the levels of the ego. The ego is, first of all, the centre from which the cogitationes radiate. This centre is the ultimate ego pole, the ultimate source of subjectivity. It is the transcendental ego. Apart from this ego is a centre of convictions and habits and may be called empirical ego which can be compared with Atman and Jiva. Finally, Husserl refers to the laws governing the intentional structure of constitution as the inborn apriori. Transcendental consciousness, with its complex of noetic constitutive acts, is an absolute factor in the Husserlian explanation of objectivity. Thus what Husserl, on ultimate analysis seeks to establish is "transcendental subjectivity as manifest within the universe of constitutive problems". Finally, the goal of transcendental idealism is "to catch the sight of the possibility of transcendental objectivity of knowledge".[11]

VI

The application of phenomenological epoche leads to the discovery of intentionality which is one of the most significant traits of experience. Husserl following Brentano holds that the essence of consciousness is intentionality. The object of my consciousness and even my own subjectivity is something meant, constructed, projected constituted, intended by me. Consciousness is a stream between two poles - subject and object. Consciousness is a vector that effects an organisational synthesis.[12]

Intentionality signifies the fact that consciousness is directional, that it is given in experience as an outward-moving vector. The source of the movement is termed the ego, whereas the focus towards which the movement addresses itself is the object. The division of the vector into ego and object is purely an abstraction because another fundamental meaning of intentionality is the essential unity of consciousness. Consciousness is understood by Husserl to be intentional - it is openness, relation to. It is a relation between a meaning act and that which is meant, its object. In other words, every experience is a directedness of consciousness from I-Pole to the object-pole, from noesis to the noema. This discovery relating to the intentionality of consciousness, Husserl believe, solves the long standing enigma of epistemology the problem of relationship between the subject and the object. Intentionality is the unity of subject and object. An object is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

necessarily an object to a consciousness and consciousness is necessarily a consciousness of object.

Husserl had mentioned in his writing that the concept of intentionality was borrowed from Franz Brentano, according to whom, every psychial phenomenon is characterised by intentional in-existence of an object with a reference to a content or directedness to an immanent object. Every psychical phenomena has, Brentano says, the characteristic of an intentional relation to an object. Thus in a presentation, something is presented; in a judgement something is judged, and in desire something is desired. Intentionality or representationality of an experience seems to be a relation between the mental state of the experiences and some extramental thing, event or state of affairs. The most obvious problem with the relational view of intentionality is that the object of an intentional mental state or act is not always some actually existing extramental object. Descartes pointed out that in case of dreams and hallucinations we don't have any extramental reality. For Husserl intentionality of an act is independent of the existence of its object & so "existence independence" can be said to be feature of intentionality. The intentionality of mental state is different from the ordinary property of being related to some object.

For the intentionality of an act depends not on object represented but on certain conception of the object represented and this feature of intentionality is "conception dependence". [13]

Intentionality is understood by Husserl to be unique characteristics of all experience. He distinguishes sharply between content of act and object and presents only a rudimetary account of act's content in logical investigation. Two fundamental constituents of content are quality and matter. Quality is that inner feature of an act that distinguishes it phenomenologically from other acts. The matter in act's content is that which gives it its specific representational character. In Ideas Husserl's notion of content is developed into two distinct but closely related notions- the noesis and the noema of an act "Noesis" is an interpretive or "meaning giving" part of an act while noema is an act's "meaning". Husserl says noesis is that part of an act's real content that "brings in the specific character of intentionality", whereas noema is an "ideal" or abstract structure common to different acts of the same type. It is the part of the noesis that gives the act its directedness towards a specific object and determines how the object is represented in the act by giving the act a "Sinn" a meaning or sense. This meaning of sense is te main constituent of the act's noema.[14] In this way, Husserl makes a distinction between the real component of our intentional experiences and intentional correlates. Husserl recognises two aspects of consciousness being conscious of (noesis) and te consciously known (noema). The consciously known is not contained in noesis; it is constituted as an object by noesis beyond the noema of an experience, Husserl says, lies

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

another fundamental trait of intentionality -what he calls the horizon of the experience. The internal horizon consists of possible further non-relational properties of the object. The external horizon consists of the object's possible relations to other things, including things not explicitly represented in the perception. So, Husserl sharply distinguishes mental acts from noematic sinne and both from ordinary objects as trees. If we follow this interpretation then to say that object is "constituted" in an experience means not that experience gives the object's being, but that the experience gives it's meaning Husserl's "transcendental idealism" is not an ontological theory about the being of objects, it is phenomenological theory about how we experience objects.[15]

VII

The universal doubt of Descartes leads us to self evident, apodictic certainly in the form of Cogito Ergo Sum and similarly Phenomenological method of Husserl points to phenomenological residue of reduction which he calls the region of absolute, apodictic, or pure consciousness. Husserl after applying phenomenological method could discover that he was led back (re-ducts) to the conscious self as the centre of reality. He reached to the conclusion that it was only through his pure ego, his conscious self, that any reality had any possible validity and made any sense to him. The whole of reality is now seen to be a stream of experiences in which intentional objects are presented to a pure reference point, consciousness. Husserl in his first edition of the logical Investigation rejected the conception of an identical subject over and above the intentional acts of consciousness. But in the second edition of logical Investigation, he attempted complete reversal of previous view. In Ideas he maintains that pure ego is to be strictly distinguished from the bodily organism and even from any psychological self which has not yet been subjected to the phenomenological reduction. Later on Husserl adopted Leibniz's expression "monad" to designate the concrete ego as comprising not only the immediate "vividly streaing present", as does the pure transcendental ego, but also its past, its future, and its mere potentialities, its habitual and personal characteristics.[16] Husserl wishes to distinguish between the transcendental ego and what he calls the empirical, the physical or the mundane ego, or simply I, this person.[17] His transcendental ego is clearly conceived as an individual.[18] As transcendental ego I am the subject of a conscious life made up of a stream of individual experiences, I am also a substrate of habitualities[19] and am constituted in the unity of a history.[20] The term transcendental ego is used by Husserl in the plural sense and one of his major problems is to understand how such egos relate to each other. There is no question of supra individual subject in Husserl, except perhaps in the sense of a community which consists of individuals.[21] The ego is thus transcendental insofar as it is the subject of intentional acts of consciousness and object transcends consciousness.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is through a series of transcendental phenomenological reduction Husserl reaches to transcendental ego which is the source of being, of objectivity, of reality and of truth. Transcendental ego is the final residue upon which operation of epoche cannot be further performed, and it is intentional in character and its intentionally cannot be put into brackets. What it means then is that consciousness never exists qua consciousness, it always exists as consciousness of. If Husserl's pressed hard to reply the question that-Is it necessary for transcendental ego to constitute the objective world in order for it to exist -then answer will be affirmative. It is my personal opinion that it is failure of his radicalism and is hanging shadow of objectivism over the penomenological-transcendental idalism. We experience the peculiar and unique existence of an " I -pole", a core from which all intentional streams of experience radiates. This I-pole is the transcendental ego or transcendental subject. The transcendental ego is not only passive, as Husserl seems to emphasize but also active. In numerous instances, I experience myself as agent or creator. The distinction between transcendental ego and psychological ego of Husserl can be compared with Atman & Jiva of advaitic tradition.[22] The transcendental ego is considered to be the source of all intentionality and constitution, Husserl feels justified in saying that it is the source and basis of all knowledge. He attempts to locate all objectivity in transcendental subjectivity or ego and similarly the Advaitic principle of Saksin is said to sustain all objectivity.

VIII

Husserl constantly faces the threat of solipsism on account of his tendency towards idealism and concern with the transcendental ego. His analysis of Intersubjectivity and of transcendental realm is the two fundamental efforts to escape that dilemma. Husserl initiates his transcendental reflections on intersubjectivity in 'Fifth meditation' which is important for objective truth claims. The prototype of objectivity is the transcendental realm which is also called "transcendental consciousness". The presence of other persons is a very important type of objectivity or otherness. When Husserl applies the eidetic reduction to other person then he is engaged in the analysis of alter ego or of transcendental intersubjectivity. There are four aspects of other persons given to me in experience.

(1) Other minds are given to me with and within the experience of space. The space which other minds occupy is a kind of experienced space, it is not the mathematical and physical space with which physical sciences deal.

(2) My experience of other minds discloses them as being interlaced with nature. When I analyse my experience and presentation of another person, I find it impossible to trace a dividing line between the person and the nature that surrounds him.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(3) My experience of other minds is that these appear to me as experiencing the same world that I experience. It follows that empirical investigations of experience disclose solipsism to be a doctrine that is contrary to facts of experience.

(4) Other persons appear to me as entities that experience me in turn. I consequently do not experience the world as my own private and subjective world "but as an intersubjective one". [23]

We experience access to other minds through empathy. The other is given us not in direct presentation but by way of appresentation, a process which acquaints us with aspects of an object that are not directly presented.[24] The transcendental realm enriched through the incorporation of the alter ego is called by Husserl "intersubjectively transcendental community". The alter ego as is true of all objects, is constituted with in the transcendental realm by the transcendental ego. However, there is a profound difference between the constitution of nature and the constitution of the alter ego. Their distinction is to found in the fact that empathy is part of the intentionality of the alter ego. The experienced intimacy between me and the alter ego is a central feature of the manner in which other minds appear to me. Natural objects are impervious to empathy; they are opaque to the unique intentional look that characterizes interpersonal relationship.[25] The other egos thus constituted are themselves transcendental and that these egos form a community of "monads" and here Husserl borrows Leibniz's expression.

IX

Edmund Husserl in his "The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology", tries to solve the problems which occur in man's theoretical knowledge and in science by a detailed analysis of man's prescientific experience in the everyday world. The life world as world common to all of us seems to have two fold characteristics- it is immanent in the various worlds, but yet it transcends them all. The life world is the world in which a man discovers himself as living conscious being. But in the world of science, there is neither man, nor his society, nor his idea and nor his senses etc. The world has undergone objectivistic dissolution to such an extent that the last vestigs of subjectivity has disappeared from it. Man is only a composition of atoms which are completely determinable by exact mathematical principles. If he is to meet the crisis which faces him, he must be reborn in the spirit of scientific philosophy that regards man as essentially a spiritual subject, where infinite goals and infinite possibilities reside. The proper task of Phenomenology would be to restore man's life world and his reason. So on the mundana level it is the science of the life world and on the transcendental level, it is the science of universal self-consciousness or universal reason. The life world represents the opposite pole of the so called objective world of the sciences. It is the prescientific

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

world and is the foundation of the objective world of the science. The life world is the most familiar natural field of all our actions and thoughts. It is the stage of all our performances theoretical as well as practical. It is given to us as universal field.[26] Husserl attempts to show that it is prescientific, prepredicative horizon of the life world which is prior to all constitutions of the objective sciences. Husserl distinguishes between the life world and the so-called objective world constructed by the science through idealization and mathematization of nature. The worlds of different sciences are ideal constructions and require the life world as the model-giving base.[27] The facts of our life world are immediately present to us and are given directly to our immediate consciousness; the scientific fact remains abstract constructions and can be understood only when we follow the methodological dictates of these sciences.

The life world is not just the raw world of uncultivated nature; it is rather the world as shaped and worked by all of us. The different world of the Chinese, Indians and Europeans appear as figures at the background of the universal field of common discourse but when Husserl speaks of the constitution of the life, world, he brings his concept of the constituting ego which is an instance of pure theoretical reflection. The world of the natural mathematical science is a theoretical construction which is given neither to direct experience nor to any other forms of immediate awareness. Since the ("Lebenswelt") life world is pregiven and is prior to all our activities, the universe of objective science requires the life world in order to get an ultimate clarification. The life world is the world of all known and unknown realities in which everything has a bodily character. It is the world in which we live according to our bodily, personal ways of being. The world is inconceivable apart from human living and human existence. The mutual reference of man and the world prompts Husserl to characterize the world as 'life world' (Lebenswelt). The life world is not non- historical, it possesses a historical consideration. It is also relative to a certain society at a given time, it has its own history. Our life world is thus a collective accomplishment and comprises all our diverse cultural products. The life world is not something static; it is no entity beyond all change and modification.

It is due to the influence of science since Galileo the life world was neglected and decried as merely subjective relative. This is why there were hardly any attempt to explore our life world seriously and scientifically. Such a forgetfulness of the life world is one of the main reason of the crisis of our modern sciences. Husserl thinks that the western man is somehow seduced by the scientific interpretation of the world. A particular reduction, that is, a suspension of culture and science is therefore necessary for uncovering the life world and its essential structures. Thus, we have to return from the world of culture to the original life world by means of a first reduction, then the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

transcendental reduction must lead us further back from the structures of the life world to the hidden achievements of the functioning intentionality of the transcendental subjectivity.[28] Once this reduction is performed, we are in a position to study the ontology of the life world which is a kind of phenomenology. Husserl calls such a phenomenology mundane phenomenology and thinks such phenomenology is a necessary condition for transcendental phenomenology. .

X

Husserl work contains a vast store of penetrating and subtle analysis; and the phenomenological method which he created is now widely used by philosophers. But however his philosophy did not develope into a full metaphysics or philosophy of being. It bracketed and ignored existence, and it confined its attention to the work of descriptive epistemology and to the philosophy of. The purpose of calling Husserl's phenomenology as"second copernican revolution" is just to highlight the revolutionary aspects of it. It is very curious to observe how he lives his own western tradition as well as how he proposes drastic alteration in it. It is unique aspect of his transcendental idealism which describes the constitutional processes in which how consciousness constitutes the world is analysed. The concept of intentionality was no doubt borrowed from Brentano's philosophical analysis but it was used to analyse the nature of consciousness in novel way by Husserl. The notion of transcendental ego or subjectivity was never discussed so thoroughly prior to Husserl as Kant has also talked about transcendental unity of apperception but it can only said to be logical pre-supposition of knowledge while transcendental ego has decidedly ontological status. The problems of intersubjectivity is discussed and analysed for the first time in western tradition so beautifully and comprehensively. He introduced the concept of Lebenswelt the ordinary world of common experiences, which truly depicts the revolutionary spirit of Husserl's philosophy.

REFERENCES

1. *Paris Lectures Translated by Peter Koestenbaum, xxii.*
2. *Ideen I, page 33.*
3. *Ideen III, page 145.*
4. *Paris Lectures-LIX.*
5. *A critical survey of Phenomenology & Existentialism, - Mrinal Kanti Bhadra- page 80.*
6. *Husserl's phenomenology & the foundation of natural science - Charles W. Harvey. - page 168.*
7. *A critical survey of phenomenology & existentialism - Mrinal Kanti Bhadra page 84.*
8. *Ibid page 85.*
9. *Phenomenological Movement - Herbert Spiegelberg, page 131.*
10. *Paris Lectures - XLII.*
11. *The idea of Phenomenology - Edmund Husserl -Translated by William P. Alstom & George Nakhnikian - XX.*
12. *Paris Lectures - XXVII.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

13. *Husserl's phenomenology - Edited by J.N.Mohanty & William R McKenna; page 150-151.*
14. *Ibid page 159.*
15. *Ibid, page 179.*
16. *Phenomenological Movement - Herbert Spiegelberg, page 125.*
17. *Cartesian Meditation translated by Dorion Cairns, page 25.*
18. *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology & phenomenological philosophy - Edmund Husserl, translated F. Kiersten page 64.*
19. *Cartesian Meditations, page 66.*
20. *Ibid, page 75.*
21. *Ibid, 132.*
22. *Paris Lectures - L-LI.*
23. *Paris Lectures - LXI-LXII.*
24. *Phenomenological Movement - Herbert Spiegelberg, page 140.*
25. *Paris Lectures - LXII.*
26. *The crisis of European Science & transcendental phenomenology translated by David Carr, page 145.*
27. *Ibid, page 132.*
28. *A critical Survey of phenomenology and existentialism- Mrinal Kanti Bhadra, page 127.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV

FAITH AND SCIENCE: POSSIBILITY FOR A NEW DIALOGUE

Jan Van der Veken

The relationship between science and theology[1] has been a predominant topic on the cultural scenes during the last three centuries.

The so-called "Warfare between science and religion" is probably the most important single fact determining the gap between religion and culture. It seems as if we live in two different worlds: the world of science, with its over increasing successes and dangers, and the world of religious faith.

Theology (as religious faith in search for understanding) has drifted away from the controversial issues of cosmology, to "specialize" in the salvation of mankind of all kinds of oppression.

But a one-sided stress upon the very important issues of social justice and liberation has its drawbacks. Justice and liberation have also a wordly dimension. To feed the hungry and to build houses for the homeless has ecological implications.

Salvation is not limited to good intentions: it is not an other-wordly or a-cosmic affair.

In at least two ways wordly - or in a broader sense: cosmological issues-impose themselves upon us. In the first place we do need the world to survive and to practice justice, i.e. to love our neighbour not just with words, but in facts and deeds.

There is another way in which a concern for nature imposes itself upon us. Science has given man such a power over nature that for the very first time in history we are able to destroy the conditions of possibility of all life on our planet. We rightly can ask the question whether this planet is really "ours", and what the first point of the creed - I believe in God the Creator of heaven and earth - has to tell us about our responsibility for creation.

We have to assume responsibility for the transmission of life itself. The question is not whether we should intervene or not: we have already

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

intervened, in reducing the rate of child-mortality and prolonging the normal life expectancy. The problem is how we should intervene responsibly. Our situation in the cosmos will probably reappear as a main theme in the theology of the following decades.

In this paper I would like to show that in the past the distance between science and religion has often been too short. As a reaction against the resulting conflict, the distance during the last decades has often been too wide: science and religion have been considered as so totally different that a conflict in principle could not exist. This can be called: "the majority point of view". Recent developments, both in science and religion, point towards an overcoming of this dichotomy. A new dialogue is possible, and is required for the survival of mankind and of planet earth.

1. DISTANCE TOO SHORT

In the past the conflict between science and religion did not exist. In the middle ages (since St. Bonaventure) the metaphor of "two two books" was very common: the will of God can be read in the book of nature and in the book of Scripture. Because God is the author of both the book of nature and the book of Scripture, a conflict or contradiction is in principle excluded.

In fact the so-called "warfare between science and theology" (which, in fact is a myth, introduced by the nineteenth century author Andrew D. White (A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology. New York, D. Appleton & Cie, 1896) is a rather recent phenomenon. The founders of modern science, like Galileo and Newton, were believing christians. In the Galileo-case the conflict was strictly speaking not a conflict between science and religion. Rather it was a controversy about "how to read the Bible". Galileo was basically right when he claimed that his science was only concerned with "how the heavens go" and not with "how to go to heaven (a felicitous expression he borrowed from his friend Baronius).[2]

For Newton it was clear that the laws of nature were the result of divine choice, and Newton wrote to his friend that nothing would please him more than that his science would contribute to the greater glory of God and would strengthen the faith of the people.[3]

In fact, Newton needed even the divine intervention to adjust from time to time the trajectory of the planets, and to prevent the planets from collapsing upon one another. Because not a sufficient distinction was made between science and religion, the two ways of reading the will of God in the two books were often confused. When there was a conflict it arose out of confusion.

2. DISTANCE TOO GREAT

As an answer to the unhappy struggle between science and religion and as a way out of the confusion (Galileo and Darwin are the two most

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

important cases in point) the more educated christians and scientists came to a truce, i.e. they came to accept that science and religion are two quite different approaches to reality, with the result that a conflict in principle is impossible. But the reason which is given for the non-conflict is different. Now it is no longer argued that God is the author of both the book of nature and the book of Scripture. It is rather claimed that the world of nature and world of the Bible are two different worlds: hence this view can be called the "two world"-view". A modern way of expression the same idea can be labelled: the two language model. In the line of the second Wittgenstein, linguistic philosophers became aware of the specificity of religious language. It is not flatly descriptive language. It is rather evocative language, or auto-implicative language (D.Evans).

This view on the relationship between science and religion is widespread today amongst educated christians and in our universities. This "majority standpoint" has many advantages: it seems to solve the problem once and for all.

Yet, it seems also to us that this solution is somehow too easy. The distance between science and religion is now too great. For many reasons, not in the least for theological reasons, this standpoint seems to us untenable. It is, according to our interpretation, another instance of the unhappy divorce between "the humanities" and the technological world dominated by positive science.

3. IN SEARCH FOR A NEW DIALOGUE

a. Let us first turn to the theological reasons. If God is the Creator of heaven and earth, then theology, which has to be a logos about God, cannot be fully a-cosmic. Here the arguments of tradition abound. The Fathers have often given full attention to the cosmic dimension of salvation. The most important text which is often quoted is the passage from Romans, about creation, groaning for its liberation. In its prayer and liturgy, the church has always honoured the cosmic dimension: "Heaven and earth are full of glory", we read in the Psalm. And God is asked to give the fruits of the earth to his faithful.

Theology as a reflection upon religious faith cannot really escape the issues of cosmology. There seems to be again a growing interest in theology for the issues raised by science. The "inroad" is threefold. Meeting points occur in the realm of ethics in the realm of epistemology, and, most importantly, in the realm of metaphysics.

In 1979 the World Conference of Churches in Boston, Massachusetts, was devoted to Faith, Science and the Future.[4] Here, clearly, new accents have been heard. Theology was urged to pay attention to the issues raised by science. The "two world model" was no longer generally accepted. It became clear for everyone that the issues raised by science and above all by the new possibilities of technology

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

claim for more-than-science. It is exactly the role of what can be called broadly: "the humanities" to afford those principles of moral guidance, which will decide what we ultimately will do with those new and immense possibilities of changing - or destroying - the world.

The first way that science and religion in our time enter into dialogue -after having gone their own way for some decades- is the realm of ethics. In this realms science itself is no judge, and often even a bad counselor. The parable about The Eating Habits of Science told by Rubem Alves at the Boston conference makes that abundantly clear.[5]

b. The second way of establishing a meeting point between science and religion is epistemology and philosophy of language. Recent investigations into the epistemology and "language" of science made it clear that science is not just a matter of "facts and nothing else than facts". Science is highly theoretical: it is an interpretative scheme; it's a way of "seeing" a whole range of data (posita) as holding together and interpretable in a coherent way. Wittgenstein has made it clear that **seeing** is always **seeing as:** seeing reality as one thing rather than as another (the duck-rabbit figure).[6]

And this applies also to our scientific outlook at reality. Interpretative schemes may change: they are subject to choice and preference, and even fashion. The development of science is in no way as "rational" as early positivists wanted to believe. Here the studies of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend are highly instructive.

These studies led to an unexpected result: science also implies a moment of choice and preference, a way of "seeing" reality as one thing rather than as another. It follows from there that the epistemology of religion -which uses also interpretative schemes and highly interpretative language - is not entirely different from the language of science.

Of course, there are important differences that should not be overlooked. (In religion verification seems to be far more difficult). The witness of the heart cannot be submitted to a check in the laboratory. Theological interpretative schemes encounter far less "resistance" than scientific theories. If we ask the wrong questions, we are confronted with what Merleau-Ponty has called: "un desaveu des choses",[7] a disavowal or disapproval from the side of reality itself.

But the time has passed when one could consider science as wholly and uniquely "rational" and religion as primitive and infantile (Think about the "law of the three stages" of the early positivist, Auguste Comte).

c. A third meeting-point between science and religion is truly metaphysical. Science implies a certain view on reality as a whole. Science has presuppositions for which science itself cannot account.

There is the overall belief that the universe is truly rational, and can be understood, even by our limited human minds. (We have shown

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

elsewhere[8] why Kant's ingenious solution of this problem is no longer viable after what can be called the fragmentation or historicization of transcendental subjectivity).

If our conceptual schemes were not adjusted to reality, our rockets would not reach the moon, and Pioneer would not be able to leave our solar system. Science is based on the acceptance or the belief that the same rules or law apply everywhere. This of course, cannot be proven. But without that assumption science could not proceed.

It is the task of philosophy to speculate about the rationality of the Universe, or even about the rationality of Reality as a whole.

We normally ask the question how cosmic evolution could bring forward living beings and man. But we can also ask the reverse question: What can be said about the Universe or about Reality as a whole on the basis of the fact that there is at least some place in the Universe a thinking being, capable of developing a conscious and successful grasp upon the environment in which he lives? This principle has been called the anthropic principle.[9]

And it is impressive how much about the Universe can be derived from the very fact that a being capable of reflective thinking exists. The conditions of possibility of intelligent life in the structive. He recognizes that the mind is not the same as the brain. One has rather the inpression that the relationship between the mind and the brain is comparable to the relationship that exists between the reader and the text. The text contains the information, but without the reader it is completely inert and meaningless.

There seems to be a growing tendency to what I would like to call a "bi-facial view on reality". I find hints in that direction in different authors, such as Teilhard de Chardin, Whitehead and the later Merleau-Ponty.

The real has, so to say, two faces: the material or objective side is what a given reality is to its environment, to the other. Its objective side is the way it is experienced by the other, as a given.

On the other hand, a reality has also some inner core: it puts itself together. A plant, e.g., is a structured whole, which somehow integrates its parts, and is related to its environment with which it interacts as a whole. Let us call this aspect the inner side of a being.

As human beings, we experience ourselves in a reflective way. And as far as we know, this type of reflective consciousness is unique in our cosmos. But it does not follow from there that other beings are totally different from us and entirely avoid of mentality, and that they are mere inert machines.

In fact, a worldview which is closer to Leibniz than to Descartes becomes increasingly probable. Leibniz conceived the whole of reality as constituted out of myriads and myriads of monads. They are centres

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of force: "everything in it is force, life, soul, thinking and striving.

That we live in a dynamic, developing world of incredible magnitude is a mystery that baffles the mind. It is not true that science has taken away the sense of mystery. The contrary seems to be the case. Science today is miles away from the positivistic claim that it can explain everything. Science has become humble. With such a science the dialogue is easier. Religion also originates in wonder. Science in its own way can lead us to the recognition that we are confronted with a universe rather to be conceived as a work of art than as a huge machine.

Both science and religion are confronted with what Heisenberg calls "the central order".[12]

Science has to accept the intelligibility of the universe. The most undeniable way in which this order confronts us is the stability of the laws of nature. Science presupposes those laws, but cannot account for them.

Here we reach the meeting-point between science, philosophy and religion.

Science tells us how all the events that constitute the visible world interact and influence one another. Philosophy leads us to a view on the totality of reality, which is conceived as a dynamic, interrelated whole.

Religion says more about "central order" than science, and more than philosophy. According to Ian T. Ramsey, religion originates out of the disclosure of the Universe and its more. In other texts the "more" is the more than the visible: the Universe, then, contains the visible and its more. I would like to paraphraze Ramsey's expression, borrowing an expression from the Dutch language which in translation sounds as follows: to believe is to see more in it.

Religion says more about the mystery of all things than science.

The word "God" functions as an "integrator" - word: it "integrates" several meanings (allen compassive reality, Creative advance into novelty, order, harmony, ethical claims, care, personal relationships, Thou!).[13]

Some, not all of those meanings are also detectable by science (e.g. the interrelatedness of concrete realities, the intelligibility of the universe, the permanence of the laws of nature).

Religion contains an interpretative element which is more related to the totality of the human person, and is for that reason more.

This book describes the developments in science which have taken place during the last hundred years. The authors have chosen the image of a "metamorphosis". One should not have the impression that contemporary science is wholly different from science in the past: but the developments are important. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar distance from what

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

should be called from now on: classical science ("La science classique", meaning science as it was conceived by the great founders Galileo and Newton, and of which Bacon and Laplace were amongst others-the theoreticians).

1. The prototype of classical science is mechanics. Indeed, the results of the two new sciences (mechanics and dynamics, according to Galileo's *Discorsie dimostrazioni matematiche* (1638) are so impressive that the mechanistic model has imposed itself. 18th and 19th century science is truly mechanistic. The whole universe is conceived as an enormous machinery. Prediction is in principle possible. An all powerful mind, knowing what is the case at this moment, and knowing also the inexorable laws of nature, could predict in principle what will happen at every moment of time. This is Laplace's famous example.

This all-powerful mind has often been equated with the mind of God. The image may, indeed, be interpreted in a "theistic" or a "scientific" way. In both cases the results are the same: according to this view everything is settled by its antecedents. Nothing really new happens. Determinism and predictability are indeed the underlying presuppositions of the classical worldview.

This classical view of science is still powerful, and is indeed successful as a first approach. For all practical purposes, and on a macrocosmic scale, the rule "the same causes have the same effects" works. But bit by bit, this worldview governed by determinism and iron law has proved inadequate to understand the finer elements of nature. The inner structure of matter, and above all, the coming into being of real novelty, cannot be understood, if the same causes produce the same effects endlessly.

On the microscopic level strict determinism seems no longer tenable (although different interpretations of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy are still possible). That scientific laws are statistical laws is widely accepted today, since Heisenberg and Born.

That strict efficient causality has also be surpassed may change our image of nature even more profoundly. Thermodynamics is the domain where strict reversibility is no longer tenable. A candle can burn, but can never return to its initial state. Yet, reversibility was one of the most cherished dogma's of classical science. The typical example of classical mechanics is the pendulum. The trajectory from A to B is exactly the same as that trajectory from B to A. with that "little" correction that a bit of energy has been lost by the heat, resulting from friction at the axle. But classical science was not troubled by that minute detail. It works with the model of the ideal pendulum. Classical science, indeed, is idealized science: it does not reflect the real world. The world, indeed, in which new and unexpected things happen.

Thermodynamics is the first non-classical science. Fourier has been an innovator formulating a mathematical law governing the propagation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of heat. It is a description in mathematical language of an event that classical science could not truly understand: the propagation of heat is an irreversible phenomenon. (Ilya Prigogine[10] obtained the Noble-prize of chemistry for his study of irreversible phenomena, which he called "dissipative structures". Dissipative structures are in principle irreversible phenomena. The use of words is telling.

Dissipation and **structure** seem to exclude one another. Yet, there are phenomena which occur in given circumstances (away from the state of equilibrium) where new structures come into being, out of lower levels of organization. These phenomena are also irreversible: something really new has happened.

Those phenomena are very probably at work everywhere. They are certainly at work in the origin and the evolution of life. Life itself, even in its very primitive forms, is a phenomenon of order; which interacts with less ordered structures. It maintains its own equilibrium.

In the classical deterministic view of science, the emergence of life in this universe is very hard to understand. In a deterministic universe, which is endlessly repetitive, non- life is far more probable than life. Jacques Monod,[11] also a Nobel Prize winner, in many respects a proponent of classical science", comes to this clear-out conclusion: life is the most improbable thing that could happen. Not evolution, but non-evolution is the rule. Invariant reproduction is the most important distinctive feature of living beings. If there is evolution- and Monod, of course, will not deny the fact of evolution - it cannot be then the result of chance. There is nothing in the universe which accounts for the probability of life, let alone for its higher forms, such as consciousness.

Monod states it explicitly: his view of "classical" science imposes upon him the breakdown of the "ancient alliance" between man and the cosmos.

The view that man is somehow expected in the cosmos, or that the world is made for man, is for Monod a form of animism. Monod is as opposed to creationism as to dialectical materialism. In all those views, he sees some justification for the being of man: some how man wants to believe that there is a reason for his presence in the universe. Those how believe in God, or those who believe in the hidden possibilities of matter agree at least on one point: man is not just a matter of chance. There is a reason for its being there.

The contrary is true, says Monod. Our scientific worldview imposes this conclusion upon us: "the ancient alliance has been broken down". We know by now that we are alone in a cosmos which has not willed us, and in which there is, after all, no room for us.

Starting from the mechanistic and deterministic presuppositions of classical science, this conclusion seems unavoidable. Indeed, in such a universe nothing really new and unforeseen could happen.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But Monod's conclusion may show that the presuppositions of classical science may not be tenable all together.

In fact, nature is rich in possibilities and if new more complex structures may emerge in ways which are not foreseeable in detail) then such an amazing fact as the emergence of life is more probable than improbable. Given the right circumstances, and given the presence of "dissipative structures" to use this expression as a general name for very complex happenings which are certainly operative in the emergence of life but which are still largely unknown as far as the details are concerned) a phenomenon such as life is - to use Prigogine's image - as "natural" as the falling down of a stone.

We said already that thermodynamics is the first non-classical science. It has introduced " the arrow of time " in physics. The thermodynamics of life makes it clear that a view of science which cannot account for the real newness is not a viable option any more.

2. A second and more important shift in our worldview is the emergence of a new insight in the relationship between mind and matter. Here, of course, we are tackling rather a philosophical than a scientific issue. But it is our conviction that developments in science itself make the "two substance view" less and less probable. By "two substance-view" is meant the position of Descartes. On the one hand there is consciousness, the "cogito", on the other hand, here is matter, mere extended reality (res extensa; partes extra partes). Consciousness or spirit is a substance completely different from matter. It is fully present to itself, and can exist in itself. Matter on the other hand, is for Descartes dead stuff, nothing else than a machine. Descartes describes the human body also as a machine, and in doing so has probably made possible a new attitude towards the body, which could be considered as merely objective and not really human. In his own way Descartes has cannonized the two substance theory: he has certainly encouraged and undergirded the mechanistic world-view of early science.

Descartes' two substance theory is very different from the Aristotelian -Thomistic view, according to which the soul was not a substance but a principle, intrinsically related to matter, which is also conceived, not as dead stuff, but as a principle of determinateness (hylemorphism).

The insights we have in the close interaction between the self and its brain, make the worldview of Descartes rather improbable. Mind and matter should not be conceived as unrelated substances. Mind can not be reduced to nothing else than a mechanical function of the brain, either. Here the work of Sir John Eccles is very in-cosmos seem to be very narrow. "Narrow" here means: complex, or rich, or demanding. A source of energy is needed (as our sun) which lives long enough to allow its satellites or planets to cool down and to develope an atmosphere. The planet itself has to be close enough to the sun to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

draw solar energy from it, and far enough away to be protected against the all devastating cosmic rays of its energy source. A planet, e.g., 10 % closer to the sun, or 10 % farther away would not be a possible bearer of intelligent life, not allowing enough time for evolution.

A golden rule for all metaphysical thinking is: Reality as a whole must be such that concrete realities are possible. Amongst those finite, empirical realities the very presence of reflective human consciousness teaches us a lot about Reality as a whole. What we really need is an overall view of reality, which shows that man is at the same time unique (we are not aware of the existence of E.T.'s or other visitors from starworlds) and that he truly belongs to the universe: man is a child of the universe.

Here, again, important developments are taking place under our eyes. Whereas traditional or classical science has created an unbridgeable gap between man and nature, to the extent that man was completely divorced from nature, recent developments in science seem to show that there is at the same time continuity and newness with regard to the place of man in the universe and in the stream of emergent evolution.

d. The fact itself that both science and theology went through a metamorphosis opens according to our understanding the most promising perspective for a new dialogue.

As far as theology is concerned: contemporary theology is far more dynamic than more traditional theology based on the so-called "philosophia perennis". This "philosophia perennis" in fact shares itself the Greek prejudice in favour of immutability, and against becoming. I think that educated theology today has generally accepted a dynamic worldview, combined with an evolutionary perspective (although the latter more hesitantly than the former). In any case creation is not conceived today as a once and for all thing. God is really "with all creation", not just in the beginning or "before all creation".

It may even be argued that the dynamic worldview which comes to us so naturally todays, has been introduced in our culture by judeo-chirstianism and is truly biblical. The God of the Bible is first of all the Lord of history: He is really underway with his people.

It is strange that chirstianity as a whole has had such difficulties with the worldview of evolutionism, which became part of our self understanding at least since the nineteenth century. The reason is that evolutionary theories have often been undergirded by a materialistic philosophy. It seemed as if there was no alternative: either the creation story, or "descent of man from the ape". Today we see that the early forms of the evolutionary theory were, it must be said, too simplistic (stressing e.g. only the struggle for life as the explanatory mechanism of the whole process of evolution). But as a whole, evolution has made its entree once and for all in the educated world.

CC-0. Prof. Dr. Dhaman Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Because the dynamic worldview has in principle been accepted, there have been far less difficulties with the assimilation of the twentieth century cosmological theories about the origin of this universe. The "big-bang theory" e.g., is generally not advanced as an alternative for creation, because it became clear that we are here confronted with two quite different interpretative schemes.

It goes without saying that such a dynamic theology is far better equipped to enter into dialogue with modern science than the either-or worldviews of the past.

On the other hand, and this is even more important for the possibility of a new dialogue, in science itself important developments are taking place under our eyes. Science also has undergone a metamorphosis. Here I refer to the title of the book of Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *La Nouvelle Alliance. Metamorphose de la science* (Paris, Gallimard, 1979). This book has been translated into English under the telling title *Order out of Chaos*, but the French title is even more instructive, and is by no matter a question of accident.

Impregnated by historical and cultural elements than science. Religion is closer to the heart than science (It is, indeed, less objective). Science is more universal, more objective. Religion says more about the Mystery which supports us in existence than science, but it does not say less. Nor does religion enter into conflict with science.

CONCLUSION

1.It will suffice, by way of conclusion, to suggest that the developments within science and within theology allow for a new and fruitful dialogue. A dialogue starts from the presupposition that the partners in the dialogue are not another's viewpoint in principle, i.e. that they do not belong to two entirely different worlds.

2.Our position is not that there is a special science for believers, and another science for non- believers, but that there is a conception or selfunderstanding of science which makes a dialogue with a religious worldview impossible, right from the beginning, and that there is another conception or selfunderstanding of science which allows for such a dialogue. The section on Science and Faith at the Boston Conference in 1979 ends as follows: "we urge for extensive and careful theological and philosophical analysis of this complex interrelation, an analysis which recognizes that science and faith share a deep sense of the mystery that underlies them both".

3. The future of planet earth will depend upon the success of this dialogue. The impact of science upon our environment and upon our future is so incredible that science left to itself will not be enough to save us from the possibility of selfdestruction, by the use of the terrible forces built into nature, or by the premature exhaustion by overcropping or other forms of exploitation. An ethical will to cope with the possibilities

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection. Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and dangers of science is necessary, and it may very well be the case that this ethical will needs, in order to be effective, a total and religious outlook at reality. Only an attitude of worship, which is at the heart of religion will bring us into a life-giving contact with the Source of all being and becoming and will show us our true nature: to be stewares in the garden of the Lord our God. But that, again, is neither philosophical nor scientific language.

NOTES:

1. *- General bibliography on the topic: Ian G.Barbour (Science and Religion. New Perspectives on the Dialogue. Ian G.Barboured. - New York, Evanston, London, Harper & Row, 1968) and Id., Issues in Science and Religion. (New York, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall 1966); W.Austin, The Relevance of Natural Science to Theology, (London, Mac Millan, 1976); A.R.Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science. The Bampton Lectures 1978. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979).*

2. *- Letter to the Grand Duchess Maria-Christina, in Galilee, aspects de sa vie et de son oeuvre (Paris, PUF, 1968), p.339: "L' intention du Saint Esprit est denous enseigner*

   comment on va au ciel et non comment va le ciel".

3. *- E.A.Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundation of Modern Science. (Doubleday Anchor Book, 1954), p. 288, quoting from I.Newton, Opera, IV, p.429, ff., first letter tot Dr.Bentley" "Sir; When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a Deity; and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose. But if I have done the public any service this way, it is due to nothing but industry and patient thought...*

   The same power, whether natural or supernatural, which placed the sun in the centre of the six primary planets, placed Saturn in the centre of the orbs of his five secondary planets; and Jupiter in the centre of his four secondary planets; and the earth in the centre of the moon's orb; and therefore, had this cause been a blind one without contrivance or design, the sun would have been a body of the same kind with Saturn, Jupiter, and the earth; that is without light or head. Why there is one body in our system qualified to give light and heat to all the rest, I know no reason, but because the author of the system thought it convenient."

4. *- Faith, Science and the Future. Essays edited by Paul Albrecht (Philadelphia, Fortran Press, 1979). Faith and Science in an Unjust World. Report of the World Council of Churches' Conference on Faith, Science and the Future. Part I, ed. R. Shinn; part II, ed. P.Albrecht, (Geneva, World Council of Churches, 1980).*

5. *- On the Eating Habits of Science. A response by Rubem Alves, in Faith and Science in an Unjust World, Vol.I. Plenary Presentations, p.41-43.*

6. *- Ludwing Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Blackwell, 1953), Part II, XI, p.193-195.*

7. *- Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Le Visible et l'Invisible, suivi de notes de*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

travail par Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Texte etabli par Claude Lefort, accompagne d'un avertissement et d'une postface (Paris, Gallimard, 1964), p.262.

8.- J. Van der Veken, 'De spanning tussen de geesteshouding van de gelovige en die van de wetenschapsbeoefenaar' in Betrekkingen tussen geloof en die van de wetenschap. Twee verkenningen. ('s Hertogenbosch Radbordstichting Wetenschappelijk onderwijsfonds, 1981),p. 13-14.

In short: Kant's philosophy must be understood as an attempt to explain why a structured system derived from the mind can account for observational relations. With the discovery of a plurality of categoreal system the situation changed completely. The basis for the description of physical reality can no longer be situated in the a priori structure of the human mind. Again, after Kant, the answer to the question which system is suitable for the description of physical reality must ultimately be left to empirical data. Cfr H.Reichenbach, 'Philosophical significance of Relativity' in Albert Einstein, 'Philosopher. Scientist. Ed. P. Schilpp (New York, Tudor, 1951), p.302.

9. *Cfr a status quaestionis in George Gale, The Antrophic Principle, in Scientific American, Dec. 1981, p. 114-122.*

10. *Born in Moskow 1917, emigrated to Belgium in 1921, professor at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Nobelprize Chemistry 1977. See also 'La thermodynamique de la vie', La Recherche, June 1972.*

11. *Jacques Monod, Le hasard et la necessite. Essai sur la philosophie de la biologie moderne. (Paris, Seuil 1970).*

12. *Werner Heisenberg, Science and Religion' (1927) in Physics and Beyond. Encounters and Conversations, tr. Arnold J. Pomerans (New York, Evanston, London, Harper & Row), p.89.*

13.



CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

V

THE CONCEPT OF SWADESHI - A GANDHIAN PERSPECTIVE

S.Radha

Swadeshi is an important vow in Gandhian Philosophy; it is a compound Sanskrit word, which etymologically means one's own country. It is a comprehensive vow, in the sense that it has got its application in religion, politics, economics, education and in almost all the departments of human life and experience. Further it is a virtue which is inherent in our very nature. It is the law of our being. It should also be one's rule of life.

According to Gandhi, swadeshi as a vow meant attachment to one's own country to the exclusive of all others. But it is not a blind attachment to one's country and its institutions. As a definition of this vow, Gandhi says, " Swadeshi is that spirit within us which restricts us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the more remote".[1] In other words, " Swadeshi is that spirit which dictates man to serve his next - door neighbour to the exclusion of any other".[2] It is the duty to one's immediate neighbour.

Thus whatever we do should be for the well - being of our next-door neighbour. This reminds us of the Gita Ideal of Svadharma which is expressed in the following words: It is better to die performing one's own duty or Svadharma. Paradharma or another's duty is fraught with danger. To Gandhi, swadeshi is nothing but Svadharma applied to one's immediate environment.[3]

To elucidate the significance of swadeshi Gandhi cites the following example. "In your village you are bound to support your village barber to the exclusion of the finished barber who may come to you from Madras. If you find it necessary that your village barber should reach the attainments of the barber from Madras, you may train him for that. Send him to Madras by all means, if you wish, in order that he may learn his calling. Until you do that you are not justified in going to another barber. This is swadeshi."[4]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is bounden duty to serve others, even at the expense of our own well being. It may involve not only self - denial but also self - suffering. If one follows the vow of swadeshi in the right spirit, then he will be ready to dedicate himself fully to the service of his immediate neighbours. He will have no trace of selfishness in him. Gandhi writes, " In swadeshi, there is no room for selfishness, or if there is selfishness in it, it is of the highest type, which is not different from the highest altruism. Swadeshi in its purest form is the acme of Universal Service".[5]

Thus swadeshi has a spiritual basis. Service is the means by which we can realise God. A genuine votary of swadeshi strives to identify himself with the whole of creation. This is possible only through selfless service. And selfless service, according to Gandhi leads to self-realization or God-realization. Thus swadeshi in its ultimate spiritual sense contributes to God-realization.

According to Gandhi, the swadeshi doctrine is a religious discipline. Swadeshi in the religious field stands for faithfulness and loyalty to one's own religion. "Swadeshi, as defined here, is religious discipline to be undergone in utter disregard of the physical discomfort it may cause to individual".[6] This swadeshi spirits restricts us to the ancestral relation in which we are born and brought up. But this does not mean a blind faith in the family religion. We must have enough freedom to examine critically the percepts and practice of our own religion so as to purge it of its defects and deficiencies. For this purpose it would be desirable to study the other great religions of the world. Gandhi does not favour religious conversion. His advice is to reform one's own religion. "By reason of the swadeshi spirit, a Hindu refuses to change his religion not necessarily because he considers it to be the best, but because he knows that he can complement it by introducing reforms."[7] It demands a study of other world religions because only by this one will be able to understand one's own religion better and find out its defects. Further religion understood in the spirit of swadeshi, is also the basis of Love.

In the field of politics, swadeshi requires one to make use of the indigenous institutions, and to curve them of their proven defects.[8] In India this means improving the villages through reforms. The villages should be made self - sufficient. Therein lies the true spirit of swadeshi. For remedying the defects, he wanted to use as far as possible the old methods. Most of his non-violent weapons, namely, non-cooperation, civil disobedience, fasting etc. are nothing but modernized forms of ancient Indian modes of political and social protest.

In the economic field swadeshi stands for the use of things that are produced by our immediate neighbours. He stood for the self-sufficiency of our country and even of the villages. To quote, "The broad definition of swadeshi is the use of all home-made articles to the exclusion of foreign things, in so far as such use is necessary for the protection of home industries, more specially those industries without which India

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

will become pauperized".[9] Referring to India's external trade he said, "if not an article of commerce had been brought from outside India, she should be today a land flowing with milk and honey ..... she can live for herself only if she produces and is helped to produce everything for her requirement within her own borders".[10] At the same time he was of the opinion that "To reject foreign manufactures merely because they are foreign, and to go on wasting national time and money in the promotion in one's country of manufactures for which it is not suited would be ..... a negation of swadeshi spirit".[11] He was not against international trade but he holds the view that imports should be limited to things which are necessary for our growth and sustenance.

Gandhi considers the use of khadi as a necessary corollary of the principle of swadeshi. According to him, khadi is the symbol of decentralized economy. Further, popularisation of khadi is "the first indispensable step towards the discharge of swadeshi dharma towards society."[12] A true follower of the ideal of swadeshi, "will carefully study his environment and try to help his neighbours wherever possible, by giving preference to local manufactures, even if they are of an inferior grade or dearer in price than things manufactured elsewhere. He will try to remedy their defects, but will not because of their defects give them up in favour of foreign manufactures."[13] He observed in 1947, "Immediately after my return to India in 1915 I discovered that the centre of swadeshi lay in Khadi. If khadi goes, I contended even then, there is no swadeshi ..... the manufactures in Indian mills do not constitute swadeshi. To that belief I cling even today".[14] Swadeshi spirit implies a preference of local manufactures and the boycott of all foreign things.

It has often been pointed out that India cannot adopt swadeshi in the economic life. Answering this objection Gandhi said that, "those who advance this objection do not look upon swadeshi as a rule of life. With them it is a mere patriotic effort - not to be made if it involved any self - denial ..... A true swadeshi will learn to do without hundreds of things which today he considers necessary."[15]

Gandhi was convinced that the deep poverty of India was mainly due to the departure from this swadeshi spirit. By this Gandhi did not mean that one should waste one's time and energy on improving the tools of the country. He always recommended for the use of the services of a workman who is one's neighbour and help him to acquire the needed training rather than importing a more competent from outside. This in brief is the spirit of swadeshi.

In the sphere of education swadeshi consists in our being true to our national culture and tradition. Gandhi insisted that education must always be imparted through the mother tongue and never through a foreign medium like English. " The foreign medium ", says Gandhi, has caused brain fag, put an undue strain upon the nerves of our children,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

made them crammers and imitators, unfitted them for original work and thought and disable them for filtering their learning to the family or the masses. The foreign medium has made our children practically foreigners in their own land. It is the greatest tragedy of the existing system. The foreign medium has prevented the growth of our vernacular."[16]

More significant than this problem of languages is the problem of learning at least one handicraft. Gandhi wrote, "It would begin the child's education by teaching it a useful handicraft and enabling it to product from the moment it begins its training. Thus every school can be made self-supporting, the condition being that the state takes over the manufactures of these schools."[17] What he points to is the introduction of spinning wheel and the universalising of khadi.

This is the spirit in which we have to observe the ideal of swadeshi in all the different fields of our activities. But many called it a cult of exclusiveness. Answering this objection Gandhi said, "Under this plan of life, in seeming to serve India to the exclusion of every other country, I do not harm any other country. My patriotism is both exclusive and inclusive. It is exclusive in the sense that, in all humility, I confine my attention to the land of my birth, but it is inclusive in the sense that my service is not of a competitive or antagonistic nature."[18] Further, he had never considered the exclusion of everything foreign as a part of swadeshi. He had gone to the extends of saying that swadeshi does not mean the mere exclusion of others. "In my opinion, therefore, swadeshi which excludes the use of everything foreign, no matter how beneficial it may be, and irrespective of the fact that it impoverishes nobody, is a narrow interpretation of swadeshi."[19]

To a true swadeshist, it is possible to serve his neighbour and the whole world at the same time. To quote, "The votery of swadeshi will as a first duty, dedicate himself to the service of his immediate neighbours. This involves exclusion or even sacrifice of the interests of the rest, but the exclusion or the sacrifice would be only in appearance. Pure service of our neighbours can never ..... result in disservice to those who are far away, but rather the contrary."[20] "I believe", says Gandhi, "in the truth implicitly that a man serve his neighbours and humanity at the same time, the condition being that the service of the neighbours is in no way selfish or exclusive, i.e. does not in any way involve the exploitation of any other human being. The neighbours would then understand the spirit in which such service is given. They would also know that they would be expected to give their service to their neighbours ..... the condition was ..... that the neighbours, thus served had, in his turn, to serve his own neighbours. In this sense swadeshi was never exclusive. It recognised the scientific limitation of human capacity for service."[21] In other words, "a man who allows himself to be lured by 'the distant scene and runs to the ends of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the earth for service, is not only foiled in his ambition but also fails in his duty towards his neighbour."[22]

Thus, for Gandhi, swadeshi is the only doctrine to serve one's neighbour in a selfless way. At the same time, it is the only law consistent with humility and love. It were better to concentrate first on serving the family and consider it as if we are serving the whole of humanity. This is the beauty of swadeshi. For "a true votary of swadeshi will never harbour ill-will towards the foreigner, he will not be actuated by antagonism towards anybody on earth. Swadeshism is not a cult of hatred. It is a doctrine of selfless service that has its root in the purest ahimsa, i.e. Love."[23]

REFERENCE:

1. C. F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas, p.120
2. Harijan, 23 November, 1947, p.79
3. M. K. Gandhi, From Yeravda Mandir, p.40
4. C. F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas, p.107
5. From Yeravda Mandir, p.41
6. Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, p.343
7. Ibid., p.337
8. Ibid., p.339
9. Young India, 17 June, 1926, p.218
10. Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, p.278
11. From Yeravda Mandir, p.66
12. Young India, 18 June, 1931
13. From Yeravda Mandir, p.43
14. Harijan, 29 June, 1947, p.211
15. Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, pp.336 - 44
16. Young India, 1 September, 1921, p.277
17. Harijan, 31 July, 1937, p.197
18. Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, p.344
19. Young India, 17 June, 1926, p.218
20. From Yeravda Mandir, p.62
21. Harijan, 23 March, 1947, p.79
22. From Yeravda Mandir, p.62
23. Ibid., p.66

By 'neighbour' Gandhi understands one who is the nearest and immediate i.e. one's own family. A man is in duty bound to serve his family first, as the family has a claim on his service. ..... his selfless service will induce them to serve others ..... as they themselves are served. ..... Thus a man renders his selfless service to the family, the family to the community, the community to the district, the district to the province, the province to the nation, and the nation to the world - Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi - The last Phase, Vol.1, Book 2. p.189

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VI

GORGIAS

Albert E. Avey

The Gorgias is concerned with the contrast of Rhetoric and Philosophy. Ask what rhetoric is trying to do and it becomes evident that it is playing upon the surface of experience or it ceases to be itself and becomes something more serious. Playing thus merely upon the surface rhetoric does not achieve the real will of men, it caters only to their short- run impulses. And these impulses do not bring real satisfaction; they bring a semblance of happiness but not happiness in its true essence. If it aimed at the real good it would seek justice, which includes a request for proper punishment where one is really guilty. But who ever uses rhetoric as such an instrument? It aims at influence, at partial success; but this again it interprets superficially. What appears as power at the moment often proves to be weakness in the long run. Men must face finally a judgement upon their value, which is based upon ultimate realities not on mere appearances.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

Callicles Socrates Polus Gorgias Chaerephon

Scene — The house of Callicles.

Callicles — The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.

Socrates — Are we late for a feast?

Cal. — Yes, and a delightful feast, for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to us many fine things: but he is staying with me and shall exhibit for you also.

Chaer. — In what art is Gorgias skilled?

Pol. — He is one of the most proficient in the noblest art.

Soc. — But you praised the art without saying what it is.

Gor. — Rhetoric, Socrates, and the teaching of rhetoric, which is the art of discourse.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Soc. — What sort of discourse? Medicine and gymnastics are concerned with discourse. Are they also rhetoric?

Gor. — No, they are concerned with doing, not with words.

Soc. — But arithmetic is concerned with words, yet I do not think you would call it rhetoric, so I would ask 'words about what?'

Gor. — About the greatest and best of human things.

Soc. — That again is ambiguous. What is the greatest good of man?

Gor. — It is that which gives freedom for themselves and the power to rule over others.

Soc. — And what do you consider this to be?

Gor. — The word which persuades judges in the court, senators in the council or citizens in the assembly. It is the art of persuasion, the chief and of rhetoric.

Soc.— Then, what is this power of persuasion, persuasion about what? The painter persuades with his painting and the Mathematician with his arithmetic. What and with what do you persuade?

Gor. — It is the art of persuasion in the courts and is about things just and unjust.

Soc. — Now, I would ask if learning and believing are the same? You say not and you are quite right: then can there be false as well as true belief? You agree that there can? Then can there be true and false knowledge? This I see you reject. Then belief and knowledge differ and are two sorts of persuasion.

Gor. — By all means.

Soc. — And do I understand that rhetoric is only the creator of belief but does not instruct the courts of law about the just and unjust?

Gor. — Certainly.

Soc. — In sickness will not the physician be called to prescribe medicine? Now, as a teacher of rhetoricians, how would you answer a prospective pupil who might ask: "what will you teach us to advise the state: - about the just and unjust or about building ships or prescribing medicine?"

Gor. — I would answer that they are also advisers. The docks and walls of Athens and the plan of the harbor were not done at the suggestion of the builders but in accordance with the counsels of the orators, Themistocles and Pericles.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Soc. — Such is the tradition and when I look at rhetoric in this way it seems amarvel of greatness.

Gor. — A marvel, indeed, and it holds in its way all the Inferior arts. I have been able to persuade people to undergo operations when the physicians could not do as much. A rhetorician, having the greater persuasive power over the multitude could, If he wished, be elected to any office over another no matter how capable of holding office that other might be. Of course he should not abuse this power merely because he has it. But if a pupil makes bad use of the knowledge he gets then he and not the teacher, is to be blamed.

Soc. — Did you not say that you can make any man who will learn of you a rheto-rician?

Gor. — I did.

Soc. — And that you have greater powers of persuasion even than the physician in matters of health?

Gor. — Yes, With the multitude that is.

Soc. — In other words, with the ignorant. Then he who is ignorant has more persuasive power than he who has knowledge? Therefore the rhetorician need not know the truth about things, but has only to persuade the ignorant that he knows more than the wise? Now I want to ask whether he is or is not as ignorant of that which is just and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, as he in the art of medicine: or must the pupil come to you knowing these arts beforehand. Will you be able to teach him anything unless he knows these?

Gor. — I suppose if he does not know these things he will have to learn them from me.

Soc. — Then the rhetorician must learn the matters of justice and injustice, whether before or after coming to you: and in the same way that he who learns medicine must be a physician, so he who learns justice must be just. Then a rhetorician must be a just man and never be willing to do an injustice.

Gor. — Clearly, he must not.

Soc. — Yet you said that when a rhetorician makes an unjust use of his knowledge, he, and not his teacher, is to be blamed. Are these statements not inconsistent? By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a deal of discussion before we get to the truth of this.

Polus. — And do you believe all you are saying about rhetoric? The truth is that there is a great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Soc. — I am willing to receive correction if you are brief.

Pol. — What? May I not use as many words as I please?

Soc. — Yes, but if you make a long oration, refusing to answer my questions, I do not have to listen. If you wish to continue our discussion by asking and answering questions then refute and be refuted. I suppose you would claim to know what Gorgias knows? You say you do? Then which will you do, ask or answer?

Pol. — I will ask you what rhetoric is.

Soc. — You mean as an art? To tell the truth I do not consider it as an art at all, but as a sort of experience in producing delight and gratification.

Pol. — And is this not a fine thing, being a sort of experience and to be able to gratify?

Soc. — So is cookery a similar experience. But rhetoric and cookery are only parts of the same profession, which is the profession of flattery. However, fearing to seem discourteous I hesitate to continue.

Gor. — Parts of what, Socrates? Never mind me.

Soc. — In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind. This habit I sum up as flattery with rhetoric as an ignoble counterpart of a phase of Politics. If, as we agreed before, we assume the existence of souls and bodies, then they may or may not be in good health regardless of appearances. Now if children or Ignorant men had to decide between the cook and the physician they would choose the cook because his cooking gives them pleasure and pleasure is a bait to the unwary who thinks that he knows what is good. Thus rhetoric is to the soul what cookery is to the body, making the less seem good, having no regard for man's highest interests.

Pol. — But that, Socrates, is absurd.

Soc. — Do men take medicine for the sake of medicine or for the health that they hope for? Then in the same way do not men generally do things because of the good they hope to attain, or refuse to do them if convinced that they are not for their good?

Pol. — Certainly.

Soc. — He who makes a bad use of his power, even though at the time he seems successful in the doing of an evil deed,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is not to be envied for his power, but pitied for his ignorance in doing evil. And this is true also of a ruler who has power but rules unjustly. He is more wretched than the man who is unjustly put to death.

Pol. — But does not the ruler have power and, having power, is he not happy? I can understand how the rash who are discovered and punished find their acts evil but if their deeds go unpunished They may still be happy and not wretched. And a tyrant like Archelaus, having gained control by killing others, is happy.

Soc. — Though the multitude disagrees, I affirm that he is more miserable than those he kills or punishes. Is it not more disgraceful to do injustice then to suffer it?

Pol. — Certainly.

Soc. — But there is no beauty in anything that is not pleasing or useful and this is as true of knowledge as of things: and disgrace may also be measured by the standard of pain and evil. It is more disgraceful to do wrong and therefore the disgraceful is the greater evil.

Pol. — That is the conclusion.

Soc. — Now there is another matter. Does punishment mean being justly corrected for wrong doing?

Pol. — Certainly.

Soc. — And all things are honorable when they are just so he who punishes justlyis just and he who suffers retribution justly, suffers justly. And what is just is honorable? And, if honorable then good. And the good is the benefit of the soul. Then is the justly punished not more fortunate than if he had not suffered?

Pol. — I do not understand you.

Soc. — Are not injustice and evil, which are of the soul, more disgraceful than disease or poverty which are of the body? And if more disgraceful are they not also more painful? Then are they not finally the greatest evils?

Pol. — Very true.

Soc. — Now for sickness of the body we go to the physician and are happier when healed than when sick. So, too, he who has taken his punishment justly is happier than he who goes unpunished.

Pol. — Clearly.

Soc. — Then happiest of all is he who is just, happy in the second degree is he who is delivered from injustice by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

punishment and the most deluded and unhappy is he who lives on enjoying the fruit of his crimes for, like a person afflicted with disease, he will not be cured because he fears the pain of being burned or cut. Thus injustice, not removed, becomes the cancer of the soul.

Pol. — To that there can be but one answer.

Soc. — Then the only excuse of rhetoric would be to accuse, instead of to excuse, anyone——and especially himself—who may be doing wrong. And another use of rhetoric might be to prevent an enemy from being punished.

Cal. — Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest or in just? For if in earnest everything appears upside down.

Soc. — I am only repeating the words of philosophy, she it is whom you have to refute: I am only her mouthpiece.

Cal. — O Socrates, you seem to be running riot in the argument: and now you have fallen into the same trap of self-contradiction into which you first led Polus and Gorgias. You also confused them by changing from the ideas of what is naturally good to what is customarily accepted. And I am sure that if there were a man strong enough he would rise and break all our customs and laws which are against nature, for nature herself intimates that it is just for the powerful to have more than the weak. This I take to then be the meaning of Pindar when he says, "Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals". A little philosophy is not a bad thing in youth but the study should not be continued into later life for the philosopher is as ridiculous in affairs of state as politicians are in the arena of philosophy. Then, my good friend, take my advice and refute no more. Cease emulating these splitters of words and emulate only the men of substance and honor, who are well- to- do.

Soc. — If you and I ever agree in any subject I'm sure it would have to be true, for a man who would make a complete trial of good or evil ought to have three qualities which are all possessed by you, knowledge, good will, and out-spokenness. Your open disagreement has shown this and you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And, therefore, when you and I are agreed the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. To me there is nothing nobler than to know what a man ought to be, both in youth and in matureyears. Be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally but from ignorance. Then do not desist from advising me but explain further.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Now, do you mean that the stronger should take the property of the inferior by force, that the better should rule the worse and the noble have more than the mean?

Cal. — Yes, and I still aver it,

Soc. — But what do you mean by the superior? Are they also the stronger and better? And are the laws of the many those of the superior and therefore by nature, good? To these you assent and yet you and the rest here have recently agreed that it is more disgraceful to do than to suffer injustice; so you seem to be wrong in your assertion when, accusing me, you said that nature and custom are opposed and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument was about nature and to nature when it was about custom.

Cal. — Have I not told you that by 'superior' I mean the better or, if you insist, the wiser?

Soc. — Then, according to you, one wise man - being superior - ought to rule over ten thousand fools?[1]

Cal. — How you go on always talking in the same way about the same things. Superiors are wise politicians who understand the administration of the state; not only wise but valiant and able to carry out their designs; not men who faint from want of soul.

Soc. — You accuse me of always saying the same things, but I reproach you for never saying the same about the same thing. Now I wish you would tell me once and for all in what way these superiors are better. When a man is ruler does he also rule himself?

Cal. — What do you mean "rule himself"?

Soc. — A simple thing enough, that a man be temperate and master of himself and ruler of his own pleasures and passions.

Cal. — What innocence! You mean those fools, the temperate? I assert that a man who would truly live ought to let his desires increase to the utmost and should have courage and intelligence enough to satisfy all his longings. To live without pleasure or passion is to be dead.

Soc. — But surely life according to your view must be an awful thing where men are always wanting and never satisfied.

Cal. — No, rather the pleasure is the influx derived from the constant fulfilling of desire.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Soc. — Yet if the desire is always there it would be like a constant itch. The scratching is pleasant for a time, but could it be a permanently happy condition? But leaving that, would you say that since you have affirmed that pleasure and good are the same would you also say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or pleasure and courage?

Cal. — Neither knowledge nor courage is the same as pleasure.

Soc. — Now you have said that pleasure and good are the same but deny that this is true of courage and knowledge.

Cal. — What is the inference?

Soc. — You just said that the courageous and wise are considered the good. Did you ever see a foolish person rejoice? Or a sensible person rejoice? Which rejoiced most? Or in battle which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy; the courageous or the coward?

Cal. — In each case both rejoiced equally.

Soc. — Then if, as you said before, the good and the pleasant are the same, and if, as you now say, the foolish and cowardly— or the evil— feel as much joy as the brave and wise and good, Then must it not follow that the good and the pleasant are the same?

Cal. — But may I not say that some pleasures are beneficial and good while some are harmful and evil?

Soc. — Yes the beneficial is good and has principles of action and reason, whereas the harmful or evil is the result of carelessness and has no thought of the final result. And there are also the pleasures which delight but have no concern for the soul's higher interest. Then the goodman, like the good artist is a lover of order. From order and law spring moderation and justice and the true orator will seek to implant these virtues and remove injustice?

Cal. — I agree.

Soc. — Then I think that you agree, also, that the physician will not permit a sick man to eat without restraint. Neither should a sick or evil soul be permitted to go uncontrolled, but ought to be prevented from doing what will be of harm to it. Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance, or the absence of control? Which do you prefer?

Cal. — I have been agreeing just to let you go on, but now I tell you that I do not heed a word of what you are saying. Let someone else answer.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Soc. — But who else is willing? I want to finish the argument.

Gor. — Not only I, but the rest of the company, would also like to hear what more you have to say.

Soc. — Listen then and I will recapitulate: — The pleasant is not the same as the good and is to be sought only for sake of the good; and good is the effect of order and truth and art. The temperate soul is the good soul; just in relation to men and holy in relation to the gods. He is, therefore, the happy man. The intemperate, or immoderate, is the reverse of this and unhappy.

And now, Gallicles, let us see whether you were right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or save them in time of danger; and that I am in the power of another who may banish or even kill me— which you say is the height of disgrace. Here again I repeat that the greatest evil is to do injustice; but that not to be punished for doing an injustice is, if possible, even worse. Then how do we protect ourselves from these greatest of evils? Must a man not provide himself with the power to do so? And is not that power within the ruler or even tyrant? And to have it a man must be an equal or companion of the tyrant and, in imitating him, be drawn into acts of injustice; contriving to do all possible wrong and go unpunished. And will this not be the greatest evil to him?

Cal. — But the bad tyrant will very likely kill him who does not imitate him.

Soc. — I am not unaware of this but there are times when death may be a good rather than an evil. O my friend I want you to see that the noble and good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved: May not he who is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time, leaving all that with God and considering in what way he can best spend his appointed term? There are two processes of training both the body and soul; the one looking to pleasure and the other to the highest good. Thus, in teaching our citizens we must look to their good and show that we can be entrusted to improve them.

Cal. — Certainly.

Soc. — If that is the aim then what of our earlier leaders: Pericles, Cimon, Miltiadeas and Themistocles? Were the Athenians made better or worse by them? Pericles, the illustrious, was accepted happily by the Athenians as a leader but he was the first to give them pay, making

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

them idle and cowardly, and encouraging them in the love of money. For this they finally convicted him of theft and almost put him to death. Was this not making gentle people savage and doing them harm instead of good? Much the same happened to these others of whom I spoke. Then were they good rulers? Greater than the present rulers, yes, but were they any better?

Cal. — No, I suppose not.

Soc. — No, they were merely more capable of building walls, providing ships and all that but not in restraining and making good citizens. But neither the statesman nor the sophist has any right to accuse their followers of wronging them if, claiming to teach them, they have not taught them the better way. Is this not true?

Cal. — But why expose them? Do you not know—-

Soc. — Don't go on. Yes, I must be a fool, indeed, if I do not know that in Athens anything can happen to a man and I shall not be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?

Cal. — By all means.

Soc. — I think I am the only Athenian living who practices the true art of politics, for I speak not in order to gain favour, or to give what is pleasant, but to say what is best for the good of the people. This they will not want in the court of justice; and when, in reply to their accusations that I corrupt and perplex the minds of young men and speak bitter words against old men, I say that I am speaking for the sake of justice, they will not listen. Therefore there is no saying what will happen to me.

Cal. — And do you think that thus you are in a good position, Socrates?

Soc. — If I Had done wrong and without the defense of truth I would indeed be grieved but if I died lacking only the defense of flattery I would not repine, for no man who is not an utter fool is more afraid of death than of doing wrong; for to go to the world below having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. Shall I go on with this?

Cal. — Go on, and then we shall have done.

Soc. — Death is the separation of the soul and body; when the true natureof an evil soul is laid open and the injustices, perjuries and crookedness are disclosed he is sent ignominiously to undergo the punishment he deserves.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The judge, being just and impartial, looks not at the wealth and power that a man had on earth but at the good or evil of the man's life. Now I am persuaded of the truth of this Callicles, and renouncing the honors at which the world aims I desire only to know the truth and to live as well as I can and, I die to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for you exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat which is the combat of life and is greater then any other.

Follow me, then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death. And never mind if someone despises you as a fool, and insults you if he has a mind to do so; let him strike you, by Zeus, and be of good cheer, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true man.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VII

LAUNCHING THE SEMINARS FOR THE ENDOWMENT: IMAGES FROM THE NIGERIAN PRESS, 1985 - 1997

Afolabi, Anthony Bamidele

INTRODUTION

Nigeria, like most of the other African countries, is facing a major crisis of survival social services and infrastructure are crumbling and the human condition, the quality of life, is deteriorating. The country is on the verge of paralysis. The economy has collapsed under the burden of heavy financial indebtedness to major Capitalist Societies. And the 1985 International Monetary Fund inspired monetary policies, for correcting fiscal deformities, have failed to revitalize hopes. Political instability, together with the increasingly awesome signals of the non-sustainability of current patterns of resources use, as well as abuse of the environment, elevates the level of individual and collective despondency. The possibilities of chaos and violence looms larger. The challenge of this continuing and in some respect growing problems of human misery and abuse may be political as well as scientific. But it is to the political challenge we turn our searchlight, for the latter itself is often predetermined by the agenda of the former, the political.

Attention is on the political elites; the ones who possess the skills and abilities to manipulate people and to channel their concerns and interests into concrete productive tasks. Research, to be candid, has never failed to focus the elites (Cohen 1976, 1981; Imoagene 1976, Osoba 1978; Lloyd 1966). Every aspect of their lives, private and public, have undergone some scrutiny. Their successes and failures have become issues of public and private debates, most of them originating within or on the fringes of the marxist tradition. Crucial real-world questions of production, consumption and distribution are addressed. Not only is fresh and exciting proposition raised at a variety of levels and on a host of different topics, but the convergences of style and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

perspective are sufficiently striking to challenge the elite themselves to look inward and perhaps seek to reeducate themselves.

The style and means of this reeducation is less focused in literature (Dale 1982). The assumption that education is civil right, an instrument of enlightenment, and technical-efficient method of social transformation simply diverts attention away from its manipulation by the elite. The tendency is to view the elite as using their education for social and status mobility, and not as a means of (re) legitimating their authority and control over human and non human resources. Ignoring this political value of the education therefore, there seems to be nothing spectacular in the elite going back to school, in the construction of new elite schools, or in the ploy of staging seminars, endowments and launching in which the public and private officials meet to discuss issues of local, national and international concerns. Yet, the cost of this re-education is staggering and prohibitive.[1] The poor can hardly afford a seminar fee of N20,000 N50,000 and a lodging at a five-star hotel.[2] Seminars, launchings, or endowments are celebrations of success. The symbols are particularizing metaphors for understanding and appreciating the elite involvement in development process. They are associative process in cultural production; one in which actors recurrently provide identity for others and themselves by reading within and across class logic and hierarchies. Each represents a class of action, but nevertheless form a part-whole relations, needed to adequatly understand the contents of these Nigerian "Scenes" the purposes they serve, and the manner of their operations.

Our intent is to see the seminar, the endowment and the launching as dramatistic; as interplay of scenes, acts, agent, agencies, and purposes focusing attention on "the power of language-based imaginations to shape social scenes, produce acts, exalt or debase agents, identify and entitle agencies, and envision and pursue purpose." (Colby, et al, 1981: 434). The constitutive power of language, bound up in their figurative tools, relating symbolism to class logic or cognitive hierarchies, enables us to appreciate the drama, quite often recorded by the press for public digest. The three concepts, in a sense, codify information about the public order. By each and through each of them, individuals and collectives, collect, organize, and disseminate facts and knowledge critical to the appreciation of a certain condition of life. The participants can, and are able to size up the development situations, name their structure and outstanding features, and cultivate appropriate attitudinal dispositions. The contents of experience may vary from time to time. This does not constrain us to personal and historical subjectivism. Rather there is some overlap, most noticeable in the nature of the mind of the participants themselves to provide us with levels of generalizations "by which situations greatly different in their particularities may be felt to belong in the same class (to have a common substance or essence)"(Burke 1967:2).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The common element to the three concepts is social decay; the collapse of social infrastructure. Endowments seek to raise the money for the repairs, While the launching is designed to extend the infrastructures, but there are unofficial consequences. The launchings have been reduced to the advertisement of biographies and autobiographies of the elite, while endowment is a competition on wealth, on the financial means of the elite. The seminars, contrastively, act as fora for the elite to mix and rationalize their failures at development process: they are attempts to come to grips with a social reality that is systematically different from their own, and to explain its specific logic and momentum. This is a conceptual and pedagogic task. It is the more so because the fundamental questions about developments are not of difference only but of relationships past and present within the country. It is in this task, as observer of the elites reeducation process, We encounter our problematic.

For identifying what it is that effectively distinguishes the educational agenda is no easy matter given the variety of substantive concerns and cross-cutting intellectual influences that have played a role in its emergence. One thing, however, is obviously and importantly new: the interest shown at all levels, and in relation to the whole gamut of substantive problems, in the investigation of the failure of the development process. This interest has necessitated the establishments of the National Institute of Strategic and Policy Studies, the War College, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, and the overtly and covertly sponsored seminars, speeches are made and theories are propounded. Donations are raised for improved services. All the efforts are geared towards revitalizing a decaying system, suffering from lack of technological competencies corruption and greed of its leadership, and the opportunistic tendencies, and crass mismanagement of even its members.

THE EDUCATIONAL AGENDA

Indeed, at no other time since independence in 1960 had Nigerians been involved in the cross-cutting of public meetings, in the trappings of debates and power, and in such other illusions of involvement in power structure and decision makings, as in the period of study. The Babangida regime started in 1985 on a note of being receptive to ideas. It asked Nigerians to debate the merits and demerits of the I.M.F. monetary policies. It then took its decision to pursue the I.M.F. policies in order to pay its huge external debts. It continued to ensure that Nigerians were involved in debating all features of governmental practices and policies. The style was for each government agencies and agents to advertize their seminars, aimed at improving productivity, in the mass media. But, occasionally, private individuals and collectives outside the government were provided the financial means to arrange for the debates and to publish them (or their own articles):

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

So also is the existence of all kinds of shadowy, government-funded associations which make it their business to speak authoritatively for the government, attack decent citizens in the most uncouth language, set individual against individuals, community, against community, religion against religion, soldier against civilian, moslem against christian, and government against citizen. In the process, they have almost destroyed the sense of community without which this country can move forward (Obasanjo 1992:28)

The debates had not corrected the decay. Rather they were part of the decay. Many people did prefer to be silent, not because they had nothing to say, or were afraid to say it, but because it seemed the exercise was futile: The government usually had made up its mind before sponsoring the debates. Nevertheless, since education implies change, and some sort of change is the key to effective action, the new trend still appears to be significantly more attuned than the old to the urgent need to fashion new ideas and be sensitive to public opinions.

Such opinions would not in certain circumstances and time have been necessary. In the 1960s and the 1970s there was, for instance, no need for public debates on decaying systems, It was a time of surplus, a period of economic boom when, in spite of wastage and fraudulent practices, the poor had sufficient crumbs to fill their stomach and divert attention away from elite mismanagement of resources. The heavy atmosphere of intellectual stagnation and self-imposed insulation from theoretical issues on the economy could be related to an assumption that people do not care, or are intellectually docile, or are loyal, when they are provided sufficient means for self survival and growth. The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s seems to, however, seriously challenge this assumption. For even if some elites remain impassive or intellectually indolent, some elites are not. These latter groups have started to write and launch their own biographies and autobiographies as critics of social order (Arogbofa 1992; Awofeso 1990; Clarke 1987, Elaigwu 1986). The reason is that to all and sundry, it has become clear that the elites are responsible for the suffering and miseries of the people. They need some explanations to make.

The conundrum in which the politico-economic elites have found themselves in the 80s have thus prompted two strategies. The first is to open-up debate on governmental issues and policies in order to defend themselves against various accusations of irresponsibilities and, in order to claim approval of legitimacy for their new decisions. The logic is simple: when all categories of people participate in the debates, the elite could say they have been empowered by the conclusions reached by the participants to forge new interest, alliances, and mechanisms of appropriation and exploitation. Alternatively, the second strategy is to adopt a compensatory attitude which would promote the re-channeling of the appropriated gains and raise the ethics of privilege and privation rather than of duties or obligations. Of course, the antithesis of privilege

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and privation are consequences of the performance of duty. They manifest as official donations or donations by the officials. The money embezzled, ill gotten, as state officials are donated for endowments. There is some sort of privation through denial or loss of some private gains, perhaps as atonement for "sins" committed against the people or as desire to nurture a more favourably disposition that would ensure collective prosperity. Only the continuity of the economic problems makes a lie of these intents.

And so the debates have remained purely at the level of rhetoric. Conclusions reached may suggest possibility of a planned economy, But such an economy remains a dream. The public and the elite are in a drama in which the media's focus on the debates help to sharpen attention to the educational agenda of the elite, to the contestation of ideas, and to the nature of the participants. The public, who could hardly afford the cost of participation at seminars, symposia and conferences can read the edited versions of the papers delivered, in the media. They, public, become the audience to the actors drama; they could judge and criticize, and they could make further comments on the ideas or proposals. Sometimes too the unedited versions are published so that "nothing important is lost". Where the papers are not available, there are, of course, photographs of the meet. These photographs provide a glimpse into the nature of elite interactions, comportments and physical endowments, The coverage embraces even more: the news on latecomers, on absentees, on sitting arrangements and tea-break relations. The broad smiles on participants would seem to convey strong solidarity among the elite but it could also be indicative of the trivial, non serious ways, issues are treated.

Notably present at these seminars are the clergy; though, many of them do not deliver papers. But the church itself has been in some kind of moral dilemma. The relations to the drama seem to be accurately summarized by Burke as follows:

> The church, ever acquiescent to the advantages of the hour despite its underlying philosophy of the Immutable, has of course stressed the aspects of its doctrine which seem to corrobate the fabulous acquisition and retention of private gain. Hence, it has largely been the naturalists, the scientific skeptics, who have contributed to the distrust of the commercial ethic. But it must be recalled that the entire commercial exaltation was developed in opposition to the church's deepest teachings. If the Communists cared to do so, they could find many astonishing parallels between their own doctrines, which come at the end of the commercial upswing, and the church doctrines, which began to pale at its beginning. (Burke 1967:318)

The official role of the clergy, in the endowments and sometimes the launchings, may be limited to saying the opening and, or, closing prayers. But some of them have turned business men and women, sharing the ethos which have necessitated the decay of the system.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The conclusion at the debates may, at best, lead to some panel-beating of strategies. But the substantive orientation remains. The lack of serious concern with issues leads, inadvertenty to personality focus. The participants and critics seem concerned with who says what and why. They focus the intent of statements, the hidden agenda. Dogs eat dogs to defend dogs. In the exchanges, usually acrimonious, the integrity of the elite becomes questionable as the skeletons in their cupboards are brought out.[3]

Whatever may be the positive values of the seminars, as a forum for exchange of ideas, for creating awareness and for mapping out strategies for development, they are more or less a context where the combative captains of the industries meet their younger, aggressive, progressives. The seminar, as Burke would say, is an occasion for the physical and the mental endowments to integrate in the survival of the individual against the destructive will of the society. "It (Seminar) permits a gratifying amount of muscular and mental self-assertion to the individual as regards his own particular contribution to the entire performance, while at the same time it flatly involves him in a group activity, a process of giving and receiving."(Burke 1967:316)

The seminars reveal two aspects of elite's status ethical: the moral of the individuality and the moral-as-social cohesion. Yet, far from being compatible, they can often be radically at odds. It is considerations of the individuality that promotes greed, corruption, incompetence and patrimonialism, which keep the productive plants in a state of partial paralysis today. By its emphasis upon the competitive aspect of status too, it runs counter to the very conditions by which the integrative aspect of the national order is made ethical. It tends to elevate man's capacity for force and fraud against accountability and peace. Hence it is no accident that the racketeers and the opportunist, the crooked promoter-director, have arisen as the culmination of the business philosophy. The racketeer and opportunist directors are frequently put forward as the bad eggs of the business community, the ones that prey upon the legitimate business, the ones that frustrate the genuine interest of the people. But as a matter of fact they are the logical conclusion of elite's failure to provide adequate charitable outlets for the creative, radical, man. This tendency, as Burke again notes: has usually been manifested compensatorily in the philanthropic activities by which the predatory frequently attempt to convert the fruits of their conquests back into social services. But this makes two antithetical stages of a process which is morally sound only when it is synthetic. It is not moral to seize and give back - it is moral to convert the act-of-seizure itself into an act of public benefit. (Burke 1967:318)

The involvement of the racketeer, opportunist directors has some devastating influences on public order and business. On the one hand, violence now rules the industry. Thus, the number of hired assassins trying to get even with cheats, trying to revenge business failures, and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

bringing back the combative, destructive ethos has been on the increase. The cooperative spirit having foundered, the drive is to put one's rival agents out of business, to sell one's full quota, to show one's supremacy. The backslapping at the tea-breaks or the opening ceremonies are just hollow performances which, nevertheless, represent a profoundly honest yearning for cooperation and trust. They are hollow because they are sheer ritual acts which pre and post seminar efforts were necessarily straining to deny. Seminars, to be moral-as-social cohesion would be nothing more or less than the distributive end of an industry serving the welfare of many. In so far as it is not this, it is vowed to a fundamental moral decay.

On the other hand, the involvement of the racketeers moves the economy and state into further decay. As we have argued the seminars cannot themselves prevent the decay. For the architects of the decay are their own teachers and students. They pretend to learn from experience, while fundamentally they are inclined to repeat the experience by which status and prestige has increased in a frustrated, frustrating, or vitiated civil life. The seminar, examined from its commercial values, is developed in opposition to the collective interest, in a battle of will of a few against many. It is alive under the feelings and expectations of the supremacy of individuality, of the supremacy of the privileged. It is no doubt cultural as it does promote a sense of a common danger, an emphasis upon sacrifice, risk, companionship, and the sense of being in a unifying enterprise. All these qualities are highly moral, and in so far as the conditions of "capitalistic peace" tend to promote such expressions, the seminars cannot be purgatory. Thus the seminars would never resolve issues. They tend to raise more questions. The moral side of the battle may bring the elite together, if only for the purpose of oppressing a common foe, the masses. But the internal rivalry itself tends to exacerbate the disagreement on power symbols and competencies. For many, "things may not be so bad after all, It all depends on how you look at them".

The entire premise of the seminars/launchings/endowments is the false consciousness that those who destroyed would rebuild, that those who talk are action- proned. The end does not necessarily justify the consciousness. Rather, a fraternity of destroyers is built up. It is like a family: at the meetings there are hosts/hostesses, guest of honour and "fathers of the day". The fathers are either the traditional royal highnesses presiding over a decaying traditional order or the Ex-presidents or incumbent governors/administrator sitting over a cauldron of dispirited people. Such a leadership dare not risk change, for it would then self destroy itself. And unless gifted with the power of empathy it hardly can be clearly discerning enough to know the feelings of the subjugated, exploited people, that daily serves it in the ministration over a decaying order.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

So, who ought to learn? The elite of course. But their basic education, in the universalized mode, is faulty in many ways. First, it tends to place the individual interest above that of the society. The individual reaps while the society starves. The norm is individualistic. The holders of the means of domination have the upper hand over the holders of the means of production with damaging consequences for accumulation and growth. Yet the individual claims to power is the goodwill of those he starves. By refusing to make society a focus of particular attention they, elite, have contributed little or nothing to illuminating the alternatives facing responsible actors in a developing country. Second, the education of the elite emphasizes functionalism rather than normativism. It is difficult for actors to know/realize that each action stems from a normative structure and also help to (re) formulate the normative structure. The functionalist approach is based on appeals to spurious necessity and unidirectional conception of end of action. The image of development is one which serves to correct primitivity. Development to them is the provision of electricity, water, housing, to mention a few. And schools are meant to transform basic traditional values, to promote the values of universalism, achievement and specificity over particularism, ascription and diffuseness. The argument here is not that "welfare" policies should not be pursued. Rather the critical issue is the underlying tone of cultural imperialism which reduces the individual, the state, or the collective to a beggar requesting for this or that of the essential commodities. How can a beggar culture be progressive? Development is stultified by the denial of the individual power to intuit and produce a body of knowledge which serves his immediate practical needs.

Moreover, the limitation of Western educational value itself is made obvious by the elite's double consciousness: they admire western and traditional education at the same time. The goals of the education may be different but they are of practical advantages. Individuals shift between them to accommodate demands.

The right education must bring into the fore the collective ethos, while not destroying all the individualistic elements of initiatives, freedom and drives. It must in addition emphasize the normative over the functionalist bent by playing down the issue of domination and creating an aura of norm, rule, and system. Each sector of the society, each social group, provides its own coherence and its own validity: it is no longer possible to speak of 'primitive mentalities' (even with reference to the societies left behind by history) or of insignificant discourse, but of pluralism.

Everything may be thought within the order of the system, the rule, and the norm. By pluralising itself - since systems are isolated, since rules form closed wholes, since norms are posited in their autonomy - the (socio economic) field found itself unified; it was no longer fissured along its former dichotomy of values.

-(Foucalt, 1973:360-61, Mudimbe, 1988:26)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A sound education must, nodoubt, admit of this pluralism as it seeks for a role to play in correcting the decay which years of mismanagement of resources has helped to ensure. The fact that there are quite a number of uncompleted buildings dotting the landscape, that social services are crippled by absence of appropriate technology, and that maintenance of existing infrastructures had been abandoned through either lack of care, poor values of aesthetics, or ignorance signifies the need for re-education. And, government has a critical role in developing human resources, in providing significantly higher level of social services and in rehabilitating and expanding essential infrastructure, or creating the enabling environment for private sector activity (Gladwin 1991). But the government who provides these services is one significantly attuned to the education for the management of plurality, competencies and initiaves. It responds to issues of accountability and sincerity of purpose, honoring merit and hardwork. Its education is inherently self critical, historical, and challenging.

Conclusion

The education of the Nigerian elite is deficient. The evidences of this deficiency exist all over the social and physical landscapes. There is greed, corruption, and uncritical accumulation sharpening the combative edge of individual-society relations. The rise of the individualistic ethos promotes the decay of the collective enterprises: uncompleted infrastructure, rusting and rusted equipment, defaced buildings, arsons, pothole highways, inefficient services. The elite are aware of this deficiency and therefore seek a re-education which, albeit, is bound to the same failure as their basic education in being improperly conceived and directed.

We have argued that the right education must be a cultural process: self critical, historical and challenging in a situation faced with simultaneous and seemingly contradictory processes. It is not sufficient in history to identify actors and actresses of nation-building, the various confrontation of the self and others in slavery, colonialism and neo-colonalism, or the nature of regionalization of interests. It must examine the normative structure which have emerged and do critically shape the sense of aesthetics justice and equity. It must pose a challenge to do things better. Yet in so far as the common denominator which runs through the Nigerian history, as conceptualized by the elite, is the argument of power, invariably, the pursuit of education, in the present context, is similarly vowed to confrontation, exploitation and destructive will. It joins the individuals and groups with an historical circle; one bound to neglect the critical import of the new challenge: the power of argument which is informing, transforming and reformative in its self-criticalness, vision and challenge.

The new challenge is for the "students" and the "teachers", whether they are elite or not. Even if the "teachers" were to come from the elite

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

class, the inherent confrontation, flexibility, accommodation and challenge of the new education confers a value which opens the vicious historical circle of decay for new possibilities and drives. But would the elite work out their own demise? And can we trust the Professors of the tertiary education whose poverty and opportunism have led to involvement in various strategies of decay? Outsiders are, of course, likely to be held with suspicion. We, are in a quagmire. But in posing a question about who also teaches, this paper rests on the premise that whatever usefulness the people may find in education, they will also be using it critically.

NOTES

1. *Practically all the Nigerian dailies carry advertisements of the seminars, launchings and endowments. The choice of daily depends on the advertiser, the targeted audience, the expected area of coverage and indeed the cost of advertisement charges. Some dailies, like the Daily Times and the Guardian, charge more than the "local press" with limited, state coverage. This is because these are papers of the "elite".*
2. *Most seminars are held at the Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, as if to cloak the deliberations in universal language and idioms. However, the participants are expected to be lodged in Sheraton, Federal Palace or Ikeja Hotels that charge as much as N5,000.00 a day on lodging and breakfast. The ordinary Nigerian monthly salary is less than N1,000.00. The launching and endowments are held at the centre of the decay, the institution affected by the neglect, corruption and parochialism of the elite. Occasionally though, they may also go "national" especially where personalities are celebrated. Thus there has been endowments for Late Obafemi Awolowo, for late Dr. Nnamidi Azikiwe, for General Gowon Foundations. Azikiwe and Gowon were heads of State. Awolowo was the leader of opposition in the First Republic, 1959-1966.*
3. *Read Citizen, November 9-15, 1992 which went to town on some of the atrocities committed by military leaders against the people. The article was written by a Former "Insider" who felt that his constituency has been maligned by the utterances of General Danjuma at Endowments and launchings that Danjuma had chaired or participated.*

REFERENCES

Arogbofa.J.O. (1992) : The Man Marches On. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Awofeso, A. (1990) : M.K.O. Abiola: To make whole again. Lagos: Update Communications Limited.

Burke, K. (1967) : The Philosophy of Literary Form. Berkely: University of California Press.

Clarke, J.D. (1987) : Yakubu Gowon: Faith in aUnited Kingdom. London: Free Press.

Cohen, A. (1967) : Two Dimensional Man. Berkely: University of California.

(1981) : The Politics of Elite Cultures:

Berkely : University of California Press, Colby, B.N., et al Colby, B.N. et al

(1981) : Towards a convergence of cognitive and symbolic anthropology. American Ethnologist 8(2): 422- 450.

Dale.R. (1982) : Learning toBe... What? In H. Alavi and T.Shanin (ed), Introduction to the Sociology of Developing Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press. PP 408-421.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Elaigwu, J.I. (1986) : *Gowon.Ibadan: Spectrum Press.*

Foucault, M. (1973) : *The Order of Things. New York: Pantheon.*

Gladwin, C.H. (1991) : *Structural Adjustment and African Women Farmers Gainesville: University of Florida Press.*

Imoagene, O. (1976) : *Social Mobility in Emergent Society. Canberra: Department of Demography. The Australian National University.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VIII

THE CONCEPT OF THE POET IN THE PSALMS

Ranjan Ghosh

Identifying the authorship of the psalms can be a monumental, though moot, exercise for contrary to the later traditions, David, Moses and Solomon can hardly be considered as possible authors of the Psalms preserved in the Psalter. This has been demonstrated increasingly clearly as exegesis developed. We can prudently and safely unite our voice with Klaus Seybold when he points out that at the most it would be impossible to speak of traces of fragments.

> There is not a single psalm, which can with any probability be said to stem from David. Of many linguistic, cultural and theological difficulties stand in the way. Even if the so-called Lament of the Bow (2 Sam.1, 17ff) could be proven to be by David, the gulf between this poem and the psalms shows that a common origin is out of the question. Only with the personalisation of the originally anonymous Holy Scriptures and the distribution of the text complexes under the names of great authors, Moses, David, Solomon, and the prophets, Ezra etc., did the Psalms come to be given an 'author', a simplification which may have had dogmatic advantages, but which in the long run has been at the cost of historical plausibility, and has led to ideological entrenchment.[1]

However, without grinding any ideological axe, we can yet triumphantly declare the moving poetic spirit, subtle and sensitive, in the whole corpus of the Psalms. There is no denying a 'sharp and clear mind ' and a 'prophetic spirit',[2] an obvious poetic inspiration and poetic utterance that verge on a discovery of divine-human relationship. It

1: Klaus Seybold, Introducing the Psalms, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1990. pp 37-38

2. In Qumran document of the Psalms (11QPs), we have the reference to David as being wise, intelligent and irreproachable before God and before mankind in all his ways. He is bestowed with a sharp and clear mind and is said to have composed his hymns in a prophetic spirit conferred on him by the Most High.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has the spiritual vision that combines life-sense, vigorous emotion, profundity of thought, and a strong aesthetic sense. It remains as a transmutation of what the poet sees outwardly in relation to man's approach to God, exciting an inner vision. Here we notice a mind that allows it to interact with the actual truths of our outward life and then encourages the crudity to sink and get drained in the onrushing crystal waters of Imagination, transforming it into an artifice that is sincere and severe in the strong outlining illumination. Eschewing all efforts towards personalisation, we can trace a poet-soul that is intuitive and interpretive, echoing the creative principles of the Vedic poet, Kavi. The argument can begin with a few lines from Psalm 40.

I waited patiently for the Lord;
he inclined to me and heard my cry.
He drew me up from the desolate pit
out of the miry bog,
and set my feet upon a rock,
making my steps secure.
He put a new song in my mouth,
a song of praise to our God.

The "new song" holds the key to our argument. In fact the divine inspiration spreads its luminous wings on the fertile tracts of the poet's mind and helps in the germination of a new art. The concept of the poet as a divine singer is an established phenomenon not only among the Vedic poets like Dirghatams or Brihaspati but also among the major early Greek poets like Homer, Hesoid and Pindar. The poet has installed himself at a place where his experiences are recorded with clarity and insight and the experiential self puts across the wisdom before men garnered from the paradise regained in the wake of the divine afflatus. Milton's prayer to illumine what in him is dark is the message. This illumination reveals one aspect of the binding force of the poetic spirit. This is evident in many of the psalms; a spirit that artfully telescopes various themes and through careful reworking engineers a balance that exhibits a strong thematic unity. There are 'growth rings' that hem the solid inner text. We can mark clear stages of development wrought by introspection, a wide surfing of thematic possibilities, and an ingenious poetic license. For instance, Psalm 19 has a three-part division. It begins:

The heavens are telling the glory of God;
and the firmament proclaims his handiwork.

The second part is a series of theses on the nature of the Word of God i.e. the law of the Lord, the testimony of the lord, the precepts of the Lord and the commandment of the Lord which is perfect, sure, right, and pure. The fear of the Lord is clean and the ordinances of the Lord are true. However, the third part rises to a prayer with the poignancy of a lyrical emotion.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Let the words of my mouth and the meditation of my heart
be acceptable in thy spirit,
O Lord, my rock and my redeemer.

Despite the obvious thematic diversity, the unification or combination does not strike us as patchwork. In the alembic of the poet's sensibility and subtilized intellect it coalesces into a coherent cogent composition that combines a hymn of creation, the nature of the creator and the prayer of His creature. The apparent disharmony in themes melts under the linguistic innovation or what one may refer to as the inspired speech. The poetic effort (leave aside the wanton tirades or imprecation directed at the enemy camp) has the prophetic inspiration and the 'impulse' of the spirit.

The organicity of the poet 's mind works on a structural intention'. He has a beginning, choosing his words carefully with the pitch and intonation. For instance, Vindicate me, O God, and defend my cause (Psalm 43), or God is our refuge and strength (Psalm 46), or Be pleased, O God, to deliver me! (Psalm 95), or Hear my prayer, O Lord (Psalm 102). Striking the note at the outset, the Psalmist makes sure that the close of the text is equally cadenced, resonant, leaving a well-nigh indelible imprint. [Psalm 104 should be a brilliant example.

May the glory of the Lord endure forever
May the Lord rejoice in his works,
Who looks on the earth and it trembles,
Who touches the mountains and they smoke!
I will sing to the Lord as long as I live;
I will sing praise to my God while I have being.
May my meditations be pleasing to him,
for I rejoice in the LORD.
Let sinners be consumed from the earth,
and let the wicked be no more!

Post-scripts are obvious for alphabetical Psalms. However, here, the creative spirit of the poet has manifested a keen sense of form and rhythm by adding the last two verses for a structural wholeness.

Bless the LORD, O my soul!
Praise the LORD.

In fact the subtlety of the rhythm goads the poet to furnish the last two verses as a demonstration of a conscious that is loyal to the demands of the wholesome harmonised final impact. It has a lively recognition for 'design' where form and substance jell together to evolve a soulful rhythm. The Psalm has a thought rhythm and a well organised development hinging on the concept of God and His creation in relation to the ultimate dependence of His creatures on Him, The world of creation may proliferate in all ways but at the end everything suspires from His Immortal Flame. A meticulous reading of Psalm 104 manifests a conceptual development from one stich to the next. Here we notice

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the extraordinary principle of organisation and growth in the poet's mind. The development is effected by making the different stichs deal not with the same but with different events. Thus one is led through several phases: light to heavens, then to firmament, from it to the clouds which leads one to the wind, then to storm and from storm to lightning and then to the face of the earth. The spirit of the poet works with supreme adhesive qualities and in the crucible of his creative imagination the ideas are well aligned and endowed with the much-needed vibrancy. The medium becomes the message.

Again the symmetry of the poet's mind is well demonstrated if we look at the prayer songs of the individual. The invocation is immediately accompanied by a cry for help; the petitioner announces what Yahweh means to him and by an illustrative and comparative way- this highlights the poet and his medium- underscores God's power to save. The next block of the 'pattern' deals with the self description of the afflicted petitioner who is distressed and poor'. The distress and distance from God continue to evoke the plaintive cry- 'why? 'How long?'- and the prayer nearly reaches the borderline of importunation but never without the latent hope that the clouds of present misfortune will disperse with time. But the imperative or the jussive mood often faces impediments in the shape of hostility of fellow mortals. True to his blemished nature, the suppllicant breaks forth into maledictions and seeks an effective intervention of the Lord. The relationship is crowned by a vow of thanks giving (todah) and a craving for His mighty fortress where truth, righteousness, and steadfastness have their holy seat.

Indeed this religious document is a product of the living centre. It has the creative rhythm and word images with the profound message from the depths of the poet's soul. It becomes the testament of the living radiant soul with *kavayah satya-srutah*. It manifests a sheer force of presentation where God-Man relationship opens up an important text of life, as the composer, guided by the power to soar into the empyrean of the Infinite, hears the music of the hidden movements. It exhibits the forceful vision of familiar things and an inquiring spirit that examines the dilating life force, the passion and ardour of existence and glories in the hues of imagination and takes pride in the power of transmutation. It becomes 'vital' poetry and philosophy well manicured by a keen aesthetic sense and subtilised intellect. The powerful mind renders a 'discipline' and facilitates the construction of the contours of well-grounded ideas in truth and eternity. It removes the veil that separates man from the usually perplexing theological problems and unearths the higher stratas of revelation. The comprehensive soul and lively sensibility of the poet thrash out a theological document, raising the banner of universal proclamation and communication. In the Psalms (102, 40, 41, 22, 30, 69, 49, 73, 104, 139), the Poet stirs the depths of human consciousness, the bizarre complex of mortal craving the intricate plexus of fear, doubt and piety, the confounding matrix of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

virtue and vice. Indeed through 'a gradation of themes' (faith, confession, lamentation, heart wrenching, praise, refuge, righteousness) and linguistic dexterity, the psalms have become special object of theological interest and reflection. The Psalmist has dealt with the mystery and wonder of a relationship with imagination, aesthetic, sensitivity, historical consciousness and linguistic acumen. Martin Luther found the Psalter a little Bible comprehending most beautifully and briefly everything that is in the entire Bible. It is biblical theology in miniature.

The writer, it may be noted, calls his poem a *maskil*, strictly 'proverb' or aphorism but also 'proverbial poem' or 'solution to a riddle', thereby bringing the Wisdom genre back into play. Psalm 49 reads:

> my mouth shall speak wisdom;
> the meditation of my heart shall be understanding.
> I will incline my ear to a proverb;
> I will solve my riddle to the music of the lyre.

The Psalmist has more often worked in the sapiential tradition, also the theological and ethical concepts of wisdom circles have impacted upon them. Language assumed the didactic and the meditative undertones and teaching the revealed will of God became the very backbone of communal and individual existence. (Wisdom was poured out in the way of righteousness, steadfastness, and was the property that remained as the abiding peace in his mighty fortress.) The obvious objective was the edification and orientation of the members of the synagogal community and the general tone was that of pastoral counseling (Ps. 1, 34, 37, 39, 49, 119, etc.) However, the didactic presentation of materials is poetically conceived with the principle of organisation of the poet's mind. The 'historical psalm' and the 'Torah psalm' assimilate "wisdom's" ideas (Ps. 1, 119, 37, 73, etc.) but not in the desiccated aphoristic method. The stimuli of wisdom run through problem poetry and prayer literature, And although the proverbial wisdom embraces three motifs- the transitoriness of life in time, protection of the city and the toil of labour, the common life of brothers- yet the wisdom slant has the touch of the poet's brilliant mind and his sense of the artistic form.

Indeed dry precepts and disembodied disquisition can never convey a complete or perfectly natural impression. Truth requires the art of the poet to express it, it need the careful adroit hands of the creator to stamp its mark. Poetry has its anointed means to make truth reveal itself for a wanton indiscretion in presentation attenuates its identity with the creative power. The interpreting eye perceives the authentic and the compelling and looks beyond the mere scientific, philosophic, or aesthetic truth into something which has an 'individual distinct significance' brought home by the transforming power of poetic vision. Most of the poems exhibit a visioned thinking attended by a realisation that maps out the clear contours of a 'righteous' existence. The poet's mind has seen the divine fire of truth and the inmost spirit has grasped

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it in entirety. The rhythmic language has seized the finite in man and conflated it with the song and light of the Infinite. The acuity of the prayer-psalms has made man to figure out his mortal configuration with the irrefutable accents of divine. The Psalmist has seized the emotional realities of man with 'wise understanding'; he presents a situation where man tries to envisage the self, outlining the journey from an intellectual apprehension to a spiritual comprehension. The poet has brought man before Truth, Unity, highly visioned Will, Harmony and Good. The citadel is built not by the arid light of intellectual reason-the dead mechanical chain of apparent things - and systematising intelligence but is the product of a synthesis of rhythm and truth. There is a spiritual experience which carries us straight to sight. Gerstenberger is apposite when he points out that the Psalter does not contain a summa of theological thought or any kind of confounding theological system 'but a treasury of experiences accumulated by generations of people who lived in the region where the cradle of our civilisation stood. They nourished their particular hopes and anxieties, they clung to their values and deities, and we are heirs of their faith'.[3] But such experiences found the eloquence of the poetic spirit to their overwhelming advantage. The force of inspired seeing propelled their emotions and with imagination, fancy, a turn of phrase, an introduction of a symbol or weaving of an image. the correspondence with the life-spirit is established. Our inner being is made to respond to the extraneous self or the world; we arrive face to face with our 'inner life'. The Psalter ceases to exist as a mere disciplined document of religious knowledge. Under the incandescence of the poet's inward and piercing sight, the higher fights of thought and art, the voices of poetry, philosophy and religion dissolve into a luminous entity secured in its inviolability.

The second stage of the discussion can trigger off with the careful perusal of the opening of Psalm 45.

> My heart overflows with a goodly theme;
> I address my verses to the king;
> my tongue is like the pen of a ready scribe.

Here the 'address my verses' has the note of craftsmanship or the art of construction (for example baking in *Genesis* 40,17 or metal work in 2 *Chronicles* 3,10). Indeed the Psalms are the handmaid of the writer and the singer, it exist as the art of the 'ready scribe', growing out of the wisdom tradition. We can easily agree with Hans Joachim Kraus when he asserts that art, in the Old Testament, does not consists of a "dialectical contradiction", as Kierkegaard puts it in the light of the "truth of the eternal" in that poetry. On the contrary, the artistic capacity expressed in the Psalms is indicated in the intensity and concentration

3. Psalms, Part I, Erhard S. Gerstenberger, p. 36.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of style, the appropriateness of the measures employed, the clarity and beauty, the heights and depths of that which is spoken and sung in the presence of Yahweh.[4] As a matter of fact, the three basic types of text in the Psalter - prayer, poem and song- require a suitable linguistic medium which under the severity of insight and the flame of imagination can grow into a definite shape and form using all the repertoire of structured speech. No doubt man has approached his god by verbal as well as non-verbal communication in the form of gestures, oblations and symbolic acts. Yet language was probably the decisive element in most ceremonies and words carefully guarded and measured came to be used having specific intonations and particular rhythm. Bowra observes that most so-called primitive people sing their prayer.[5] In fact, in singing, lies the art of welding proficiently words and music, idea and the rhythm, instruction and the intonation. There is the 'fine recasting of the conventional'.[6] With an ear that is extraordinarily sharp to music, the poet makes sure that the Psalms exhibit a sound pattern - the vocalic and the consonantal structure of words and sentences. The sound structure makes remarkable use of repetition, assonance and alliteration, seeking to print his message in sound pictures. The metrical system is substantiated by the accentuation system, the alternating system and the stichometric system. Also remarkable is the *parallelismus membrorum* where rhyme-relationship effects a sterophony of thought content. The Psalms demonstrate a 'keen mind' working on the various stylistic devices, catering to the demands of the poetic situations. The basic textual structure has the 'refrain' providing the unity to the stropes, also a symmetrical or concentric or chiastic schema can be discerned. Interestingly, the formal structure and the semantic structure have a synchronisation and the bulk of the poems (Ps. 9, 25, 119, 102, 104, etc.) exhibit an organic wholeness and tectonic symmetry. The poet has infused a balance in rhythm, length, and meaning. His edifice has synonymous, antithetical, climactic and synthetic parallelism and Kugel stresses the dominance of the later, Kugel defines it as 'A is so, what's more, B is so' which indicates that 'B typically supports A, carries it further, backs it up, completes it, goes beyond it'.[7] Robert Alter sees a forward movement, both intralinearly and interlinearly in the larger structure of some poems. He perceives a movement of 'consequentiality' or 'intensification' and this intensification works on the Poet's use of the images and the involvement of the poetic spirit that infuses a dynamicity in the movement of the verse. This has worked well with the interpreter for the enrichment of the language serves well towards the communication of concepts and the meaning of the text. It is part of the poet's shaping effect and 'intentionality'. Patrick D Miller works on this aspect with laudable care.

4. Hans-Joachim Kraus, *Theology of Psalms*, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1992 P 15
5. C. M. Bowra, *Primitive Song*, New York, Weidenfeld, 1962
6. R. Alter, *Art of Biblical Poetry*, 112, 113
7. J. Kugel, *The Idea of Biblical Poetry*, p. 52

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Psalm 2:2 shows the way in which successive cola second earlier ones by elaborating and expanding:

A The kings of the earth set themselves
B and the rulers take counsel together
C against the Lord and his anointed.

> While the second colon (B) is clearly parallel to the first (A), it does not merely repeat the thought of A but intensifies and elaborates it. The rulers not only take their stand, they counsel or conspire together. The verb in B explains in a quite specific way that goes beyond A. The third colon (C) is sometimes omitted by commentators as a gloss. There is no compelling reason for that, however. Again the colon moves on to intensify and elaborate in a startling way by identifying the object of the action of kings and rulers. That action is emphasized and explained by the double object in colon C. The tricolon as a whole serves to build in intensity as each successive colon adds a dimension to the basic thought in the first colon. The interpreter is led by the poetic process to hear the development of thought and the force of each new dimension as he or she hears the members of the poetic line.[8]

It is not the labouring on an idea to a nauseation but an intensification that harps on the aesthetic and interpretive faculties of the Poet's art. This should not mislead us to believe that the poet was merely a thinker in lines and stanzas - a rhapsodist with rhetorical virtuosity. Instead we are made to see through the thought -power. Notwithstanding the objective, subjective and the aesthetic imagination, a creative imagination is at work, stirring the *self-interpretive self*.

In fact liturgical language is always poetic or semi-poetic. It has to soar above the colloquial usage for it is essentially a communication with divine things. So we need not be surprised by the poetic-liturgical vocabulary extant in the Psalter. The poet included the devices of pairings, merismus, anaphora, anadiplosis, repetition (inclusion is the predominant form), balancing the concrete and the abstract, metaphor and the delicate mosaic of images that illustrate a point and pack a muscle to the poet's supreme art of interpretation, be it didactic or aesthetic appropriation. Here it is important for us to observe the use of metaphors.

As a hart longs
for flowing streams,
So long my soul
for thee, O God. (Psalm 42)

8. Patrick D. Miller, *Interpreting the Psalms*, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1986, pp. 34-5

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Or,

In them he has set a tent for the sun,
Which comes forth like a bridegroom
Leaving his chamber
and like a strong man runs its course with joy. (Psalm 19)

Here the metaphoric language in its lucid elegance touches a dimension that has the importation of exhortation, meditation, and concentration. This leads to a meaningful focus on the divine-human relationship that encompasses anxiety, jubilation and the marvelous works of God in nature and history. The images demonstrate a 'crossover effect' (in the words of Adele Berlin) as evidenced in the Psalm 19 or Psalm 42. The Poet has made sure that the multiple metaphors bore common allegiance to a subject. The metaphors emanate from different images and are threaded under an overaching idea. Dennis Sylva[9] observes an overarching ideas (s) or feeling(s) to which the disparate images in the poem contribute; the poem's unity arises from its metaphorical diversity. The poet makes sure that the images are carefully constructed to convey an overarching idea and an overarching feeling and that individual images do not form literary worlds unto themselves. Imagery adds the three-dimensionality to the poetic text and the language although has a restrictiveness yet is never devoid of a delicate elevation. The Poet's purpose is to integrate and keep the circulation in the poetic circuit unhindered. His flame of creation binds the internal and the external experience to a nicety that betrays an attitude of profound authority.

Some Psalms primarily have a 'theme word' which can be the key to its exegesis. The metaphoric language is in tune with the religious language for it remains the powerful medium to express the inexpressible. Also in verse the Scripture sets the three-dimensional scene in which the word is alive. There exists a remarkable rule of word-order that applies for lists and chains of words whereby they run from shortest to longest. Perpending Ps. 90 closely we come across the art of the poet and the prayer writer generating their own style. Leaving aside ornateness or bombast, the unconstricted linguistic pattern holds its ground with an intentness of spirit. It has a picturesque language punctuated by images that are exquisite in themselves.

Thou dost sweep men away; they are like a dream
Like grasses which are renewed in the morning:
in the morning it flourishes and is renewed;
in the evening it fades and withers.

Here the poetic spirit works feverishly, as it were, on the syntactical structure to evolve a chaste model of expression that

9. Dennis Sylva, *Psalms and the Transformation of Stress*, Louvainn Peeters Press, 1993, p. 27

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

harbours the emotion and wisdom to inundate the reader in the clear transparency of an everlasting light. Often pedagogical intent comes together with poetic art with the former in strong proverbial form. The poetic speech has the felicity and the finesse to make the exhortative undertone less husky.

However, the mere meretricious use of poetic devices can easily relegate it to the borderland of half poetry. It is true that the entire corpus of the Old Testament poetry does not reveal the essence of poetry and fails to distil the coruscating power of the poetic spirit. However, the best reveal the imaginative vision, the spiritual sense, the soul-feeling and the soul-sight. The Psalms largely avoid philosophical abstractions or the labyrinth of metaphysics to communicate in a poetic speech that mediates between the immaterial and the concrete and the spirit and the 'life'. Herein lies the triumph of the Poet's mind. Poetry catches the joy or agony of the poet's soul - the benign formula to liberate man into pure delight and endow life with immutable beauty. Poetic speech catches sonorously the mundane and the divine selves of man, juxtaposing the finite and the infinite, the transient and the Eternal, encouraging an expansive vision that removes the dross from the surface of our existence and obviates the 'profane' by winging to the hitherto unscaled heights. The spirit combines the best of the philosopher, the prophet, and the singer without allowing one to dominate the other. The 'fused' vision is poured into thought images evading cryptogram and enigma and drops all the ostentatious rigours of structured expression which would have falsified the vision itself. The Psalms have shown the five eternal powers about which Sri Aurobindo talks so eloquently in the *Future Poetry* (Truth, Beauty, Delight, Life and Spirit). Partaking of the vast creative will of life, the poet leads us to the awakening of the self and paves the way for an approximation to a 'greater knowledge'.[10]

Biblical poetry does not have the inane rhythm we associate with lyrical poetry of the common run; rather it has the rhythmic soul-movement of a keen poetic consciousness. Mere metrical excellence does not make a poem as knowing all the laws by heart do not make one a good lawyer. It has to be the creative spirit that runs through the verses to satiate the claims of melody and harmony. The truth or the wisdom has the support of a full-throated inspiration and the art of melodic recurrence to reveal a beauty that wakes the soul. Perhaps herein lies the significance of the Psalms, inviting debate on human experience, the possibilities of a spiritual revelation and the ground of soulful interpretation that eclipse our befogged sensibilities and prepare the road to a transparent consummation. Old Testament poetry evolves the creative sound that makes one conscious of the 'power' behind its genesis. There is the radiant impulse that makes us hear the 'greater movement' that casts up something from the expanse of eternal depths, making it just not beautiful poetry but powerful poetry. With the Psalms, we may say, a terrible beauty is born.

10. Sri Aurobindo, *The Future Poetry*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1994, p. 197

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ISSN - 0011 - 6734

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An

INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

156

MORADABAD (India)

Vol. XXXIX October 1999 NUMBER

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

EDITORIAL

VALUE AND CHANGING SOCIETY

Girish Baruah

Value is an element of superstructure, which is an outgrowth of the basic structure of human society, which again depends on relations of economic production. It influences every aspect of human life, as it is intimately related with the economics of human life. So it is ultimately matter oriented, although it is mainly understood in spiritual terms. It may be held, therefore, that human values take shape according to the nature of a definite economic system of a society.

Value is nothing but a reflection in man's mind of the external forces which control man's daily life. Value does not come from God, nor from the souls. It emerges from the material basis of human life and is reflected in human consciousness. It is no doubt a spiritual phenomenon moulded by consciousness, which springs from the material basis of man's life.

Values take shape according to the interests of people. They emanate from the ideas of the people. Interests and ideas change from time to time, Human society constantly enters into a new stage. But human consciousness, as it is infected with definite interests and ideas, is often reluctant to change with the social change. It takes with it certain ideas and theories from the previous stage. These ideas may date to the remote past, which has no bearing on the modern life. They remain as vestiges of the past.

Values stand for the spiritual aspects of social life. So they are not absolute, but relative; and relative to social life, which again is matter based. Values, thus being the spiritual aspect, have dominant effects on human society. Even then values are sometimes neglected or ignored. Why? It is so, because the present mode of society is reluctant to entertain the outdated, or so-called out-dated, values. They fail to cope with the changing model of the human society, and so they become ineffective. Their influence on the life and development of society often becomes negative, They more often hamper society's advance, rather than channelise it. Such values have simply retrogressive effects. They lose the progressive content within them.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Spiritual phenomena make up the social consciousness of people. These phenomena, however, do not come from heaven; but are shaped within the world itself. They are this earthly, not other worldly. Therefore they exert an active influence on human psychology. Human psychology wants that man should observe certain common ethical rules such as parents' concern for children, children's regard for parents, respect for old age, politeness, modesty, keeping one's word, condemnation of hooliganism, rape, theft, dacoity, lying, corruption, murder, terrorism etc. Although they arose in the remote past, they have passed down from generation to generation, taking on a richer form. They are the universal moral standards, although different epochs create different conditions for them. They are in keeping with the elementary rules of human behaviour, although more often people violate and distort them to fulfil their selfish individual and class interests. In this way more often the sphere of universal aspect of morality contract, instead of widening.

People, influenced by individual interests, have different view concerning good, evil, justice, injustice etc. So sometimes it becomes difficult to draw a demarcation line between the moral and immoral. Moral judgements, therefore, differ from person to person. But we should remember that despite differences in moral judgements between some people, there is something common in them. This common element assumes the form of a system of moral principles recognised by all members of a society, or of a class of it. Individual differences do not preclude the existence of this system.

Values are generally understood in terms of norms or ideals, which are nothing but beliefs about the way we ought to behave, i.e., they concern about ideas of right and wrong, good and bad, what should and what should not be done.

A thing acquires value when the human element is infused in it. Flowers were blooming on earth even before men were coming on it. They were still beautiful. But this beauty was valueless, because there was nobody to appreciate it. This beauty had become value, when people came to appreciate it. Therefore when a thing establishes a relation with a man, or in other words, when a man establishes a relation with a thing, a thing acquires value. So value is always man oriented. This man oriented value may be either physiological, biological, psychical, intellectual or spiritual, or may be all in one.

A thing may have its existence without having any relation to man. But a value has no meaning without this relation. Value is, therefore, a humanistic addendum to a thing.

Generally truth, good, beauty— these values are regarded as eternal. Yes as abstract concepts they are eternal. But their imports change from time to time. We cannot deny that moreover new values are created

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from time to time. In every new phase of society a new set of values comes into the foreground as a result of the new social situation, of course it does not, thereby mean, that at the event of the birth of new values, traditional values die out. Even believing in them heartily, people may welcome the new values, which may condition the existence and welfare of the present society.

We as man lives in a society, We, therefore, cannot evade the responsibility of being a social being. We should not forget that we have some duties to be performed to others. We have, therefore, to inculcate in ourselves certain accepted virtues deemed as values, no matter in whatever society we may live. These virtues are: temperance, courage, wisdom, justice, love, co-operation, respect for law, self-restraint, self-control etc. Moreover some social ideals such as freedom, fraternity, equality etc. should also be pursued.

We have said values are meaningless unless they are appreciated by man. But man often suffers from a subdued appreciation or no appreciation at all. This is so because he has to live in a suppressed condition due to a definite mode of society. A free situation is warranted for full appreciation of value; and only a classless society can create such a situation. Again we know that appreciation of value consists in self realisation. This self realistion, however, does not mean what interpreted by Advaita Vedanta. It means "a process of realisation and embodiment in material objects and spiritual values (as we interpret it), and in a person's life itself, of engineering and technical sides, moral and artistic standards, and ideals of a just social system." This just social system is nothing but a system wherein all men can live with equal status without there being exploitation of man by man and where all people can live in equal liberty.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I

GEORGE HERBERT AND THE NATURE OF A TRUE RELIGIOUS DOCUMENT

Ranjan Ghosh

Eckhart equates God with nothingness. To Scotus Erigena, God is not a what; He is a that. Indeed such finite efforts to define the Infinite continue ad infinitum. The nature of God is a circle of which the centre is everywhere and the circumference is nowhere. But our efforts to draw the 'circumference' need not be balked at any stage of our religious growth. Our doubts will be the inspiration. Our courage will be the faith. Our effort will be the reward. Our failure will be the success. His magnetic effulgence draws man into a battle ground where his soul is pounded with the pestle of Truth. His suffering becomes a revelation: his 'crisis' is the spiritual recovery: the void in him becomes meaningful; the encounter becomes his Religion. So what begins in darkness ends in light. He comes out of the carapace of condemnation into the light of life and becomes the child of it.

True to the spirit of Hinduism and early Christianity, George Herbert sets the tone with his poems that reveal a picture of many spiritual conflicts that have passed betwixt God and his soul before he could submit his will to the will of Jesus. He sits and broods on the waves of despair and delight, but the initial tremulous restive flutter acquiesces into a halcyon flight in the end. Contrary to the neo-orthodox theologians and neo-Calvinists, he stands out as the sedulous devout, holding his ground with aplomb under the solemn arches, waiting patiently to be inundated in the white radiance of Eternity. The code of feeling and law as expressed through his poems remain the standard of the purest unsectarian Christianity. He stops short of slithering into an insipid formalism. Ritualistic legalism can contribute to the improvement of conduct but cannot engineer a modification of consciousness. Herbert's religious order puts forth an outstanding canvas where the religion of character is contraposed with the religion of rites. In fact an understanding of the true essence of any religion requires a 'growth' through the terrains of demur and doubt. (It is 'doubt' that forms the essential component in the development of God-Man relationship and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the significant resultant is the 'crisis'.) There is an agonizing toil in him. His volatile swaying of moods take wind from the impassioned terra firma of man's raging follies and frailties. Herbert's "Collar" and "Affliction" Jettison an acquisitive self that impede the attainment of the unitive knowledge of God. The shrieks ('waste/ 'blasted') declare the dominance of a God-eclipsing selfness and evoke the 'doubt' that hints at the meaningful 'crisis' in man. Although Herbert finds- 'Man is all symmetrie - yet the 'inner' man has an asymmetrical texture that requires the 'cold dispute' of life and Dogma to redeem it. To become a 'stately habitation' man has to put his inner apartments in order- Oh mightie love! Man is one world, and hath/Another to attend him. ("Man") Man is not vile. He is 'most ignorant of what he's most assured;'[1] it is what turns him vile. Pascal in Pensees considers man as a thinking reed who can harbour, In my opinion, the 'cold dispute'. The boisterous striking of the board in "Collar" erupts an untamed ebullience that lashes a question: How free does man think is?

The question of freedom ransacks the rebel spirit in man. (The Book of job can always provide a different angle to the study) He stands bemused, stuttering on the line that divided the continents of freedom and servility. God manifests in time, Death, Rest and Restlessness. He has drawn the borders of the sanctuary wherein as to his action, faith and allegiance make man go through the paces. I call it 'Faith in Dispute, Dispute in Faith.' From this dispute rises the question: If God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent how can evil exist? When Christ has washed off all sins by his blood, how can evil creep into the inner castle of man and run foul through his veins? Joyce makes a pointed assertion:

> The man who sins thereby offends God... We are called on to explain how God came to create an order of things in which rebellion and even final rejection have such a place. Since a choice from among an infinite number of possible worlds lay open to God, how came He to choice one in which these occur? Is not such a choice in flagrant opposition to the Divine Goodness?

However, it can be argued that there is an immense necessity of God's power to make humans fall and work on evil. Man's utter helplessness jolts him out of the religious insouciance and inspires an awe. It drives home a salutary fear of violating. His laws which are invincible and irrevocable. The existential angst exhumes the real man. The bucked-up battler in the high seas. Given questions about the preferability between a grim fight with the possibility of a splendid triumph and no battle at all. Evil inevitably breeds suffering and God never tramples upon evil only to let loose suffering so that man may rise to height of heroism have been beyond his scope. (This suffering is slightly different from that of job and Herbert's consciousness encounters the problem acutely.) Joyce argues,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Nor are these the only benefits which it confers. That sympathy for others which is one of the most precious parts of our experience and one of the most fruitful sources of well-doing, has its origin in the fellow-feeling engendered by endurance of similar trials. Furthermore, were it not for these trials, man would think little enough of a future existence and of the need of striving after his end. He would be perfectly content with his existence.3

It shows the importance of the office filled by pain in human life and the invalidity of the assertion that suffering is irreconcilable with the wisdom of the Creator. So coming to accept the incompatibility of free will and absolute goodness, we can leave open the region of genuine personal struggle. This fluid acre of man's journey can emerge if one accepts God's bestowal of free will without choking the growth of moral evil: So to receive our final beatitude as the fruit of our labors, and as the recompense of a hard-won victory, is an incomparably higher destiny than to receive it without any effort on our part. And since God in his wisdom has seen fit to give us such a lot as this it was inevitable that man should have the power to choose wrong. We could not be called to merit the reward due to victory without being exposed to the possibility of defeat.[4] Indeed the imperfection in man calls for the exercise of the free will, a will directed towards the 'ordering' of the inner house.

Herbert's religious document fingers another area of considerable importance, namely human suffering. The Hadith of Ibn Majah propounds the deep seated installation of faith in suffering. The believer needs to expose himself to torments for it is worth more than the one who distances himself from the suffering. In fact man is called to suffer and to labour, not to live at ease: men are tried as gold in the furnace. Herbert bears a confused relish for a rebellion against the suffering that nettles his way- the dividends of rigorism stinging him sharp as if he owed a mammoth debt of suffering to his lord. However, the initial judders in Herbert's forte scour away the rust of sin in the long run. The suffering points to Kierkegaard's concept of the true God-relationship- the nearer to Thee, the more pain. The God-man relation defines itself through the alphabets of suffering with the punctuations of self-knowledge. Kempis believes that the secret thoughts of man's heart are known by God and it is most expedient for his salvation that man be left sometimes without the taste of spiritual sweetness for without such 'trial by existence' man would feel complacent of his condition and get puffed up by his inherent hubris. So Herbert would muse: 'Yet take the way; for sure thy way is best stretch or contract me, thy poor debtor.' ("The Temper I") Suffering cannot be an anathema, an obnoxious intruder into the universe of God and man for Christ led the way as the Eternal sufferer- Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example that you should follow his steps (I peter 2:20-21). Taking a cue from Kierkegaard's Papirer, one can look at suffering in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

philosophy of Herbert as a badge of honour in consonance with the concept of suffering in New Testament. Paul bore the 'marks of the lord Jesus' (Galatians 6:17) and recognized suffering as the warp and woof of the universe (The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now- Romans 8:22). In the address of Jesus to his disciples- then said Jesus unto his disciples, if any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me - we find the seeds of suffering through self-abandonment verily impregnated. So our whole peace in this miserable life consist rather in humble forbearance than in escaping adversity. He that finds the secret of endurance will enjoy the greatest peace. It is what Kempis called 'the exercise to self-conquer'. Thus suffering becomes the highest action in inwardness. Herbert never attempts to seek the rosebed of an imaginary world of the anodyne of dreams. Leaning on his professed faith, he canalises its resources towards the 'inward action'.

Propelled by intense meditation that leads him into the paradoxes of religion, Herbert conducts the search with a mind affixed on an accumulating energy. His ascending spirit has an ecstatic nimbleness unstained by any extraneous intrusion; it is an unfettered flight to the ground of Beautitude, a religious intensity tempered with sober harmony. His time-hardened faith ignites the quest for Divine Beauty- a conscious vocation that fortifies itself through a massive soul-searching. Beauty in God is true and such beauty is rendered more profound by devotion. This leads us to the concept of Bhakti in the oriental tradition of religious thought. In Ramayan, Hanuman is the epitome of bhakti and in Narada Bhakti Sutras bhakti commingles with love that is ineffable in its quality. It is this bhakti which leads the way to the ultimate recognition accorded to Truth. Bhakti is bred from desirelessness. Temptations throw up a gruelling 'crisis' for the survival of the soul and the desire 'conceived' gives birth to sin. In the spirit of the Katha Upanishad, Herbert's religious configuration sought the 'good' and not the 'pleasant'.

Karl Barth regards God as so absolutely sovereign that no real initiative is possible. Even faith is viewed with a pall of scepticism and it is said to denote pure passivity, emptiness, and vacuum. But such attitude leaves human effort with no scope, banishing all incentives for spiritual practices. Herbert stands out from such neo-orthodox conclusions. In fact Jesus has demonstrated his religion through practice, prayer and communion with God. Herbert in "prayer (1)", has found the glory of the act steeped in submission and steadfastness. (The thesis on the exercise of free will enjoys a critical angle here.) prayer is 'God's breath in man returning to his birth.' It initiates a communication from man to God- 'heart in pilgrimage'. But the real rub lies in the bristling expression- 'Engine against th' Almightie'. Should prayer be of this nature? Should the language of prayer be couched in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

forceful diction, compelling God to respond? It proffers the two theories on prayer- 'prayer in petition' and 'prayer is self-training in virtue'. When prayer becomes the means of persuading the gods to satisfy our desires, to provide for our necessities, it is merely the man who prays. We press God. We importune God. Prayer can have the nature of impudence. So is prayer a 'reversed thunder', Forceful and violent? Is it the 'Christ-side-piercing spear?

However the uniform Christian tradition disparages every attempt to bend the divine will to our own. It is a glide in humility for the keys of the heavenly harmonies without in the least being vociferous. Words in prayer need not be spears. It is for Herbert- 'Softnesse, and peace, and joy, and love, and blisse, / Exalted Manna, gladnesse of the best'. Herbert's implicit message finds the full-throated corroboration in Bremond who feels that meditation without contemplation and prayer uttered with practical utility can never serve the purpose for which it is meant. It is kind of happiness that emanates from a close-door communion with God without intermediary. Prayer becomes an actuation of an intellective soul towards God, expressing or at least implying, an entire dependence on Him as the author and fountain of all good. Kierkegaard stoutly believes that the root of true prayer is the sense of one's own unworthiness. (Papirer, IX) prayer for the poet grows as an equation where God increases and Man decreases and it becomes a tacit accord with Him. Like the prayer of Herbert, almost all the ides on prayer in Luke 11:5-13, John 16:32, Acts 14:23, I Corinthians 7:5, Thessalonians 3:1-2, philemon, I Timothy 5:5, Ephesians 1:3-15, Hebrews 13:6, point to a potent force that brings home a spiritual peace, radiating a divine power. In consonance with the spirit of the Qur'an or the Journals of Kierkegaard, prayer becomes a self-training in virtue where Jesus or the Allah is the decisive factor..

Dwelling on the question of free will- prayer being a welcome expression- one needs to know of the inherent 'goodness' in man. Plato affirms in Theaetetus that only by becoming God-like we can understand God. But this need not confuse us for goodness exists in our soul unperceived (Theologia Germnica) to be tapped for an identification with the Divine Ground. Working on the principle of 'goodness', Herbert imbibes the postulates of Philo who stakes his faith in the relationship prevalent between the citizen of the city and the Monarch firmly at the helm. Realising the goodness within, the free will needs to be directed toward the 'joy' that exits in abandoning the transient (The Isa Upanishad mentions about this joy). Out of several ways- a rebirth, a new life, apotheosis, 'enthousiasmos', a possession of or possession by the divine spirit, 'gnosis', 'photismos' -Herbert chooses the most pellucid of all, choosing a creed that springs from a refined 'receptivity'. As a matter of fact, Christian perfection is not achieved in a moment. Herbert's world has enunciated this doctrine of progress. Abbot

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Nesteros in Cassian's fourteenth Collation elucidates on the spiritual knowledge being active and contemplative. The first knowledge is attained by the improvement of conduct (enumerated in The Kural as well) and the second in the contemplation of things divine and the knowledge of the most sacred thoughts. Herbert's universe catches these two stages most delicately. With inner reconstruction and persistent reformation he graduates to the next stage where a real and unflappable love for the higher life sprouts. Devotion and austere perseverance comprise the following stage. Finally comes a clean conscience and a pure heart that can dwell upon God's providence and mercy, and be transported by the fervent prayer with God which passes man's tongue to express. It is a dogged single mindedness (similar in strain as found in Manava Dharmashastra) that nourishes a green tree in the heart where a singing bird can come. Avoiding the sinuous paths of theological ambiguity Herbert demonstrates a state of equanimity flooded by the boundless light that Buddha pointed out for ailing Ajatasatru in Mahaparinirvana Sutra. There cannot be a separate religion for this Light. What is Eternal is Real. What is Real is Light. This light helps man to balance the desirable and the undesirable and attain a quiet happiness so pleasantly touched upon in the Oracle of Sumiyoshi.

Footnotes:

1. Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, II, ii, 119.
2. G.H. Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology, Chap.17.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Prayer, indeed is the most powerful energy that one can generate. In it we seek to augment our finite energy. This is an obvious pointer to an uninhibited exercise of the free will. It could be made laborious, a method to buy up virtue. It is Martha rather than Mary. Heiler in Das Gebet points out the assiduous cries of the devout to weary God into submission-force Him to grant our wishes with stern and hostile siege. This itself is a comment on the nature of the free will and leaves open the irksome scab before paganism and christianity.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

MOKSHA AND ITS LIMITATION

Paul Richardson

Radhakrishnan; despite his desire to assert the superiority of *jnanayoga* over all other *yogas*, does believe that the perfection of *yoga*, any "*yoga*," results in *moksha* or liberation. With this in mind, it is important to consider Radhakrishnan's view concerning *moksha*, or the state of the realized being, and what he considers to be the viewpoint of the Gita on this most important point of all.

In Radhakrishnan's opinion:
Freedom or *moksha* is unity with the supreme self.[1]

He finds many names for *moksha* (freedom) in the Gita: *mukti* (release), *brahmisthiti* (being in Brahman), *naishkarmya* (non-action), *nistraigunya* (absence of the three qualities), *kaivalya* (solitary salvation), siddhi (perfection), para siddhi (supreme perfection), *param gatim* (supreme goal), padam anamayam (blissful seat), *shanti* (quietude), *shashvatam padam avyayam* (eternal indestructible abode), *param shanti* (highest rest), *brahma samsparsham* (contact with God), *brahma nirvana* (rest in brahman), *brahmabhuta* (transmutation into Godhead)).[2] And there are many others as well.

The richness of the *Gita's* language in regard to *moksha* is extraordinary. However, despite this great variety or multiplicity of expression, Radhakrishnan holds that:

> The Gita insist on the unity of the life of spirit which cannot be resolved into philosophic wisdom, devoted love or strenuous action.[3]

He agrees with Shanker, that *moksha* is not an act of service devotion, or cognition rather:

> It is an experience or a direct insight into truth.[4]

Radhakrishnan generally supports the *advaita*, or non-dualistic, interpretation of the Gita, and feels that the Gita supports "*advaita metaphysics*." Since *advaita philosophy* derives its name and import from its view concerning the nature of *moksha*, the quality of realization,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it is only natural that it is on this point above all others, that one would expect Radhakrishnan to show the greatest consistency. Curiously, this is not the case, for he believes that both a dualistic and non-dualistic ontology are supported by the Gita:

> There are then two conflicting views in the Gita about the ultimate state.[5]

These "two conflicting views" of *moksha* conflict on the point as to whether the individual continues, whether there is existence for the individual after realization, or not. For doctrinally-minded commentators, this is the most important philosophical consideration of all. Radhakrishnan considers the following verses to support the *advaita* view of *moksha:*

> udarah sarva evai'te jnani tvatmaiva me matam
> asthitah sa hi yuktatma mamevanuttamam gatim
> Noble indeed are all these but the sage, I hold, is verily Myself. For being perfectly harmonized, he resorts to Me alone as the highest goal.
>
> (7.18)
>
> antakale cha mameva smaranmuktva Kalevaram
> yah prayati sa madbhavam yati nastyatra samshayah
>
> And whoever, at the time of death, gives up the body and departs, thinking of Me alone, he comes to My status (of being); of that there is no doubt.
>
> (8.5)
>
> tasmatsarveshu kaleshu mamanusmara yudhya cha
> mayyarpitamanobuddhirmamevaishyasyasamshayah
>
> Therefore at all times remember Me and fight. When thy mind and understanding are set on Me to Me alone shalt thou come without doubt.
>
> (8.7)

The verses which Radhakrishnan considers to support the *dvaita* view (that the realized being continues to act and therefore is an individual) include:

> vitaragabhayakrodha manmaya mamupashritah
> bahavo jnanatapasa puta madbhavamagatah
>
> Delivered from passion, fear and anger, absorbed in Me, taking refuge in Me, many purified by the austerity of wisdom, have attained to My state of being.
>
> (4.10)
>
> idam jnanamupashritya mama sadharmyamagatah
> sarge'pi no'pajayante pralaye na vyathanti cha
>
> Having resorted to this wisdom and become of like

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

nature to Me, they are not born at the time of creation; nor are they disturbed at the time of dissolution.

(14.2)[6]

Radhakrishnan does not discuss in detail why he thinks that these verses support diametrically opposed views concerning the nature of ultimate reality, and to any casual reader of the Gita, it would appear that any of these verses could equally be used to illustrate either of these views. Krishna's words defy easy categorization.

Indeed, the only criterion the Gita establishes for determining "individuality" is the *sankalpa* that the *atman* is the body (*deha*). Therefore it hardly makes sense to consider whether or not action is performed by a body to be germane to the question of "individuality," even separateness of bodies does not constitute individuality:

prthaktvena tu yajjnanam nanabhavan prthagvidhan
vetti sarveshu bhuteshu tajjnanam viddhi rajasam.

The knowledge which sees multiplicity of beings in the different creatures, by reason of their separateness, know that that knowledge is of the nature of "passion." (18.21)

Simply because many bodies say "I" does not mean that individuality exists. The oneness of being is undiminished by the appearance of multiplicity.

It is important and significant to note that the question of individuality after realization is never a concern of Arjuna's, nor does Krishna find it a point worth informing Arjuna about, and least not in such terms. This is really an academic question only, for *moksha* is realization of the Whole, perfect freedom. The question as to whether or not individuality remains after realization is itself nothing but *sankalpa*.

Radhakrishnan appears to be aware of the fact that the Gita does not address this question. Instead, he contends that the Gita is vague and contradictory on this point:

The author of the Gita seems to believe in a continuance of conscious individuality even in freedom. [7]

In *aparoksanubhava* or the ultimate state in which the individual is absorbed in the Absolute, the separate individual as such does not survive.[8]

The Gita is not clear on the point whether there is any basis of individuality in the ultimate state.[9]

These expressions are colourless, and do not tell us whether there is a continuance of individuality in the state of freedom.[10]

Due to this apparent lack of clarity or certainty, Radhakrishnan

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

considers the Gita to support all views concening the question of *moksha* and what happens to the individual when he is self-realized:

> The goal of transcendence is represented as the ascent to the world of the Creator (*brahmaloka*), or the attainment of the status of the Impersonal Supreme (*brahmabhava* or *brahmishiti*). One side of it is isolation from the world (*kaivalya*). The *Gita* mentions all these views.[11]
>
> Many passages suggest that, in the state of release, duality disappears and the released soul becomes one with the Eternal Self. It is a condition beyond all modes and qualities, impassive, free and at peace.[12]
>
> The *jivanmukta* or the freed soul possessing the body reacts to the events of the outer world without getting entangled in them. On this view, spirit and body are an unreconciled duality and we cannot think of any action of the released soul.[13]
>
> The main emphasis of the *Gita* is not on such a view. For it, the state of spiritual freedom consists in the transformation of our whole nature into the immortal law and power of the Divine. Equivalence with God (*sadharmya*) and not identity (*sayujya*) is emphasized.[14] The highest condition is not a laya or a disappearance in the supreme, but one of individuality.[15]

According to Radhakrishnan, as well as most other commentators, the question as to whether or not the individual "continues" after self-realization, is germane to the associated question of "Does he continue to act?" Underlying these questions lies the assumption, that unless one is an individual, one cannot act. This is despite the fact that God says He continues to act though He is not a body-identified individual, and despite the fact that the Gita says that action continues regardless of questions such as: What is *karma*? What is *akarma*?[16] Karma is *brahman*; there is no question as to whether it exists or not.

However *karma* does not depend on, nor belong to, the physical body alone, although Radhakrishnan and most commentators don't consider this point. The logical sequence: To act, is to be a body, is to be an individual, is to be unrealized, is to suggest that the Gita supports a dualistic ontology; is not supported by the Gita. Nevertheless Radhakrishnan considers the varying opinions expressed in the Gita concerning *moksha* to be distinct from each other according to their difference of this opinion on this point.

Therefore when Radhakrishnan is considering whether or not the individual continues after realization, he treats this question as if *advaita* realization precludes the possibility of action. Therefore, if the individual continues, and thus action is possible, then the moksha

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in question is dvaita. If the individual no longer exists in the ultimate state, then that realization is advaita (non-dualistic)and action is therefore not possible.

Radhakrishnan also believes that the synthetic character of the Gita is reflected in the Gita's dual teaching concerning the nature of *moksha*: realization of both *purushottama* and *brahman*:

> In the discussion of Gita metaphysics we have said that the Gita does not repudiate the ultimate reality of the absolute Brahman, but it suggests that from our point of view this absolute reveals itself as the personal Lord. There is no other way for thought, human and limited as it is, to envisage the highest reality.[17]

That is, when the ultimate reality is conceived as *purushottama*, the "concrete individual" that Radhakrishnan himself believes is necessary for *bhakti*, then *moksha* will include the continuation of the individual alongside the ultimate reality, *purushottama*. According to Radhakrishnan this is a logical imperative: there cannot be both complete identification with the ultimate, and continuation of the sense of individuality.

According to Radhakrishnan, it is the intellect that "grasps" and the intuition that "intuits" this highest reality:

> The two views of the ultimate state of freedom are the intuitional and the intellectual ways of representing the one condition.[18]

Purushottama, or the "conceivable" personal Lord, is the intellectual representation of the ultimate condition, and absolute *brahman* the intuitional. If we accept Radhakrishnan's view, then we must conclude that the intellect is limited in its "becoming," forever "not grasping" the absolute reality, trapped in its illusion of one day "becoming" a super intellect, God. While intuition, which for Radhakrishnan appears to mean knowing, but not in an intellectual, or conceptual way, leads to the highest level of *moksha*, identification with *brahman*

Radhakrishnan's observation reflects a commonly held view that the absolute *brahman* is beyond conception, that it cannot be grasped by a human being. However, if this is the case, then why does Krishna choose to speak about this *brahman* at all? Even to say that "the absolute is beyond conception," is itself a conception. When something is said to be "beyond words," some meaning is still grasped by the use of these words. If this were not the case, what would be the point of the many scriptures that do not speak about the personal Lord at all? Are they simply ungraspable? Human thought is not limited, otherwise how could one grasp this point: "Human thought is limited"? Therefore it would be more correct to say that neither *purushottama* nor *brahman*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are simply realized by, or according to, the conception of an unrealized being. Realization requires *yoga* (meditation). Thought is divine and infinite, It is identification with this thought that limits it.

According to this dual scheme, *jnana*, the absolute reality to be realized, is stated to be only an intellectual expression or "representation." 'However, when *yoga* is understood to be meditation, then this odd interpretation is not necessary. For then *jnana* becomes *jnanayoga*: intellect and meditation (intuition) are the path, and the intellect transformed or "*yog-ed*" is the ultimate ideal. In this sense, there is no contradiction between identification with the Supreme Lord and identification with the absolute *brahman*, nor is there a question as to what is graspable and what is not, nor is there a question as to whether the individual remains after realization or not. The Gita accepts these questions on the level of *sankalpa: yoga* realization does not depend on these questions being answered. Yoga realization is perfect peace and freedom. It is perfect peace and freedom, not because these questions have been answered on the level of *sankalpa*; nor by answering these questions, does the aspirant become realized.

Radhakrishnan appears to understand the "foreignness" of these *dvaita* restrictions when applied to *yoga* in the Gita, but cannot reject their logical propositions. In the end he compromises, and offers a concept that does not appear to be supported anywhere in the Gita, absolute individualism:

> Absolute individualism is the view of the Gita so far as the end is concerned.[19]

He does not elaborate on this point, but it would appear to suggest that individuality does "survive" realization, but individuality which has all the qualities of the Absolute. This odd intellectual juxtaposition, Absolute and individual, is put forth despite the fact that Radhakrishnan has throughout his commentary dwelt on the irreconcilability of the individual and the Absolute.

Rather than offering a reason as to why Krishna in the Gita will not answer these duality-based questions to the satisfaction of the duality-based (*sankalpa asannyasta*) mind, Radhakrishnan attempts to innovate, but does so on the basis of the same dualistic assumptions. He believes that the truth is *advaita*, but has difficulty in demonstrating how the Gita can be said to reject the arguments of those who believe that reality consists of the permanent ontological duality between *atman* and *brahman*.

Moksha is a singular phenomenon, not a word describing a variety of experiences. The definition of *moksha*, the answer to the question "What is *moksha*?" must be uncompromising. It cannot be an intellectual estimation, nor a composite of different phenomena, nor a compromise between varying opinions. The mark of *moksha*, including the nature

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection. Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or "position" of the *atman* when realized, is the chief point of disagreement bet-ween all the chief commentators of the Gita. This is natural, since *moksha* represents the *summum bonum* of life, and is the focal point of all philosophical considerations of the Gita, including the ontological, epistemological and soteriological dimensions of *yoga*.

REFERENCES

1. *S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, p.575*
2. *S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, p.575; Bhagavadgita, p. 75*
3. *S. Radhakrishnan: Bhagavadgita, p. 75*
4. *S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, p.574*
5. *See, ibid., p.578*
6. *It is interesting to note that Radhakrishnan considers the expression madhavam to support both the dvaita and advaita views of moksha (4.10;8.5)*
7. *S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, p.577*
8. *S. Radhakrishnan: Bhagavadgita, p. 65*
9. *S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, p.575*
10. *See, ibid., p.576*
11. *S. Radhakrishnan: Bhagavadgita, p. 75*
12. *See, ibid., p. 75*
13. *See, ibid., p. 76*
14. *See, ibid., p. 76*
15. *S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, p.577*
16. *Bhagavadgita, 4.16*
17. *S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, p.578*
18. *See, ibid., p.578*
19. *See, ibid., p.579*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

CAN GENIUS BE PSYCHOANALYZED

Mark Halpern

Many definitions of genius have been attempted since first that rarest of intellectual qualities manifested among us. Today it is scarcely more understood than it was in the earliest days of its observation. But upon one thing people seem to be agreed when they note some of the strangle idiosyncrasies of the individual possessing that uncommon faculty: that genius is apparently akin to a form of madness.

The above view is not only peculiar to the average layman. It is proved by the fact that the famous Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), who became a professor of clinical psychiatry, wrote a work along this line which he called Genius and Insanity published toward the close of the 19th century, it aroused quite a bit of controversy.

Considering the behavior of some of our greatest geniuses, it is no wonder that their anomalous breed has been figuratively branded with the label of madness.

When the untamed Beethoven, walking along in a town where he happened to be sojourning, behold her majesty the queen and members of the royal family coming towards him, he did not step aside with bowed head, as was customary. Instead, crossing his arms over his chest and holding his head erect, he marched on in the center of the walk, forcing the queen and her family to stop aside, where they stood bowing to him until he passed.

Such an act was no doubt regarded as shamefully inexplicable to the subjects of royalty in his day. But not to Beethoven. "We have had and shall continue to have," he explained to Goethe, who was with him on that occasion, "thousands of such royal personages. But there is and always will be only one Goethe and one Beethoven. We are the real princes. The true royalty of the world."

Once when Beethoven was deeply preoccupied in composing one of his immortal works, having been steadily engaged at it for many hours, his solicitous housekeeper stole into his room with a heaping dish of pudding. Seeing that he remained completely oblivious of her, she crept

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

softly closer to him, then shoved the pudding under his nose.

Abruptly jerked back from a distant sphere of creative inspiration to the prosaic world of mere food for the physical body, Beethoven started long and hard at what was being held before him, as though painfully trying to determine just what it might be. Then, with a violent grunt, the composer suddenly seized the dish of pudding and hurled it at the terrified housekeeper.

Madness, you say? Well, put yourself in Beethoven's place. And remember, he was only poor misunderstood genius, and not yet a liberated Master.

What would the people of today think if they were to see a naked man running down the street while joyously repeating, "I have found it! I have found it!" No doubt but they would think the same as the people in the days of the great Archimedes, the ancient mathematician and inventor, when they beheld the scientist's nude figure and heard his triumphant reiterated shout, "Eureka!" (I have found it!) While in his bath, Archimedes had discovered the solution to a problem of physics on which he had been working for some time. He immediately dashed out into the street, not stopping to dress.

And it is said that when the Roman army invaded the town where the scientist lived, he was so intent on his experiments that he was utterly oblivious of all the commotion. He remained absorbed in his work, contemplating mathematical formulas he had drawn in the sand, until killed by the soldiers!

Sir Isaac Newton, another great scientist, famous for his discovery of the Law of Gravitation, was not free from the eccentricities of genius. Once when Newton was taking a rest on his farm, he learned that the barnyard cat had given birth to a litter of kittens. Observing that there was an opening out in the side of the barn at ground level, large enough for the use of the cat, the scientist, whose intellect was accustomed to dealing with universal laws, became burdened with the mighty problem of how the tiny kittens would be able to move in and out of the barn, since there appeared to be no opening for them to use. He continued to wrestle with the problem.

Then the great inspiration of genius! Newton proceeded to fashion another and much smaller hole beside the large one. Now the little kittens would also have the means of ingress and egress and not run the danger of being shut inside or outside the barn.

And, of course, there is the classic example of Socrates, suddenly stopping dead still while walking through the streets of Athens, lost in thought. There he remained motionless while the hours passed, with his fellow citizens wagering bets as to when he would come back to himself.

What wonder then that geniuses are held to be touched with more

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or less of madness. For who can understand a true genius of the caliber of a Socrates, Archimedes, Newton or Beethoven? Modern psychology, in the person of none other than the celebrated father of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud, attempted to fathom the essential cause and nature of genius in Freud's treatise describing his psychoanalysis of the world's most versatile genius, Leonardo da Vinci. In this work, Freud endeavored to prove that da Vinci's genius is explainable by childhood fixations formed by the boy in those first years when he was constantly with his mother and saw nothing of his father.

It seems odd that apparently it never occurred to Freud that there have been and will continue to be untold thousands of similar cases of childhood in which only the maternal parent is known. Yet there has been thus far, only one da Vinci, and at the present time there is no sign of another on the creative horizon.

Of all theories held as to the explanation of genius, the one that seems most plausible is preexistence of the individuality, or reincarnation. Heredity and environment alone seem inadequate to account for our immortals. Else why only one Confucius, one Pythagoras, one Socrates, one Plato, one Dante, one Michelangelo, one da Vinci, one Shakespeare, one Milton, one Mozart, one Beethoven, one Goethe, one Tagore, one Gandhi, one Einstein.

There were other children in the families of these great ones with the same heredity and environment. And some of our most famous geniuses had offspring. Whatever happened to these other children and offspring?

But when taken in the light that genius is nothing more of less then the result of practice and hard work, not in merely one lifetime, which may be considerably shortened, but in many throughout the ages, the unexplained becomes clear.

The analytical intellect is incapable of revealing the secret of whence comes genius and what makes it "tick." Therefore, it would seem that from the futility of past experience it would be the better part of wisdom to forego the fruitless effort of trying to understand that anomaly among the human species, let alone the great Spiritual Giants of the ages. If we can understand the masterpieces of genius, and appreciate them to some extent, we may rest content.

The true spirit of genius itself can never be made captive. Genius is the Flaming Eagle of abstract creativity capable of sustained flight through the Fiery Empyrean of Universal Mind.....

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV

SHANKARA, KANT AND SCHOPENHAUER

Gopal Stavig

Arthur Schopenhauer held deep reverence for Immanuel Kant's philosophy and considered himself to be his heir apparent and immediate successor. His metaphysics begin with Kant's ideas which he endeavored to modify and improve upon.[1] Four of Shopenhauer's major revisions of Kant's metaphysics are: **1.** in our essential nature as the Noumenal Self (Sk. Atman) we are identical with the thing-in-itself (Sk. Brahman), which is ambiguously stated in Kant's philosophical system; **2.** the highest manifestation of the thing-in-itself is the realm of the platonic ideas which is intermediate between the noumenal and phenomenal planes of existence; **3.** it is possible to enter into the realm of the noumena in a state of mystical experience; and **4.** a person should obey the categorical imperative because of the oneness of human existence. It is significant that each these important constructive additions to Kant's philosophy is endorsed by the Advaitic philosophy of Shankara.

Schopenhauer noted the similarity between the Indian Upanishads upon which Shankara's system of thought is based and Kant's metaphysics. Both Paul Deussen and Friedrich Nietzsche alluded to the correspondence between Shankar's Commentary (Bhasya) on the Vedanta Sutras and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Swami Vivekananda wrote that long before Kant, the seer philosopher Shankara discovered that space, time and causality are modes of thought which he called maya. The Swami sent some passages from Shankara's commentary illustrating this point to Max Mueller, who had translated Kant's Critique of Pure Reason into the English langauge.[2]

The common points of agreement between the philosophical system of Shankara, Kant and Schopenhauer are: **1.** the Absolute (Brahman, noumena, thing-in-itself) is unknowable by discursive reason, transcending the perceptual and conceptual categories of the mind that are valid only for finite existence; **2.** the Absolute is the ground

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and substratum of the phenomenal world; **3.** There is an epistemological distance between real existence and the apparent world (maya, representation, phenomena); **4.** the phenomenal world is an appearance or representation and not an illusion; **5.** the philosophy of subjective idealism is in error; **6.** perception and conceptualization are reducible to a limited number of fundamental categories of the mind; **7.** the empirical world is a limitation of the Absolute, conditioned by restrictive mental forms of the human mind; **8.** the human observer is actively involved in the construction of the empirical world and **9.** there is a transcendental unity of apperception that is responsible for the subjective experience of self-identity.

ATMAN, NOUMENA SELF AND THE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION

Kant was more concerned about the possibility, principles and limits of a priori knowledge than with the Noumena Self. His commentators are not in agreement on whether he accepted or rejected a Noumena Self, since his writings are ambiguous on the subject.[3] He wrote, "I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself... We should also have to allow the subject an intelligible character, by which it is indeed the cause of those same actions as appearance, but which does not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility, and is not itself appearance."[4] The phenomenal self is an appearance, derived from the transcendental object which is its foundation. Like Brahman-Atmam, the intelligible transcendental object is changeless existing prior to the limitations of space, time and the categories of human understanding and possesses a nonphenomenal causality. Kant maintained that a person does not know himself as he really is, independent of the phenomenal categories of understanding or as a member of the intellectual world that transcends the objects of the senses. From an epistemological standpoint, humans have a twofold nature, an apparent sensual empirical self and as a thing-in-itself, an intelligible super sensible Self. An unknowable subject-in-itself, is the substratum that underlies the empirical "I." In its intelligible character the subject is free of all influences of sensibility and causal determinations.[5] According to Kant's philosophy of practical reason, as expressed particularly in his Opus Postumum, a person's true intelligible Self is identical with God and is truly free. The moral law is the ground of man's own inner being, immanent in him, yet a person is alienated from his true Self and does not fulfil the demands of his own nature. As phenomenal appearance we are bound to the laws of causality, but as intelligible beings we are free from sensibility, necessity and the determining laws and causes of the world. Freedom comes from our noumenal existence as a thing-in-ourself, not limited by space, time or the law of causality. A free moral timeless choice was made by our intelligible character, which determines the entire casual sequence of our life in the empirical world.[6]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Kant's transcendental unity of apperception like the Indian Atman is an ineffable, immutable, pure, unconditioned and undivided unity of consciousness that is the source of all thought. It is prior to space and time, synthesizes empirical perceptions and is the condition and presupposition of knowledge, but not the object of knowledge. Making the perception of space and time possible, it is the primary principle of synthesis and the source of all thought In Kant's words,

"There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness 1 shall name Transcendental Apperception.[7]

Yet, according to most of Kant's commentators, the unity of apperception is not the Noumenal Self, but is a nonempirical bare formal unity of consciousness, a frame of reference used to synthesize mental experience. As a transcendental ideal, it is empty of content and unreal until it is objectified in perceptual and conceptual experience. It is known only through its objectifications which are its predicates and apart from that is unknowable. The a priori faculty of the unity of apperception orders a fragmentary and disunited mass of representations, into a meaningful constructed synthetic pattern.[8]

Kant taught that self-identity is a necessary condition for the possibility of all representations. The identity of the self is never discovered in empirical experiences, but is a condition of them. Without the a priori synthesis of the manifold into a unity of apperception, there is no identity of self-consciousness. The 'I' of apperception that accompanies all representations and pervades every thought is a permanent condition of experience, a logically simple subject. A representation belongs to a contextually interconnected system of mental states and is not a mere bundle of sensations as David Hume mistakenly thought.[9]

Schopenhauer unequivocally supported the existence of a Noumenal self. As the substratum of phenomenal existence the thing-in-itself is the immanent cause of the universe, objectifying itself in the phenomenal world as the will within us. It is the real internal nature of a person's phenomenal self and is wholly present in each of its expressions. The Noumenal Self is the transpersonal subject. The knower, which lies outside of the forms of space, time and causality and is immutable, undifferentiated, eternal and unconditioned. We never comprehend the knower, which is that which knows in the process of understanding. "Everyone finds himself to be this will, in which the inner nature of the world consists, and he also finds himself to be the knowing subject, whose representation is the whole world."[10] As the noumenal thing-in-itself we are eternal and undetermined and as phenomenon we are transitory and determined. Our true inner nature exists in everything with the same immediacy as it exists in our self-awareness. Transcending the limitations of phenomenal existence,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the knowing subject is eternal, whole and undivided. The expression "tat tvam asi" ("thou art that") in the Indian Chandogya Upanishads, means that in our essential noumenal nature we are all one and the same entity.[11]

Shankara proclaimed that the Self-existent Atman is our true absolute, essential unconditioned and perfect transcendental self. The Atman, sees everything by its own light. No one sees it. It gives intelligence to the mind and intellect, but no one gives it light..... This is the Atman, the Supreme Being, the ancient. It never ceases to experience infinite joy. It is always the same. It is consciousness itself..... It maintains our unbroken awareness of identity. The Atman is the witness, infinite consciousness, revealer of all things,... it is the eternal reality, omnipresent, all-pervading.[12]

As the seer of seeing and the knower of knowing, it is the pure subject that pervades all cognition and perception, revealing objects but is never known as an object. It cannot be doubted, since it is the essential nature (svabhava) of the person who attempts to deny it, nor can it be verified by reason, since it proceeds all proofs and judgements. Atman is not the empirical self or the sum of all selves in the universe but the immanent ground of reality. The ephemeral self is the Atman limited by a finite mind and body.[13] Atman is the immanent witnessing self (saksin), an eternal and immutable pure unitary consciousness (chit), a passive observer and the substratum of phenomena that illumines the mind like a light. Functioning as a unity of apperception, the witness self is the preposition of all knowledge, the knower (jnatr) which pervades the changing cognitive self. The 'I' which is the background precondition of all experience is not a mere form or frame of reference that hold the multiple mental states together. As the foundational consciousness it unifiles the manifold ideas and scattered date of perception, synthesizing them into a meaningful unity. "Unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognizes everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on."[14]

Shankara held that mental content is subject to origination and decay and is not self-luminous. Cognitive and perceptual knowledge are known through the pure light of the Atman whose essential nature is self-luminous and self-revealing (svaprakasha), like a lamp that illumines an object. The luminous Atman is directly reflected without an intervening mode on the mind, which undergoes modifications that reveal objects and produce thoughts (vritti's). The mind receives the light of consciousness from the Atman like a crystal that absorbs physical light. Cognitive knowledge is self-revealing carrying its certainty self-validity.[15]

As Kant opposed David Hume's denial of personal identity, so also Shankara rejected the Indian Buddhist ideas of a nonself (anatta) and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

momentariness (ksanika-vada). The Atman is the permanent, immutable nonmomentary self, not in a state of flux. It is necessary for the awareness of personal identity, for the syntheses of manifold ideas into a meaningful unity and for making memory and recognition possible. There must be something independent of the mind, a reality that is beyond the flow of consciousness, by which the events of consciousness can be fixed.[16]

While Shankara declared there is only one Atman that is identical with Brahman, Kant often used the plural term, things-in-themselves. The advantage of the concept of things-in themselves, is that it explains why one phenomenal object is different from another. For Kant, the thing-in-itself of one object differs from the thing-in-itself of another object. If Kant is implying that there is a multiplicity of noumenal objects, then his conception resembles in part the Sankhya doctrine of multiple selves (Purushas). Sarvepalli Radhakrishan criticized Kant on this matter, maintaining that multiplicity is a phenomenal distinction and not a characteristic of the noumenal realm. There is only one Noumenal Self since it is without attributes, parts or distinctions and is independent of space and time.[17]

ISHVARA AND THE PLATONIC IDEAS

According to Kant's agnosticism pure reason cannot comprehend the supersensible world, which transcends the boundaries of all possible human experience and can never be objects of cognition. The tools employed in the analysis of phenomenal existence like reason and empirical perception, do not function in the supersensible realm outside of human experience. Transcendental illusion involves the unrestricted use of the categories of understanding beyond their legitimate field of experience. All attempts to gain knowledge of the Divine realm lead to paralogisms, antinomies and unproven dogmatic statements. The so-called eternal truths of theology are forms of the intellect, principles of mental representation, that do not apply to things-in-themselves. Human reason cannot prove the existence or non-existence of God or the soul, which are outside the possibilities of human comprehension. Since "intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge, it follows that the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the objects of experience."[18]

Schopenhauer taught that the platonic ideas are the highest and most direct objectification of the thing-in-itself, existing in an intermediate realm between the noumenal and the material world. The ideas are the "different grades of the will's objectification, expressed in innumerable individuals, exist[ing] as the unattained patterns of these, or as the eternal forms of things. Not themselves entering into time and space, the medium of individuals, they remain fixed, subject to no change."[19] Both the thing-in-itself and the Platonic ideas are immutable, transcending space, time and causality. Unlike the thing-in-itself, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ideas are knowable, plural and are representations. Being an object for a subject. Like the ideas of Plato, they are the original changeless exemplars of all objects, related to the world as archetypal forms to ectypical copies that participate in them. They are the universal eternal forms, species and class concepts of all things that actualize and express themselves in empirical existence according to a hierarchical ordering. The Will is wholly present in each phenomenal entity, but its degree of objectification through the Platonic ideas is subject to variation.[20] Christian philosophers have identified the Platonic ideas with the ideas in the mind of God.

Unlike Kant, Shankara accepted the religious doctrines of a personal God (Ishvara), Divine incarnation (avatar), liberation (mukti), the kingdom of Heaven (Brahmaloka), revealed religious scripture (shruti), religious devotion (bhakti), mystical experience (anubhava, smadhi), faith (shradha), grace (prasada), worship (arca) and saintly spiritual teachers (guru's). Ishvara the personal God like Schopenhauer's Platonic ideas, is the highest expression of the noumenal Nirguna Brahman in the finite world. Endowed with name and form it is the eternal, mutable and relative Brahman with attributes (Saguna Brahman) and a distinct personality. Ishvara is conditioned by the maya of knowledge (vidya) and totally free from ignorance (avidya); omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent as the creative potency of the universe. Existence, consciousness and bliss (satchitananda) are Ishvara's essential attributes, while creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world are only secondary characteristics. Ishvara is the uncaused first material and efficient cause of an orderly universe. Regulating the cosmos from within as the inner guide and controller (antaryamin), Ishvara is both transcendent and immanent. The world was created by the Divine intelligence. Just as clay requires a pattern directed by a potter to be molded into a pot. The harmony, Symmetry and regularity of the world indicate an omniscient director. Existence or being (sat, satta) is the common property of both Ishvara and the objects of the world. Worship of Ishvara leads to the Divine world and eventually to Brahman. The eternal creation of the universe is the Lords play (lila), being an expression of the fullness and abundance of God's free and joyous nature. As an act of compassion, part (amshena) of Ishvara manifests as a Divine incarnation (avtar) to restore righteousness in the world and to reinvigorate spiritual life.[21]

The Vedas which originate from Nirguna Brahman are eternal, authorless and express the ideas in the mind of Ishavara, the personal God. Like the platonic ideas the Vedic words (shabda) are the archetypical patterns used to generate the names and forms of the genus of all objects in the universe. For instance, the word "bhuh" manifested in the mind of God, he uttered it and its corresponding object, the earth came into existence. The primal meaning of a word is universal and a species and only secondarily a particular individual.[22]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE

Kant was brought up in an atmosphere of Protestant piety accepting their emphasis on moral integrity. He rejected the Pietists emphasis on mystical experience, prayer, Divine grace, religious devotion, church going and hymn singing, yet he profoundly believed in the existence of God. He contended that the church promotes superstition and heteronomous authority by denouncing reason, and auonomy.[23] Kant radically denied the mystical presence of the Divine in humans, rejecting the idea of an immanent spirit or inner light that dwells in the heart. Religious experience is unimportant and may lead to fanaticism and superstition. According to Kant's critical philosophy the transcendental illusion that considers the appearance to be the reality, does not cease after it has been intellectually discerned through transcendental criticism. One cannot venture beyond the limitations of sense perception and the categories of understanding to experience God or the soul. Superconscious intellectual intuition of the thing-in-themselves is not possible for humans, who possess only empirical intuition, which does not penetrate behind the phenomenal representation, We have only symbolic awareness of supersensible object conceived of through universal concepts and not intellectual intuition free of empirical objects.[24]

Realizing the serious practical limitations of Kant's critical philosophy, Schopenhauer reasoned that since the thing-in-itself is the reality behind the phenomenal appearance, it "must express its inner nature and character in the world of experience... we ourselves are the thing-in-itself. Consequently, a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things."[25] The thing-in-itself as the noumenal Will takes innumerable forms as the immanent cause of the world. As the ground of phenomenal existence, it can reveal its nature to our inner being through our will and consciousnèss. Whatever an individual wills in their inner being they become because we are what we will. A person can transcend the world by withdrawing his mind from it and disengaging from the projections of the will. Denial of the human will is a subjective event, an act of self-transformation and a departure from the empirical world of experience and cognition. In aesthetic contemplation the will is temporarily denied, when the creative person rises above temporal and changing phenomena comprehending the eternal Platonic ideas and the immutable state of existence. Lost in contemplation of the aesthetic object, the mystic temporarily becomes the will-less and desireless subject of cognition, mentally residing in a realm of pure knowledge without any afflictions.[26]

Schopenhauer considered the Platonic ideals to be intermediate between noumena and phenomena and attempted to devise useful contemplative techniques for experiencing union with them. Direct comprehension of the Platonic ideas is achieved by inner intuitive perception and not by abstract reason, conceptualization or inference.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Experiencing the eternal immutable ideas, the essence of the object, is achieved in the inner depths of consciousness, unfettered by spatial, temporal, causal, conceptual or relational limitations. In a contemplative state of complete objectivity,

we lose ourselves entirely in this object...and continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of object...We are no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one... What is thus known is no longer the individual thing as such, but the idea, the eternal form...The individual has lost himself, he is pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.[27]

What remains, is the object in-itself, a pure perception, a Platonic Ideal, the highest objectification of the will. What is contemplated in joy and tranquility is not the empirical object, but the eternal form, the primary manifestation of the will. Since each idea is wholly present in each member of the species, knowledge of the ideas is gained by concentrating on a single thing and not many particulars. All forces of the mind are directed on a single image of perception in an act of intense concentration.[28]

As one of the founders of comparative mysticism, Schopenhauer noted a concordance between the religious experiences of devotees of widely divergent religions and cultures. Mystics from various religions, describe an experience of the identity of their inner reality with the oneness of existence. No longer deceived by the veil of maya, the saint is free from the mental forms of phenomena. He experiences the inner nature of things, independent of the perceptual and conceptual limitations of space, time and causality, This idea has been verbalized in different religions and languages according to the theological dogmas that the saints espoused.[29]

Shankara the seer philosopher achieved spiritual illumination and created a practical religious philosophy that concentrates on attaining supersensous transcendental consciousness and spiritual intuition (anubhava, samadhi). Though Brahman is unknowable through reason and the intellect, it is realized through mystical experience and illumination. Spiritual intuition is a direct immediate revelation of the higher reality and a state of self-enlightenment, beyond subject-object duality, discursive reasoning and speech. An awakened soul passes into the ultimate state of illumination where the mind is completely absorbed in Brahman and pure consciousness and unlimited bliss are attained. Spiritual intuition carries the highest degree of certitude and only transcendental consciousness nullifies the representational appearance and the experience of plurality. The infallible messages of the religious scriptures are verified by supersenuous consciousness. When a person realizes that everything abides in the Atman which is the origin of all things, he becomes one with Brahman.[30]

Anubhava is attained by withdrawing the senses from everything

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

external and merging the mind and ego into the pure consciousness of the Atman. Transcendental consciousness is realized by reinterpreting the world following the discriminative practice of "neti, neti" ("not this, not this") in order to negate the apparent phenomenal existence. Religious devotion, image worship, ritual and ceremonies are gradual paths to the final liberation of identity with Brahman. A knower of Brahman is liberated while living (jivanmukti), enjoying the constant bliss of the Atman, After the prarabdha karmas are exhausted, the body dies and the ultimate state is attained.[31]

ETHICS AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Kant taught that the categorical imperative is an absolute universal moral command valid for all people binding everyone without exception. The moral principle of duty is an intrinsically valuable and in itself, performed out of respect for the rational moral law and not for any ulterior motive, such as seeking happiness or fear of punishment. Since there is nothing independent of morality from which it gets its value, the autonomous good will acts out of respect for the moral law. Moral duty should be obeyed because it is an unconditioned law, an end in-itself based on reason, possessing absolute value. It is a person's duty to strive for perfect virtue found in the harmony of my will with what is holy and good.[32]

The question arises why should a person follow the moral law and obey the categorical imperative, if it is a hardship that is not in their best interests? To answer this question, Schopenhauer offered a metaphysical rationale based on his interpretation of the philosophy of transcendental idealism. Intuitive insight of the oneness of existence, is the metaphysical ground of the categorical imperative, compassion and the moral law. A man of compassion realizes that,

> the will is the in-itself of every phenomenon, the misery inflicted on others and that experienced by himself, the bad and the evil, always concern the one and the same inner being... The in-itself of his own phenomenon is also that of others, namely the will-to-live which constitutes the inner nature of everything...He ...takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own ... recognizing in all beings his true and innermost self.[33]

We are all manifestations of the one will that is whole and undivided in the inner being of all phenomena. Our real inner nature abides in everything with the same immediacy that it exists in our self-awareness. Compassion and altruism require that we empathize with other people, so that there is an immediate participation in their suffering. The more a person overcomes the egoistic principle of separateness, the more they regard other peoples suffering as their own. A just person fulfills his own moral obligations and harms no innocent person, while a person

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of loving kindness makes personal sacrifices to help others, By realizing ones identity with all existence, a person reduces self-centeredness and the anxiety resulting from the perils that threaten the self. Schopenhauer cited the Bhagvad Gita (13.27-28) which states: "He who sees the Supreme Lord equally present in all creatures, not perishing while they perish, he sees indeed. When he sees the Lord equally present everywhere he does not hurt the self by means of the self; thus he reaches the highest goal." Schopenhauer offered a metaphysical rationale for the doctrine of eternal justice which is equivalent to the Indian law of karma. The good and harm done to another, always concern the one and same inner being though in the realm of phenomena they are separate individuals. The person who injures others unknowingly buries his teeth in his own flesh, since as the thing-in-itself they are one.[34]

Shankara concluded that Brahman is manifested to a greater extent in humans and consequently, they are subject to ethical norms. The Atman forms the basis of ethical action and the moral law (dharma), since goodness springs from the essential intrinsic inborn reality of a person. Dharma is the law of higher self which is the basis for attaining the supreme good. Social ethics, self-purification and mastering one's lower nature are necessary in order to attain to a higher spiritual reality. Right action purifies the heart and helps one to be free of past sins. A mediator should follow scriptural injunctions and maintain high moral standards. The primary ethical virtues are compassion, forgiveness, nonviolence, truthfulness, self-control, renunciation, continence, tranquillity, contentment, straightforwardness and the absence of pride and greed.[35]

ADVAITA VEDANTA AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

Nine different topics are analyzed to illustrate the basic similarity between the metaphysics of Shankara, Kant and Schopenhauer.

1. The Absolute is ineffable: Shankara observed that Brahman is indescribable (acintya) existing outside the boundaries of space, time, discursive reason and sense experience. It is neither a genus nor a substance, having no qualities, relations, activity, form or internal variation. Since it is without parts preceding the subject-object distinctions of knower, known and knowing it is not ascertained by the power of reason. There is no class or genus that Brahman belongs to, and thus, it cannot be comprehended by the intellect or denoted by words that signify a category of thing. Brahman the eternal subject is the intelligence that illuminates all objects. It exists prior to all possible experience and is not an object of knowledge. The knower can never be known as an object, since it is the foundation of all logical proofs which it precedes. It is definable only in the negative sense of "It is not this."[36]

Kant realized that things-in-themselves are unknowable by discursive reason which is valid only for finite existence. We are screened

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

off from ultimate reality which is not a possible object of experience or cognition. "What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us." The "transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance ... can be thought neither as quality nor as reality nor as substance." Understanding "cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something."[37] Schopenhauer posited that the thing-in-itself is never an object, it exist prior to the subject-object duality and the categories of space, time and causality, through which it manifests as diverse empirical objects. It is ineffable and unfathomable, transcending all human perceptual and conceptual experience. We know that it is, but not what it is, since the a priori forms of the intellect conceal it's true nature. One may ask what noumenal Will "is ultimately and absolutely in itself...This question can never be answered because...everything that is known is as such only phenomenon."[38]

2. The Absolute is the substratum of existence: Shankara taught that Brahman is the supporting or constituent cause of the universe. It is the formless, partless, infinite, indeterminate, unconditioned ground of all relations. Liberation is possible because ultimate reality is the all-embracing substratum of the world of appearances unaffected by worldly modifications and changes. Brahman is the archetype (bimba) that shines on the surface of the intellect (buddhi), generating the reflected (pratibimba) individual self (jiva) and the universe. This process is illustrated by the metaphor of the reflection of the sun on water. The reflected image is mistaken for the archetype, until maya is abolished, and then the reflection terminates and only Brahman remains.[39]

Kant posited that sensible objects of experience have a substratum of intelligible objects that exist independent of our experience of them. Things-in-themselves are objects without a subject, outside of space and time, independent of a perceiving subject. An "appearance must be recognized as already indicating a relation to...something in itself, that is, an object independent of sensibility."[40] Schopenhauer emphasized that the indivisible thing-in-itself is both the transcendent and the immanent cause of the world as the ground phenomenal existence. As the noumenal Will, it is wholly present in each of its objectifications, expressing its inner character and nature in the phenomenal world. It is the real internal nature of a person's phenomenal being, manifesting as the will within us and individuating itself into different objects.[41]

3. There is an epistemological distinction between real existence and the apparent world: Shankara contended that Brahman and the empirical world exist in a relationship of reality and appearance (abhasa), like a conch shell that is improperly perceived as silver. The transcendental reality seems to be creator of phenomenal existence by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

modifying its forms yet Brahman is immutable and causation is only apparent (vivarta-vada). From the practical empirical point of view (vyavaharika), phenomenal existence is regarded as real. From the absolute point of view (paramarthika), only Brahman is real and the phenomenal world is nonexistent.[42] Kant's transcendental idealism draws a distinction between things-in-themselves and their apparent phenomenal representations, which corresponds to the Advaitic contrast between Brahman and maya. All empirical objects are appearance and representation, determined partly by the sensory-conceptual apparatus of the human mind. The objects are empirically known as they appear in phenomenal experience and not as they appear in phenomenal experience and not as they are in-themselves. All objects are composed of two forms of representations, the inner sense (thoughts) and outer sense (objects). The representations have no independent reality outside of human thought. Transcendental illusion consists in equating the apparent, conditioned, determinate and sensible with the real, the unconditioned and indeterminate.[43] Schopenhauer explained that we only perceive and conceive of representative appearance of an object and not things as they really are in-themselves. All things have a twofold nature as phenomenal objects and as the noumenal thing-in-itself.[44]

4. The phenomenal world is an appearance or representation and not an illusion: Shankara concluded that maya is ineffable and indefinable being neither real nor unreal (anirvacaniya). It is not real since only Brahman exists, and the maya vanishes with the higher awareness. Neither is it an illusion like the son of a barren woman, since it creates the appearance of a world and is pervaded by the Absolute reality. From the practical standpoint the universe is phenomenally real since it provides the basis for liberation and potential consciousness of Brahman, but is not ultimately real.[45] Kant upheld the idea that phenomenal objects "are therefore real if they stand in an empirical connection with my actual consciousness, although they are not for that reason real in themselves." Empirical objects are not "mere illusions. For in an appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given."[46] The world is an appearance and not an illusion since its attributes are real existing representations, but are illusory only in regards to their ultimate properties. Transcendental Things-in-themselves are present in the representation as its substratum. Space and time are empirically real but transcendentally ideal since they do not apply to things-in-themselves.[47] Schopenhauer considered the world to be a representation, an object that is dependent on and conditioned by a subject. We start with neither the object (realism) nor the subject (idealism) but the representation that proceeds them both. Phenomena are known indirectly, as determined by the forms of representation of the mind, since there is no object without a subject. All phenomenal

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection. Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objects are a combination of two factors: the a priori forms of cognition and perception conditioned by the senses and the intellect and the thing-in-itself.[48]

5. Subjective idealism is to be criticized: in opposition to subjective idealism, Shankara, Kant and Schopenhauer each maintained that the inner subjectivity of the mind is as much of an appearance or representation as the external objective existence. They also concluded that Brahman or things-in-themselves or the thing-in-itself is the ontological ground of both external and internal phenomena.[49] As Shankara vehemently criticized the idealism of the Buddhist subjectivists, so also Kant opposed the subjective idealism of George Berkeley. Shankara held that from the standpoint of phenomenal existence (vyavaharika), external objects and internal awareness are two different things. Perceptual awareness reveals what exists, but does not subjectively create external content out of itself. An inseparable connection between subject and object does not imply they are identical. This world exists separately from our perception of it, since we experience an object as an external entity and distinguish between the subject and object. The waking state unlike imaginary dream objects, is based on sense perception, is public not private, endures coherently for a long period of time and is not sublated by another empirical experience.[50] Schopenhauer disagreed with Kant and supported the idealism of Berkeley, acknowledging that on the phenomenal level "there is no object without a subject." However, he surpassed Berkeley, asserting that both the subject and object are apparitional representations of the thing-in-itself.[51] Like Schopenhauer, Prakashananda (c. 1505) a later member of the Shankarian school under the inspiration of the Yoga-Vasistha (c. 1200) also supported subjective idealism.

6. Perception and conceptualization can be reduced to fundamental categories of the mind: In Shankara's system phenomenal existence appears to be limited by name (nama), the internal aspect of the form and form (rupa) the external aspect of the name analogous to the subject-object distinction. "Excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms."[52] The form of eternal material substance continually changes, just as clay can be molded into many forms with different names, yet remains as clay. For Kant, the two primary categories are the objective forms of sensibility or intuition and the twelve subjective forms or categories of understanding. According to Schopenhauer "the division into object and subject is the first, universal, and essential form of the representation."[53]

Unlike Kant, Shankara did not create an elaborate system of conceptual categories. He criticized the categories (padartha) of the Vaishesika philosophy, because they considered them to be objective

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

eternal metaphysical objects, rather than subjective universal concepts, He did mention that the categories of existence, quality, action, relation and genus do not apply to Brahman.[54] In a couple of references Shankara mentioned the limiting forms of place (space), time and cause, which approximates Schopenhauer's representation of phenomenal existence as space, time and causation.[55]

Kant pointed out that the sensibility and understanding which involve space, time and the twelve categories of conceptualization, result from the structural foundations of the mind. Space and time are not empirical concepts derived from experience, but are sensible forms of intuition. They are representations that underlie all intuition as a priori subjective conditions of sensibility that are superimposed on things-in-themselves. The a priori representation of time is the determinate form of the inner subjective sense and of space the outer objective intuition. Quantity, quality, relation and modality are the principal "forms of thought, which contain the merely logical faculty of uniting a priori in one consciousness the manifold given in intuition" into coherent perceptions and conceptions.[56] Kant's specification of twelve conceptual categories to explain finite existence, was anticipated by the Indian Buddhists who posited, substance, quality, action, genus and name, as the five subjective categories of mental construction (vikalpa) that are superimposed on indeterminate, unqualified objects. These five misconceptions are responsible for a false ascription of difference to what is nondifferent. Unlike Kant, they did not differentiate forms of sensibility from those of understanding. Madhava (14th century) a dualist, maintained that the concrete apprehension of the category of determinate objects resulted from the objectification of the category of name, and the seven Vaishesika categories of substance, quality, action or motion, relational inherence, generality, particularity and nonexistence.[57]

Schopenhauer held that space, time and causality are the three secondary mental patterns of representations that manifest through the universal a priori forms of knowledge. These three innate a priori subjective functions of the mind enter into all possible phenomenal experience and determine the way we perceive and conceive the world. The three categories are mind dependent structural forms that understanding imposes on sense data transforming them into perceptions. Infinite things-in-themselves appears to be conditioned, limited and individuated epistemologically by these categories. Kant's twelve categories of understanding are reducible to causality, which is the only category needed for the construction of a perceptual object from diverse senstion.[58]

7. The empirical world is a limitation of the Absolute, conditioned by restricted mental forms of the human mind: Shankara maintained that the dualistic world of subject and object is an illusory construction

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(Kalpana) of our thoughts. In its tamasic aspect the mind negatively conceals and veils (avarana) the real nature of Brahman. Limiting adjuncts (upadhi's) like the Kantian a priori forms, are expressed through a mental mode (antahkarana-vritti) taking a subjective form as internal cognition and an objective mode as external perceptions. The finite updhi's of the mind, senses and physical body limit the infinite, restricting it to a particular space and time, as illustrated by the metaphor of universal space being enclosed in an individual object like a jar. Universal consciousness is individualized through the mind (antahkarana) becoming the individual self. So also the undivided all-pervasive infinite Brahman seems to be limited, individualized and divide. Remove the conceptual and perceptual limitations of name and form and the individual becomes one with Atman. As a wave exists separately though it is not different from the ocean, so the objects of the world are not different from Brahman.[59]

According to Kant, human reason can never transcend the limits of sensibility or the conceptual categories of the mind, within which space and time and phenomenal objects are given. The original representations of space and time are infinite, while sbjects are known to us only through limitation. Diverse spaces are parts of a single space. " Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on (the introduction of) limitation.... Every determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations of a single time that underlies it... Understanding is not limited through sensibility, on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility.[60] If all a prior conditions of comprehension were removed, the unknowable things-in-themselves would remain. [61] Schopenhauer view is that the noumenal Will is one, appearing to individuate itself into different objects, since all multiplicity exists only in the phenomenal realm. The Will and the Platonic ideas are free of particularizing a priori forms and the principle of individualization. Representations are the objectification of the will from a state of unity to diversity.[62]

8. The observer is actively involved in the construction of the empirical world: Shankara pointed out that in its rajasic aspect the mind utilizes its power to project (viksepa) the attributes of name and form, creating an apparent existence. The nonself and empirical world as space and time are superimposed by the human mind on Brahman (svarupadhyasa) or a secondary quality like redness is superimposed on a primary quality like a crystal (samsarga-adhyasa). The reality appears to take on the characteristics of maya, as a rope is misperceived to be a snake. Superimposition produces a false cognition of the apparent presentation of the attributes of one entity on another entity and is removable by right knowledge (vidya) which leads to the higher reality.[63]

Kant affirmed that all awareness involves not passive contemplation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

but active judgement and synthetic interpretation. The immediate element of knowledge in our consciousness is always conditioned by an interpretive process in order for awareness to take place. Space and time are forms of passive intuition that combine with the active categories of understanding. They coherently unify the manifold sense data given in intuition which allows us to think the sensible objects. "If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations...is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding,"[64] Schopenhauer wrote that presentations tale two forms; sense perceptions of the external world and concepts of understanding that actively organize sensation into perceptions. The human mind is not a passive recipient of sense impressions, but plays an active part in organizing sense data. The active subjective faculties of the mind work through the a priori mental forms of space, time and casualty. They organize sense data into an objective empirical world consisting of the primary qualities of extension, figure, solidarity, motion and number.[65]

9. There is a transcendental unity of apperception that produces the experience of self-identity, This subject is discussed in the Atman, Noumena Self and Unity of Apperception section. Also both Shankara and Schopenhauer affirmed that; the world is eternal, the soul reincarnates and that human personality types can be classified as sattvic, rajasic and tamasic.[66]

In 1813, Schopenhauer received a copy of Duperron's Latin translation of the Upanishads (Oupnekhat, 1801-02) He wrote that he was not influenced by the Upanishads when he wrote his first volume of The World as Will and Representation during the 1814-18 period.

Interestingly, Schopenhauer's idea that our Noumenal Self (Sk. Atman) is one with the thing-in-itself (Sk. Brahman) and that one can attain to oneness with the thing-in-itself (Sk. Nirvakalpa Samadhi), are found in numerous terse suggestive passages in the Upanishads. He also espoused the Upanishadic concepts of asceticism, the law of karma, reincarnation, "tat tvam asi" and the veil of maya. He acknowledged the concordance of his teaching with Asian religions and prognosticated that "Indian wisdom flows back to Europe, and will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought."[67]

In conclusion, it was Immanuel Kant who introduced a metaphysical system of thoughts akin to Shankara's Advaita Vedanta into western philosophy. Schopenhauer made some crucial improvements in Kant's philosophy which bring it more in line with Shankara's teachings. The metaphysical and epistemological ideas encompassed in the teachings of Kant and Schopenhauer, reach their logical fulfillment in the life transforming spiritual philosophy of Shankara. In the applied

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sotereological sense Shankara's philosophy far exceeds that of Kant and Schopenhauer, since their formulations do not lead to liberation or the experience of Nirvakalpa Samadhi. From a theoretical standpoint, Kant's doctrine of the categories, the a priori nature of perception and human thought, and the transcendental unity of apperception; and Schopenhauer's monistic ethic of oneness, application of the Platonic ideas, description of maya as a representation characterized by the limiting characteristics of space, time and causality, and studies of comparative mysticism; are valuable original contributions, which have expanded the scope of a universal Advaitic philosophy.

Endnotes

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (hereafter WWR), E.F.J. Payne, tr. (2 vols.; New York; Dover publications, 1969), i, pp.416-17.
2. WWR, i, p.419; Hans Rollmann, "Deussen, Nietzsche and Vedanta," Journal of the History of Ideas 39 (1978), pp. 125-32; Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (9 vols.; Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 1964), iii, pp.341-42; vi, p.43; vii, p.50; viii, p.237.
3. According to J.N. Findlay, Kant and the Transcendental Object (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1981), pp. 15, 185, Kant taught the doctrine of the Noumenal Self; while Norman K. Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Humanities Press, 1950), pp. i-iii, rejects this idea.
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter CPR), Norman K. Smith, tr. (New York: Humanities Press, 1950), Sections B158, A 540.
5. CPR, Sections A350, 537-41, 553; Smith, Commentary, pp. 513-14; Keith Ward, The Development of Kant's View of Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 972), p.71.
6. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Thomas Abbott, tr. (London: Longmans, 1967), pp. 188-91; Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis Beck, tr. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1985), pp. 70-71,79; CPR, A 541; Ward Development, pp. 164-66
7. CPR, Section A 107; See also: Sections A99-101, 106-10, B132-40; Ram Singh, An Inquiry Concerning Reason in Kant and Samkara (Allahbad: Chugh Publications, 1978), pp. 208-12.
8. CPR, Section A 346; Findlay, Kant, p. 185; H.W. Cassirer, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgement (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970), pp. 10-15.
9. CPR, Sections A 116, B133-135, 407-08; Patricia Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self," in Allen Wood, ed., Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 113-20.
10. WWR, i, p. 162
11. WWR, i, pp. 5, 155, 162, 222, 282, 354-55, 374; ii, pp. 182-83, 195, 495-96; Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (New York: Clarendon press, 1983), pp. 210-12, 215.
12. Shankara, Crest-Jewel of Discrimination (Viveka-Chudamani) (hereafter VC), Swami Prabhavanand, tr. (Hollywood: Vedanta press 1947), pp. 62-64, 81.
13. VC, pp. 58, 62-64, 76-81, 140-41, S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (2 vols., Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), ii, pp. 475-85; Shankara, The Vedanta Sutras (hereafter VS), George Thibaut, tr. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas,1988), Sections 1.1.1; 2.3.7; Gopal Stavig, "The Supreme Atman of Shankara's Advaita and the Absolute Essence in the Philosophy of Ibn Al-' Arabi," Journal of Dharma 23 (1998), p. 306.
14. VS Section 2.2.31; See also: VC pp. 62, 80; A. K. Chatterjee, "The concept of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Saksi in Advaita Vedanta" Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 10 (1992), pp. 45-64; Shankara, Brhadaranyaka Bhasya Swami Madhavananda, tr. (hereafter BU) (Almora: Advaita Ashrama, 1950), Section 3.4.2.

15. Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, pp. 481-83, 486-92, 500; Swami Satprakashanda, Methods of Knowledge (Calcutta: Advaita Aashrama, 1974), pp. 46, 52, 89-90.

16. VS, Section 2.2.31; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, i, pp. 397-98; Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1987), pp. 83, 269.

17. Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, pp. 332, 478, 522.

18. CPR, Section B 308; See also; Sections A 640-42, B 307, 309-12; WWR, i, pp. 420, 425-27.

19. WWR, i, P. 129.

20. WWR, i, pp. 128-30, 169-172, 180.

21. Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, 539-61; A.L. Herman, "Indian Theodicy: Samkara and Ramanuja on Brahma Sutra II. 1. 32-36," Philosophy East and West 21 (1971), pp. 266-69; VS, Sections, 1. 1. 2-3, 14; 2.1.14, 33, 37.

22. VS, Sections 1.1.3; 1.3.28-30; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, pp. 495-96; A.L. Herman, "Sphota," Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Reserch Institute 19 (1962-63), pp. 10, 17-18.

23. Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson, trs. (New York: Harper & Row publishers, 1960) pp. ixvii, 182-84; Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), pp. 344, 364-65.

24. CPR, Sections A297, B72, 307-12; Allen Wood, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 114, 201-07; Singh, Inquiry, pp. 124-30.

25. WWR, ii, pp. 183, 195.

26. WWR, i, 197-98, 212, 222, 366, 382, 390, 410-11; ii, 182-83, 195-97, 289.

27. WWR, i, pp. 178-79.

28. WWR, i, pp. 152-53, 178-80, 184-87, 285, 301, 390-91; ii, pp. 380, 389.

29. WWR, i, pp. 383-84, 410-11; ii, pp. 613-14.

30. Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, pp. 510-14, 636-46; VC, pp. 81, 108, 131; Singh, Inquiry, pp. 151-61.

31. VS, Sections 3.2.22; 4.1.15; VC, pp., 131-32, 141-43; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, pp. 616-17, 625, 639-41.

32. Kant, Practical Reason, pp. 4, 37-38, 176, 226-29; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Lewis Beck, tr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 190-93.

33. WWR, i, pp. 354, 372, 379.

34. WWR, i, pp. 350-51, 354, 370, 372-74, 379, 403; ii, p. 610; Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 143-48, 163, 172-73.

35. VC, pp. 41, 51-53, 60-61; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, pp. 462-63, 612-21.

36. Shankara, Bhagavad Gita Commentary of Sri Shankaracharya, A. Mahadeva Sastri, tr. (hereafter BG) (Madras: V. Ramaswamy Sastrulu, 1961), Section 13.12; VS, Sections 3.2.22-23; 4.3.14; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, ii, pp. 468, 484, 502, 534-35, 604; Stavig, "Shankara," p. 305.

37. CPR, Sections A 42, A288, B312; See also: Sections A 43-44, 109, 346, 350; Ward, Development, pp. 71-72.

38. WWR, ii, p. 198. See also: i, pp. 110, 170-171; ii, p. 197; Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena (hereafter pp), E. F. J. Payne, tr. (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), i, pp. 91-92.

39. BU, Sdection 2.4.12; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, p. 607.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

40. CPR, Section A 252; See also Kant, Foundations, pp. 72-73.
41. WWR, i, p. 155; ii, pp. 183, 198, 489-90, 493-95.
42. Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, pp. 582-84; Stavig, "Shankara," pp. 308-09; Sharma, Chandradhar, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1987), p. 279; Klaus Klostermaier, "Moksha and Critical Theory," Philosophy East and West 35 (1985), p. 66.
43. CPR, Sections A 369-72, 491-93; WWR, i, pp. 274, 417-19.
44. WWR, i, pp. 3-5, 282, 417, 419; ii, pp. 5-7.
45. VC, pp. 58-59; Sharma, Critical, pp. 274-75, 279.
46. CPR, Sections A 493, B69.
47. CPR, Sections A 491-92, 538-39.
48. WWR, i, pp. 3, 434-36, 444; ii, pp. 3-6, 8.
49. CPR, A 38; Smith, Commentary, p. 157; H.W. Cassirer, Kant's First Critique (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1954), p. 225.
50. VS, Sections 2.2.28-29; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, pp. 456, 496-99, CPR, Sections B274-79.
51. WWR, i, pp. 434-35; ii, p. 8.
52. VS, Sections1.3.41.
53. VS, Sections 1.1.11; 2.1.14; 2.2.17; BG, 13.12; Radhakrishnan, Philosophy, p. 571.
54. VS Section 2.2.31. In Shankara, Sankara on the Yoga Sutras. Trevor Leggett, ed. (2 vols.: London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), i, pp. xi, 168-69, which is ascribed by some but not all scholars to Shankara; a form of samadhi is described that transcends the apparent projections of place (space), time, causation and experience.
55. Jadunath Sinha, Indian Psychology (3 vols.; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1986), I, p. 53; iii, pp. 46-52.
56. CPR, Sections B 305-06; See also: Sections A 23-34, 37, 80.
57. WWR, i, p. 25.
58. WWR, i, pp. vi, 157, 171; Magee, Philosophy, p. 67.
59. VS, Sections 1.1. 5.11; 1.4.21; 2.1.13-14; BU, 3.8.12; Radhakrishnan Philosophy, pp. 570-71; Sinha, Indian, i, pp. 372-74.
60. CPR, Sections A 25, B 48, B 312.
61. CPR, Sections A23-34, B 303; Magee, Philosophy, P. 69-70.
62. WWR, i, pp. 171, 179.
63. VC, pp. 58-59; VS, Section 1.1. Introduction; Sharma, Critical, pp. 274-75, 279; Radhakrishnan, Philosoophy, p. 571; John Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), p.11.
64. CPR, Section A 51; Smith, Commentary, p. xiii.
65. WWR, ii, pp. 19-21. Kant and Schopenhauer's dichotomy of passive and active faculties of perceptions are paralleled by the Indian distinctions between indeterminate and determinate perception. For example, Pathasarathi Misra (c.1075) a Mimamsa philosopher considered indeterminate perception to be undifferentiated and non-relational apprehension. Conversely, determinate perception divides the undifferentiated sensory matrix into related component parts that are integrated into a unity. Determinate perception apprehends the class-genus, substance, quality, activity and name of an object. Sinha, Indian, i, pp. 36.
66. Vs, Sections 1.3.29; 2.1.35-36; 3.1.8; VC, pp. 59-61; WWR, i, pp. 321, 494-95; ii, pp. 15, 502-07.
67. WWR, i, p. 357. See also: i, pp. xv-xvi, 355, 357, 388; ii, p.169; Heinrich Dumoulin, "Buddhism and Nineteenth Century German Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981), pp. 463-64.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

V

CONCEPTS IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

V. Sujatha

Conceptual analysis is unquestionably the most absorbing problem for philosophical enquiry. Today, conceptual analysis has come to occupy so prominent a place in philosophical discussions that sometimes philosophy is identified with conceptual analysis. The reason for this identification does not merely lie in the fact that it is the most important topic of philosophical discussions. It lies rather in the fact that it is used for such varied and divergent purposes. First, it is utilized by those who reflect upon experience in order to seek a clearer understanding of experience itself, of the empirical world. Secondly by those who philosophize in order to seek beyond and behind everyday experience, some special insight into the really real. Thirdly, conceptual analysis is also an essential process in understanding the meaning and the significance of words. The ideational theory of meaning holds that what a word means is the thought behind it. Therefore to understand the nature of concepts is to know also the meaning of words.

For my purpose here, I intend to limit the use of conceptual analysis to the first of the purposes mentioned above, namely, the clearer understanding of experience of the empirical world. I do not favour the identification of the philosophy with conceptual analysis for two reasons. For one thing, conceptual analysis being a tool of philosophy, is less than philosophy. Secondly, in accordance with my limited purpose I consider conceptual analysis only from the point of view of its utility in giving a clearer understanding of experience of the world. And it is the most essential tool in the study of such experiences.

Although analyses of concepts are present in philosophy from the pre-socratics on, it is only in philosophy of recent years that the precise nature and the role of philosophical analysis of concepts are clearly stated. There are two ways of regarding concepts, both of which are necessary to understanding. The first is that of formal investigation. It

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

answers the question, how do concepts and judgments depend on each other? Here the answer is sought through logical analysis and it is a problem which belongs to the formal sciences. The second is the extralogical problem, namely, the relation of concepts to sensible experience which is essential in understanding what concepts are. And this is the specific problem which is encountered in conceptual analysis. Concepts can acquire content only when they are connected with sensible experience. Mere logical investigation cannot reveal this connection; it can only be experienced. Yet it is this connection that determines the cognitive value of concepts.

WHAT ARE CONCEPTS:

There are two universes as though, namely, the real universe and the conceptual universe. In order to understand the conceptual universe we must understand what concepts are. Concepts cannot belong to the external world because they were introduced to account for our ability to conceive of that world as complete when perceptually it is so fragmentary. As Bergson points out conceptualization freezes a world which is in constant flux.[1] Aristotle does not pay much attention to concepts as such since his primary concern is with the logic of judgements. He does, however, deal with them in connection with terms and their definition. For him, human reason has the power of discerning the forms or the universals in their particular exemplification. Such forms constitute the essence of things, they are real: at the same time they are principles of reason. Thus they are both forms of thoughts and forms of reality. Our knowledge always begins with sense perception, and rises from particular facts to universal concepts. Universals are the last things we reach in our thinking, but are first in nature: they are the first principles of reality.

Locke, in his introduction to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, says - "the word idea stands for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."[2] According to Locke, then, ideas or concepts are psychic phenomena: whatever one has in the mind. But for G.E. Moore concepts stand for or point to something, and what they stand for or point to is the meaning of them.[3] By concept Moore means the same as Bradley's "universal meaning".[4] According to Moore the basic constituents of the world are certain entities which are the meanings of the concepts. Concepts are not dependent upon any mind to think them and so are neither abstractions nor ideas in the sense of Locke (Bradley also criticizes Locke in this respect). Concepts are immutable: they can be the objects of mental acts but they are indifferent to our mental acts. They are not individuals or particulars. They exist in some eternal way. Their proper conjunction gives rise in some way to particular things. For instance, the combination of concepts such as "red", "soft", "flower", "rose", "now" and "this", along with further unspecified concepts gives us a particular rose.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE:

Science starts from perception but proceeds to the constitution of conceptual schemes whose order reflects the order of perception. As far as scientific knowledge is concerned, science uses its own concepts in constructing a world of its own. It is obvious that the realms of perception and conceptual thought in science are rooted in the same ground, that is, the reality outside and that they are related to each other. For conceptual thought cannot stand by itself: It relies on perception. In fact, conceptual thinking is done by relating percepts. In the case of perception, it may be argued that it is autonomous; it can stand alone in the sense that it need not necessarily pass over into concept formation. Though it is true that the contents of perception are grasped in a form which makes them suitable for thought, it is not always necessary that they should lead to thought. Peter Caws has argued that in the condition known as awareness, for example, in aesthetic experience, we are able to concentrate on perception to the exclusion of thought.[5] But we may note that for scientific purposes perception stands linked with thought. Thought recognizes and represents objects of perception. Thus the two realms cannot be sharply demarcated; they are inter-related.

REFERENCES

1. *Henri Bergson* : *Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Hulme; New York, 1912*
2. *John Locke* : *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; P. 8.*
3. *G. E. Moore* : *The Nature of judgement; P.179*
4. *Bradley* : *The principles of logic.*
5. Peter caws : The Philosophy of Science; New York,1965; P. 67.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VI

BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Sumitra Purkayastha

Professions mean some occupation or activity by which human beings earn their livelihood. But all occupations or vocations are not professions. Professions are described as those occupations which provide highly specialised intellectual services.[1] In a profession accomplishment in serving the needs of people is more stressed than personal gain. One of the main features of profession is "a system of control over the practice of the calling and the education of its practitioners through associations and codes of ethics".[2] In this world so many types of professions are found. Some are professors, some are doctors while others are lawyers and so on. Every profession has its own ethical and moral values also termed as code of conduct. And it is generally found that morality which is found in one kind of profession may be different from the morality in another profession. A physician, whose primary duty is to cure the patient may have to tell a lie to the patient in certain circumstances in order to save the life of that patient. In such cases telling a lie is morally justified though in other cases it is totally unjustified. Similarly, a lawyer sometimes lies to save his client. Because it is his code of conduct that as soon as he takes the responsibility of his client as a lawyer he must fight in the court in his favour. Thus scientists, journalists, teachers, parliamentarians have their own ethical codes which may not be applicable to others. Engels also opines that not only each class but each profession has its own morality.[3]

Now, business is also an economic activity which is directed towards the purchase and sale of goods undertaken with the objective of earning profit and at the same time to satisfy human wants. Thus business may also be termed as profession and being a profession it should also relate to professional ethics. But there is a controversy regarding the question whether business can be termed as a profession or not. There are many people who do not recognise business as a profession. Their argument is that business cannot be regarded as a profession since it is engaged more in production and sale of commodities rather than of services. Business is involved to a greater extent in the investment of capital. The success of business is more or less determined by its profits. It is also maintained that a profession requires a lengthy and specialised

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

education, while business does not call for such specialised education. Even an uneducated person can become a successful businessman. Hence, business is not considered as a profession by these people.

But this view is not shared by all. Now-a-days, business is also accepted as a profession. It is true that in a profession some special knowledge and skills are required so as a professional is also to perform some functions in a society better than the average person. Similarly a businessman must also possess some specialised skill in order to run a business properly. In present day society business education is accepted as an important branch of education is provided for preparation of business careers on a professional level. Makee Fish opines that "business education or more properly education for business is concerned with teaching the skills, attitudes and knowledge necessary for a business carrier."[4]Thus in business also specialised knowledge in some form or other is necessary.

Again in modern days profit maximisation is not the sole and primary objective of business. There are hawkers or artisans, who are only concerned with their livings, But they are not recognised as businessmen in the truest sense of the term. Now a days business enterprise is an operating unit of what constitutes the 'economy' of a society. Business activities are the economic activities ultimate aim of which is to ensure peoples' welfare. No welfare can be achieved without ethical behaviour and activity. Today a business does aim to make profit but it reaches this goal by providing jobs, supplying quality goods and services to the community. As such profits are not the end of business activity. Profits get distributed and reinvested. Profits are a means to building the business and rewarding employees, executives and investors. Thus business is also becoming professionalized. It implies that businessman has a social responsibility. The social responsibility of the business include vast areas such as solving unemployment, controlling over population, rural development, environmental protection, conservation of resources, control of pollution and provision of drinking water etc.,

Now, there are professional ethics for the priest, the soldier, the lawyer, the magistrate, and so on. Why should there not be one for trade and industry? "A good simple code of business ethics has been formulated by Mr. Edward A Filene: 1- A business, in order to succeed, must be of real service to the community. 2- Real service in business consists in making or selling merchandise of reliable quality for the lowest practically possible price, provided that merchandise is made and sold under just conditions."[5] "The purpose of business enterprise is to produce and distribute economic goods and do it ethically so as to serve the general welfare. Since the economic and social objectives of business are mutually exclusive, but are intertwined, the management has both social and economic responsibilities."[6] Keeping this objective in view, some codes for the conduct of business activities are

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

incorporated into the laws and regulations for business. These include truth in advertising and publicity, regulations for monopoly control. Prevention of adulteration, hoarding and such other malpractices etc. As far as such ethical approaches are concerned, the concepts of right and wrong, fair and unfair, just and unjust are reflected by either the organisational policies or by social reactions.

We in India have the following laws and regulations in order to ensure ethical behaviour on the part of the business establishment:- the company act, the Industrial policy Resolution, Monopolies Restrictive Trade practices Act, Consumers' protection Act –Necessary Commodities Act, Payment of Bonus Act, Sales of goods Act– Necessary commodities Act, payment of Bonus Act, Sales of Goods Act, etc. There are statutory agencies also to monitor the effectiveness of such legislations to regulate and ensure desired ethical business behaviour and standard. Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and The Company Law Board for example, work as statutory watch-dog for the above business Laws and regulations. The business houses have to declare their amount of stock, 'quality of stock' or articles and even 'the product ingredients and utility etc.' They have to declare 'product standard' using approved trade marks- such as 'ISI' given by the Bureau of Indian Standard (BIS) or 'AGMARK'. The world Trade Organisation(WTO) has also specified some series of global standards such as- IS 9000 and IS 1400 standards. The business houses have necessarily to abide by such ethical Norms.

According to peter F. Druker, the purpose of the businessman is to promote customers. The fate of business is being determined by the customers. As the businessmen are regarded as getting more money in certain cases, hence they are required to contribute the society with schools, the armaments, medical aid etc. M.C. Shukla points out that in India, there is an attempt to correlate the concept of social responsibility of the businessman with the Gandhian doctrine of "Trusteeship".[10] Gandhiji wanted that the industry must be under state control so that human beings are more benefited than the profit motives of industry. Everyone must get the share of the national income. And so there will be no scope of exploitation. It is a fact that social justice and growth are inextrically interwined in a modern democratic society. Emphasis on any one to the exclusion of the other will create such distortions in the economy and social life that ordinary functioning of democracy might become impossible.

Businessmen are leaders of the larger community as well as of their own enterprises. Hence, the moral responsibility of the businessman is also great. But yet it is found that the business management often forget their duties and consequently the society is filled with corruption, black marketing etc. unemployment problem is increasing day-by day. It is a fact that the businessman has not fully

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

applied the ethical codes in his business. Businessman in most cases are motivated only by the desire to make money. Accordingly, they often take resort to practices which exploit the public, the workers and also the investors. We find much adulteration, misbranding and misrepresentation of goods.

There are many business organisations who in order to reduce their cost price often overlook the public interests. An example is cited by Hasmer La Rue Tone of this tendency in his book "The Ethics of Management", a paper company in northern Maine built a large dam on their land in order to generate power and to reduce their energy costs. That dam blocks a river that canoeits and fishermen were using for years (vide Hasmer La Rue Tone, The Ethics of Management, P.1). Many more examples can be cited in this content.

It is the duty of the businessman to pay the workers a fair wage and see that working conditions is conductive to health and safety. But in many a cases wages are kept low. Executive work for low wages and child labour are often found. Workers safety is also neglected. The case of Bhopal Gas Tragedy is an example of such negligence and irresponsibility. On December 3, 1984, some 2000 people were killed and 2000,000 were injured when a cloud of poisonous methyl isocyanate gas was accidentally released from the Union Carbide Company plant in Bhopal. But when the accident occurred the Union Carbide officials strongly denied their responsibility for the tragedy. Their point was that they have already warned the people. As their warning has not been heeded to they have no responsibility for the tragedy. This type of attitude of the business community is the most condemnable.

It is true that consumers satisfaction is the primary aim of all business. But in the practical field adulteration of goods, poor quality, failure to give measure etc. are increasing every day. Advertisement which occupies a large portion of our media where we spend large portion of the day is often misleading. As for example, the drug industry spends a huge amount yearly in their effort to increase drug sales. But many of these drugs bear misleading labels and many are totally ineffective.[11]

There are many more cases where businessmen take recourse of unethical practices for their own benefit neglecting the larger benefit of the society, There are many business firms who pour their waste materials in the nearby rivers and tanks with the sole interest of decreasing expenditure. This causes serious pollution problem.

In many cases people are displaced from their homeland as a result of the activities of the big business houses. Big industries are established by the capitalists occupying the land of the poor people who are not properly rehabilitated.

In addition to other unethical practices the businessman also takes recourse to bribery which is regarded as "the greatest course of modern

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

age". Not only does this occurs within business circle but it takes the form of bribery of government officials in order to secure special favours. The disclosure of many a scandals related to bribery in our country is the evidence of the prevelance of such evil practices in our country.

But even though these types of unethical practices are prevelent in business. We cannot say that all businessmen are dishonest. The majority of businessmen are honourable and want to do the right thing. The businessman cannot afford to go on neglecting the public interest. It is possible and desirable for them to use methods of enforcing the moral codes. If they are really motivated businessmen also show a great capacity for public service and loyalty to mankind. What is needed is to make the businessman more conscious of their standards and of the gap between their standards and practices. Since the beginning of the twentieth century there has been noticed a constant demand on the part of the enlightened businessman of USA for improvement in business standards. This tendency is noticed in other countries also. This is really a very good sign.

It cannot be denied that competition is a must in every form of business. But however competitive a particular business may be, it must always rest on the foundation of shared interests and mutually agreed-upon rules of conduct. Competition takes place not in a jungle but in a community which it both serves and depends upon. Thus the fundamental necessity of business life is mutual co-operation. Hence, though competition is needed, this competition should be within the bounds of mutually shared concern. Competition is not meant for undermining ethics and social welfare.

The Central concept of much of business ethics is based on the ideal of social responsibilities. The concept of social responsibility in business ethics has however, irritated many people who have forwarded a number of bad or misleading arguments. One argument is that the managers of the Corporation are the employees of the stock holders and as such have foremost responsibility to maximise their profits. These type of arguments are the most damaging to the concept of business ethics. Profit making is essential. There is no conflict between moral duty and selfish interest. For morality depends upon the prior satisfaction of material needs. "A man can be neither a saint, nor a lover, nor a poet, unless he has comparatively recently had something to eat."[9] It is not possible for a businessman to earn his livelihood without making profits and for a corporate to sustain its employees and dependants. Hence now-a-days business ethics is no longer concerned with the criticism of business and business practice. Profits are no longer condemned. The main concern of business ethics now is how profit can be applied to productivity and social responsibility. Corporations are no longer regarded as soulless monoliths but are regarded as complex communities which can serve both their own

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

employees and the surrounding society.

It has already been stated that in business there is an element of co-operation. This co-operation involves the producers, the buyers, the sellers, the partners etc. This sense of co-operation is practically associated with the sense of morality and social responsibility. Because the higher fulfilment of the individual's life is possible only in and through society. If a businessman remembers this idea of co-operation he cannot involve in evil practices.

Moral crisis is an everyday problem in our life. This is found not only in a particular group but in each and every group. Businessmen are also not exceptions. Rules are formulated to avoid these problems. It is the duty of all men to follow and also to guard these rules. It is a good sign for the humanity that though immortality tried to cover the world, the human conscience stands up to safe guard him against doing harm to others. And this paves the way to ethics and morality. Every professional including a businessmen is not only a professional man but he is a family man, a religious man, a loyal man also. All these roles of man must be so interwined that one must not conflict with the other, The Macro Darwinian concept of the 'Survival of the fittest' should not be the way of life. Co-operation and social responsibility should be the central code of all professional ethics as also of business ethics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. *Hosmer La Rue Tone; The Ethics of Management; Universal Book stall, Delhi, 1995.*
2. *Girvetx Harryk (ed.); Contemporary Moral Issues, Wadsworth Company, California, 1974.*
3. *Spencer Herbert ; The principles of Ethics, Vol. II, Liberty Classics,1978.*
4. *Hazlitt Henry; The Foundations of Morality, D-Van Nostrand Company,INC, 1964.*
5. *Wright William Kelley; General Introduction to Ethics, The McMillan Company, 1929.*
6. *Titus Harold H. and Keeton Morris T.; Ethics for Today, D.Van Nostrand Company, New Work, 1973.*
7. *Titus Harold H. and Keeton Morris T.; The Range of Ethics, Affiliated East-West press Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1972.*
8. *Titus Harold H.; Ethics for Today, Eurasia publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1966.*
9. *Sherlekar, S. A.; Modern Business Organisation and Management, Himalaya Publishing House, 1978.*
10. *Durkheim Emile; Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Routledge & Kegan paul Ltd., London, 1957.*
11. *Williams Bernard; Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985.*
12. *Prasad, L.M.; Organisation and Management, Sultan Chand & Sons, New Delhi, 1984.*
13. *Ghosh, P.K. & Bhushan V.K.; Business Organisation and Office Management, Sultan Chand & Sons, New Delhi, 1975.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

14. *Dr. Awasthi, G.D. & Sachdeva; Economic theory, Prakashan Kendra, Lucknow.*
15. *Bali, D. R.; Modern Indian Thought, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1993.*
16. *Shukla. M.C.; Business Organisation and Management, S.Chand & Co. Pvt. Ltd .. 1974.*
17. *Nataliabelfkaya; Ethics, Progress Publisher, Moscow, 1986.*
18. *Singes Peter (ed.); A Companion to Ethics.*
19. *Teichman Jenny; Social Ethics.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VII

INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE

Chhaya Rai

May there be welfare to the whole world, may all beings devote themselves to doing good to others; may all evils subside; may the world be happy in all ways.[1]

Such peace-solicitations mirror Indian spirit and India's dedication to global peace. The notion of peace has considerable impact on Indian culture and society through philosophy because peace within and without has been considered a preferable state for self realization progress, prosperity, welfare and happiness etc. The Sanskrit and Hindi synonym of "peace" is Santi with its etymological root-term Sam, which means unperturbed state of mind, happiness, health, absence of disturbances. During Vedic period another Sanskrit term "Swasti" had also been used as having similar meaning. Consequently "Santipathas" were also called "Swastipathas". It is notable that the term "Swasti" had generally been used for happiness, but it also referred to welfare (Kalyana), goodwill (Bhadra) and blessing (Mangal Kamana).

In vedic literature the term "santi" is used in several senses as tranquillity calmness, as state of being free from evil influences and also for well-being not only of human beings, but of all the living creatures. It is also used for cosmic awakening, and for benediction i.e. invocation for happiness. Here it is notable that the Vedic concept of happiness includes "Swasti"(Welfare) "Bhadra" (goodwill) and "Aabhaya" (fearlessness), since without these three, we cannot experience happiness.

Hence the cherished goal of Indian philosophy is summed up in the following prayer:-

Sarve bhavantu Sukhinah,
Sarve santu niramaya,
Sarve Bhadrani pasyantu
Ma kaschit dukhabhag bhavet
Om Santih ! Santih !! Santih !!!

Reference 1

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1. Shivamastu sarvajagataam
Parahitanirata bhavantu bhootagannah,
Dosah prayaantu santim,
Sarvatra sukhee bhavatu lokah

Bhavabhuti, Malatimadhava

Let all be happy, let all be healthy, let all see welfare and good, no one be unhappy. Om peace ! peace!! Peace!!!

It is remarkable that every Upanishad beings and ends with peace-prayer, and at the end of each peace-invocation, the primordeal sound of "Om Santi" is chanted three times, because according to Upanishadic philosophy, there are three regions or "Lokas" viz. the celestial sphere (Akas) the earth (Bulok) and the nether-most world (Patal). Hence the Upanishadic seers used to make fervent request to have peace in all the three inter-related regions, as is clear in following prayer, which is still chanted in India at religious and social functions -

Peaceful be the earth,
Peaceful be the sky,
Peaceful be the heaven,
Peaceful be (for us) the running waters,
Peaceful be the herbs and plants,
Peaceful be the Brahman,
Peaceful be the entire universe,
May peace and only peace prevail,
And may that peace come unto me,
Oum peace! peace!! peace!!![1]

Atharvaveda XIX 9, 14

Another interpretation of chanting "Oum Santi" three times is more convincing and recognised. According to it, the human life is full of three kinds of suffering viz. Physico-mental, mundane and divine, so human beings want to get rid of all these three types of grief or "Duhkha". Hence the three times chanting of the term "Santih" refers to our request for complete cessation of all the three kinds of suffering in order to have peace.

The mission of Indian philosophers has always been two-fold, negatively it has been to rescue or protect the suffering man from sorrow, misery, disease, old age and even from the agony of death. Positively it has been to suggest the ways to attain the state of equanimity, bliss and well being. To fulfil this mission, Indian seers, sages, and philosophers have been prescribing the path to peace not only by creating theoretical philosophical systems, but also by describing and demonstrating the practical way, known as "Sadhana Marg". So the noteworthy feature of Indian Philosophy is that it has been metaphysical as well as practical at the same time. Vedic seers and sages used to beg for long, healthy, happy and prosperous life, yet the mere chanting of "SantiMantras"

Reference 1

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1. Prithivee Santirantariksam Santih,
Dyauh Santih Apah Santih,
Osadhayah Santih Vanaspatayah Santih,
Visve devah Santih Sarve devah Santih,
Santireva Santih.

(Peace hymns) without follow-up actions had been considered useless. Consequently Atharvaveda prescribes the three-fold Action - plan or "Karmakanda" with "Swastic Karma" i.e. actions conducive to welfare, "Paustic Karma" or nourishing actions and "Santic karma" or pacificatory action. "Santic Karmas" are those actions which pacify the disturbances of three kinds, caused by extra-organic agencies, physio-mental disorders and super natural powers.

Besides "Grahsanti" (pacification of disturbances due to planetary effects) "Adabhut Santi", was also enumerated as a part of peace-effort. It is meant to prevent unexpected or unknown future disturbances.

The phrase "Param Santi" (ultimate peace) is also found in Indian philosophical literature to mean unconditioned or supreme peace, which can only be attained by self-realisation.

In addition to the above mentioned kinds of peace, rituals and efforts to protect society and state from war is also mentioned in the Brahmanic literature.

Punishment is also recommended for keeping peace. In fact Indian philosophy is not an intellectual gymnastic. It is a sect of experienced truths by which we should live and conduct our life purposely. Undoubtedly our behaviour in home, society, in national and international politics bears the stamp of our conscious or unconscious philosophy. So we have to outline and follow a pacificism in this age of crisis.

If we review Indian philosophical literature, we find that three stages are recommended for the attainment of peace. First is to fed equality with all human beings. Secondly to realise equality with all living beings, and thirdly to experience equality with the universe i.e. with sentient beings as well as with insentient objects.

Indian idealism preaches universal Brotherhood by emphasizing the invisible unity of soul or consciousness, underlying the visible diversity of caste, creed, country and culture etc. Indian theory of "Panchakosas" or five sheaths explains that there are individual differences with regard to body or physical constitution, biological development, psychological or mental tendencies, intellectual progress etc., yet in respect of spirit or soul there is no difference, as pure or blissful soul is one and the same. The realisation of this soul is called liberation or Moksa i.e. freedom from all lower discriminatory stage. Thus the quintessence of Indian philosophy is "Samdarsana" i.e. the realisation of oneness or spiritual unity of all men. Accordingly we find such peace invocation as following:-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Om Bhadram karnebhi srnuyaama devaah bhadram pasyemaakshabhir yajatraah.

Sthirairangaistushtuvaamsastanoobhih Vyasema Devahitam yadaayuh.

Swasti Na Indro Vrddhasravaah swasti Nah pooshaa Viswavedaah.
Swasti Nastaarkshyo arishtanemihi Swasti No Brhaspatirdadhaatu
Om Santih Santih Santih.

O, ye Gods ! May we hear with our ears (always) what is auspicious; O worshipful ones, may we with our eyes see what is auspicious. May we live the entire length of our allotted life hale and hearty offering our praises (unto thee). May Indra the ancient and the famous, pooshan (sun) the all knowing, the Lord of swift-Motion (vayu) who saves us from all harm, and Brhaspati who protects the spiritual wealth in us bless us. Peace! peace !! peace !!!

When a person attains such state of pure existence, he automatically goes beyond all vices like fear, anger, hatred, jealously, enmity etc. According to ethically universalistic upanisadic philosophy to maintain peace, we require purification of heart through virtuous life. Chandogya Upanishad, therefore, mentions the requirement of inculcating five virtues of self-renunciation (Tapas) Charity or philanthropy (Dana) moral conduct (Arjavam),non-violence (Ahimsa) and truthfulness (Satyavacana).

Indian seers are also aware of the fact that peaceful co-existence with other living beings ensures a sense of physical, social and moral security i.e. (yoga-ks'ema). It is, therefore, frequently declared that who does not differentiate among living beings and treat them as equal, gets happiness and peace. So says seers-

"Atmavat sarvabhutesu yo pasyati sa pasyati" i.e a person who considers all living creatures equal to his own self is the true seer.

Now requesting the third stage, we see that metaphysically cosmic Upanisadic philosophy claims that the highest kind of realisation is the realisation of cosmic consciousness i.e. one's realisation that he is one with the whole universe- organic as well as inorganic, sentient as well as insentient. After attaining this state, the jnana yogi becomes a pacifist, since he perceives everyone and everything as identical with his own self and behaves accordingly.

The question is : how can we achieve such holistic view? The answer given by Indian schools of philosophy- orthodox and heterodox is : By self-realisation and self-realisation is possible when a person rises from selfishness to self-sacrifice or abandonment of egoistic attitude, from sensual satisfaction to the state of equipoise and equilibrium and from personal passion to the impersonal universalised transcendence.

Another peculiar feature of Indian philosophy is that it recommends moral code of conduct as a means for attaining and keeping peace at

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

all levels. The celebrated Bhagwadgita (14th Chapter) enlists those moral qualities or virtues, which are pacificatory and auspicious. They are called "Daivi Sampada" or Divine properties. Peace in the sense of mental peace or tranquillity is also included in this list, since internal peace is basic to external peace. Other qualities are non-violence, truthfulness, freedom from anger, agreed, pride and ignorance, Aversion to fault finding compassion to all living beings, gentleness, modesty, steadfastness, purity, forgiveness etc.

Against these peace-promoting qualities are vices or devilish qualities, named as "Asuri Sampada". These are deterrent to peace. They are Anger (Krodha), greed (Lobha), cunning treachery, vanity, wilful doing of injury to others (Dvesa), lust (Kam), excessive self-esteem (Ahamkar), enmity (vaira), non-tolerance of other's praiseworthy qualities (Asuya) fault- finding (Dosa-Kathan) etc.

Anger is considered by almost all schools of Indian philosophy as very harmful for peace, as it disturbs mental peace in letting loose the six evils- violence, scepticism, unkind behaviour or cruelty, transgression of truthfulness, dishonesty and violation of sexual morality. Anger generates violence in the form of war at international level and civil war at national level.

Buddhism believes that we can have peace, if we possess the quality of humility (Vinay), moral character (Sila), forgiveness (Ksama), compassion (Daya), charity (Dana), renunciation (Vairagya), non-enmity (Avaira).

Buddhism admits of the possibility of attaining peace here and now. Buddha, who renounced the world when his heart was overwhelmed at the sight of suffering in the form of disease, old age, and death etc., felt that suffering humanity could not be redeemed by metaphysical speculations so he identified the cause of suffering and also suggested a way to escape misery by attaining "Nirvana" or freedom from sorrow and suffering. Nirvana literally means cooling i.e. dying out of passions. It is an unshakable state of peace, which makes us realise the worthlessness of petty quarrels. Buddhist Nirvana is indicative of the altruistic aspect of Buddhism, since even after attaining it, the aspirant continues to work for the well-being of humanity. The gradual march towards Nirvana is, in fact, the systematic gradual progress towards a state of universality and is, therefore, a humanistic, not individualistic moral progress of personality. Such progress could be facilitated by constantly cherishing the four sublime moods called " Brahmaviharas", viz, friendliness (Maitri), compassion (Karuna), cheerfulness (Mudita) and impartiality (upeksa).

Buddhism believes that Nirvana could be achieved by any person by breaking the chain of 12 links of suffering. To break this chain is needed a righteous life. Accordingly Buddha prescribed the eight-fold path, that includes (1) Right view (samma ditthi), (2) Right-Resolve

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(sammasamkalpa), (3) Right speech (sammavaca) (4) Right conduct (sammakammanta), (5)Right livelihood (samma-ajiva), (6) Right Effort (sammavayama), (7) Right mindfulness (sammasati), (8) Right concentration (sammasamadhi). Right knowledge is the knowledge of four Arya truths and Right resolve means not only to abandon ill feeling towards others, but also to renounce the tendency of committing injurious acts. Right speech is recommended, because sometimes words are more distressing than swords. This step requires to restrain ourselves from falsehood, backbiting, harsh-language and frivolous talk. Hence to maintain peace in inter-personal relations. Right conduct consists in renouncing injury, stealing and sensual gratification. Buddhism instructs to adopt moral conduct at every level domestic, social, national and international. Right livelihood implies the earning by honest means i.e. not to cheat anybody or to adopt corrupt practices. Right effort includes four sorts of endeavour -(1) not to allow fresh evils, (2) try to obliterate existing evils, (3) try to develop new good ideas and (4) to adhere to maintenance and development of existing good ideas and virtues. "Samyak Karmanta" or unselfish actions are needed to materialise the resolution. Seventh is Right mindfulness means constant self reminder of the nature of soul and body, of distressing mental states like doubt, sensuality, malice etc. Last is Right concentration, that have four stages. Third is to experience bliss of equanimity and the fourth is the state of absolute cessation of all suffering.

Another heterodox philosophical system Jainism also defines moksa in term of peaceful state. Jainism classifies all voluntary actions as "punya" and "papa". "Punya" means moral actions while "papa" are immoral actions. It is needless to say that moral actions alone are auxiliary to peace. Our assumption is proved, when we consider the list of good actions provided by Jainism. First is "Anna Punya" or serving food to hungry and poor. Second is "Pana Punya" or virtue of quenching the thirst. Third or "Vastra Punya" means giving clothes to needy. Fourth is "Layana Punya" or to provide residential accommodation. These four actions are concerned with the charity of food, water, cloths and house which are basic needs of human beings. Such actions are supports social peace. Fifth is "Sayana Punya" or providing beds to the ascetics. Six, seventh and eighth are Mana, Sarira and Vacana Punyas or controlling of emotions, body and speech to avoid every kind of violence to others.

Papa or evil deeds are also described. They are (1)Jiva Himsa or killing, (2) Asatya or falsehood, (3) Adattadana or stealing, (4) Abrahmacharya or indulgence in sexual intercourse, physically or mentally or unchastity, (5) Parigraha or over attachment to one's belongs of covetousness, (6) Krodha or anger, (7) Egoism or Mana Pap, (8) Maya or hypocrisy (9) Lobha or greed, (10) Raga or Asakti papa i.e. self love, (11) Dvesa papa or hatred towards someone, (12) Klesa papa or Quarrelsomeness, (13) Abhyakhyana or spreading rumours/scandals

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection, Varanasi

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in order to lower someone's prestige, (14) Paisunya or tale-telling, (15) Paraparivada talking ill of others, (16) Rati Arati Papa, Attraction towards sensual and emotional life, and distraction from self control, (17) Maya Mrisa papa-resorting to improper or sinful acts under the pretext of propriety and virtue, (18) Mithya Darsanasalya Papa - taking an unreal thing to be real even when one is capable of discrimination.

If we consider the above mentioned classification, we find that "Punya" are those actions which supply/lay foundation to sustain peace at personal, interpersonal, social and even at international level. When Jainism teaches to refrain ourselves from all types of injury- mental, verbal, physical- even to animals and trees, of preaches to adopt non-violence at all levels, from personal to global.

Orthodox school of Vaisesika though gives importance to "moksa" or metaphysical ideal, also advocates social and personal well being as the ideal of relaltive ethics. Consequently it classifies all duties into Universal duties and Particular duties. Universal duties are categorical, which ought to be performed by every person irrespective of caste, creed, country etc., while Particular duties are based on person's particular station of life. Among thirteen universal duties are included some duties that are pacificatory i.g. Ahimsa (non-violence), Bhutahitatva or kindness to all living creatures, Satyavacana or truthfulness, Asteya or non-stealing, Brahmacharya or moderation, Anupadha- bhavasuddhi or mental purity, Krodha-varjana or freedom from anger, Apramad or alertness in performing one's duties.

Samkhya philosophy talks of three types of suffering-Adhibhautika, Adhidaivika and Adhyatmika, and directs us to overcome these disturbances and suffering by following the eight-fold path or Astanga Yoga, suggested by yoga system. As is well known, yoga philosophy is concerned with personal mental peace, perhaps because ultimately person is the centre of all activities – social, national and global.

Advait Vedanta also emphasises the importance of mental peace. It affirms that there can be no peace of mind without the potentialities of tolerance, forbearance, endurance etc. These are needed to achieve the highest goal of life i.e. the sublime state of selfless service, universal love etc. Thus it preaches to adopt a cosmopolitan's outlook.

The foregoing description tries to outline the peace initiative found in classical Indian Philosophy. Contemporary Indian thinkers like Mahatma Gandhi, Radhakrishnan, Nehru, Tagore etc., also emerged as path-finders in a war-torn century, completely submerged in the exploitative system of colonialism, consumerism and capitalism etc.

Mahatma Gandhi has been recognised as the greatest advocate of peace and Non-Violence. The vitality of ancient Indian Culture is expressed perhaps best in his concept of peace, as he feels that spiritual awakening is much needed to achieve peace. In fact, his philosophy of peace is an

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

integral part of his philosophy of life, which gives importance to human values and ideals such as truth, non violence, justice, goodwill towards all living beings, feeling of brotherhood, regard for all religions, etc.

As Gandhi's notion of peace springs from his concept of non-violence, he emphasises non-killing, non-injury, love and justice etc. He is of the firm opinion that complete non-violence is complete absence of ill will and malice against all living beings so it leads to peace. Affirming love or the positive aspect of non-violence as the essence of peace, Gandhi says that law of love should guide the life of individuals, society, nations and the world. If we argue that Gandhi's notion of peace contains practical difficulties in the present day world, Gandhi would reply by asking, if an individual can practice non-violence, why not all nations? He accepts that human values such as peace and virtues like non-violence can be cultivated only by deep understanding and constant efforts.

He says that if nations truly aspire for peace, they ought to build themselves on principles of non-violence. Such nations do not require peace treaties. But to have such nations, we have to cultivate the spirit of non-violence and peace in the hearts of each and every person, since they act as administrators, diplomats, policy-makers and politicians.

Gandhiji remarked, "I have no doubt that unless big nations shed their desire of exploitation and the spirit of violence, of which war is the natural expression and Atom Bomb the inevitable consequence there is no hope for peace in the world. He mentioned three conditions, which are conductive to international peace. First, all nations should be free. Second, the equality of all nations should be recognised. Third, disarmament should be accepted by all nations without exception.

His philosophy of peace is to be distinguished from the conservative plea for peace at any cost, since his concept of peace is integrally related to justice.

(D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma: life of M. K. Gandhi, the publication Division, Government of India, 1962, vol. VII, p.2.).

U.N.O., the world Organisation for International peace, has not achieved its supreme goal i.e. establishment of peace at Global level because of its wrong policies. Gandhi says that permanent peace can not be achieved through violent way of conflict-resolution, since they are unjust. It will be attained through co-operation and persuasion. World Organisation such as U.N.O. should be governed by the laws of a family both in principle and practice. Thus Gandhiji contributed by showing the path to peace at personal, Social, National and Global level.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime Minister of India was of the opinion that the famous insight of "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" i.e. the whole world itself is a family, must be the guiding principle of people and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

political leaders, since that provides the ground to achieve global peace through goodwill. Nehru was a pacifist and a promoter of non-violence in international politics. So he propounded the well known philosophy of "Panchsheel", which incorporates five principles of the international code of conduct, leading to peaceful co-existence. Following are the principles-

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other nations.
2. Non-aggression or eschewing armed attack on other nations.
3. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nation
4. Maintenance of equality and mutual benefit with regard to trade and commerce with other nations.
5. Peaceful co-existence or toleration of other nation's ideology.

Thus Nehru outlined the guidelines for all nations with the aim to allow non-disturbed political freedom to all nations, to give them equal opportunities to prosper materially and to enjoy peace.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the philosopher diplomate, endeavoured to realise mankind's most cherished dream of a peaceful world through his lectures and articles on "one Earth one Family", "The Emerging world Society", International peace", "Our Nationality is the Human Race", "Battle for the Future" etc. He was motivated to frame a holistic philosophy, because of the "economic and intellectual barbarism, which confuses civilization with comfort, morality with convention, religion with routine and politics with trade, exploitation and opening of markets (kalki p.28). In his opinion, it is due to spiritual chaos and moral aimlessness. He felt that human predicament was due to the lack of adjustment of the human spirit to the starting development in Science and Technology. He, therefore, suggests the need of a worldwide spiritual and moral revolution, which in turn, needs inward transformation, and such transformation is possible through universal religiosity or authentic religious consciousness, which is basically concerned with the spirituality of man and without spiritual recovery we cannot survive. We must utilise the scientific instruments with spiritual awareness.

To escape present predicament and achieve world-peace, he referred to the traditional Indian culture, which represents an ideal in which the modern world may find valuable lessons- the primacy of the spiritual, the supremacy of the ethical and the holiness of human life. Hence we need inner development of man as a spiritually, morally and socially creative being (Towards a New World, p.112), so he could follow the Rgvedic prayer-

Sangacchadhvam samvadadhvam sam vo
manamsi janatam
Samano mantrah samitih samani samanam
manah saha cittamesam
Samanl va akutih samana hrrdayani vah.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Samanamastu vo mano yatha vah susahasati

Walk together, speak in concord; let your minds comprehend alike; let your efforts be united; let your hearts be in agreement; let your minds be united, that we all may be happy.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VIII

MENTAL HEALTH: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Ashok Kumar Nanda

('Mental Health' needs alarming attention in view of erosion of human resources at the present juncture of the history of human civilization. The educational system in India is miserably failing to work for the development of mentally healthy personality. The mental health of the nation is dependent on the quality of the wholeness or soundness of each of its individual members. In this paper, an effort has been made to understand and analyse the concept of mental health from various view points. Also, the author attempts to explain the meaning of mental health from an integrated view point emphasizing mainly on the cycle of individual's relationships; (i) to himself, (ii) to the society and, (iii) to the world. As an attribute of human personality, and equally, as a social value, mental health is to be worked for, guarded and maintained through a purposeful living.)

Mental health is difficult to define. It has a very wide connotation. The concept of mental health is like a diamond which appears to be of different colour when seen from a different angle.

In common language certain derogatory terms like "insane", "lunatic" , "mad", and "crazy" are used to denote a mentally unhealthy person. In scientific terminology phrases like mental illness, mental disorders, mental diseases, psychiatric ailments are used, Thesė labels connote a negative state of human mind and behaviour. The positive concept, to be defined within a cultural frame, is mental health. The former is a problem and the later is the goal.

There are numerous definitions on mental health. For the sake of clarity and better understanding of the concept of mental health, the various definitions can be grouped into the following six categories and lastly an integrated view on mental health is given by the present author.

(i) Mental health from medical view point
(ii) Mental health from psychological view point

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(iii) Mental health from social view point
(iv) Mental health as adjustment process
(v) Mental health and personality factors
(vi) Community mental health approach
(vii) Intergrated Approach (author's view)

MENTAL HEALTH FROM MEDICAL VIEW POINT

Defining from medical point of view, the mentally healthy individual is one whose psychic system functions in perfectly baianced manner free from pathological symptoms. A system functions satisfactorily so long as it is in homeostatic balance. Health and illness are seen to exist along a continuum. In the field of mental health, the medical practitioner has retained primary right to the role of diagnostician including the making of judgement as to severity of illness. Thus, mental health and severe mental illness are two sides of a straight line.

MENTAL HEALTH FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW POINT:

While the physician's primary focus has been on the deviant behaviour or the illness, much of the psychologists' interest in "mental illness" has been generated by the utility of data on mental patients for formulating principles about psychological functioning in general.

According to Sigmund Freud, all psychological disturbances are caused by the unconscious conflicts between the 'id' and 'super-ego'. In this respect mental health could be viewed as awareness of unconscious conflicts and the subsequent self-control based on this awareness. In a mentally healthy person, the 'Ego' has sufficient energy to perceive reality and accommodate the 'super-ego'.

A similar view point has been put forward by Etic Berne (1973). According to him. There are three basic mental states i.e. child, Adult and parent which exist in all people. From this view point, a mentally healthy individual remains in the Adult state and not blindly dominated either by child or parent state.

Moreover, psychologists find it necessary to order persons along a continuum. When a sick-well continuum dominates the medical orientation, a normal continuum characterizes the psychological approach. Because of the influence of medicine there has been pre-occupation with "illness". Health, in general has been defined as the absence of illness.

Over the years, there is an increasing effort among psychologists to come to grip with a "positive" definition of mental health. In this context.. the work of Jahoda (1958) reveals that, mentally healthy person is one who actively masters his or her environment, demonstrates a considerable unity or consistency of personality and is able to perceive self and the world realistically. Such a person is also able to function effectively without making undue demands upon others.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Komhauser (1965) has taken up six indexes of mental health in his studies such as: Anxiety, Self-esteem, acceptance of people, sociability and friendship, satisfaction with life and personal morale.

To quote W.H.O. (1983) "Mental health is a condition which permits optimal development—physical, intellectual and emotional aspects of the individual, so far as this is compatible with that of other individuals"

Thus, the above cited definitions agree with the fact that mental health is a positive state of human mind and not more absence of mental disorders.

MENTAL HEALTH FROM SOCIAL VIEW POINT:

This approach focuses primarily on external behaviour. According to social criteria. The order of assessment is provided by measures of performance in social roles. Since social prescriptions and expectations must directly enter into definitions of the abnormal or deviant, mental health is viewed in its most relative terms and with best concern for psychodynamic process.

This social view point is more concerned with the functioning of individuals in inter personal situations. As defined by Sullivan (1954) a person's drive towards mental health is those "processes which tend to improve his efficiency as a human being, his satisfactions, and his success in living", and places major value on effective and efficient social functioning. This social relatedness perspective is also exemplified by From (1955) who focuses on the individual's relationship with the larger social environment.

MENTAL HEALTH AS ADJUSTMENT PROCESS:

Mental health manifests adjustment of individual within himself and with his surroundings. To describe the concept of mental health Bernard (1961), quotes from the proceedings of a White House Conference in these words: "Mental health may be defined as the adjustment of individuals to themselves and the world at large with a maximum of effectiveness, satisfactions, cheerfulness, and socially considerate behaviour and the ability of facing and accepting the realities of life. The highest degree of mental health might, therefore, be described as that which permits an individual to realize the greatest success which his capabilities will permit, with maximum of satisfaction to himself and to social order and minimum of friction and tension."

In the words of Rogers (1957) "Mental health implies satisfactory relationship to oneself and to one's environment as well as the posession of problem solving techniques for establishing a satisfactory relationship between the two"

Thus, from this view point, mental health can be understood as the capacity of an individual to form harmonious adjustment to his social and physical environment.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

MENTAL HEALTH AND PERSONALITY FACTORS:

Personality has been considered to be dynamic organization of those psycho-physical systems which go to determine an individual's unique adjustment with his environment. Mental health includes the concepts of personality, character and behaviour all in one.

In the words of Hardfield. "Mental health is the full and harmonious functioning of the whole personality. "Dr. S.P.Anand (1986) defined mental health as the behavioural characteristic of the personality. A sound mental health which may be sought after by all of us carries a homogeneous structure of desirable attitudes. Healthy values, righteous self -concept and a scientific perception of the world as a whole. At the same time, a mentally healthy person should be understood as a dynamic and conscientious individual who is found to be reasonably rational in the choice of means for the realization of his pious ends".

This view point appears to be highly humanistic and rational in defining mental health.

COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH APPROACH:

This approach recognizes that mental health problems may be rooted in the characteristics of society itself, such as racism, sexism, poverty, alcoholism discrimination, social injustice, unemployment and restricted educational opportunity. This view also stresses the importance of interactions between the individual and his environment. This approach discards the medical model and relates mental health to the entire web of social and personal relationships in which the individual is caught.

Thus, the community mental health approach takes into consideration the prevailing social and economic conditions while defining mental health.

INTEGRATED APPROACH (THE AUTHOR'S VIEW):

From the foregoing discussions, it can be said that definitions of mental health are so inclusive that they involve every aspect of the life of man. The concept of mental health is explained as under:

Mental health can be defined as an attribute of human personality. The term mental health refers to the quality of wholeness or soundness. It is not mere absence of mental illness but it is a quality of individual's daily living. Mental health is a normal state of well-being of the individual. It is a condition which is characterized by the average person, who meets the demands of life on the basis of his own capacities and limitations.

Mentally healthy person must be constantly conscious to strive for perfection keeping in view the sublime principles of human life. Mental health governs the feeling of an individual about others and how he is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

able to face the realities of life. It is rooted in his activity to balance feelings desires, ambitions, ideas and competency. The individual's state of mental health is not static, but it is continuously changing depending upon his actions and the factors acting upon him.

Mental health is an index of mind. It symbolises mental readiness and willingness with which an individual identifies himself with his work or is found to be indifferent towards it. It is the norm of fortitude and firmness with which an individual acts and reacts with his environment. A relatively consistent mood and persistent make up of the mind are the salient indicators of one's mental health. Mental health serves as the mirror to look at oneself and perceive the world around him.

The mentally healthy person sees the indivisibility of existence, the rich complexity and inter-relatedness of all lives. He has deep respect for the absolute value of all things.

Moreover, mental health reflects the integration of personality while living through the vicissitudes of life. It also indicates the extent to which a person believes him or herself capable, significant and worthy in solving the day to-day problems of life.

Mental health also involves the physical, mental and emotional style of one's adjustment in life. It includes the individual's best for living and urge to achieve something in life.

A mentally healthy person feels proud of his strengths and tries to overcome his weaknesses and limitations. An integrated, well-composed, self-reliant, contented , optimistic, righteous and ardently determined person only can justifiably claim a good mental health.

Physical health and mental health are intimately related to each other. Each one is very important for the build up of the other one. A sound physical health brings enthusiasm, vigour, vitality and dynamism in life. On the other hand, a sick individual is a parasite on the family and is a liability to the society.

To aid to this, a mentally healthy person is a dedicated, committed individual of character and strong will -power. He is an ideal and dynamic individual who lives a life of self-satisfaction and social contribution. The ups and downs in the wordly affairs, usually fail to destabilize him.

On the other hand. A mentally unhealthy person fails to develop a positive healthy self-concept and does not entail a happy view of human life. He is not free from temper-tantrums, excitement, melancholia, depression, attitude of suspicion and insecurity and other such overt behaviour traits. At the sometime this person lacks conviction, and does not relish his record of achievements. Even he lacks proper adjustment in his daily life. He is not active and productive.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Briefly, it can be said that mental health of an individual has three broad components i.e., (i) the individual's relationship to himself, (ii) his relationship with the society, and (iii) his relationship with the world at large. The mentally healthy individual maintains a balance between these tension-ridden dimensions. He tries his best to actualize his potential amidst the vicious circle surrounding him. Since man is a social being , dependent and interrelated to other man, he is required to adapt himself to a life in society. Being one with humanity and mankind, he has to understand and contribute to the world situation.

The concept of mental health, therefore, relates to the integral formation of man. It implies his balanced formation in every domain that comprises the make-up of his personality i.e. moral, spiritual, intellectual, physical, emotional, social cultural and aesthetic aspects.

With fortitude to combat any problem, with forbearance to face hardships, with restraint to cool anger and frustration, with composure to bring peace of mind, with selfless submission to one's profession, with resignation to the divine will and with faith in himself and Almighty, an individual can build up his mental health.

Mental health, as a goal for living must be cherished, loved and cultivated by all of us. A healthy mind brings happiness to himself and the family and is an asset to the society. Besides, the development of human resources of our country is of utmost importance now. Let us enter 21st century with healthy minds competent to face future challenges.

REFERENCES:

1. Anand. S.P.(1986), In the Quest of Guidance in Education. Education Quarterly, XXXIII (III) 8-11.
2. Bernard,H.W.(1961), Mental Hygiene for Classroom Teachers. Mc Graw Hill Book Co. Newyork.
3. Freud, Sigmund(1923), "The Ego and Id" Vol. 9, pages 12-63, Macmillan.
4. Formm, Erich (1955), "The Sane Society". New York, Holt.
5. Jahoda. M.(1958). Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health. Newyork, Basic-Books.
6. Kornhauser, A.(1965), "Mental Health of Industrial worker". Newyork, John Wiley and Sorns.
7. Nanda. A.K. (1991). A study of Mental Health of Socially Disadvantaged High School Students of Orissa. Doctoral Thesis, POONA UNIVERSITY, PUNE.
8. Rogers, C.R.(1957). Mental Hygiene in Elementary Education. Newyork, Haughton, Mifflin Company.
9. World Health: (The Magazine of World Health Organization, May 1983.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IX

SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING SAMANYALAKSANA PRATYAKSHA

Bhupendra Chandra Das

The present paper deals with the concept of Ṣamanyalaksana pratyaksa and considers some philosophical problems that arise on the way of understanding and attempts to give their probable solutions from common sense level and Nyaya standpoint.

I

According to the Naiyayika, samanya is a class-concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common characteristic of certain individuals which fall under the same class. A padartha which is being eternal, one and inhering in many things is called samanya or a generic attribute.[1] For example, 'manhood' (manusyatva) inheres in every individual of the class 'man'.

In the word 'samanyalaksana-sannikarsa' 'laksana' implies two meanings: svarupa and visaya. That whose nature is universal is called samanyalaksana.[2] And that which has got samanya as an object of knowledge is called samanyalaksana. In this sense, it is the knowledge of samanya (i.e., samanyajnana) which serves as a pratyasatti (i.e contact). When we perceive, with normal contact, a pot present before us we also directly can know all the other pots of all times and spaces through supernormal contact.

If the first definition is accepted, everybody would have knowledge concerning all smoke-individuals through the contact of smokeness which is eternal and inheres in all smoke individuals. But in practical life this does not happen. So a different type of definition is being introduced: samanyalaksana sannikarsa means the universal which has become a qualifier in the knowledge of which the object connected with sense organ is a qualificand (Indriya samvandhavisesyaka).[3] In the case of the knowledge of a particular manifestation of smoke, the smoke has become a qualificand which is connected with sense organ. In this smoke, the universal smokeness inheres as a chief qualifier

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(prakaribhuta). All the individual manifestations of smoke existing in distant, past, present and future can be perceived with the help of supernormal connection through smokeness existing in a particular smoke.[4]

Samanyalaksana is the perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property (samanya) perceived in any individual member of the class. Thus when we perceive something, e.g. a man we take it as belonging to the class of men. To know that the individual belongs to the class of men is also to know all other members of the same class. But initially there should be a linkage between our senses and the external objects for normal (laukika) perception. When we perceive a man we perceive the universal 'manhood' as its defining property. When we perceive the universal 'manhood' in the present 'man' there obtains a link between our sense- organs and all other men. Thus the perception of one thing implies the perception of the generic attribute of that thing which exists in all other things of its class. Here the man existing in distant, past, present, and future can be perceived by the extraordinary linkage through manhood existing in a particular man.

It has been stated by Visvanath a that the knowledge having the universal as content is called pratyasatti. The knowledgeness (property of being knowledge) having universal as content (samanyavisayka jnanatvam) becomes the limitor of the pratyasatti. It entailss that the knowledge which comes through samanyalaksana is of an object remaining immediately after indeterminate perception and recollective knowledge.[5]

In this context, the phrase samanyavisayaka jnanam (knowledge having samanya as its content) means knowledge of the universal which has become a qualificand by virtue of being connected with sense organ.[6] According to a section of Naiyayikas, mere knowledge of the universal which is common to the indeterminate perception and recollective knowledge becomes the pratyasatti.[7]

The above-mentioned view is not at all tenable. Because the knowledge of the universal cannot be apprehended at the stage of indeterminate perception. Moreover, in the case of memory, samanya cannot also be perceived because, the content of memory is very much difficult to as certain whether it is true of not. The veifiability principle being not applicable to it fails to reveal the real nature of an object. That is why, it has been mentioned in the Prabha that the knowledge of universal has to be ascertained in an object remaining just after indeterminate stage i.e. savikalpaka stage and after the memory stage i.e. at the level of knowledge (prama). Smrti being not verifiable, cannot provide us the knowledge of an object as per a section of philosophers.

At present we have to find that reality of samanyalaksana as a type of perception depends on the direct knowledge of a class of things. Provided that there is any such knowledge, samanyalaksana will be a genuine type of perception. If we can perceive some individual object,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

then there is the presentation of a class of objects to which it belongs. So the important question is: Is there any presentative or direct knowledge of a class of objects? The Naiyayikas demand that there is such a knowledge and that knowledge is obtained by samanyalaksana pratyaksa. Now we can mention the following facts for the justification of samanyalaksana pratyaksa.

We find that the pot in front of our eyes is known particularly but in case of samanyalaksana pratyaksa other pots are not known in the way like the former. Here the knowledge of the former is called particular knowledge and that of the latter is called universal knowledge. If the objectivity of knowledge is not admitted in the same way in the same kind of knowledge, then why do we say that all the pots as a whole are objet of knowledge? That all the pots of all times and spaces are perceived at the time of seeing one pot is not accepted by experience (anubhva). With a view to justifying this imagination which is contradictory to experience and showing a connection between our sense organ and the pots of the distant, the present, the past and the future, it seems non-sense to call knowable samanya (universal which comes under the purview of our knowledge) or knowledge of samanya (samanya jnana) to be a contact.

In responses to the above question, the Naiyayikas point out the some defects may occur if samanyalaksana is not admitted. First, if someone finds the co-existence of smoke and fire in some places, he may have doubt that all the manifestations of smoke of the world are not universally related to fire. This doubt cannot be overcome if samanyalaksana is not admitted. For it is established that there are universal concomitance (vyapti) of fire in the perceived cases of smoke. Here, there is no doubt of vyapti between smoke and fire. Now we shall have to admit that there is a doubt of vyapti between smoke and fire. Now we shall have to admit that there is a doubt of universal concomitance (vyabhicarasamka) between the unperceived cases of smoke and fire. This doubt will be dispelled through the means of samanyalaksana pratyaksa. The case of samanyalaksana pratyaksa has been justified by the Naiyayika in the following manner:

In respect of a visual perception of a number of cases, e.g. smoke is found to coexist with fire. All cases of smoke and fire and their co-existence can never be covered through our sensuous perception. In our ordinary life we notice a number of cases, and on the basis of that we form the judgement that whenever there is smoke, there is fire. It is considered as a type of perception which is pure and simple. Whatever it may be, the question arises: How can a universal concomitance (vyapti) of smoke and fire be established on the datum of perception? A sense-organ can never be related to all instance of smoke, fire and their co-existence. This difficulty is steered clear of by saying that when we perceive a particular instance of smoke and a particular case of fire

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and their co-existance, we also perceive their generic attributes, i.e. 'smokeness, 'fireness' and the property of co-existence at that very moment. And it is only at the next moment that we perceive through the data of 'smokeness', 'fireness' and the property of their co-existence all the individual instances respectively related to the above universals. Thus the perceptual knowledge of the universal serves as the supernormal link through which all the unobserved instances of smoke, fire and their co-existence become available to the visual sense organ.[8] Such is the way of justifying samanyalaksana pratyaksa which assists in ascertaining vyapti. Samanyalaksana is a guarantee to the fat that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Because samanyas in 'smokness' and 'fireness' serve as a medium of taking all cases of smoke and fire.

Secondly, darkness is a perceptible thing. Samanyalaksana sannikarsa is required for perceiving this thing (padartha). According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, absence in general (samanyabhava) of all manifestations of fire is called tamah (darkness). The perception of that thing called tamah depends on the knowledge of all kinds of fire because of the cognition of counter-positive (pratiyogi) becomes a cause of cognition of absenee of non-existence (abhava). Hence, at first the knowledge of all kinds of fire or that of counterpositive is required for the perception of tamah. But, how is the knowledge of all kinds of fire possible? It is the samanyalaksana sannikarsa which can make this possible. We can know all the manifestations of fire after the perception of a particular fire by the samanyalaksana sannikarsa of the knowable (jnayamana) fireness (tejastva) or the congnition of samanya and thus the perception of darkness which depends on the knowledge of the counter- positive of all the manifestations of fire will occur immediately provided we admit the samanyalaksana sannikarsa.[9]

Thirdly, it has contended by some that samanyalaksana sannikarsa is a necessary condition for the perception of previous non-existence (pragabhava).[10] The knowledge of the counter- positive (pratiyogi) is the cause of the knowledge of non-existence. A thing which has not yet been produced may be the counter positive of preceding non-existence (pragabhava) .The ordinary perception of the counter-positive is not possible owing to the absence of a sense-object contact. The counter-positive (pratiyogi) may be known by the linkage of jnanalaksana which is also not possible here. So samanyalaksana has to be admitted. Hence when we perceive a pot we can perceive all other pots including the non-produced or even the damaged ones through the universal potness present in the perceived pot.

Fourthly, samanyalaksana pratyaksa is a requisite for forming any negative judgement of perception. For instance. "This (horse) is not a cow", is a negative judgement of perception as there is an absence of cowness in the horse which is described by the Buddhists as 'apoha'. But "absence of cowness in a horse" can be known by perceiving all

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cows. And all cows cannot be perceived ordinarily. We can perceive cowness in an individual cow and the cowness is linked with all other cows. And through this link we can perceive all the cows. Thus any negative judgement can be perceived through samanyalaksana pratyaksa.

Fifthly, we cannot explain the voluntary effort to attain pleasure without the help of samanyalaksana pratyaksa. To desire for pleasure is somehow to know it as something to be, but not yet experienced. When we perceive one pleasure, we perceive all pleasures including the future pleasure through the generic properity, 'pleasurability' present in the perceived pleasure.[11]

II

SOME PROBLEMS AND THEIR PROBABLE SOLUTIONS

The Buddhists like Shantaraksita (in Tattvasamgraha) and pt. Ashok (in Samanyadusanadika Prasarata) have rejected the hypothesis of universal (samanya) as argued for by the Naiyayika. In support of the Buddhists, we may say that a universal is not a sense-datum. As its existence cannot be ascertained by perception or by any other means, It is non-existent like the so called horns of a hare.

According to the Buddhists, even if a universal is the object of a judgement, it has only an imaginary being but not real existence. An inference of verbal knowledge cannot establish the reality of universals since they reveal imaginary objects but no real ones.

A universal is not different from an individual since a universal is not to be cognised if an individual is not perceived. If an object is different from another object then the congnition of one does not entail that of another. For instance, a jar is different from a piece of cloth. The former is cognised independently of the latter. But a universal is never cognised if an individual is not cognised. Conversely an individual is not different from a universal.

If an individuals is not apprehended then its universal would remain uncognised. Such a contention is hardly supportable since the suggestion that a universal abides in an individual can be contrarily argued.

If a universal wholly abides in a distinct individual then it bides there exhaustively and as such it should be exclusively perceived there. There is no chance of cognising it at another locus. Again if a universal abides in an individual partially then it does not exhaustively abide in an individual. In that case, how can be we recognise an individual cow as such? Moreover, a universal is a partless whole. As such, it does not consist of parts. Thus, it is difficult to solve the problem of locating a universal in a proper locus since no appropriate locus is found.

Now if existence is denied to universals, how do we explain a common

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

idea, a concept, viz., a cow as referring to an individual? We may say that there are no universals which are objectively real. The concept 'cow' explains everything which the universal of cowness is supposed to do. According to the Buddhists people ordinarily judge all members of particular class, e.g. 'molasses", 'cow' etc. perform the same function. So they are to be taken as one. They hold further that they look alike i.e. their difference of form is negligible. So, there is no need to hold on to view of universals. And thus it is argued that a universal does not actually exist.[12]

The arguments of the Buddhists are criticizable. If samanya (universal) does not exist, then the question arise. How do we come to attain the knowledge of all the objects of the past, distant and future?

A universal comprises within all individuals irrespective of time and space. Without knowing the individuals in their entirely the universal also cannot be known. This would result in the non-ascertainment of vyapti between the two. Thus, the knowledge of all individuals is made possible by samanyalaksana.

The Buddhists are of course correct in their position so far as their presuppositions are concerned. The Buddhists admit theory of impermanence of entities and hence they do not accept any antity that is permanent in its mode of being. They are in order in their non accepting samanya. But the Naiyayikas have no such ontological commitment. So they accept samanya as a separate category and adjust their own position accordingly.

To illustrate the case of the Naiyayikas a person saw an individual cow called Dhavali in the past. Latter on he sees another individual cow Kalindi by name. Experience says that he remembers Dhavali which was seen before. We cannot explain the remembrance of Dhavali if no common property inheres in the two individual cows. We cannot remember an individual on encountering another individual entirely different from the first. As a person remembers an individual cow seen before on finding another only because he has noticed a common property shared by both of them. So it is reasonable to hold that a common element (i.e. universal) is grasped.

The Naiyayikas hold that it is not the case that unless the particular exists the universals cannot exist. The existence of universal does not depend on the particular. To be sat is its own nature. When there is the particular, the relation of inherence (samavaya) becomes apparent between the particular and the universal (yadaiva vastu tadaiva gotvenabhisambandhate-Nyaya-Vartika). Gotva is eternal, smavaya relation is also eternal , but the particular cow is not eternal. It is one of the relata only. Thus, in the absence of a particular cow the relation between cowhood and the cow is not visible. Therefore, it is obvious from this that the relation between sattva and asattva can be interpreted only with the help of the particular.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

According to the Naiyayika, the real universal cannot be an aggregate of different essential properties, for a real universal should be unitary, simple, unanalysable (akhanda) eternal, timeless, indestructible, and present in many through a single unitary relation called inherence (samavaya). The Naiyayikas say that the universal 'sweeper', 'nurse' cannot be real universals for the application of such general terms depended on some upadhi. That is nominal properties are not objective universals. The relation which is essential for a real universal is samavaya relation. The samavaya relation exists in dravya (substance), guna (quality) and karma (action), that is the blue particular is related to the blue thing, the action particular to the acting i.e. moving object that instantiates it. This relation is described as a yutasiddha or inseparable. This inseparability is unidirectional. It is a parmanent relation in which one of the relata cannct exist without the presence of the other though the latter can continue without the former. The blue particular exists in the pot and when the pot continues to exist with another colour etc, the blue particular is destroyed.

In his Nyayamanjari Buddhist doctrine of samanya has been refuted by Jayanta Bhatta. He argues that universal (samanya) cannot be constructed by our mind and it cannot be regarded as a kalpana. These are directly presented us. Our first cognition of a thing is not merely an apprehension of its unity but also its disjunctive feature. When we perceive something, its manifoldness is such manifested to consciousness as its unitary character.[13] It is congnised as a totality of many parts, qualities and aspects. The Buddhists say that the universal is a mere concept, but the real is a unipure particular. This is refuted by Jayanta and he points out that an object denoted by a word is real because it is the same object which is revealed by nirvikalpaka pratyaksa[14] also.

The Naiyayikas state that when we see cow-something we also see cowhood inherent in it, although we may not at the same time see one as cow and the other as cowness. Both entities appear in our consciousness.

This non-qualificative awareness is also in a sense inexpressible in language. It is supposed to be a reflex of the Buddhist thesis of the inexpressibility of the pure object of sense-perception. For in the linguistic expression of the awareness of the cow as such or the sun as such we donot say 'This has cowness' or 'This has sunhood'. Because this would be expression of very different cognitive episodes. The Naiyayikas hold that these universals are unexpressed in the verbal representation of the awareness because if they are expressed, they also need another 'qualifier'.

Against the Naiyayikas, who are the realist, the Buddhist states that a cow is known from the fact that it is not a non-cow. If the specific individualization of a cow should require one common factor to hold

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

them together ,then these should require another and so on adinfinitum. So samanya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impression of past experience of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred wrongly to increase the object in number.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher opine that negation of non-cows is a negative perception. (abhavatmaka pratyaksa) while the sameness perceived as a cow is a positive perception (bhavatmaka pratyaksa)The negative theory or the apoha theory of the Buddhists cannot explain the positive peerception. Therefore, samanya has to be accepted as a separate category. If samanya is accepted, the supernormal perception through samanya (samanyalaksana) will find its solid base. The negative perception i.e. 'The perception of non-cow in a cow' is a result of perception. That non-cow exists in a cow is known by virtue of the awareness of the inherent property of a cow which may be described as cowness. Hence universal cowness serves as the basis of distinguishing it from the now-cow class. Depending on these arguments it can be concluded that universal has to be accepted as a category of real but not unreal.

It has already been stated that the knowledge of all individual manifestations of smoke and fire existing in different time and space through the universals- smokeness and fireness. The definition of samanya as given in Nyaya is as follows: Nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam (i.e. that which being eternal is inhered with all the individual of the same class is called samanya). If this be the case, what will be the status of the Upadhis which are not taken as samanyas as per definition? The property existing in a single individual like moonness, sunness etc. and the acquired properties like fatherhood, teacherhood etc. can be described as Upadhi as in the previous case the adjunct 'anekasamavetatva' does not exist and in the latter the adjunct 'nityatva' does not exist. How can we know the properties of a teacher or a father existing in future? Through samanyalaksana it is not possible because the fatherness or teacherness is not a samanya. In reply, it can be said that the internal qualities of a teacher or a father can be known through jnanalaksana but not samanyalaksana. As the fragrance of a sandalwood is known through jnanalaksana the affection etc. existing in a father is known from father.

The Mimamsakas and the Vedantines do not accept samanyalaksana as a form of super normal perception, For thought there is absence of perception of all cases of smoke and fire, there is no harm. The invariable concomitance of smoke with fire can be ascertained through the cognition of smoke characterised by smokness with fire characterised by fireness. For the knowledge of qualifier is the cause of the qualified congnition (visistajnana). Though there is the absence of all the cases of smoke and fire, yet the invariable concomitance between them can be ascertained due to the knowledge of coexistence along with the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

absence of knowledge of deviation. Hence, there is no necessity of admitting samanyalaksana.[15]

It has been stated in the Prakarana-Pancika by Salikanatha that the invariable relation between smoke and fire is ascertained through the observation of the one (i.e. smoke) and recollection of its invariable relation (niyama) with the fire. Initially the invariable relation between smoke and fire is ascertained through their perception and afterwards the absence of upadhi (limiting adjunct) is ascertained through the repeated abservations of them. Hence there is no question of accepting samanyalaksana to establish an invariable relation between all cases of smoke and fire.[16]

As each and every action is accomplished easily without accepting samanyalaksana, there is no necessity of accepting the same due to absence of relevant proof and logical cumbrousness. There is no necessity of knowing all cases of smoke and fire in terms of smokeness and fireness. For, if invariable relation is ascertained in terms of smokeness in known or familiar cases of smoke, there is no scope of doubt of deviation due to the special observation of vyapti existing in smoke characterised by smokeness.[17]

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For, if the knowledge of vyapti regarding all individual manifestations of smoke and fire as a whole is not attained, there would arise the doubt of deviation (vyabhicarasamka) leading to the impossibility of inferential cognition (anumiti). Anumana or inference has to be accepted as a means of valid cognition as this means is frequently used by people in this world. For this the supernormal contact called samanyalaksana through which all individual manifestation of vyapya and vyapaka are said to be present has to be accepted with the help of this cantact all individuals of a particular class are known and due to this the knowledge of vyapti is attained.[18]

It may be argued that if such supernormal connection is accepted there would arise contingency of being omniscient for all beings as they would be able to know all individuals at a time through this samanyalaksana.[19]

In response to the above, the Naiyayikas might argue in the following manner. How do the purvapaksins (vedantins) know about the fact of our omniscience? For, omnisciene is phenomenon which the Vedantins are not capable of understanding. Because, one who knows the fact of omniscience of others should be omniscient. If one is not omniscient, how does one understand other's omniscient character? If one is omniscient, on the other hand, how is this fact of omniscience know due to the non-acceptance of samanyalaksana.[20]

The Naiyayikas argue that the question of being omniscient does not arise here. If all the objects of this world are known in terms of prameyatva (Knowability), there is the chance of being omniscient.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But if the objects are known in terms of jarness (ghatatva) clothness (patatva) etc., all objects are known due to the absence of them and hence there is no question of being omniscient.[21]

The Advaitins do not accept samanyalaksana or Jati as a category of real and hence they do not accept samanyalaksana as a supernormal means of knowing. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in his Vedanta-paribhasa has said that jatitva (universalness) and upadhitva (limiting adjuanctness) cannot be taken as reals as this existences cannot be proved by any pramana. These two are nothing but sounds having no corresponding objects, as pramans fail to ascertain them.[22] From the above discussion, it may be concluded that the jatitva and upadhitva cannot be provable entities or aprameya and hence they are apramainika (not capable of being proved) i.e. unreal.

It may be argued that the jatitva and upadhitva which have been accepted as non-entities (apramanika) is not correct. Because their experience can be proved with the help of determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyaksa). In determinate perception the qualificand (visesya), qualifier (visesana) and their relation become the content of knowledge. In the determinate knowledge in the form 'This is a jar' (ayam ghatah), the qualificand is 'jar' qualifier is jarness (ghatatva) and their relation. In this case the determinate knowledge grasps ghatatva as a qualifier. In the same way, the determinate knowledge like 'This is mediate' 'This is immediate', can grasp the universals like mediacy (paroksatva) and immediacy (aparoksatva) as its qualifier. Therefore, the determinate perception alone can prove ghtatva etc. as universals. This view is also not correct. For, a determinate knowledge can reveal the qualifier and qualificand, but it cannot prove this qualifier as a jati..The entity which is not a jati may become qualifier and qualificand, but it cannot prove this qualifier as a jati. The entity which is not a jati may become qualifier and qualificand. With the help of the knowledge of common attributes between two or more than two objects (anugatapratiti), the common properties in the qualificand can be established, but from this it does not prove that the common properties are jatis.

Again the apponents have come forward to argue that perception may not be a proof for the existence of universal (jati), but inference (anumana) may accomplish the same. First, through the perception of similar properties among the different objects the perception of similarity is possible. After this inference in the form, "The properties like fingurness, etc. are universals (jati), as there are general properties excepting upadhis (angulitvadikam jatih upadhibhinnatve sati samanyadharmatvat) can be drawn. Inspite of this the common properties like fingureness etc. cannot be proved as jatis. In this inference the minor term (Paksa) is the properties like fingurness etc. (angulatvadidharma), middle term (hetu) is being the property of common attribute (samanyadharmatva) which is free from upadhi

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(upadhibhinnatva), the probandum (sadhya) is jatitva (universalhood). According to the Nyaya, the universal is co-existent with eternity (nityatva) and residing in many through the relation and samavaya.

But according to the Vedantins, no object excepting the Brahman is eternal and hence there is no inference (anumana). To them, probandum is not familiar in any locus. An individual who knows probandum as existing may infer about the existence of sadhya in a different place in fact the Vedantins do not know sadhya as existing. Hence it is not possible for him to draw inference. Moreover, if sadhya is absurd, ascertainment of vyapti between a hetu and a sadhya is not possible and hence, the hetu given in the previous inference is a pseudo-one and hence there is the fallacy called Vyapyatvasiddha.[23]

The previous inferential argument is fallacious in another way which is indicated by the term samavayasiddhya in the Vedanta-Paribhasa. The previous syllogism is defective as there is no mark of samavaya and there is no proof for the existence of it. As the Advaitins do not admit inherence (samavaya) the properties like jarness etc. do not exist in many objects through the relation of inherence (anekasamavetatva). To the Advaitins all objects excepting Brahman is transitory and hence the properties like jarness etc. are transitory but not eternal. In jarness etc. There is no eternality and existence through inherence in many objects of the same class. In this case of syllogistic argument there is the absence of sadhya in the minor term i.e. jarness etc. and hence there is the fallacy called vadhita, the definition of which runs as follows. When the absence of sadhya in a paksa is ascertained through other pramana it is called vadhita. Due to these reasons the Advaitins do not accept universal as a category of real which ultimately suggests that the supernormal connection through universal (samanyalaksana) is not possible.[24]

The above-mentioned view may be refuted by the Naiyayikas in the following way: To an Advaitin only one entity i.e. Brahman is real but others are false. Hence, to them all objects other than the Brahman are false. As the properties like jarness etc. fall under the category of unreal they are false. But the Naiyayikas have accepted seven categories constituting the real world. Hence, the properties like jarness etc., are real as they are under the category of samanya. To them, the property existing in many individualos and eternal is callled samanya (Nityatva sati anekasamavetatvam samanyam) As they accept (samanya (Nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam samanyam) As they accept inherence (samavaya) as an eternal relation (ayutasiddha), there is no problem of accepting the properties as samanya, But the advitins cannot accept this due to having different set of presuppositions. In order to prove that the Brhman alone is real and eternal it is not possible for the Advaitins to admit another eternal substance and hence they do not accept samanya as well as samavaya. All these arguments will fall flat upon others who hold a realistic view like the Naiyayikas etc. The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Naiyayikas haveaccepted a separate category called samanya through which we have the cognition of similar objects (a nugatapratiti) To them samanya like jarness etc., through its locus i.e., a jar is destroyed, remains intact as they are eternal in character. Through the supernormal connection of smanya all other members containing this can be apprehended immediately. Hence, samanyalaksana is an inevitable means of knowing.

The main spirit of accepting samanyalaksana as a prtyasatti lies on the fact that through the acceptance of universal in an individual all the individuals can be brought together. It is not empirically possible to know all cases of smoke and fire, but we have to trust on some sort of causal relation between smoke and fire or humanity and mortality. Otherwise our day today behaviour would be totally impossible. Depending on several instances we have to depend that a case of smoke will be invariably with fire. In this way the causal relation between two objects can be established if such causal relation is denied no philosophical conclusion or scientific conclusion can be drawn. Hence such relation is to be taken as granted through samanyalaksana pratyaksa.

NOTS AND REFERENCES

1. *"Nityatve satyanekasamavetatvam"- Siddhantamuktavali on Verse No. 8 padarthadharmasamgrha- Prasastapada (chowkhamba) p. 311.*
2. *Samanyam laksanam yasya ityarthah"- Siddhantamuktavali on Verse No.63*
3. *"Indriyasamvaddhavisesyaka-jnanaprakaribhutam vodhyqam".Siddhantamuktavali" on Verse No. 63.*
4. *Tatra dhumatvena sannikarsena dhuma ityevam rupam sakaladhumavisayakam jnanam jayate. Siddhantamuktavali on Verse No. 63.*
5. *Samanyavisayakajnanatvam pratyasattitavacchedakam ityarthah. Tatha ca nirvikalpakottaram smaranottaram ca samanyalaksanajanya- jnanameva tanmate istamiti bhavah. Prabha commentary on Siddhantamuktavali on Verse No. 64. Karikali. Ed Sri C Shankarram Shastri. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan. Delhi. 1988. P. 464.*
6. *Indriyasambaddha visesyakam samanyajnanamityarthah yadva samanyavisayakam janam ityarthh. Dinakan Commentary on Siddhantamuktavali on Verse No. 64. ibid. P. 464.*
7. *Etanmate ca nirvikalpaka-sadharanam smaranasadharanam ca samanyajnanam pratyasattih. Dinakari commentery Siddhantamuktavali on Verse No. 64. Ibid. p. 465.*
8. *Gangesa: Tattvacintamani. Anumankhnda. Bibliotheca Indica Edition. 1910. p. 251.*
9. *Tarkasamgraha: Narayan Chandra Gosvami Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar. Calcutta. P. 277.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Tattvacintamani. II. P.P. 283-90. Anumana Khanda Bibliotheca Indica Edition. 1910.*
12. *Janki Ballabha Bhattacharyya (Tr. into English)Jayanta Bhatta's Nyaya-Manjari. Motilal Banarsidas. Delhi-7. Vol-1. 1978.p. 627.*
13. *Tasmadvisesa vadapratyakhyeyam Samanyam. visesavatpratyaksatvatsamanyasya kah kalpanarthah. yadi hi karyanumeyam smanyam kalpayem tat evamanuyujyemahi karyasypyanyatha siddheh kim tatkal panyeti- Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta Ed. Pandit Sri Surya Narayana Shukla . The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series office. Benares.1936. p. 286.*
14. *Yadi ca nama nirvikalpakena sarvatmana vastu punah paricchindanti vikalpantarani vaiphalyamasnu virankimetavata tesamaprati yamanarthagrahitakalpayitum sakyate- The Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta. Ed.Pandit Sri Surya Narayana sukla. The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series office. Benares.1936. p. 288.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

15. *Mimamsakairvedantibhiscasamanyalaksana-jnanalaksanayoranabhupagamat tadbhedena dvividham pratyaksamapi nasthiyate. Tanamatesakaladhumanam sakalavanhinanca pratyaksabhave pina kaciddhanih visistajnanam prati visesanajnanasya karanatayā dhumatvajnanena vanhitvajnancna vanhitva-visistavanherdhumatva-visistasya dhumasya ca jnanasadbhavat tenaiva vanhinirupita vyaptirdhume grahitum sakyate sahacarajnanad vyabhicarajnanabhavacca vyapterupagraha iti sakala dhumanam sakalavanhinancanupasthitavapi na kacidnupattiriti samanyalaksanakhyayah pratyasatterangi-karo vyarthah.*

Shyamapada Mishra Samanyalaksananirasah: a paper published in 'Our Heritage' (special Number)150th anniversary volume Ed. Bishnupada Bhattacharya.Sanskrit College. Years-1824-1974. p. 73.

16. *"Iha tu sambandhaniyamasmaranamekadesadarsancanubhavakaranamastiti yatha pratitiranubhutirupatevasrayitumucite" ti ca.*

Tantrarahasye 'pyuktam' atah prathamikam pratyaksameva dhumagamyoh sambandhaniyame pramanam bhuyodarsanena pascat tasya nirupadhikatvaniscaya iti (pramana pah) etena sakaladhumajnanam sakalavanhijnananca sambandhaniyame navasyamapeksitamiti pratipadayata samanyalaksana na svikrteti sucyate. Ibid. p.75.

17. *Atrocyate, samanyalaksanapratya satteranangikare pi sakalavyabasthopapattau manabhavat gauravacca nasti samanyalaksana-namapratyasattyantaram. Tathahi dhumatvena sakaladhumopasthitervanhitvena sakala vanhyupasthitervavasyakata nasti. Yadi dhumatvena prasiddhadhume vyaptiniscayah syattarhi dhumadharmikavyabhicarasamsayasyavakaso nasti tatra dhumatvena dhumanisthavyaptiniscayasya visesadarsanataya samsayaprativandhakatvat. Ibid. P. 79.*

18. *Naiyayikaih sakalavyaktyupasamharena vyaptijananam vina kkacidvyabhicarasankayamanumiti na syat, bhavati ca lokanamanumitya vyavaharah. Sa ca sakalavyapyanam. vyapakanancopasthitimulaka iti samanya laksanapratyasattiravasyam svikarya. Taya ca pratyasattya tattajjatiyah sarvah vyaktayah grhyante, tena ca sarvopasamlharena vyaptijnanam sidhyatiityucyate. Ibid. p. 75.*

19. *Tathahi evam samanyalaksanasvikare sarvapadarthanam sarvesam jnanasambhavat sarvajnatvapattih syat. Ibid. P. 75.*

20 *Tatra yadi naiyayikairanyairva evamucyte-purvoktaritya assamanmatopari yat sarvajnatvamapadyate bhavata taccapadanam durghatameva. yasmad yo nyasya sarvajnatvamapadayati sa sarvajno na va ? Yadi sa na sarvajnastarhi' kathamanyasya tathatvamapadayitum saknuyat. Atha yadi sa sarvajnah syattarhi tasya sarvajnatvam katham lavdham tanmate samanyalaksanaya asvikaaraditi. Ibid. p.p. 75-76.*

21. *Na ca prameyatvena sarvesam padarthanam samanyalaksanaya jnansasambhave pig hatatvadiattadvisesarupena sakalapadartha jnanasambhavanna sarvajnatvapattiriti vacyam. Ibid. P.76*

22. *Jatitvopadhitva-parribhasayah sakaladramanagocarataya' pramanikatvat. Vedanta-Paribhasa Pratyaksa pariccheda P.44. Ed. Sri Panchanan Bhattacharya. 1377 (B.S.).Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta.*

23. *Ghato yamityadipratyaksam hi ghatatvadisadbhave manam, na tu tasya jatitve pi jatitvarupasadhyaprasiddhau tat sadhyakanumanasyapyanavakasat. Samavayasiddhya brahmabhinnakhilaprapancasyanityataya ca nityatva-samavetatva ghatitajatitvasya ghatatvadavasiddhesca Vedanta - Paribhasa, ibid.*

24. Vivrti of Vedanta-Paribhasa (chapter on perception), Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharya. 1377 (B.S.). Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, pp. 45-47.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri



CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri